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SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether horizontal 
equity in the taxation of individuals in South Africa improved 
after the legislative changes from 1984 to 1995 and the Katz 
Commission recommendations. 
After an extensive literature study, horizontal equity in the 
taxation of individuals in South Africa was defined as the 
equivalent tax treatment in equivalent economic circumstances for 
the same economic units. The household as the economic unit, is 
the unit to be considered when evaluating horizontal equity. 
The study also reviewed the solutions found in other countries for 
the dilemma of the one-breadwinner versus the two-breadwinner 
married couple. It was found that the tax systems of most 
countries provide relief to the one-breadwinner couple while the 
working wife was taxed separately from her husband or had the 
option to be taxed separately. 
An important part of this study compared the tax of the unmarried 
taxpayer and the married couple as the units for horizontal equity. 
It was found that, although two-breadwinner married couples were 
discriminated against until the separate taxation of married 
couples was introduced, the one-breadwinner couple and single 
taxpayers with dependants now suffer more horizontal inequity than 
was previously the case. 
The research indicated that to attain greater horizontal equity 
provision should also be made for families and households with only 
one breadwinner (breadwinner being defined as the provider in a 
one-breadwinner couple or a ·taxpayer with dependents). 
Recommendations made to alleviate this inequity are transferable 
allowances for spouses, or, without ·contravening the Constitution's 
demands for equality, a separate rate schedule for breadwinners, a 
fixed allowance or rebate for breadwinners, or a proportional 
allowance depending on the breadwinner 1 s income. 
The study also addressed the financial and administrative 
implications and political acceptability of these recommendations 
and concluded that the proportional allowance, although expensive, 
would come the closest to providing the greatest horizontal equity. 
The research into the international tax measures to promote equity 
revealed that horizontal equity could be further promoted by 
providing tax relief for child-care and day-care facilities. This 
would benefit both the two-breadwinner married couple and the 
single parent with dependent children. 
Key terms: 
Horizontal equity; Taxation of individuals; Two-breadwinner married 
couples; Working ma~ried women; Single parents; Dependents; Margo 
Commission; Economic units; Household; Equality. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVE AND PROBLEM DEFINITION 
In the 1980s marriage is seen as a partnership with the spouses 
sharing the duties and responsibilities, both legal and 
otherwise. Sir George Baker was surely correct in Midland Bank 
Trust Co v Green {No3) when he spoke of the law's need to 'adapt 
and develop to the needs of living people whom it both governs 
and serves'. 
(Harper 1981:838) 
1.1.1 BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVE 
The background to this study mainly concerns the sociological changes 
in the work patterns of the family over the last century and the 
consequent pressure on tax systems and changes thereto worldwide. 
Also, several tax commissions and committees reviewed these aspects 
locally. Finally, there was the matter of the separation of the 
taxation of husband and wife recommended by the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Tax System of South Africa {Margo Commission {South Africa 
1987)) and the eventual actual separation of taxes payable by the 
married couple. 
The Margo Commission said that "[t]ax reform in South Africa demands 
the restoration of the tax bases, the elimination of erosion and 
leakages of revenue, the simplification of the structure, the 
redistribution of the overall 
and more acceptable, II 
tax burden to make it fairer, easier 
The basic aspects sought by the 
Commission were "equity, neutrality, . simplicity, certainty, 
administrative efficiency, cost effectiveness, flexibility, 
stability, distributional effectiveness and a fair balance between 
direct and indirect tax" {Welcome to Margo 1987:405). 
This study will focus on the aspect of 'equity' and the 'fairer 
distribution of the tax burden' mentioned by the Commission and will 
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attempt to ascertain whether changes in the legislation affecting the 
taxation of individuals provided more horizontal equity than the 
legislation reviewed by the Commission. 
1.1.1.1 Change in the work patterns of married couples from 
traditional husband-as-only-breadwinner to double-earner 
couples. 
Previously, men were the hunters and fighters who provided food and 
security for their families while women were responsible for bearing 
and raising children. In Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind, 
Wells (1932:523), in discussing "the role of women in the world's 
work" said that "motherhood has been so great a disadvantage to women 
as to impose upon them a dependence and defencelessness that are 
almost inextricably woven into our social tradition" (Wells 
1932:539). 
Circumstances wrought changes "destroying all the foundation facts 
upon which that tradition was based". These circumstances were 
firstly, "the restriction of births (" ... birth control minimizes her 
ancient specialization as the reproductive sex ... " (Wells 1932:525)) 
and such a hygienic prevention of infant mortality that physical 
motherhood becomes a mere phase of a few years in a woman's life"; 
secondly, the "socialization of education and of most domestic 
services", and thirdly, the "supersession of any protective function 
on the part of the male by the law and the police .... Woman is left 
almost abruptly released and exposed" (Wells 1932:539). 
The above trend, already apparent in the United Kingdom in 1932, 
continued both overseas and in South Africa. This was made clear in 
the following extract: 
Since the introduction in 1914 of a tax on income, the tax unit 
in South Africa has been the married couple. The decision to 
aggregate the incomes of husband and wife in order to compute 
4 
the normal tax payable by them rested on an assumption 
undeniably valid for the early part of this century. 
The evidence suggests that the assumption of pooling has become 
increasingly suspect as the family has changed socially and as 
the rising incidence of divorce has revealed the declining 
stability of marriage. Women no longer play the stereotyped 
roles etched out for them when our tax laws were formulated; 
their increased participation i~ the workforce and the 
expectation of the legal system that they be financially 
independent suggest that to regard marriage as a support 
institution for the purpose of formulating fiscal policy is no 
longer justified. 
But the single most outstanding phenomenon of the [twentieth] 
century is the trend from the single-breadwinner family to the 
double-earner marriage. And while the marriage penalty for 
double-earner marriage only begins to operate when their 
combined income exceeds R12 000 a year, inflation has ensured 
that most such families now are penalised. In 1981, 83% of all 
taxpayers earned less than R12 000 annually; this had fallen· to 
29% by 1984. 
(Margo Commission Report Finance Week 1987:11) 
A married woman worked, in the vast majority of cases, not to 
supplement her pocket money, or because she was bored at home, but 
because the household and family needed her income for financial 
survival. It had become an economic necessity. The tax system (and 
Government) should take note of this and provide relief by way of tax 
concessions or help with childcare facilities. 
The problem was that all the tax systems considered the married 
couple to be the tax unit and taxed the wife's income in her 
husband's hands. This provided horizontal equity in the majority of 
cases where the husband was the only breadwinner. 
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Danziger (1981:276-282) noted that in 1981, in terms of s 7(2) of the 
Income Tax Act, no 58 of 1962, the income of a married woman living 
with her husband was deemed to have accrued to her husband. 
The effect of this deemed accrual is that the income of both 
spouses is aggregated and taxed in the hands of the husband, 
while the wife is effectively ignored by the income tax system . 
... [This was ameliorated] by the calculation of the husband's 
tax according to married tax scales, the allowance of a 
deduction from the husband's income of R1 200 in respect of the 
wife's earnings, as well as the grant to the husband of the 
married person's primary rebate .... 
(Danziger 1981:280) 
This •ameliorationn, however, was introduced because it cost more to 
support a family and a married couple's household would be more 
expensive to maintain, at least theoretically, than that of an 
, unmarried person. 
The first question is what should be the tax unit, the group 
whose income and deductions are pooled in determining tax 
liability. Many people believe that the tax system should be 
nmarriage neutraln; that is, a married couple should have the 
same tax burden as two single persons, each of whom has the same 
income as one of the spouses. Many people, however, also 
believe that, because most married couples pool their income and 
spend as a unit, fairness requires that the tax burden of a 
married couple not depend on how their combined income is 
distributed between them. 
(U.S. Congress Joint Committee on 
Taxation 1980:4) 
Research done by the Human Sciences Research Council in 1986 showed 
that external factors such as taxation prevented married women from 
working. This was especially so where the salaries and academic 
qualifications of one or both of the spouses increased, as they 
considered taxation to be a burden (Hirschowitz 1986:2). 
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The adoption of the married couple as a tax unit for purposes of 
income tax must be viewed against the background of social 
history. The prevailing system of assessing the married couple 
as a tax unit was introduced in 1914, many years before married 
women in South Africa started entering the labour market in 
increasing numbers. The system is moreover related to the basic 
law regarding community of property, in terms of which the 
woman's property ceases to be hers upon marriage, in the sense 
that she cannot without her husband's consent, alienate property 
or enter into contracts. 
{Wessels 1977:11,12) 
According to Danziger {1981:280), the system of joint taxation has 
been a "bone of contention" to married taxpayers since its inception. 
Although this was not entirely true, as it was only since the 1950s 
that committees and commissions began discussing the concept of joint 
taxation, it was certainly true that problems had been anticipated 
for a long time. Especially recently "the independent status of the 
woman has enjoyed increasing recognition, and the battle for women's 
rights has inevitably spilled over into the income tax arena" 
(Danziger 1981:280). The changing social circumstances of women and 
the continuous evolution of the household and the concept of the 
relevant positions of its members over the last century gave rise to 
demands for a change in the taxation legislation regarding the joint 
taxation of husband and wife. Legislation changed gradually and what 
emerged was separate taxation and a move to a "gender blind" tax 
statute. 
1.1.1.2 Change in taxation of married couples in other countries 
For more than the past two decades, the taxation of husband and wife 
had been an actively discussed topic in many other countries. The 
following titles of articles on this topic stated the problem 
descriptively: 
"Made in heaven taxed on earth" (Wood & Hallpike 1987); 
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"Man proposes - God or the taxman disposes" (Homer & 
Burrows 1984:117); 
"Until death or the taxman do us part" (Grant 1989:138); 
"Till death or the taxman do us part" (McAuliffe 1989:23); 
"The marriage tax isn't dead yet" {CPA Journal 1987:12). 
The last example referred to the taxation of married couples in the 
United States of America and stated that in 1988 forty per cent of 
married couples would have paid a marriage tax averaging $1100 and 
fifty-three per cent would have received a marriage subsidy averaging 
$600. 
In Canada, research into the legal status of women stated that 
[w]hile women and men were deemed equal in the sight of God, on 
earth women were deemed to be decidedly inferior and the 
appropriate role for the married woman was generally that of a 
servant to her husband. It has been observed generally that 
most patriarchal societies go through an evolutionary process; 
from an insubordinate status for the married woman to a status 
of equality. 
{McCaughan 1977:v) 
In the United Kingdom the economic realities that required the wife 
to work were stressed as follows: 
The annual population monitor conducted by the Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys demonstrates that few households 
can afford economically inactive women: In 1971, 45 per cent of 
non married women and 44 per cent of married were 'economically 
active', in 1975 the figures were 42 and 51 per cent 
respectively and in 1978 40 and 52 per cent ... there has been a 
steady decrease in non-married working women and an increase in 
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those married. The figures apply to all women in the 16-54 year 
age bracket. 
(Unfair to women 1980:34) 
In the United States of America the increase in the number of women 
workers continued as well. In the "early 1960s" when the husband's 
breadwinning role was still strong, women constituted 34 per cent of 
the workforce while in the mid 1980s this figure had increased to 44 
per cent (Michels 1991:8). 
Brozovsky and Cataldo (1993:21) defined the penalty for marriage in 
the United States of America. They described it as being 
... the additional federal income tax paid by married couples 
over what would be paid by two single individuals having the 
same combined income and deductions. It is the result of (1) 
different standard deduction amounts and the more significant 
(2) different bracket/rate schedules. Both of these are 
dependent entirely upon the marital filing status of the 
taxpayer. 
In the United States of America married taxpayers had a choice 
between being taxed as a couple (that is jointly) or filing 
separately. It was, however, considered more advantageous to file 
jointly because n[m]arried taxpayers who file separately virtually 
always pay more tax than if they had filed jointly or as unmarried 
individuals" (Jagolinzer & Strefeler 1986:76). 
The efforts to diminish this penalty continued but the penalty itself 
(or the marriage tax advantage depending on the circumstances) 
remained a problem. 
The efforts to equalize the tax burdens between married couples 
where both parties earn income, and unmarried persons cohabiting 
where both parties earn income created a whole new set of 
inequities .••. [This] is particularly highlighted where the two 
parties each have relatively equal incomes .... [A]ll in all it 
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is a complex calculation that leads to the determination of the 
allowance that was intended to equalize the difference between 
married couples and unmarried couples, with a view to 
eliminating the penalty on marriage, and the inequality still 
remains through these added distortions and inequities. 
(IRS still subsidizes cohabiting ..• 1983:319) 
The tax.system in the United Kingdom, which formed the basis for the 
South African tax system, also taxed the husband and wife jointly. 
The marriage tax was not as heavy, however, as in South Africa. In 
1990 the system in the United Kingdom was changed to a system of 
separate taxation. It did, however, provide for the taxation of the 
couple where there was only one breadwinner or for allowances to be 
transferable between the spouses where the one spouse could not 
utilize the full allowance. (For a more detailed study of the tax 
treatment of married couples in other countries refer to Chapter 3.) 
1.1.1.3 Increasing attention to this problem in South Africa 
Since 1950, various taxation commissions and committees have 
discussed the problem of joint taxation. All more or less agreed that 
joint taxation was the correct system for South Africa even though 
the wife paid tax at the husband's marginal rates. 
The question of the married couple as a tax unit where both 
spouses are employed has been the subject of scrutiny since 
1951, the time when married women started entering the labour 
market in large numbers. 
(Wessels 1977:11,12) 
The Steyn Committee (1951) (South Africa 1976:13) refused to concede 
that the system then in force was unfair. It was not in favour of a 
change as it considered the family to be the "economic unit". The 
Diederichs Commission (1953) (South Africa 1976:13) concurred with 
these findings. The Franzsen Commission (1969) (South Africa 1969), 
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although recommending the retention of joint taxation, suggested the 
exemption from tax of a portion of the married woman's earnings. 
The Margo Commission was the first to suggest separate taxation, but 
acknowledged the problem of equity for one-breadwinner families. The 
taxation of married couples, however, remained particularly heavy for 
the married woman. The Financial Mail (Joint taxation 1986:29) 
pointed out that even with the 20 per cent married-women's earnings 
allowance, the effect of the new tax tables would increase the wife's 
tax. Even if the wife and her husband earned identical incomes, her 
tax would be higher than his. 
1.1.1.4 Emotional issue 
The joint taxation of husband and wife had always been an emotional 
issue for militant feminists. The eventual outcome of the empirical 
research of the facts should, however, provide an objective 
conclusion. Scathing remarks about the joint taxation system and the 
militant feminist viewpoint will only be mentioned, if appropriate to 
the study at hand and to show why change possibly came so slowly to 
South Africa. 
Bloch (1982:273) quoted the Minister of Finance with reference to 
the taxation of married women as saying that 11 [t]his aspect of tax 
policy has unfortunately become a somewhat emotional issue." He also 
referred to the tax system as" ... iniquitous to such a degree", 
conceding, therefore, that reasonable safeguards were justified, but 
questioned whether, in the wake of the creation of these safeguards, 
it was right that the "collective morality, the morality of the 
State, for the sake of such protection, should sink to the level of 
the morality of some of its citizens and in the process should do 
injustice to those who are honest" (Bloch 1982:274). 
During 1983, the South African Women's Foundation presented a 
petition with over a million signatures to the Deputy Minister of 
Finance calling for the separate taxation of married couples (Joint 
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taxation 1983:18,19). They referred to the joint taxation system as a 
tax on virtue. The Financial Mail (Joint taxation 1983:18) expressed 
the opinion that the standpoint of Inland Revenue stemmed from 
sociological and political, rather than fiscal, reasons. It also 
noted that the excuse usually given for not changing the system, 
namely cost, would have been only one per cent or R200 million out of 
a total revenue of R19 000 million. 
The Financial Mail (Joint taxation 1983:19) ~tated that the reason 
for the separate taxation of husband and wife, was the "not very 
ennobling one of patriarchal tradition and anti-feminist prejudice 
male chauvinism in all its gloryn. 
It is to be feared that government is misusing arguments based 
on revenue take to conceal a mixture of anti-feminist prejudice, 
confused demographic thinking and even anti-business-class 
thinking to prevent [South African] women, many of them highly 
skilled professionally, from taking their rightful position in 
the workplace. 
(Joint taxation 1983:19) 
Feelings ran high, not only against joint taxation, but also against 
the separation of the married couple's tax liability. The 
pro-separationists were considered to have the nwomen's liberation 
view •.. held by a vocal minority" (Danziger 1981:280). 
In 1976 the Standing Commission of Inquiry in collaboration with the 
Directorate of Inland Revenue reported on the matter of joint 
taxation and stated that, owing to the universally unpopular nature 
of taxation, it would be used as a nscapegoat for anythingn (South 
Africa 1976:para 6(d)). 
Gradually, however, what had been perceived as a purely militant 
feminist issue, became an issue affecting the husband and the wife. 
Discontent with the present dispensation is now strongly felt by 
many men who are legally responsible for the payment of tax 
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levied upon the earnings of their wives. These men resent the 
fact that a divorce induced solely by fiscal considerations 
seems to be the only way to reduce their tax burden, and are 
acutely aware of the disadvantages to our economy of any 
disincentive that may discourage skilled married women from 
taking up paid employment. 
{South Africa 1987:par 7.8) 
The Report of the Margo Commission clearly showed that submissions 
advocating separate taxation were not only received from the feminist 
cadre but also from men and male-controlled organizations (South 
Africa 1987:108). 
1.1.2 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
The Commission believes that the need for marriage neutrality 
and the equal treatment of men and women justifies a change in 
the tax unit. It is no longer true that women necessarily depend 
upon their husbands. Fiscal policy should be seen to discourage 
neither marriage nor employment. 
(South Africa 1987:par.7.159) 
The married couple was taxed jointly because of the background social 
structure that viewed the husband as the breadwinner and the wife as 
the homemaker. This structure had gradually changed. Wives also 
entered the labour market and earned a taxable income. Changes were 
made to the taxation of the income of individuals worldwide. In most 
instances there was a move towards separate taxation of husband and 
wife while retaining some fiscal provision for the single or sole 
breadwinner. locally, interest in the topic continued to increase 
with the Wessels report (1977), the Cronje review (1985) and various 
other reports referred to in previous paragraphs. The topic received 
specific attention from the Margo Commission and the number of 
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representations made to the Commission clearly indicated that the 
taxation of married couples was a problem. 
Continuous speculation in the Press, complaints from working married 
women and feminists, and personal experience indicated that there was 
a perception that married couples, where the wife earned an income, 
were treated unfairly by the tax system. A preliminary study of the 
petitions received by the Margo Commission indicated that not only 
married women, but all taxpayer categories had problems with the 
joint taxation and that the problem would not be a simple one to 
solve. 
Various commissions and other local researchers noted and discussed 
the problem. In other countries, the different legislative bodies 
considered the system of taxation with regard to the fair treatment 
of both married couples and single taxpayers. 
The report of the Margo Commission (1987) suggested drastic changes 
to the system. Since 1987 changes have been made to the tax system, 
especially with regard to the taxation of married couples and the 
definition of the tax unit. 
The post-apartheid South Africa, in its drive towards the elimination 
of discrimination, including gender discrimination, would surely 
require the tax system also to be non-discriminatory. Changes in 
income tax legislation from 1987 to 1994/5 raised questions such as: 
Was the double-income couple (jointly taxed previously) still the 
worst off? Were all couples affected in the same way? The married 
couple should, however, not be the only tax-paying unit to be treated 
fairly. All taxpayers must receive fair tax treatment. 
Smith (1776) (Stack & Cronje 1995:2), and many since him, regarded 
fairness as one of the founding principles of taxation (other 
principles are certainty, convenience and economy). Fairness is also 
known as equity. This equity consists of horizontal and vertical 
equity. The Margo Commission reiterated this view of the importance 
of fairness or equity with the equity which it envisaged for the 
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South African tax system. (Equity is discussed in detail in Chapter 
2.} 
The following questions need to be answered: Does the new tax system 
provide more horizontal equity among taxpayers in similar 
circumstances? Is this the case not only for the married couple but 
also where there is one breadwinner or two breadwinners? Would it be 
right or fair, or even acceptable, if everything is made equal? 
Alternatively, would it be fair to taxpayers in general to retain the 
system as it has evolved over the past ten years? This study 
attempts to find answers to the above questions. 
The problem therefore is: Has horizontal equity in the taxation of 
individuals in South Africa been achieved with the changes brought 
about since the recommendations of the Margo Commission? Is there 
more horizontal equity than there was previously? If not, how can 
horizontal equity be achieved or at least be improved? 
1.2 REASONS FOR AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The principle of horizontal equity or 'equal treatment of 
equals' has long been viewed as a fundamental issue in any 
fiscal policy debate. 
(Balcer & Sadka 1982:291) 
Horizontal equity has assumed a basic and prominent role in the 
evaluation of tax systems and has received much attention in 
recent years. 
(Anderson 1985:358) 
In the wider context of horizontal and vertical equity, the separate 
taxation of married women was not completely achieved with the 
amendments to the income tax legislation in the 1995 year of 
assessment. This study researches the extent to which equity was not 
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achieved and makes recommendations which, together with the 
discussion of problems related to the recommendations, will 
contribute to the current tax knowledge. If the tax legislation did 
not achieve equity, this study hopes to make recommendations for 
achieving or at least improving horizontal equity. 
The many representations made to the Margo Commission in this respect 
indicated the importance of this topic. The study attempts to measure 
the changes made to the taxation of individuals, since the 
publication of the report of the Margo Commission, in terms of actual 
taxes payable by individuals over the period. It will compare the tax 
payable before these changes with the tax payable after these 
changes. This will indicate whether equity was achieved, whether the 
recommendations made by the Margo Commission were implemented and 
whether the problems with the system brought to the Commission's 
attention were dealt with. From there certain reforms to improve 
horizontal equity will be recommended. 
The outcome of this study should be important to the following: 
- Firstly, the tax authorities, as it will enable them to show that 
the new system was either horizontally equitable or more equitable 
than before and that the taxpaying public should, therefore, be more 
content. If this is not the case, then this study should enable them 
to identify areas for improvement and, with reference to the proposed 
recommendations, change the tax system or legislation. If the new 
system was equitable only to certaid groups, an attempt could be made 
to provide tax relief in other ways for the other groups. 
- Secondly, the married woman and feminist counterparts, as it will 
enable them to see the effect of the changes and note the progress, 
to properly plan changes in legal status (marry or divorce or take up 
employment) and to take cognisance of the financial consequences of 
the tax effects. 
- Thirdly, all taxpayers (horizontal equity affects all taxpayers) as 
it will enable them to see whether they are taxed fairly and so be 
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able to plan changes in their tax status accordingly. 
- Finally, employers, who must implement the legislation and consider 
the tax implications when providing a remuneration package to their 
employees. 
1.3 EXPLANATION OF TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS 
Specialised terminology is defined and explained in the chapters in 
which it is used. Words, definitions and descriptions used in this 
study must be viewed in the context in which they are referred to in 
the Income Tax Act, no 58 of 1962 and be given their "tax" meaning. 
Horizontal equity is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 but brief 
reference thereto is required here. "Equity" means fair or just as 
opposed to "equality" which means the exact same (mathematical 
correctness} treatment of everyone despite different circumstances. 
These words "equity" and "equality" are used in the economic sense. 
Feldman (1987:183} preferred to use "equity" which takes into account 
individuality as compared with "equality" which, in its extreme 
form, destroys incentives and productivity. 
Vertical equity attempts, through the mechanism of the progressive 
tax system, to redistribute income to the less rich and is an 
indirect way of providing, or attempting to provide equality. 
The concept "horizontal equity" has been widely discussed in the 
literature. This research is referred to in Chapter 2 but definitions 
thereof range from" ... the command that equals be treated equally 
... " (Kaplow 1989:140} to " ... taxpayers in essentially equivalent 
circumstances should bear essentially equal tax burdens ..• " (Blum & 
Pedrick 1986:100}. An even more comprehensive definition by Habib 
(1979:283} considered the family as the tax unit and he defined 
horizontal equity as " ... families with the same initial living 
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standard experience an equal change as the result of redistribution 
..• •. It is furthermore accepted that horizontal equity implies that 
certain of the personal circumstances of a taxpayer have to be taken 
into account in taxation legislation. 
The tax unit refers to the entity being taxed whether it is a 
company, close corporation, trust or individual. In the case of 
married individuals, and until the 1995 amendments to the Income Tax 
Act, no 58 of 1962, the unit could either be the married couple 
(normally taxed in the hands of the husband), or the husband 
(referred to as a "married person" in the Act) or the wife (known as 
a "married woman" in the Act). The classification of the tax unit 
depended on the country and the legislation in force at the time. In 
the United States of America the married couple themselves could 
choose whether to be taxed together or separately and the tax unit 
changed accordingly. 
Unless stated otherwise, the legislation referred to here is South 
African tax law and refers to the Income Tax Act, no 58 of 1962. 
1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Overviews of the tax statutes of South Africa and other countries 
were limited to the last and current centuries. 
The calculations in Chapter 6 of the effect of tax changes on 
individual taxpayers were limited to salaried incomes of up to 
R200 000 and to changes in legislation from 1985 to 1995. The effect 
of children on tax payable, that is rebates for children and the fact 
that entitlement to a child rebate could mean a change in tax status, 
medical expenses and other deductions which did not directly impact 
on the perception of the tax unit, were ignored. The tax payable by 
the married couple as a unit was compared to the tax payable by an 
unmarried person earning the same taxable income as the joint income 
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of the married couple. As the unmarried person was considered per se 
to be an economic unit compared with the economic unit of the married 
couple, only one unmarried person's tax was calculated and not two as 
for the married couple. 
The impossibility of achieving perfect equity {horizontal and 
vertical) has been noted over time and should be mentioned here. 
This study does not hope to find or recommend a tax system that 
provides absolute equity, but merely to suggest ~mprovements to 
horizontal equity where gross deviations occur. Vertical equity is 
not considered, although it is referred to briefly in Chapter 2. 
It must also be stressed that horizontal equity does not only impact 
on the tax unit but also on various other legislative and fiscal 
aspects. The horizontal inequity inherent in the Standard Income Tax 
on Employees system {SITE system), for example, where a person could 
earn RSO 000 per annum from each of two different jobs, paid only 
SITE as the final tax, did not submit a return and therefore paid tax 
at lower marginal rates, was also not considered to be part of this 
study. This study concentrates on the influence of the description 
of the tax unit on horizontal equity. 
The effects of recommendations made that will be taken into account 
are the tax base, fiscal tax collections and fiscal policies, 
problems of additional burdens on the administrative system of tax 
collection and the possible effect on the other canons of taxation. 
The costs of any recommendations could, however, only be estimated as 
no definite costs and details were obtainable from the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue. The figures of married and divorced taxpayers 
used were estimates as widows, widowers, divorced persons entitled to 
a child rebate and married men are all included under "married 
persons" in the statistics received from the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue. 
Taxation legislation was considered from the previous century and 
detailed evaluations were made from 1984 to the 1994 Amending Act. 
The Recommendations made by the Commission of Inquiry into certain 
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aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa (Katz Commission (South 
Africa 1994)) (which preceded and pre-empted the drastic changes of 
the 1995 Amending Act) were also taken into account. The effect 
thereof on the horizontal equity of the taxation of individuals is 
calculated and criticised in detail in Chapter 6. As the 1995 
amendments closely followed the spirit of the Katz Commission's 
recommendations (if not always the letter), and Chapter 7 recommended 
solutions to the specific horizontal equity problems inherent in the 
Katz recommendations, no further detail calculations were done on the 
1995 amended legislation. 
As tax is viewed as a disincentive it was deemed necessary to 
ascertain whether the new system is now more fair and acceptable. 
The consideration of whether everyone regards the tax system as being 
more acceptable (fair) than previously would be grounds for further 
study and does not form part of this study. 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 gives a review 
of the literature relating to equity and horizontal equity in 
particular. The descriptions, definitions and measurement of 
horizontal equity, and problems with horizontal equity are reviewed 
in Chapter 2. From this a description or definition of horizontal 
equity for South African circumstances is sought. 
Chapter 3 gives a broad overview of the taxation of individuals in 
other countries, noting in particular the treatment of married 
couples and the changes to this legislation during the past decade. 
The overseas legislation that could be applied in South Africa to 
improve 1 oca 1 hori zonta 1 equity 1 s re,searched 1 n Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 reviews the developments in taxation legislation in South 
Africa up to the 1994 amending legislation. This chapter notes the 
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continuous disenchantment of taxpayers with the system of joint 
taxation since the 1950s and the various recommendations by the 
different committees and commissions appointed to review tax 
legislation. 
Chapter 5 evaluates the Margo Commission's work in respect of joint 
and separate taxation. The study critically reviews the submissions 
received on this subject and their relation to the final 
recommendations made. Although the proceedings of this chapter would 
appear to fall chronologically within Chapter 4, it was discussed in 
a separate chapter in order to give more prominence to the 
proceedings, petitions, actions and recommendations of the Margo 
Commission. This Commission was the first to positively recommend 
separate taxation of husband and wife and to set the ball rolling for 
the subsequent taxation changes in this respect. The petitions 
received by the Commission against the previous regime often 
highlighted the complexity of the problems with separate taxation and 
the influence of the tax unit on horizontal equity. 
Chapter 6 evaluates the tax system relating to individuals and the 
changes thereto since 1985 by way of empirical calculations based on 
the annual taxation legislation as it pertains to individuals. 
Comparisons are made of taxes payable by the married couple and the 
unmarried individual and the differences in these taxes payable are 
considered. The conclusions in this chapter refer to the state of 
horizontal equity in South Africa in 1994/95, the progress made 
towards horizontal equity since 1985 (when the Margo Commission 
started their work) and critically evaluate the recommendations of 
the Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects 
of the Tax Structure of South Africa (Katz Commission (South Africa 
1994)). 
Chapter 7 contains the final conclusions and recommendations for 
improving horizontal equity and takes into account certain proposals 
by the Katz Commission. The recommendations for horizontal equity are 
based on either changes in the tax unit or the application of certain 
tax deductions to married couples, certain spouses or breadwinners. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 2 
HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF EQUALITY AND EQUITY 
2.2.1 GENERAL DEFINITIONS 
2.2.1.1 Equality 
2.2.1.2 Equity 
2.2.2 ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION 
2.2.2.1 Equality 
2.2.2.2 Equity 
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2.4 HORIZONTAL EQUITY DEFINED 
2.5 PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
2.5.1 MEASURING HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
2.5.2 EFFICIENCY AND COST 
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2.5.3.1 Tax preferences, transfers and income tax credits 
2.5.3.2 Capitalisation of tax preferences and transfers 
2.5.3.3 Tax avoidance with capitalisation of tax preferences 
2.5.4 GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND TAX REFORM 
2.5.5 HORIZONTAL EQUITY AND INDIVIDUALS 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
"The principle of horizontal equity or 'equal treatment of 
equals' has long been viewed as a fundamental issue in any 
fiscal policy debate." 
{Balcer & Sadka 1982:291) 
"Horizontal equity has assumed a basic and prominent role 
in the evaluation of tax systems and has received much 
attention in recent years ... " 
(Anderson 1985:358) 
Horizontal equity, being the evenhanded treatment of "equal" 
individuals, has been described in many ways and has many complex 
concepts. This chapter will attempt to clarify these concepts. In 
order to ascertain whether the tax system taxing the married couple 
separately is fairer than the system of joint taxation of spouses, 
fairness needs to be defined. In this chapter an attempt will be 
made to do so by means of a review of the literature on equity and, 
specifically, horizontal equity. 
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Firstly, in paragraph 2.2, the concepts "equity" and "equality" are 
discussed both from a general and from an economic point of view 
and a choice of the most appropriate word and concept is made. 
Secondly, "the other half" of taxation equity, namely vertical 
equity and its correlation with progressive tax rates and poverty 
is considered in paragraph 2.3. 
Third1y, the definition of horizontal equity and the concepts of 
measurement of equity, efficiency and cost are considered. 
Finally, problems with horizontal equity are discussed, not the 
least of these being the tendency to capitalize on tax preferences, 
leading to evasion and avoidance of taxes. Tax reform is 
considered briefly, as this is the instrument used to alleviate 
inequities {or to cause them). 
A broad review of the nature and concepts of horizontal equity will 
be used to acertain the actual horizontal inequities in force in 
the taxation of individuals in South Africa. 
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF EQUALITY AND EQUITY 
2.2.1 GENERAL DEFINITIONS 
Before discussing the specialized tax meanings of "equality" and 
"equity", the general definitions given by the dictionary will be 
considered. 
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2.2.1.1 Equality 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1961:347), nequalityn 
has the following three different meanings: 
1. The condition of being equal in quantity, amount, value, 
intensity, etcetera. b) especially in Mathematics - the 
exact correspondence between magnitudes and numbers in 
respect of quantity, the existence of which is sometimes 
expressed by the sign =. 
2. The condition of having equal dignity, rank or privileges 
with others; the fact of being on an equal footing; b) 
the condition of being equal in power, ability, 
achievement or excellence ..•• 
3. In persons: fairness, impartiality, equity. In things: 
due proportion, proportionateness. 
While Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English 
Language (2nd ed. 1975) and other dictionaries consulted concurred 
with this, Webster's referred to the "staten of being equal as 
[L]ikeness in magnitude or dimensions; value qualities, 
degree and the like; the state of being neither superior nor 
inferior; as, the equality of men; an equality of rights; 
Evenness; uniformity; sameness in state or continued 
course; as, an equality of temper; in mathematics, a 
comparison of two quantities which are in effect equal, 
though differently expressed or represented, usually denoted 
by two parallel lines = • 
(Webster's 1975:616) 
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Equality therefore, refers more to a precise measure being repeated 
in the two value items that are compared; a mathematical measure as 
indicated by the sign"=". 
2.2.1.2 Equity 
With righteousness shall He judge the world and the people 
with equity. 
(Psalm 96 verse 9) 
"Equity" has a close relationship to "equality" but does not denote 
a mathematically correct relationship; it refers more to "fair", 
"just", but also means "justice". 
It was defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (1961:262) as 
follows: 
1. The quality of being equal or fair; fairness; 
impartiality, equity. 
2. What is fair and right; something that is fair and right. 
3. The recourse to general principles of justice (the 
naturalis aequitas of Roman jurists) to correct or 
supplement the provisions of the law; 
Equity of a statute: the construction of a statute 
according to its reason and spirit so as to make it apply 
to cases for which it does not expressly provide; 
"Equity" was also used in the United Kingdom to distinguish a 
system of law used with the common and statute law called "natural 
justice". Thus it follows that an "equitable right" was one 
recognisable by a "court of equity"; and equity of redemption 
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meant to "buy back forfeited property" (Oxford English Dictionary 
1961:262). 
"Equity" was defined by Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 
(1975:618) as above, but it added: "the giving or desiring to 
give each man his due"; and "the value of·the property beyond the 
total amount owed on it .... In law ... [a] resort to general 
principles of fairness and justice - whenever existing law is 
inadequate; supplementing common and statute law and 
superseding such law when it proves inadequate for just 
settlement". 
Roget's Thesaurus (1988:353) defined equity as "the state, action 
or principle of treating all persons equally in accordance with the 
1 aw". 
Both "equity" and "equality" implied fairness, impartiality, a 
"condition" or "state" of being equal, whether in quantity, amount, 
value, dignity or even treatment. Therefore while "equity" and 
"equality" were close to each other in meaning, "equality" implied 
a mathematical precision and absolute amounts, whereas "equity" 
leaned more to the concepts of fairness and justice without having 
precise units on each side - thus, it encompasses both vertical 
and horizontal equity. 
2.2.2 ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION 
2.2.2.1 Equality 
"The very use of the term 'equality' is often clouded by 
imprecise and inconsistent meanings." 
(Coleman 1987:169) 
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Defining equality from an economic viewpoint appeared to be more 
difficult and more complex. Economists differentiate between 
"equality before the law" (equality of treatment by authorities), 
"equality of opportunity" (equality of chances in the economic 
system), and "equality of result" (equal distribution of goods). 
{Coleman 1987~169) 
Coleman, in The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics, explained 
the different concepts of equality with the following system - an 
abstraction from reality: 
The system consists of 
{a) a set of positions which have two properties: 
(i) when occupied by persons, they generate activities 
which produce valued goods and services; 
(ii) the persons in them are rewarded for these 
activities, both materially and symbolically; 
(b) a set of adult persons who are occupants of positions; 
(c) children of these adults; 
(d) a set of normative or legal constraints on certain 
actions. 
(Coleman 1987:169) 
According to Coleman what was normally meant by equality under the 
law had to do with {b), (c), and (d) where the legal constraints 
on actions depended only on the nature of the action, and not on 
the identity of the actor. That is, the law treated persons in 
similar positions similarly, and did not discriminate on the 
grounds of characteristics which were irrelevant to the action. 
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He further explained that equality of opportunity had to do with 
(a),(b), and {c): 
[T]hat the processes through which persons come to occupy 
positions give an equal chance to all. More particularly, 
this ordinarily means that a child's opportunities to occupy 
one of the positions {a) do not depend on which particular 
adults from set {b) are that child's parents (Coleman 
1987:169). 
Equality of result had to do with (a)(ii) in_ that the position 
earned the same reward, independent of the activity. 
Coleman (1987:169) discussed the different relations of the State 
to the inequalities that existed or spontaneously arose in ongoing 
social activities as connected to the three conceptions discussed 
above. Equality before the law was what concerned this study as 
the taxation laws limited or extended the equality among the 
different taxpayers. 
Equality before the law implies that the laws of the State 
do not recognize distinctions among persons that are 
irrelevant to the activities of the positions they occupy, 
but otherwise make no attempt to eliminate inequalities that 
arise. Equality of opportunity implies that the State 
intervenes to ensure that inequalities in one generation do 
not cross generations, that children have opportunities 
unaffected by inequalities among their parents. Equality of 
result implies a continuous or periodic intervention and 
redistribution by the State to ensure that the inequalities 
which arise through day-to-day activities are not 
accumulated, but are continuously or periodically 
eliminated. 
(Coleman 1987:169) 
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As far as taxation was concerned, equality before the law, as 
defined above, and equality of result, affected the horizontal 
equity among individuals because the State redistributed money via 
collection by taxation and attempted to eliminate the inequalities 
by giving these monies to the underprivileged. They, however, were 
not the only recipients of taxpayers' money and this may well be 
where the concern of this study is concentrated. (The "collection" 
took, for example, more from one taxpayer than from another earning 
the same income but having a different marital status.) 
In the economic system, the government was seen as ensuring 
equality by way of legislation - taxation and other legislation -
thus righting the "wrongs" of the supply and demand action of the 
economy. 
Reference was also made to the "welfare economy" in economic theory 
(welfare economics acted closely with government to attempt to help 
people unable or less able to help themselves in an attempt to 
treat people equally). Welfare economics was considered to be a 
substitute in general for the absence of "natural equality". Each 
person contributed to general welfare and 
.•. welfare economics, makes up for the absence of 
'equality' from positive economic theory, for the idea of 
equality of result is a part of the very atmosphere 
surrounding welfare economics. It assumes that each 
person is an island, and contributes nothing to the welfare 
of others, nor has his welfare contributed to by others. 
{Coleman 1987:170) 
Coleman (1987:171) noted, however, that this was not the case. It 
depended on the actions of the person. For example, one person 
might spend money on loud radios that caused a disturbance, while 
another person planted flowers enjoyed by others. Or, one used 
income for training, which was productive and benefitted general 
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welfare, while another used income on drink and became an 
alcoholic, requiring hospitalisation at public expense. 
It was, however, impossible to have total equality, as depicted by 
Coleman when he pointed out that an equal distribution at one point 
would lead to an unequal distribution at a later point. He cited 
the example of the brilliant basketball player who had a contract 
to receive 25 cents for each ticket sold to one of his games. All 
the spectato~s contributed equally to see the game (25 cents each), 
but the player received an enormous amount, more than each had 
paid. 
"Equality" in this instance could be brought about in one of three 
ways (all of which, carried to their limit, could be shown to 
reduce welfare): 
- One way is to prevent people spending their incomes as they want 
to, as monies may then be accumulated by the "gifted players" of 
the world; 
- A second way is to attack the activity - 11 the system which 
generates that matrix of coefficients that transform equality into 
inequality" {Coleman 1987:171), in this instance, shutting down 
professional basketball as it redistributes income from those with 
low incomes to those with high incomes. 
- The third way is to allow the exchange, but then to tax the high 
incomes back down to equality. This effectively eliminates the 
activity, because if income is an incentive to carry out the 
activity that is paid for, the gifted player loses all incentive to 
carry out the activity: do extra exercise, work harder, and give up 
leisure time. 
It is true that taxation which is not carried to the limit, 
but is merely 'progressive' does not eliminate the incentive 
for activities that bring high income, for these activities 
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continue in societies that have progressive taxation. But 
this taxation may lead to underprovision of 
welfare-generating activities. That is, efficiency may be 
sacrificed to achieve some distributional goals. 
{Coleman 1987:171) 
Thus, although a tax reasonably applied would not take back all 
earnings, progressive rates might still act as a disincentive. It 
would also act as a disincentive for the poor/unemployed because, 
if they received the handout in any event, why should they work? 
There were, however, other advantages for the basketball player, 
even if he paid high taxes. These advantages were in the form of 
fame, perhaps being able to endorse certain sports equipment and 
thereby earning income from advertising as well, and doing 
something that he enjoyed. 
Coleman {1987:171) considered that all three approaches to 
preventing inequalities from arising out of equality gave, at 
their extreme, the same result: elimination of the very system of 
activities that generated welfare in the first place; as it was 
these activities which not only generated welfare, but also later 
transformed equality into inequality. 
He concluded that "it becomes clear that the source of inequalities 
is embedded in the very matrix of social and economic activities 
through which individuals increase the welfare of themselves and 
one another." {Coleman 1987:171). It would thus seem that achieving 
equality was not a reasonable ambition. To aim for total equality 
among all people, with their inborn differences, was not a possible 
or a plausible goal. 
This study is therefore not concerned with equality among South 
Africans or even with equality among taxpayers, because equality, 
besides being almost impossible to achieve, leads to other problems 
such as becoming a disincentive for people to work. 
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2.2.2.2 Eguitv 
According to Feldman {1987:183) in The New Palgrave. A Dictionary 
of Economics: "[d]epending on the user's inclinations, 'equity' can 
mean almost anything." He then adopted a meaning close to 
"equality" or "fairness". 
Considering the differences between "equal" and "equitable" the 
following was noted: 
If goods, advantages, etcetera were divided equally, that is, 
everybody receiving 1/nth of the total, they would be treated 
equally, but they would not necessarily be happy "for no other 
reason tha~ that no two people would ever want to consume exactly 
the same bundle of goods" {Feldman 1987:183). 
For, if two people had to share one apple and one orange when the 
one person loved oranges and the other preferred apples: the equal 
division would be half an orange and half an apple each, but the 
equitable division would be the apple to the one who liked apples 
and the orange to the one who preferred oranges. 
[G]etting society to that equal allocation would require 
transferring wealth from the more productive individuals to 
the less productive, and the transfer mechanism itself would 
destroy incentives to produce [because if the additional 
earnings are to be paid over in taxes to less productive 
individuals, why work the extra hours or put in the extra 
effort required to earn that income.] 
{Feldman 1987:183) 
Feldman (1987:183) also pointed out that although economists have 
quantified equity in a formula it was not necessarily the correct 
way to do it: 
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But the notion of equity has an obvious disadvantage, 
For instance, the economist's model, which reduces person 
(i) to a utility function (ui) and a bundle of goods {x) 
ignores the fact that life is full of things not captured in 
(ui) or {x), for instance, non-transferable attributes like 
beauty, health and family. 
Therefore, in a world where some people were poor and others rich, 
some intelligent and others not, some enjoying perfect health and 
others not, some lazy and others diligent, equal results and "equal 
lives for all" was clearly not possible or necessarily required. 
An equitable society could be strived for, however, (where justice 
and fairness would rule and just and fair treatment would be 
attempted) and for that reason "equity" and not "equality" was used 
in these discussions. 
From the above it was clear that all people could not have equal 
bundles to consume, as all people did not have the same abilities, 
talents, ability to work, tastes and preferences. 
But equity does not share equality's obvious disadvantage of 
forcing all to consume the same no matter what their tastes. 
{Feldman 1987:183) 
2.3 VERTICAL EQUITY 
To ensure the just and equitable society we strive for, income 
taxes were instituted. Mirrilees (1979:1) noted that taxation 
served three purposes, namely " ... raising money to finance public 
outlays; redistributing income among households; and guiding the 
behaviour of private agents". 
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Although he noted that all types of taxation have those three 
effects, he argued that any particular type had "only one primary 
purpose", and proceeded to decide what this purpose was in the case 
of the income tax. 
As neither the first nor third purposes appear to call for a 
tax of such complexity, the income tax would seem to be 
necessitated primarily by the requirements of income 
redistribution .... The ... aspect [of income redistribution] 
has to do with the lessening of perceived inequalities in 
personal economic welfare, and must proceed from an ethical 
preference for egalitarianism. This preference is 
unnecessary to a ... second aspect of income redistribution 
- the requirement that where a given level of public 
expenditure is desired by a country's citizens, its cost 
should be distributed amongst them in a fair and just 
manner .... Income redistribution ... is only incidental to 
the primary requirement of fairness. 
{Mirrilees 1979:1) 
Berliant and Strauss {1985:182) defined vertical equity as 
referring to any comparison of the after-tax income distributions 
generated by tax systems. "Measures of vertical equity {or 
inequity) are essentially measures of after-tax income inequality~~. 
Wealth redistribution was needed to sustain that portion of society 
which was less fortunate. Vertical equity was thus "equality" for 
all by redistribution of earnings by way of {generally) a 
progressive tax system. This had more to do with equality among 
people and the welfare economics mentioned earlier. To achieve 
vertical equity, progressive tax rates were applied and the "rich" 
were taxed to give to the "poor". 
The Meade Commission (1978:12) noted as one of the requirements of 
a "good tax system" that " a modern tax system must be so 
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constructed as to be capable of use for vertical redistribution 
between rich and poor". 
The Commission divides equity (which is closely linked to 
neutrality) into horizontal equity and vertical equity. The 
former requires that similar individuals be treated 
similarly or that persons in the same circumstances bear the 
same taxes. Vertical equity, on the other hand, requires 
that those in different circumstances bear appropriately 
different tax burdens, ie that those with a higher level of 
"economic well-being" shoulder greater tax burdens than 
those less fortunately placed. Underlying both these 
notions of equity is the idea of equal sacrifice. 
(Neutrality and Equity in taxation 1990:161) 
Mirrilees (1979:25) noted alternative ethical views of vertical 
equity, namely the principle of equal sacrifice, the principle of 
proportional sacrifice and the principle of minimum sacrifice. He 
noted, however, that not one of them appearred to be applicable as 
progressive rates were used and that was not conducive to one of 
the three principles. 
It could be argued, however, that the principle of proportional 
sacrifice was the closest to the system of progressive tax rates as 
a person who earned more could be expected to derive more from 
material resources than one who earned less. That, however, was not 
always the case as not everyone used their money in the same way. 
A progressive tax system strives for vertical equity. Progressive 
rates and problems with "welfare" distributions (the main problem 
being the perception that those who have a lot must give to those 
who do not, while those who have less then simply do less work) 
acted as a disincentive for those who do work (and often work very 
hard to achieve more) as explained by Rothbard (1962:796-797). He 
criticized all taxes from an economic viewpoint: 
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Taxation, as we have seen, takes from producers and gives to 
others. Any increase in taxation swells the resources, the 
incomes, and usually the numbers of those living off the 
producers, while diminishing the production base from which 
these others are drawing their sustenance. 
In the market economy, net incomes are derived from wages, 
interest, ground rents, and profit; and in so far as taxes 
strike at the earnings from these sources, attempts to earn 
these incomes will diminish. The labo[u]rer, faced with a 
tax on his wages, has less incentive to work hard; the 
capitalist, confronting a tax on his interest or profit 
return, has more incentive to consume rather than to save 
and invest. The landlord, a tax being imposed on his rents, 
will have less of a spur to allocate land sites efficiently. 
(Rothbard 1962:796-797) 
He also mentioned the disincentive effect on savings in that "[t]he 
income tax, by taxing income from investments, cripples saving and 
investment, since it lowers the return from investing below what 
free-market time preferences would dictate" (Rothbard 1962:797). 
Rothbard (1962:800-801) went on to discuss the attempts at a 
neutral taxation: "The imposition of different taxes disrupts these 
patterns and cripples the market's work of allocating resources and 
output" and defined ~ neutral tax as "a tax neutral to the market, 
leaving the market roughly as it was before the tax was imposed" 
calling it a "hopeless venture". "For there can be no uniformity 
in paying taxes when some people in society are necessarily 
taxpayers, while others are privileged tax-consumers". 
He felt, however, that that would be a misconception of what a 
neutral tax would have to be, that is, not one which left the 
income patterns the same as before; but 
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it would be a tax which would affect the income pattern, and 
all other aspects of the economy in the same way as if the 
tax were really a free-market price. For normally, 
market prices are not proportional to each man's income or 
wealth, but are uniform in the sense of equal to everyone, 
regardless of his income or wealth or even his eagerness for 
the product. ... Far from being "neutral" to the free 
market, then, a proportional income tax follows a principle 
which, if cc~sistently applied, would eradicate the market 
economy and the entire monetary economy itself. 
(Rothbard 1962:801-802) 
He further discussed the fact that taxation was a compulsory 
expense and people were not freely willing to participate. This 
should be the case in a free-market economy: 
Progressive taxation, where each man pays more than 
proportionately to his income, of course makes no attempt at 
neutrality .... Proportional income taxation has many of the 
same consequences, and therefore the level of income 
taxation is generally more important for the market than the 
degree of progressivity .•. demonstrating that it is not so 
much the progressivity as the height of his tax that burdens 
the rich man. 
(Rothbard 1962:805} 
Thompson (1988:141,142) also criticised a progressive rate 
structure: 
Although it is true that no clause of the Constitution [of 
the United States of America] expressly requires all taxes 
to be a flat amount or a flat rate, both a progressive rate 
structure and a regressive rate structure are 
unconstitutional because they violate the law of equality as 
expressed in the Declaration. 
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Thus, vertical equity ensured or attempted to ensure an equality of 
means for the people in a country by taxing the rich at a 
higher/progressive rate to take their money and give to the poor by 
way of direct subsidies or transfer payments, reductions in their 
tax burdens, tax credits, etcetera. This was regarded as 
even-handedness. Rothbard (1962:818) viewed the State's poor 
relief as a clear subsidization of poverty. Progressive rates thus 
provided vertical equity but at the cost of income neutrality and 
work incentive. 
Preece (1991:13) discussed the question of chronic economic 
inequality in South Africa and an "inequality index league" was 
considered for a worldwide comparison of the income spread of 
individuals. "What cannot be disputed, however, - and virtually 
no-one does - is that the current enormity of the income spread in 
SA is a major threat to any hope of long-term socio-political 
stability". This "spread" would indicate the distance between the 
lowest and highest income and would then be an indication of the 
vertical equity problems which had to be solved by progressive 
rates. 
He went on to discuss ways of measuring or comparing the extent of 
financial inequality between various countries and concluded that 
the position appeared appalling for South Africa. He said, however, 
that there was no doubt that from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, 
black labour in the mining and manufacturing sectors at least 
secured substantial increases generally in real incomes. He showed 
how black wages almost doubled in real terms while white wages rose 
by only 9 per cent between 1970 and 1984. The black share of the 
modern sector wage bill rose from 20 per cent to nearly 30 per cent 
during the same period (Preece 1991:13). 
The Gini ratio developed over the last century "deals with 
distribution by size of income, or personal income distribution, 
and the quantitative assessment of the relative degree of income 
inequality among the members of a given set of economic units." 
39 
(Dagum 1987:529,530). In a Gini rating (one of several commonly 
used international methods of comparing the extent of financial 
inequality between various countries) done for certain countries in 
the world in 1989, South Africa had a Gini rating of 0,57 where a 
zero coefficient would reflect absolute equality while the nearer 
the figure got to 1 the greater the level of inequality. It was, 
however, generally considered that somewhere around 0,30 was the 
lowest practical figure obtainable, showing an exceptionally "fair" 
distribution of income while 0,70/0,75 showed maximum inequality, 
except for some essentially freak situations. Taiwan had a Gini 
rating of 0,27 (the lowest) and the Bahamas 0,63 (the highest). It 
must be noted that the dates when the Gini rating was calculated 
varied from 1970 to 1989 and resulted in an average Gini rating of 
0,49. 
TABLE 1 
COUNTRY GINI DATE 
SOUTH AFRICA .... 0,57 1980 
BAHAMAS ......... 0,63 1979 
BANGLADESH ...... 0,39 1981 
BRAZIL. .....•... 0,57 1983 
COLUMBIA ........ 0,57 1981 
COSTA RICA ...... 0,42 1982 
IVORY COAST ..... 0,55 1985 
HONDURAS .•...... 0,62 1968 
HONG KONG ....... 0,45 1981 
INDIA ........... 0,42 1975 
S KOREA ......... 0,36 1982 
MALAYSIA ........ 0,46 1984 
PANAMA .......... 0,57 1970 
PHILIPPINES ..... 0,45 1985 
SIERRA LEONE. ... 0,59 1969 
SINGAPORE •...•.. 0,42 1983 
TAIWAN .......... 0,27 1985 
(Preece 1991:19) 
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Saunders, Stott and Hobbes (1991:63-79) studied income inequality 
in Australia and New Zealand and compared it with other 
industrialised countries. They gave the following Gini ratings in 
the distribution of equivalent net family income: 
TABLE 2 
COUNTRY GINI DATE 
AUSTRALIA ....... 0,31 1981-82 
CANADA .......... 0,30 1981 
GERMANY ......... 0,25 1981 
NEW ZEALAND ..... 0,29 1981-82 
NORWAY .......... 0,24 1979 
SWEDEN .......... 0,20 1981 
UNITED KINGDOM •. 0,27 1979 
UNITED STATES ... 0,32 1979 
(Saunders, Stott & Hobbes 1991 :67) 
Compared with the study done by Saunders, Stott and Hobbes, South 
Africa had a higher Gini rating (0,57) than any of the countries 
which they surveyed. Their Gini ratings fluctuated between 0,20 
for Sweden and 0,32 for the United States of America. These 
countries, however, were among the top first-world countries and in 
quite a few of them socialist principles were in effect. 
The Sunday Times (Other countries more unequal than us 1991:17) 
noted that "Brazil, Mexico and Malaysia are all at roughly the same 
stage of development as South Africa and all have roughly 
comparable Gini coefficients." It also noted that South Africa was 
slowly improving its record. 
Ringen (1991:6,7) compared the equality and wealth distribution 
from 1970 to 1986 in Norway where the Gini rating fluctuated 
between 0,305 (1970) and 0,3048 (1973). He concluded that the trend 
was towards greater equality but that this was on a household and 
not on an individual level. 
41 
Kincaid (1977:95) discussed the impact of taxation on social 
security in Britain and showed another aspect of vertical equity in 
force, namely that " ... those who believe that the social security 
system lessens the gap between rich and poor attach particular 
importance to the role of general taxation in the financing of 
social security". He also noted that one-third of the total cost 
of social security was met from Government taxation. 
He felt that the tax system was in itself, an important cause of 
poverty, and noted that a very large part of social security was in 
fact managed through the tax system by the mechanism of giving 
people tax relief (Kincaid 1977:95). 
In discussing the progressive income tax, the efficiency of the tax 
system were considered: 
That there is a trade-off between "distribution" and 
"efficiency" has long been recognized in the literature on 
income taxation. More progressive tax structures have 
greater disincentive effects but, in principle at least, 
result in more egalitarian income distributions. 
(Stiglitz 1976:1). 
It is always difficult to think rationally about a subject 
which has all the political and moral overtones that 
inequality does. 
It may in fact be that we should focus our attention not on 
the distribution of income itself, but on the processes by 
which it is generated; that our concern should be with 
equality of opportunity rather than with equality of 
incomes. 
(Stiglitz 1976:26) 
In this study on horizontal equity it was necessary to refer to 
vertical equity and the equality among "non-horizontals" (that is, 
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taxpayers earning different incomes). Progressive tax rates 
ensured that the rich, or those who were more well-off, contributed 
more to the Government coffers than the poor or lower income 
groups. In this way income redistribution attempted an equalization 
among income groups. The Gini coefficient measured the differences 
in income between the high and low income-earners in a country in 
an attempt to compare the differences. This revealed those 
countries where incomes were "most equal" or where the "poor" and 
"rich" earned almost the same. 
2.4. HORIZONTAl EQUITY DEFINED 
"Equity" as such was defined 
Definitions of "horizontal" and 
discussed. 
in detail in paragraph 2.2. 
"horizontal equity" will now be 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989:384), "Horizontal" 
denoted among other things, "a relationship, movement, _etcetera 
between a social group of a particular status, class, age-group, 
etcetera and another of similar specifications, as opposite a 
'vertical' relationship with higher (or lower) authority, class, 
age group etc". It also quoted an extract from H.G.Wells in Work, 
Wealth and Happiness of Mankind (1932:540) that "The only remaining 
physical differences between man and woman are becoming horizontal, 
ie differences between individuals in the same class, and not 
vertical differences in which all women are put below men or vice 
versa." and W. Mailer (1959:374) said that "The old 
exploitation was vertical, the poor supported the rich. To this 
vertical exploitation must now be added the horizontal exploitation 
of the mass by the State and by Monopoly". 
In the literature various definitions occur for "horizontal equity" 
specifically applied to income taxation: 
" 
43 
the command that equals be treated equally ... " 
(Kaplow 1989:140) 
... the traditional principle of equity, taken to mean 
"equal treatment of equals," is logically separate from the 
more recent notion of horizontal equity which suggests that 
the relative positions of individuals' before and after-tax 
income be maintained for horizontal equity to be achieved. 
(Berliant & Strauss 1985:179,180) 
It is normally defined as a situation in which families with 
the same standard of living are treated equally in a system 
of transfers and taxes. In other words families with the 
same initial living standard experience an equal change as 
the result of redistribution. 
(Habib 1979:283) 
..... taxpayers with equal incomes should pay equal taxes ... 
(Anderson 1985:363} 
II 
should 
taxpayers in essentially equivalent circumstances 
bear essentially equal tax burdens ... " 
(Blum & Pedrick 1986:100} 
"Equal tax treatment of persons in ·the same economic 
circumstances" 
(Hettich 1983:417) 
le Grand and Reschovsky (1971:475-486) discussed horizontal equity 
from a more complicated viewpoint, concentrating on what was needed 
to achieve horizontal equity between states and concluded that only 
"merit" goods must be considered for horizontal equity: 
Merit goods are goods which society decides it is every 
individual's right to possess; thus a revenue sharing 
program should award grants to every state sufficient to 
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meet their costs in providing those goods. So far as 
horizontal inequities are concerned, Thurow argues that 
these are best measured by disparities in the ratio of 
public expenditure benefits to tax effort in each state 
(called benefit-effort ratios by Thurow) and therefore a 
revenue sharing program should have as its third goal the 
elimination of these disparaties. 
(Le Grand & Reschovsky 1971:475) 
Although what they discussed referred to horizontal equity between 
states in the United States of America, it could be applied to 
individuals as well. That is, horizontal equity was achieved by the 
elimination of the disparaties between the benefits to individuals 
or even the incomes earned by them compared to the particular tax 
"efforts" which they had to make. 
All these definitions referred to the same basic requirement in tax 
legislation, namely that no discrimination should be made between 
taxpayers on any grounds but their income and, in this respect, 
Berliant and Strauss' definition would appear to be the closest. 
Anderson's simplified definition was easiest to apply to the "new" 
South African situation, namely that all taxpayers, irrespective of 
whether they were married (either husband or wife), or unmarried, 
must pay the same tax on the same income. This ignored the economic 
reality of one-breadwinner families versus two-breadwinner 
families. 
The definition of Berliant and Strauss (1985:179,180) applied with 
reference to Hettich's shorter definition took the family size into 
account. That is, that the tax must actually look at the economic 
circumstances of taxpayers, as tax was an economic reality 
introduced to solve economic problems. This could then take 
account of one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner families. 
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If the smallest economic unit was considered to be the household, 
and in order to provide for one-breadwinner families then Habib's 
definition was the closest and this will be used in this study. 
Horizontal equity was an elusive goal and was not easily attained. 
Goetz (1978:805} felt that 11 ••• in absence of identical tastes and a 
single type of ability no income tax is consistent with horizontal 
equity ...... 
2.5 PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
Horizontal equity has been studied from many angles and a broad 
review of this follows. The literature studied mainly discussed 
problems with horizontal equity and, in specific terms, concerned 
the measurement of horizontal equity or rather inequity, 
efficiency, the cost of horizontal equity and the influence of tax 
reform via tax preferences on horizontal equity and on tax evasion. 
2.5.1 MEASURING HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
It is not easy to measure horizontal equity. It is easier to 
measure the inequity(ies} that exist. The measure could be purely 
the difference between the taxes paid by two individuals who had 
the same income, but who paid different amounts of tax because of 
certain exogeneous difference(s). It would appear to be purely a 
matter of add and subtract to measure the inequity, but it is more 
complex than that and depends on factors such as the definition and 
classification of the different taxpaying groups, when they are 
considered to be treated inequitably. 
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As equity appeared to be an elusive matter, it might have been more 
a question of analysis of the inequities rather than a measure of 
the equity. 
The different measures of horizontal equity will only be summarised 
briefly here, but the horizontal inequities between individuals in 
South Africa over a number of years will be quantified in Chapter 
6. 
Mention could also be made here of the classification of taxpayers, 
as this affected the measures for horizontal equity. Anderson 
(1985:363) felt that individuals had to be placed into groups of 
equally-situated taxpayers in order to analyse the minimum tax from 
a horizontal equity perspective: 
Equally situated taxpayers are those having the same or 
similar amounts of income, where income represents ability 
to pay taxes. The need for this classification system 
follows from the horizontal equity concept, which holds that 
taxpayers with equal incomes should pay equal taxes. This 
concept of horizontal equity also implies that a 
comprehensive measure of income, rather than statutory 
taxable income, be used as the criterion for classification. 
This negated all discrimination on other grounds. The 
one-breadwinner family was not the same as the two-breadwinner 
family. In South Africa taxpayers were classified in one of three 
groups, namely unmarried taxpayer, married taxpayer (which excluded 
a wife) and married woman. The unit of taxation will be discussed 
in more detail later in this study. 
Different researchers developed different measures or different 
ways of measuring horizontal equity and inequity and their views 
will be discussed briefly. 
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Anderson (1985:365) used the coefficient of variation to measure 
horizontal equity when comparing the different minimum tax 
provisions in the Tax Reform Acts from 1969 to 1982. He divided the 
taxpayers into different groups according to their incomes. He 
called them "equally situated taxpayers" and he based the division 
on expanded income. 
Anderson (1985:364) assumed that the expanded income most 
accurately reflected a taxpayer's ability to pay taxes within the 
limitations. He defined expanded income as adjusted gioss income 
plus tax preference items excluded from adjusted gross income minus 
investment interest to the extent that it did not exceed investment 
income. The taxation of investment income was excluded from this 
study except insofar as it affected horizontal equity between 
taxpayers. 
Stiglitz (1976:1), 
'distribution' and 
in considering the 
'efficiency'", noted 
judgments were involved: 
"trade-off between 
that the following 
Empirical judgments concerning the order of magnitude of 
the "costs", the disincentive effects, and benefits, i.e., 
the change in the income distribution; 
Value judgments concerning one's attitudes towards 
inequality. 
He also referred to Atkinson, Dalton and Kolm's measures of 
inequality as "measures of the percentage of national income which 
society would be willing to sacrifice if all inequality were 
eliminated .... [I]n other words, a measure of total cost of 
inequality." (Stiglitz 1976:2). This would refer more to the costs 
of vertical equity. 
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Stiglitz (1976:2) also considered the cost via a marginal measure 
of inequality, that is, "how much would society sacrifice to reduce 
inequality to a given amount?". 
Browning and Johnson (1984:176,177) tried to establish the cost of 
more or less inequality by way of the "income distribution 
frontier" originally used by Baumol and Fischer (1979:514). 
Preferences and options were also considered and it was concluded 
that the definition of equal position was very vague: 
The general conclusion is that definitions of horizontal 
equity in terms of either income or utility encounter 
equally debilitating problems of definition.... If 
horizontal equity is interpreted to mean that tastes are not 
to count, taxes are based on ability to pay, that is, income 
and prices. In contrast, in a utilitarian framework, tastes 
are to count and taxes may, accordingly, discriminate on 
that basis. 
(Goetz 1978:806) 
Hettich (1983:418) approached the measurement of horizontal equity 
from a concept of comprehensive income. He said that, as 
horizontal equity required equal tax treatment of persons in the 
same economic 
best measure 
equality was 
circumstances, comprehensive income provided the 
of economic circumstances. On the other hand, if 
defined as equal welfare or utility, then 
comprehensive income may not represent a theoretically satisfactory 
measure of ability to pay tax as it did not provide a value for 
leisure consumed and differences in taste and ability could 
complicate calculations further (Hettich 1983:417). 
Hettich (1983:418) identified a second set of problems associated 
with the notion of horizontal equity which has received less 
attention. These problems arose once an appropriate index of 
ability to pay had been defined and was used to evaluate tax 
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policy. The most common approach was to compare this "correct" 
standard with the way in which tax liability was measured in actual 
fact. 
According to the principle of horizontal equity, those in 
equal economic circumstances should pay the same amount of 
tax. If comprehensive income is accepted as the appropriate 
index for measuring economic position, a tax system 
satisfying the following conditions will ensure complete 
horizontal equity: 
all taxation must be related to income; 
all relevant components of income must enter the tax 
base; and 
all parts of the base must be subject to the same 
schedule or rate. 
In actual tax systems, the three conditions are generally 
violated. Income taxes are used together with other taxes 
such as those on retail sales or property, while the 
definition of taxable income does not include all relevant 
components. Furthermore, some components of income that 
form part of the existing base may be taxed at special 
rates. As a result of such deviations persons in equal 
circumstances may be treated quite differently by the tax 
system. 
(Hettich 1983:418) 
This violated the principle of horizontal equity and a need arose 
to measure the inequities. 
Hettich (1983:419) noted further that knowledge of what an ideal 
tax system would look like was useful only if the ideal could be 
related to what existed in practice. 
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Since we do not observe tax systems achieving complete 
horizontal equity, we must analyze the prevailing state of 
imperfection. This can be done by asking how existing 
deviations affect the degree of equity that is achieved and 
by analyzing the effects of changes in the tax system that 
move it closer to the norm. 
Hettich's (1983:425) paper developed a model to evaluate imperfect 
situations. His method compared the distribution of tax payments 
with a comprehensive tax base and the distribution of such payments 
with various alternative definitions of the base, given a fixed 
government budget. The results of the analysis were also relevant 
if horizontal equity was used as a justification for equalization 
grants in a federal state: "The paper shows that empirical 
measurement is necessary if we are to arrive at a systematic 
evaluation of policies" (Hettich 1983:417). He did, however, note 
that 
in an imperfect world where tax laws are affected by 
political changes, differences between actual tax payments 
and payments that would be imposed if a tax base closer to 
the ideal were in effect can provide a reasonable guide to 
assessing equity .... [Q]uantification of existing inequities 
is essential. As long as imperfections remain a feature of 
the tax system, it is improper to compare each deviation 
separately to the norm. 
(Hettich 1983:425) 
Habib (1979:294), on the other hand, worked with living standards 
(a concept equally difficult to quantify) as opposed to 
comprehensive income. He concluded that a direct implication of 
his analysis was that the pattern of tax reduction for family size 
required for horizontal equity could be determined on the basis of 
given assumptions about equivalence scales and the desired degree 
of progressivity. 
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Any attempt to define the degree of horizontal equity 
associated with family size must begin by establishing a 
basis of comparison for the living standard of families of 
different size. One must be able to define incomes at 
which the living standard of a family of any size is 
equivalent to that of a family of some other size. For this 
purpose equivalence scales have been developed which express 
the relative needs of families of different size in relation 
to an arbitrarily chosen base family size. 
(Habib 1979:283) 
A progressive tax system also affected the after-tax income 
available to the family for use on both essential and inessential 
goods. The South African tax system was a progressive one. 
Although the husband and wife both worked and earned the same 
income, their total tax was different from the couple where one 
spouse was the breadwinner and earned the same as the combined 
income of the previous couple. The tax was also different where the 
wife was the only breadwinner, but she could choose to be taxed at 
her husband's married-person rate instead of at the married-woman 
rate. The rate system will, however, be changed from the 1996 year 
of assessment. 
Habib (1979:284) also noted that in the literature, the degree of 
horizontal equity was linked to the pattern of variation of tax 
reductions with family size. Income and the variation of 
reductions with family size were compared with estimated 
equivalence scales. 
Most - if not all - analyses of horizontal equity have not 
recognized the role played by the progressivity of the tax 
system ... how the degree of progressivity interacts with 
the pattern of scale economies and derives the conditions 
for alternative structures with respect to family size and 
income. 
(Habib 1979:285) 
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Hamlin (1985:116) gave the three basic propositions for analysis of 
horizontal equity concerning, "in turn, the definitions of the 
group over which horizontal equity is sought, the definition of 
equity itself, and the nature of the political environment implied 
by federalism". Although he considered horizontal equity from a 
federal viewpoint, the first two "propositions" held true for 
consideration of individual horizontal equity as well. The general 
political environment was also a factor as Hamlin's analysis was 
done in a federal context. It was, however, possible to convert 
his basic propositions to suit the 'local' South African situation 
and still consider the unique South African political environment. 
(Political considerations are discussed later in the chapter with 
reference to tax reform.) 
The problem of classification of taxpayers (which was a 
considerable problem in South Africa) and the problem of measuring 
equity, which is more a case of measuring inequities, were the 
problems associated with the measurement of horizontal equity. 
There was no consensus about how to measure either equity or 
inequity - every researcher developed his or her own measures. 
Should one look at families or at individual taxpayers? The answer 
to this question was not clear. This study will look at the 
economic unit. 
It was clear from the above that no hard and fast rule existed for 
the measurement of horizontal equity and that this was indeed a 
difficult subject to approach. It was also clear that there was no 
shortage of measures to apply to the different circumstances and 
that, during the last twenty years, a great deal of work has been 
done on this problem elsewhere in the world, even though no 
clear-cut solution presented itself. In South Africa very little 
work has been done to date, but this study will measure the equity, 
or inequity, of taxes payable by looking at the taxes payable by 
the economic unit (normally the family). 
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2.5.2 EFFICIENCY AND COST 
How efficient was the economic system in striving for horizontal 
equity? Was it a practical goal? Did it cost too much to obtain 
horizontal equity? In discussing efficiency and cost of horizontal 
equity, the disincentive effects of redistribution of income via 
income taxes were considered, that is the costs to the government 
and the individual to provide for the underprivileged. This would 
appear to be more a case for vertical equity, but to achieve 
horizontal equity a certain cost of redistribution was also 
involved. (For example, taxing all individuals who earned the same 
income at the same tax rates, even though some of them were married 
and thus saved some money by living together whilst other married 
couples only had one breadwinner supporting the entire family). 
The disincentive effect of taxing wives who entered the labour 
market at a high marginal rate (compared with colleagues doing 
exactly the same work but who paid lower taxes) was presumed to 
have cost the country many trained workers (see Chapter 5). 
In a study done by Browning and Johnson (1984:176} to establish the 
"trade-off between equality and efficiency" they concluded that 
"the marginal trade-off between equality and efficiency is quite 
severe even when labor supply elasticities are low and despite a 
modest total welfare cost of the current tax-transfer system " 
They only evaluated the labour supply effects and ignored other 
behavioural effects. 
The most striking finding is that marginal cost is quite 
high even for modest labor supply elasticities. For 
example, in the benchmark case ... the disposable money 
income of upper-income quintiles of households is depressed 
by $9,51 for each dollar increase in the disposable money 
income of lower income quintiles. When income equivalent 
values that take account of the value of leisure are 
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compared, the marginal cost for this case is estimated to be 
$3,49. 
(Browning & Johnson 1984:175) 
They also noted that inefficiency in the allocation of resources 
was costing money: "Income redistribution is not a socially 
costless endeavor because the policies required to accomplish it 
generally produce misallocations of resources" (Browning & Johnson 
1984:175). 
Stiglitz (1976:1) studied the trade-off between distribution and 
efficiency and commented that, although more progressive tax 
structures had a greater disincentive effect, they resulted in 
"more egalitarian income distributions" and " ... the cost in loss 
of efficiency and disincentives is too great relative to the 
benefits in attaining a "better" income distribution, at least at 
the margin". 
Varian, in The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics (1987:275), 
was concerned about efficiency and noted that "[t]he issues of 
equity and efficiency are central aspects of most economic 
problems". He felt that in the political domain it often seemed 
that concerns with equity - or at least distribution - outweighed 
concerns with econom-ic efficiency when policy alternatives were 
considered. " ... [T]he natural choice is equal division. But even 
if equal division is a fair way to divide the bundle initially, it 
may not remain fair ... " . 
Sgontz (1984:249) also noted the cost resulting from the 
disincentive effect on the secondary earner or married couple, 
mentioning that "a lower marginal tax rate for secondary earner 
would increase efficiency" and "efficiency increases as marginal 
tax rates vary inversely with supply or demand elasticities". 
Hamlin (1985:116) considered horizontal equity from a different 
viewpoint, namely that all equally situated taxpayers must receive 
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the same services from government for which they paid the same 
taxes, "[t]he balance between the contributions made and the value 
of public services returned to the individual should be the 
relevant figuren. But, as pointed out earlier, tax was not only 
collected to provide public services, but to redistribute income 
from high-income earners to low or no-income earners. Hamlin, 
however, then redefined horizontal equity by comparing after-tax 
incomes, "[t]he fiscal structure is equitable in this primary sense 
only if the fiscal residua of similarly situated individuals are 
equivalentn. He defined horizontal equity as being the situation 
that existed when the after-tax incomes of similarly situated 
individuals were the same. 
Baumol and Fischer (1979:514) offered some theoretical grounds for 
believing that an approximation to equality achieved via the 
traditional instruments - transfer payments (discussed in more 
detail later) and progressive taxation - would cause an income loss 
far more serious than many have realized. n... [A]ny attempt to 
guarantee absolute equality of incomes using only progressive 
income taxes and transfers for the purpose must, at least in 
theory, reduce society's output to zero!n. 
They furthermore noted that 
[a] comparison of the income combinations that are feasible 
under taxation with redistribution and under wage rate 
differentiation confirms that under rather natural 
assumptions about individuals' behavior, the second set of 
policy measures [by way of wage rate differentiations] can 
permit far more equitable income distributions without 
reducing total output substantially. Indeed, in our 
example, complete equality merely reduces total output to 
2.9 from its maximal value of 3.0. 
(Baumol & Fischer 1979:525) 
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Their suggestion, however, that wages be differentiated to ensure 
equality rather than to do so via taxation, would be extremely 
difficult to implement in practice. Wages provided the incentive 
for harder work, provided compensation for better training or more 
intelligence and provided the incentive to take on more 
responsibility. If the less trained, less diligent and less 
responsible workers received the same salary as their superiors, 
would anyone try to do a better job? 
It was interesting to note that where Le Grand and Reschovsky 
(1971:475) considered horizontal equity from a federal viewpoint 
(defining it as "equal benefit-effort ratios for all states"), they 
showed that the "benefit-effort equalization formula resulted in 
horizontal equity between states (in the United States of America) 
at a cost of approximately $30 billion". 
Meade (1978:7) considered "economic efficiency" in the "costs of 
administration and compliance" as a desirable goal for a tax 
structure, differentiating between the costs of administration 
involving a simple tax system and the costs of compliance, which 
were" ... the costs which the private taxpayers must incur in 
order to cope with their tax liabilities. There is evidence that 
such private compliance costs are often heavy and in many cases 
much heavier than the official administrative costs themselves" 
(Meade 1978:18). 
Meade (1978:18-21) gave three reasons for tipping the balance away 
from compliance costs in favour of official administrative costs 
where it was reasonably possible to make a choice of administrative 
arrangements to ensure this effect, namely: 
1) administrative costs are themselves met from taxation 
which can itself be determined with reference to fairness 
of tax burden, whereas compliance costs fall on the 
private taxpayer and can be markedly regressive in their 
incidence; 
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2) compliance costs are likely to be much resented by 
taxpayers, particularly where much time and trouble must 
be spent by small taxpayers only to show a very low or 
indeed a nil liability to tax; 
3) administrative costs are easier to ascertain and more 
open to public scrutiny than are compliance costs. 
It could be deduced from the above that to achieve a certain 
equality or equity via tax would involve a substantial cost. This 
would lead to inefficiency in the marketplace, with labour supply 
and in the redistribution of taxes. To obtain horizontal equity 
different people were taxed differently and if one paid more tax 
than another, the one that paid more tax might be induced to work 
less. Tax collection costs also affected the efficiency of the tax 
system. 
2.5.3 TAX PREFERENCES, CAPITALIZATION AND TAX EVASION 
The horizontal inequities referred to are tax preferences 
and the process of competitive resource allocation is either 
the capitalization or the erosion of tax preferences. 
(Goetz 1978:803) 
Horizontal inequities were normally caused by legislation which 
provided certain tax credits or preferences to certain groups of 
taxpayers. (Groups such as farmers (the deduction of capital 
improvements), married men (lower tax rates and higher rebates), 
manufacturers who purchased machinery (allowances on these assets 
in certain circumstances) and people who earned less than a certain 
amount per annum.) This was done either by way of cash grants, tax 
reductions, rebates or credits to expand certain activities or help 
in circumstances of need. These transfers may not always have had 
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the desired effect (for example an allowance being granted to 
ensure an extension of the activity) while other taxpayers abused 
the advantages meant for certain groups of taxpayers in order to 
avoid paying their rightful amounts of tax. In the following 
paragraphs the nature of tax preferences, the capitalization 
thereof, and tax avoidance through tax preferences will be 
discussed. 
2.5.3.1 Tax preferences, transfers and income tax credits 
Transfer activities come in many forms. Some involve direct 
payments to recipients, either in money or in-kind benefits 
such as food, medical services, or housing. There are, 
however, other forms of transfers: price supports, entry 
restraints, price ceilings, tariffs, quotas, and subsidies 
[which] transfer wealth just as surely as direct income 
transfers. Thus, when we speak of transfer activities we 
include a broad range of policies intended to increase the 
economic welfare of various subgroups at the expense of 
others in society. 
(Gwartney & Stroup 1986:112) 
Goetz (1978:799) preferred the term "tax preferences", because it 
was more neutral than the other alternatives and he noted that "the 
presumption [is] that a preferential rate of tax is granted to an 
activity, which is deemed to confer some benefits over and above 
any tax savings that accrue to taxpayers, in order to expand the 
level of the activity". 
2.5.3.2 Capitalization of tax preferences and transfers 
Gwartney and Stroup (1986:123,124) compared the economy to a 
balloon: 
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If you push it in one place, it bulges in another ... When 
changing conditions reduce the attractiveness of earning 
opportunities in one area, people will shift to other more 
attractive. options.... This indicates that once 
allowance is made for factors such as risk and nonpecuniary 
benefits, competition will tend to equalize the after-tax 
rate of return among earning opportunities .... Thus low 
interest loans cannot make farming or small businesses more 
profitable for long. Neither can tariffs nor quotas make 
protected industries more profitable in the long run. The 
best the transfers can do is create windfall gains, which 
competition will erode in the long run. 
Goetz {1978:810) showed that the granting of a preferential rate of 
tax was "conceptually equivalent to the creation of an asset which, 
if correctly priced, eliminates the tax saving by applying the 
capitalization or transitional gains principle to an examination of 
the structure and reform of preferential tax provisions". 
Goetz (1978:798) considered the preferential provisions of the tax 
laws as "rent-generating restrictions" because the tax saving 
brought about by the provisions would be capitalized. He noted 
that "if preferential tax provisions are capitalized, they will 
only temporarily serve the goal of expanding the consumption of the 
commodity. 11 He felt that this view of tax avoidance required a 
reinterpretation of horizontal equity. 
It was also argued that 
[A]ny government program which confers a privilege, ie, a 
monopoly position, on any group will ultimately be 
unsuccessful in that the privilege will only generate 
transitional gains which will subsequently be capitalized. 
Therefore, successors to the original recipients of the 
privilege will be no better off than if the privilege were 
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not to exist; however, they would be harmed by the 
elimination of the privilege. 
(Goetz 1978:799) 
Goetz (1978:800) further warned that, given the assumptions of a 
single type of ability and common tastes, horizontal equity might 
not arise from an existing tax structure, but could only arise from 
changes in that structure: "We have the paradoxical situation in 
which the elimination of tax preferences which are commonly thought 
of as constituting horizontal inequities would itself constitute a 
horizontal inequity". 
He also pointed out that although the cancellation of a tax 
privilege would violate horizontal equity, " the goal of the 
legislature, the expansion of the activity, will have been 
achieved" (Goetz 1978:801). 
This formulation illustrates the 
capitalization is complete, an existing 
not a source of horizontal inequity. 
system is horizontally equitable, since 
premise that 
tax preference 
In fact, the 
the pre-tax 
post-tax utility levels are identica~ and any change in 
tax preference would alter the utility ordering 
therefore cause horizontal inequity. 
if 
is 
tax 
and 
the 
and 
Equality of preferences requires identical tastes; equality 
of options refers to identical opportunity sets. In tax 
design, horizontal equity requires that if, in the absence 
of taxation, two individuals would have the same utility 
level, they should have the same utility level in the 
presence of a tax. 
(Goetz 1978:801,802) 
Gwartney and Stroup (1986:111) debated the merits of the 
redistributive state and generally focused on the proper trade-off 
between more income equality and more total income. " How much 
61 
economic growth should we sacrifice in order to promote the welfare 
of the poor and disadvantaged? How much inequality should a just 
society accept?" 
perceived to be 
Taxes, transfers and regulatory policies were 
"adjustment levers available to fine-tune the 
economic machine that grinds out goods and services". 
They also felt that taxpayers and transfer recipients were "human 
beings, not sheep who can be shorn at will, their wool 
automatically growing back for the next shearing season" (Gwartney 
& Stroup 1986:111). People would act to their individual 
advantage, in response to changes in legislation. "Similarly, 
since the political process, like the market, results from 
individual choices, it may or may not yield its stated goals. 
Thus, it is not obvious that income transfers emanating from the 
political process will promote economic equality or even help the 
targeted groups" (Gwartney & Stroup 1986:112). 
Baumol and Fischer (1979:514) noted the disincentive effects of 
moves towards equality and were of the opinion that these, "after a 
point, lead· to unacceptable lo~ses in real income." They also 
offered some theoretical grounds for believing that an 
approximation to equality achieved via the traditional instruments 
- transfer payments and progressive taxation - would cause an 
income loss far more serious than was realized. 
Balcer and Sadka (1982:303) concentrated in their study on family 
size and noted that many economists recommended income-tax credits 
as the proper way for the income tax system to treat differences in 
the household size. "And indeed, most states and countries have 
incorporated tax credits or some imperfect variant of them (eg tax 
exemptions) into their income tax laws." They further mentioned 
that "[w]hether a tax credit is a good or bad policy depends on how 
differences in family size manifest themselves in the consumption 
patterns (preferences) of households of various sizes". 
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2.5.3.3 Tax avoidance with capitalization of tax preferences, 
As a result of the attractive tax treatment of various activities, 
persons other than the intended taxpayers might participate in such 
activities (for example members of certain professions that farmed 
on a part-time basis because of the tax advantages to farmers which 
could be set off against professional income while, at the same 
time, capital could be built up on the farm). Sometimes, these 
credits were even obtained in a dishonest manner. The taxpayers 
pursued the activity purely for the tax benefit and not as bona 
fide participants. This resulted in a distortion of the activity, 
so that there was less help for those who needed it and diminished 
the tax income from other activities originally intended to help to 
"provide" for these credits. 
Tax avoidance can be defined as the legal reduction of tax 
through the use of preferential provisions of the tax laws. 
These preferential provisions of the tax system have been 
referred to as either tax loopholes, tax incentives, or tax 
expenditures. 
(Goetz 1978:799) 
Strader and Foglassio (1989:39) addressed the problem of taxpayer 
non-compliance in an international context and noted that a 
"growing concern in almost every nation today is the amount of 'tax 
gap' (that is, the difference between the taxes actually paid and 
what would be paid if all taxpayers filed complete and accurate 
returns and paid all the taxes they owe). Because the tax gap is 
often quite substantial, the problem of taxpayer non-compliance is 
one that requires careful scrutiny". Their article presented three 
of the main factors said to affect taxpayer non-compliance, namely, 
rate structure, tax complexity and control system. In South Africa 
the rate structure, namely the provision of different rates for 
married persons, unmarried persons and married women, affected 
horizontal equity and not only the non-compliance aspect. 
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Avoidance also affected horizontal equity by making it possible for 
some people to pay less tax, thereby having an unfair advantage 
over their peers. It could be argued, however, that they were not 
equal to the others as they were able to obtain these tax 
'advantages' intended to ensure equality or equity for them. 
Gwartney and Stroup (1986:135) concluded with this very concise 
summary of the problems connected to transfers: 
The impact of transfers on economic equality and poverty is 
far more complex than most people realize. It is not obvious 
that the political process will yield egalitarian transfers. 
And, even when it does, the net egalitarian impact may well 
be quite modest. Since annual income is a highly imperfect 
measure of economic status, some slippage can be expected 
there. 
They also noted that market adjustments eroded some of the 
redistributive effect of egalitarian transfers, and an expansion in 
transfers of any variety encouraged rent seeking which lead to 
higher marginal taxes, both of which reduced aggregate output. 
Furthermore, means-tested transfers presented the poor with high 
marginal tax rates which, in turn, acted as a disincentive for them 
and discouraged participation in the work force (a portion of the 
transfer benefits was merely replacement income). Transfers that 
were based on a means test (that is, transfers from the government 
to the lower-income groups, such as the social security payments in 
the United Kingdom) meant that the recipients worked less as they 
received income from the State because of the fact that they were 
poor and so they did not need to work for this income. These 
transfers were thus a disincentive and discouraged participation in 
the work force. As they did not work, or worked less, their 
knowledge of their work deteriorated or was forgotten. 
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Over time, this resulted in a depreciation of skills because these 
were not used. Income was received without applying the skills 
previously required to earn 
abilities to help themselves. 
income. This further reduced their 
Gwartney and Stroup (1986:135) also 
noted that public sector antipoverty programmes tended to eliminate 
or reduce voluntary charity, which was likely to be more cost 
effective as it operated on a limited budget and was often managed 
along business lines. "Thus when one considers structure and side 
effects of transfers, their apparent failure to promote equality 
and improve the economic status of the poor is not surprising". 
Lilla (1986:139,140) concurred with Gwartney and Stroup, but 
pointed out that, although Americans felt strongly about equality 
and believed in open economic opportunity, they were not concerned 
about the current distribution of income. 
Surveys conducted by social scientists ... all bear out this 
fundamental point. And, no matter what their class, they 
have no desire to make that distribution more equal .... 
When asked about their economic expectations, about justice 
and fairness, they will speak about the importance of equal 
opportunity, especially in education, but also about effort, 
mobility, tenacity, and keeping what you earn. And rather 
than speak about their individual income they will focus on 
their children and their children's future. This point is 
very important. Family, not the individual, is their "unit 
of analysis" in thinking about distributive matters; some 
far distant future, and not the present, is their time 
frame. 
Tax preferences -
horizontal equity 
(Lilla 1986:139,140) 
the government's way of attempting equality or 
by giving help either outright or via 
preferential tax treatment, transfers or income tax credits - did 
not always achieve equity as these preferences drew other taxpayers 
to the activities and lead to their capitalization. Although this 
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normally expanded the activity, it did not necessarily bring about 
horizontal equity and it could be used as a means to avoid tax. 
Furthermore, the simple transfer of monies to, for example, the 
poor in an equilisation attempt could have lead to a work 
disincentive which, in turn, could have resulted in a depreciation 
of skills and subsequent inability to work. Although tax transfers 
and preferences were the way to achieve equity, care had to be 
taken to ensure that self-reliance was not discouraged and that 
effort was still part of the generation of income. 
2.5.4 GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND TAX REFORM 
Tax reform was needed to create a 11 fair 11 tax system, to bring about 
horizontal equity and for political purposes. Reform disturbed (or 
achieved) horizontal equity because reform changed the status quo, 
and gave tax advantages to, for example, the underprivileged or 
taxed the privileged more strenuously. 
Van Blerk (1990:7) discussed tax reform as follows: 
Tax systems are seldom static - it is a rare year when a 
country introduces no change to its fiscal legislation. 
However, the concept of tax reform entails more than 
legislative amendment of a tax system. Tax reform can be 
defined as a process which results in fundamental changes to 
the means whereby a government levies taxes, these changes 
relating to: -the number and types of taxes; 
-the tax base on which these are levied; and 
-the tax rates. 
Reform gave government the opportunity to provide incentives in 
certain industries or businesses and to give tax credits or 
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subsidies for families and individuals in certain, less privileged 
groups. 
These credits or transfers were eventually capitalized (see 
paragraph 2.5.2). Thereby, rent preferences were created which 
were abused. This lead to avoidance/evasion and disturbed 
horizontal equity - and reform had to start again. 
Thus, tax reform was extremely important in the tax process to 
ensure or attempt to ensure horizontal, and indeed vertical equity, 
as it was only by reforming tax laws that inequities could be 
solved. It was, however, noted that reform also instigated other 
inequities. 
Blum and Pedrick (i986:100) noted that tax reform had to be 
implemented to the end that "equality in taxation" was the guiding 
principle so that "taxpayers in essentially equivalent 
circumstances should bear essentially equal tax burdens ... " . 
They suggested that "one of the great approaches to equality in 
taxation would be: if no one pays any tax then it would seem that a 
state of equality had been secured" (Blum & Pedrick 1986:101). 
This, however, completely precluded vertical equity as 
redistribution of wealth did not occur without a mechanism like 
taxation. 
The role played by politicians in the reform process was also a 
factor as elected officials tended to react to tax legislation with 
circumspection, considering "their" voters' interests. 
[P]olitical advisors would certainly care about horizontal 
equity. This is true of course since how people are treated 
is highly relevant to how they will react .... Finally, quite 
apart from the effects of violating horizontal equity on 
individuals, imposing requirements of equal treatment as a 
constraint might limit actions by imperfect government 
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institutions that do not in fact advance social welfare ... 
[It was suggested] on these grounds that permitting unequal 
treatment may make arbitrary discrimination favoring certain 
interest groups more likely. 
(Kaplow 1989:148+) 
Gwartney and Stroup (1986:112) referred to such discrimination in 
favour of certain interest groups, as "politically attractive 
transfers". A politician would consider the interests of "his" or 
"her" voters when deciding on tax laws as the voters were the ones 
who kept him/her in power. 
Just as self-interest is a powerful motivating force in the 
' 
market place, so, too, it is in the political arena. There 
is little evidence that politicians are an unusually 
altruistic class of citizens. But, even if they were, 
competition would force them to consider primarily votes 
when making political choices. 
(Gwartney & Stroup 1986:112) 
The following types of transfer activity that would help a 
politician win elections were identified: 
1) Transfers from many unorganized individuals to 
concentrated groups of well-organized individuals 
[with a] special interest issue that generates 
substantial personal benefits for a small group of 
constituents while spreading the cost widely over a large 
number of other voters. . . . [These] special interest 
groups also provide an important source of campaign 
workers and financial support. 
2) Transfers from future to present voters. Policies that 
provide easily observable, current (before the next 
election) benefits at the expense of future costs that 
are difficult to identify will also be attractive to 
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vote-conscious politicians. The pre-election benefits 
will enhance the image of the politician with the voters 
on election day. In contrast, post-election adverse 
effects that are difficult to identify will exert little 
negative impact. 
3) Transfers from the poorly informed and politically 
inactive to the better informed and more politically 
skilled. Persons with persuasive skills, 
organizational abilities, and financial resources will 
exert a disproportionate influence on the political 
process. 
(Gwartney & Stroup 1986:113-116) 
It was also stated that "given the nature of the political 
process, there is little reason to believe that egalitarian 
transfers will be very attractive to political entrepreneurs." 
(Gwartney & Stroup 1986:114). They noted that, despite the fact 
that the poor were a concentrated group, they were less organized 
and less likely to vote than persons in the higher income groups. 
According to Gwartney and Stroup (1986:115) only 36 per cent of the 
population (in the United States of America) aged 18 and over in 
households with an income of less than $12 500 voted in 1984, 
compared with nearly 60 per cent for the rest of the population and 
"[t]he voter participation rate for unemployed workers has 
consistently been only about two-thirds of the rate for employed 
workers". 
It was thus clear that equity was not that easy to achieve via a 
political process that favoured lobbyists with money and/or power 
to influence policy-makers to their advantage. 
Katz (1990:16) felt that tax reform in South Africa benefited from 
international experience, and that "[t]he political and economic 
issue of the distribution of wealth is an area in which tax can 
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play a crucial role, through the application of an efficient tax 
system". 
He saw the role of tax reform in contemporary South Africa as 
bringing about the distribution of wealth and providing an 
efficient tax system "that will enable the first world sector of 
our economy to grow so as to assist it to help the third world 
sector" (Katz 1990:17). He viewed the features of an efficient tax 
system as being "a broadening of the tax base; lowering of tax 
rates and the promotion of tax neutrality" (Katz 1990:18). 
Goetz (1978:798) noted the close connection between tax reform, tax 
avoidance and horizontal equity and said that 
[f]ew concepts in the area of taxation can generate more 
discussion and controversy than tax avoidance and tax 
reform. Debate over these issues is customarily framed in 
terms of the desire for or the departure from the criteria 
of horizontal and vertical equity .... In particular, it can 
be demonstrated that questions of tax avoidance and tax 
reform are inseparable from the definition of horizontal 
equity .... 
As regards tax reform and tax design he said that 
[p]leas for additional preferential treatment or complaints 
against the perceived inequities of existing preferential 
treatment mark public discussion of both taxation and 
regulation .... The process of designing a tax system 
contains the seeds of its own modification whether by 
piecemeal reform or by the capitalization of existing 
privilege. 
(Goetz 1978:807) 
Hettich (1983:417) demonstrated that, in order to reform the tax 
base, explicit preferences concerning both horizontal and vertical 
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equity must be incorporated and that evaluation of income tax 
reforms must take account of the existence of other taxes in the 
revenue system. Policy recommendations could then be concerned with 
removing the deviations or "loopholes" that were discovered. 
In an imperfect world where tax laws are affected by 
political changes, differences between actual tax payments 
and payments that would be imposed if a tax base closer to 
the ideal were in effect, can provide a reasonable guide to 
assessing equity. Other approaches to measurement may, of 
course, be possible. However, quantification of existing 
inequities is essential. As long as imperfections remain a 
feature of the tax system, it is improper to compare each 
deviation separately to the norm. The assessment of policy 
situations requires quantitative indices according to which 
imperfect situations as a whole can be evaluated and 
compared. 
(Hettich 1983:425) 
Mirrilees (1979:1) isolated equity and economic efficiency as the 
most important among the criteria that must be satisfied by the 
structure of principles of income tax reform for personal income 
tax and he argued that these two goals would best be met by a 
comprehensive definition of the income tax base. He noted that the 
integrity of the income tax structure was violated by legislative 
provisions justified by their incentive effect (Mirrilees 1979:7). 
Van Blerk (1990:12) concluded that the last decade has seen 
fundamental changes in taxation systems worldwide. He also noted 
that, after a hesitant start during the first half of the decade, 
the last five-year period has seen substantial declines in 
corporate tax rates, and even more substantial declines in maximum 
individual tax rates. There has also been a strong trend towards 
imposing one of two broad-based types of consumption tax. He asked 
"What of the next decade?", and noted that the trend towards value-
added tax would accelerate and that 
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[a]s far as direct tax is concerned, it is likely that the 
countries which impose corporate rates above 40% will move 
towards this figure at a steady but slowish pace. However, 
regarding individual tax rates, the target of higher tax 
rate countries is more likely to be 50% and a reasonably 
quick move towards this figure is quite probable. 
(Van Blerk 1990:12,13) 
It was noted that the maximum marginal tax rate for individuals in 
South Africa was declining. It was the intention of the Minister of 
Finance to have reduced this rate to 40 per cent within 5 years. 
From 1992 to 1994, however, no reduction was made in this rate (see 
Chapter 6) and the proposed maximum rate in the 1995 taxation 
amendments was 45 per cent (South Africa 1995:Schedule 1). 
To achieve horizontal equity the tax system must change. As this 
involved changing the legislative system, political input via 
Parliament was required. Politicians were seen to act in their own 
interest, in the interests of "their" voters and to favour causes 
which had strong lobbyists or which were favourites in the press. 
2.5.5 HORIZONTAL EQUITY AND INDIVIDUALS 
Horizontal inequities were most visible in the taxation of 
individuals. Single taxpayers were taxed at different rates from 
married ones, married women were taxed at their husband's top 
marginal rates and then paid a rate of tax different from other 
taxpayers. Also, a comparison of the tax burden between 
one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner families was difficult. 
The report of the European Parliament's Committee of Enquiry into 
the situation of women in Europe, "Memorandum on income taxation 
and equal treatment for men and women" (EC [European Community 
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1985:158) stated that taxation systems should be neutral as regards 
their effect on women's work. 
The memorandum noted that the proportion of women who worked in the 
European Community had increased from 33,5 per cent in 1970 to 37,5 
per cent in 1982 while men's activity rates remained static. It 
concluded that this increase appeared largely due to the increased 
participation of married women and mothers and the increase in 
single-parent families. This, together with the economic crisis, 
resulted in more and more women wanting and needing employment (EC 
[European Community] 1985:158). 
Income tax systems that were set up with the intention of 
benefiting the traditional family (ie husband working, wife 
at home or earning pin-money and with dependent children), 
entail in present circumstances a very heavy marginal 
taxation of the family's second income earner, and will, in 
many situations, serve as a strong disincentive for the wife 
to join the labour market. 
(EC [European Community] 1985:159) 
Another problem that the memorandum identified as affecting a 
number of women in the community was that of tax rules which had a 
restrictive effect on remuneration for the work done by the spouse 
of the head of a business. "Wages paid to a spouse are generally 
deductible from the taxable income of the head of the business only 
up to a certain ceiling, which inevitably limits the actual amount 
paid to that ceiling" (EC [European Community] 1985:159). 
A situation where the tax treatment of working women 
differs, in practice, from that of men, runs counter to the 
progress already achieved in promoting equality in 
employment, and may in cases where a woman finds net tax 
payment increasing upon marriage, act as a disincentive in 
her decisions relating to employment. 
(EC [European Community] 1985:159) 
73 
Atchley (1986:3) requested tax equality in spite of political ends 
and found the United Kingdom government's proposals for 
transferability of allowances between spouses to be far from 
acceptable when examined against the simple criterion of equal 
treatment of men and women, married or single: " ... [t]hat the new 
system should be fair as between men and women seems reasonable. 
The Government does not disagree. But as to whether there should be 
equal treatment of the married and the single- ... well, it seems 
the Chancellor wants it both ways". 
She noted that the mortgage interest relief that was given once 
only to married couples, the same as for a single person, might be 
seen as a penalty on marriage whereas the proposed transferability 
of allowances between husband and wife was "clearly discriminatory 
in favour of marriage" (Atchley 1986:3). 
How about the single adult daughter supporting her mother 
while working; or the parent whose unemployed youngster 
still lives at home .... Transferability would also lead to 
some high marginal rates of income tax generally 
discouraging wives from working. 
(Atchley 1986:3) 
Leuthold (1984:98-105) studied the effect of income splitting 
(dividing the combined income of husband and wife equally between 
them for purposes of income tax) on the participation of women in 
the labour force. Her study used data from the 1979 Michigan 
Survey of Income Dynamics to test the effect of income splitting on 
the labour-force participation of wives. "The results of a probit 
estimation showed that the elimination of income splitting and the 
introduction of individual filing would probably significantly 
increase the labour force participation of married women" (Leuthold 
1984:98). 
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Thompson (1988:143) criticized the United States system of income 
tax because it discriminated between individuals on the basis of 
marital status. 
Exemptions even vary depending on an individual's age (over 
65) and handicap (blindness). Plus, other legal entities, 
such as corporations, and trusts, estates, and other 
fiduciaries, all pay income taxes according to still other 
tax rate schedules. In every case, the tax treatment of 
income is not so much a function of the amount of income, as 
it is a function of the identity of the taxpayer. 
Sgontz (1984:249) studied the effect of a progressive tax applied 
to the aggregate income of a married couple. Both the primary and 
secondary earner faced the same marginal tax .rate. She found that 
the labour-supply elasticity of wives (who are usually secondary 
earners) was "greater than that of husbands, and for this reason a 
number of economists have asserted that a lower marginal tax rate 
for the secondary earner would increase efficiency". 
Blau (1984:200) proposed an explanation for the fact that while 
wages of married women contributed to equalizing the distribution 
of family wages, the equalizing effect declined during the early 
stages of the married life-cycle. This was normally the time when 
the wife stayed at home for a certain period to bear and rais~ 
children. 
Balcer and Sadka (1982:303) evaluated the common practice of 
allowing income tax credits (or exemptions) for dependent members 
of the household. They noted that most countries have incorporated 
"income tax credits or some imperfect variant of them for their 
income tax laws" and concluded that "tax credits are desirable if 
horizontal ~quity is desirable" (Balcer & Sadka 1982:305). In 
South Africa, however, no real credits were available to provide a 
measure of horizontal equity for spouses - the married woman's 
earnings allowance helped in this respect while it was in use. The 
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married woman was then subsequently taxed at her own tax rates 
which reached the maximum marginal tax rate at a taxable income of 
R50 000, compared with other tax classifications, but her marginal 
rate was lower than the other tax categories' rates. 
It was clear from the above that a serious problem existed as 
regards horizontal equity in the taxation of individuals. The 
equity problem arose mainly from the different tax units used to 
tax individuals and from the fact that families differed in size 
and in the number of working adults. Their tax treatment differed 
also from the treatment of single individuals in such a way that 
inequities were perceived. These inequities will be quantified 
later in this study. 
Horizontal inequities arose in the taxation of individuals by 
reason of the classification of individuals according to sex and 
marital status. The European Commission advised that the tax 
treatment of women, and especially married women, must be looked at 
as it was a disincentive to work as the "traditional family~ had 
come to entail a working wife. They also noted that equal 
employment opportunities must have equitable tax treatment. There 
were problems with horizontal equity, as a result of the tax 
classification, all over the world - in the United Kingdom, United 
States of America, Australia and elsewhere changes to the taxation 
system were continually being made in an attempt to adjust for 
this. Many significant changes in the way in which a married couple 
was taxed have been made overseas during the past decade. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
"[A] neutral tax syst~m is one which minimises as far as possible 
the impact of the tax structure on economic behaviour, including 
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business organisation, work effort and saving" (Neutrality and-, 
equity in taxation 1990:161). Marital status could be added here. 
The Margo Commission divided equity (which is closely linked to 
neutrality) into horizontal equity and vertical equity: 
The former requires that similar individuals be treated 
similarly or that persons in the same situation be treated 
equally or that individuals and families in similar 
circumstances bear the same taxes. Vertical equity, on the 
other hand, requires that those in different circumstances 
bear appropriately different tax. 
(Neutrality and equity in taxation 1990:161) 
Coleman (in The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics) (1987:169) 
considered an equal distribution of benefits as "natural, self 
evidently right and just, and needs no justification, since it is 
in some sense conceived as being self justified." He said that 
equality needed no reasons, only inequality needed reasons; that 
simi 1 arity, "uniformity, regularity, 
specially accounted for, 
behavior, changes in conduct, 
justification ... •. 
symmetry, ... need not be 
whereas differences, unsystematic 
need explanation and, as a rule, 
In this chapter a literature review of horizontal equity was made 
starting with the definitions of equality and equity and 
progressing through to the problems encountered with horizontal 
equity. The word •equity•, which denoted more of a •fairness", a 
"justice" among people rather than the mathematical precision 
implied by "equal", was considered the more correct term to use 
with the concept of horizontal equity. It was also used most often 
in the literature researched. 
A short review of vertical equity was given for comparison purposes 
to indicate the justice or equity between rich and poor, the 
additional taxes paid by the higher earners being used to benefit 
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the less well-off. Horizontal equity was then defined as the equal 
treatment of persons in the same economic circumstances. 
Lastly, the following problems with horizontal equity were noted: 
-The difficulties in developing a measure of the horizontal 
inequities, and the inefficiencies and costs connected to 
horizontal inequities and the striving for equity 
-The provision of tax preferences, the capitalisation 
thereof and the subsequent use of these preferences for tax 
evasion 
-The role of Government political influences in formulating 
taxation legislation and tax reform 
The taxation of individuals and the horizontal inequities inherent 
therein will be researched further in this study. 
The following applications could be drawn for this study: 
Ever since taxation was first imposed it was clear that tax must be 
fair on the taxpayer and be perceived to be fair. A standard rate 
would mean that all were taxed equally but this would preclude a 
provision for welfare and vertical equity. Progressive rates must 
therefore apply. 
As social circumstances changed and tax systems became more complex 
and sophisticated, so the definition of the tax unit changed. This 
affected the perceived fair treatment. 
The tax unit used in South Africa differentiated between a married 
person (including taxable income earned by the wife) and an 
unmarried person. Since 1990, married women were a separate tax 
unit but a different rate schedule applied and higher taxes were 
levied on married women than on their spouses, although married 
78 
women had a lower maximum marginal rate and a lower tax threshold 
applied to them. 
The new South African constitution would demand equality for all 
and would not allow for discrimination on the grounds of gender and 
marital status. All taxpayers should be equal before the law for 
taxation purposes as well. 
In order to measure and achieve horizontal equity, the unit that 
was referred to should be the economic unit and not the tax unit. 
That is, not "equal tax treatment in equal circumstances" but equal 
or equivalent tax treatment in equal/equivalent economic 
circumstances or for the same economic units. 
Hamlin (1985:116) required the following three definitions for 
horizontal equity: 
- The group: here it will be the family or the 
breadwinner(s) or the household 
- A definition of equity: (for this study) the same tax 
treatment of families/breadwinners in the same economic 
circumstances 
- The nature of the political environment: in the "new" 
South Africa equality is strongly favoured above equity. 
Other writers who favoured the family or family-related equity were 
Ringen (1991:1), who concluded that equality improved in Norway on 
a household basis, Habib (1979:283), who felt that families should 
be treated equally in a system of transfers and taxes, Blum and 
Pedrick (1986:100), who said that taxpayers in equivalent 
circumstances should bear equal tax burdens, Balcer and Sadka 
(1982:203), who worked on family size and the tax exemptions based 
thereon, and Hettich (1983:417), who required equal tax treatment 
of persons in the same economic circumstances. Lilla (1986:140) 
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also concluded that the family was important as the unit of 
analysis. 
Equal tax treatment with one unit for all taxpayers was required, 
while a solution was needed to provide equity, horizontal equity, 
for equal or fair treatment of households so that in a 
two-breadwinner household the married woman was not treated 
unfairly or did not have an unfair tax liability. Also, the 
breadwinner in a one-breadwinner household had to have some tax 
concession for having dependants. 
The required horizontal equity would only be achieved by way of tax 
reform provided by politicians. This research will indicate which 
reforms suggested for improving horizontal equity, if any, would be 
considered politically attractive, that is, favoured by the 
politicians as advantageous to their voters. 
Tax reform could create tax preferences and this research must also 
indicate the extent to which such preferences could be capitalized 
and used for tax avoidance and evasion. 
The next chapter will consider the taxation provisions for 
individuals in the most prominent Western countries in order to 
establish a comparative base for the measurement of horizontal 
equity in other countries and to compare these provisions with 
current South African provisions. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2 the definition of horizontal equity was discussed with 
special reference to horizontal equity between individuals and with 
regard to the taxation of married couples. It was clear that the 
achievement of equity was an elusive goal and the reduction of 
inequity was the most that could be hoped for. 
In this chapter the taxation systems in a number of Western countries, 
in respect of the taxation of individuals, will be reviewed. 
Reference will be made to the treatment of married individuals and the 
separate taxation of married women, or alternatively, the choice of 
the married couple to be taxed separately or jointly. 
This review was necessary as the taxation system in South Africa 
evolved from those in the United Kingdom and other European countries 
and it has followed, albeit slowly, the tax reforms . introduced 
overseas. Commissions investigating the taxation system in South 
Africa, for example the Margo Commission (1987) and the Franszen 
Commission (1969) have investigated overseas systems and referred to 
research done in other countries on the matter of taxation· reform, 
equity and taxation of married couples (refer to Chapter 5 of this 
study where the problems encountered by the Margo Commission are 
discussed in detail). The steps taken towards separate taxation in 
other countries could also serve as an indication for South Africa in 
this respect. 
3.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
According to Cronje (1985:19), the first income tax act in the world 
was adopted in 1799 in the United Kingdom. She also noted that from 
1710 in France King Louis XIV levied a tax of 10 per cent on income, 
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and from 1820 in Prussia taxes were raised on the household's income 
{Cronje 1985:86,111). In the United States of America married 
couples were taxed as separate individuals under the initial version 
of the modern individual income tax act enacted in 1913 (United States 
Congress Joint Committee on Taxation 1980:3,19). 
Thus, only since the nineteenth century, with the exception of France, 
were income taxes levied and in the nNew World" {outside Europe) 
income taxes were introduced only from the beginning of the twentieth 
century. 
THE TAX UNIT 
The tax unit may be the individual, the company, the close corporation 
or various other units, depending on the country that levied the tax. 
Individuals, however, may marry. In many Western countries; the 
married couple was considered to be the tax unit. This 'unit'comprised 
two people, which previously were individually responsible for tax. 
The married couple was considered to function as an economic unit 
using one house or dwelling for both individuals and thus saving on 
rent, furniture and even food, as a result of economies of scale, when 
compared with a single individual who lived on his or her own. 
The adoption of the married couple as a tax unit for purposes of 
income tax must be viewed against the background of social 
history. The prevailing system of assessing the married couple 
as a tax unit was introduced in 1914, many years before married 
women in South Africa started entering the labour market in 
increasing numbers. The system is moreover related to the basic 
law regarding community of property, in terms of which the 
woman's property ceases to be hers upon marriage, in the sense 
that she cannot, without her husband's consent, alienate property 
or enter into contracts. 
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The question of the married couple as a tax unit where both 
spouses are employed has been the subject of scrutiny since 1951, 
the time when married women started entering the labour market in 
large numbers. 
(Wessels 1977:11,12) 
This chapter will review the tax unit adopted in various Western 
countries in order to be able to compare the different systems with 
the system used, and the changes made to this system, in South Africa. 
A review of those Western countries whose peoples formed the basis of 
the South African population and which had more or less the same 
social circumstances as those prevailing in South Africa, will be 
reviewed. A short review of the taxation of individuals in certain 
eastern countries is also given for comparative purposes. 
3.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES 
The taxation of individuals in the following Western countries will be 
reviewed here: the United Kingdom, United States of America, Australia 
and certain European countries, with limited reference to the 
Scandinavian countries. 
3.3.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM 
As South African tax legislation was taken mainly from the legislation 
of the United Kingdom, its system of taxation of individuals will be 
discussed first. 
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3.3.1.1 History 
The first income tax act was adopted in 1799 in the United Kingdom and 
in 1806 the wife's available income (profit) was already considered to 
be her husband's for income tax purposes. In 1894 it was provided that 
where a married couple's income did not exceed £300, the wife would 
be entitled to the same tax deductions as an individual. It was only 
in 1909, with the introduction of super tax by means of progressive 
tax rates, that the principle of joint taxation resulted in a higher 
tax category for married couples than for single individuals. Since 
1914, however, the husband and wife could choose to be separately 
assessed and from 1918 the married man was allowed a deductible 
allowance in respect of his wife. (Cronje 1985:31) 
A Royal Commission on Income Tax in 1920 expressed the view that the 
joint taxation of husband and wife was not based on the wife's 
submissiveness but on the rule of taxable capacity. Their report 
resulted in a higher rebate/deduction for the married man and another 
deduction from the wife's earnings. This amount was raised to the 
rebate claimable by a single person in 1942. Pay-as-you-earn (PAVE) 
rates for the working wife were used from 1948. (Cronje 1985:32-33) 
In 1971 the wife was allowed to choose whether her earned income 
should be taxed as if she was unmarried and from 1978 a married woman 
was entitled to her own PAVE repayments and to have any correspondence 
in connection with her tax matters addressed to her and not to her 
husband (Cronje 1985:34). 
In 1978 the Institute for Fiscal Studies under chairmanship of Judge 
Meade (1978:377-8) listed the "conflicting criteria for the choice of 
tax unit" and noted that "the treatment of the tax unit must 
inevitably be a matter of compromise between a number of conflicting 
considerations". 
During December 1980 another report on the taxation of married couples 
was tabled in Parliament and the following four possible systems were· 
discussed: 
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An extension of the then current system 
The optional separate taxation of both earned and investment 
income 
The forced separate taxation of married couples with 
transferable allowances 
The forced separate taxation of married couples with cash 
benefits 
The system in operation during the eighties was criticised because it 
was not marriage neutral, it did not ensure privacy of the married 
woman's tax matters and problems arose when the allowances had to be 
allocated between the marriage partners. Furthermore, the husband was 
responsible for the payment of both his and his wife's tax. (Cronje 
1985:38-46) (More or less the same criticisms were levelled at the 
South African system in representations made to the Margo Commission 
{Chapter 5).) 
The deduction allowed to a married couple, where both spouses worked, 
was 2,5 times the deduction allowed to individuals and 1,5 times the 
allowance granted to a married couple where the husband was the only 
breadwinner. Although the wife could choose to be taxed separately on 
her earned income from 1971, less than 3 per cent of married women 
exercised this choice in 1977. Her investment income was still taxed 
in the hands of her husband. There were also problems of justice with 
the tax deductions allowed to two married persons over the age of 
sixty-five, compared with the deductions allowed to two unmarried 
individuals. A married man and his wife {both over the age of 
sixty-five) were only entitled to a total deduction of £4 255, which 
was less than the deduction allowed to two unmarried individuals 
(Cronje 1985:47-49) 
In 1985 Foreman noted the implications of divorce on the income tax 
payable and said that tax planning was necessary not. only when 
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taxpayers were getting married, but also when a married couple was 
getting divorced. 
With a divorce the following should be considered for tax purposes: 
That relief be obtained for maintenance payments and mortgage 
interest paid on the former matrimonial home 
That matters be arranged so that any school fees can be paid from 
pre-tax income 
That capital gains tax implications of the divorce settlement be 
considered carefully [capital gains tax was not a concern of this 
study as it was not a tax levied in South Africa]. 
(Foreman 1985:16,17) 
He further noted that, for payments to be deductible, the payment had 
to be made under a legally binding agreement or by court order, if the 
payment was more than £143 (Foreman 1985:16). 
Ashby (1986:22) and Rayney (1989:102) considered the tax advantages of 
marriage and the family. Ashby noted examples of how to "use marriage 
to your fiscal advantage", especially when a husband employed his wife 
or vice versa, and how savings affected the tax of a married couple. 
Rayney (1989:102) also mentioned that value could be extracted from 
the family company primarily by emplo.ying the proprietor's wife. He 
did note, however, that "[f]rom 6 April 1990 husband and wife will be 
subject to the new independent tax rules ... from a tax viewpoint, it 
becomes largely irrelevant whether the wife receives earned income or 
investment income" and that "[a] proprietor ... may transfer some of 
his shareholding to his wife ... to divert dividend income into her 
hands". 
If the couple elected to be taxed separately on their earned incomes, 
it was "almost as if they are not married". The tax return was still 
completed in the same way, but all investment income was assessed as 
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the husband's income. Jackson (1985:98} pointed out that the choice 
to be taxed separately was mostly beneficial if the couple was to be 
taxed at higher rates. If the election to be taxed separately was 
made, however, the husband received the single person's personal 
allowance instead of the married man's allowance. 
At the same time the wife's taxable earned income is no longer 
treated as the 'top-slice' of the family income which may be 
liable to higher rates of taxation. The benefit arises from a 
reduced liability at the higher rates, thus the election can only 
be beneficial when the combined income is liable to higher rates. 
(Jackson 1985:98) 
3.3.1.2 Current practice 
British tax law changed and with effect from 6 April 1990, married 
persons were taxed as separate individuals. This was considered by 
Smith (1990:49) to be "the most radical change in taxation since the 
introduction of personal tax in any form". It treated husband and wife 
as completely separate individuals for both income tax and capital 
gains tax purposes. This meant that each spouse was responsible for 
his or her own tax return, was assessed on his or her own income and 
gains, and was given tax relief for his or her own tax deductions and 
allowances. The investment income of the wife and any pension she 
received as a result of her husband's contributions was now taxed in 
her hands. {Ernst & Young 1991:475 and Seymour 1990:92) 
Although each person received his or her own tax allowance, a further 
allowance, called a married couple's allowance, was also initially 
given to the husband. If the husband's income· was not sufficient to 
utilize all of the married couple's allowance, then the unused portion 
could be claimed by the wife (Ernst & Young 1991:475). This allowance 
was severely criticised as a "manifest injustice" by Robinson and 
Stark (1988:56). It cost the British taxpayer £0,7 billion to provide 
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childless two-earner couples relative to two single people living 
apart" ... with £400 per annum for life" (Robinson & Stark 1988:56). 
The two-earner couple received higher allowances than two single 
people but, according to Robinson and Stark (1988:56), "allowances are 
usually justified by the existence of dependants such as children or a 
non-working spouse". A child allowance could only be claimed until the 
child became independent. The new British law and married couple's 
allowance favoured marriage and was not neutral to it (Robinson & 
Stark 1988:48-56). 
According to the commentary in Certified Accountant on the 1993 
budget, relief for "the married couple's" allowance and the "other 
allowances and reliefs linked to it, is to be restricted to 20 per 
cent for 1994/95, and 15 per cent for 1995/96" (The UK Budget 
1993:vii). This allowance was, however, increased for those aged 
sixty-five and over. Thus, the perceived inequity was phased out. 
Income from jointly held assets was divided equally between the 
spouses and taxed accordingly. However, if the husband and wife were 
beneficially entitled to unequal shares of the capital invested in 
certain property and the income therefrom or either spouse was 
beneficially entitled to the capital or income to the exclusion of the 
other, it was possible to make a declaration to Inland Revenue for the 
income to be assessed in accordance with the beneficial interest 
(Ernst & Young 1991:475). Seymour (1990:95) noted that it was "[a] 
possibility for the high income spouse to transfer assets into joint 
names so that each of them will be taxed on fifty per cent of the 
income or make an outright gift of assets to the low income spouse". 
Other tax advantages 
interest that could be 
to have a part of it. 
included mortgage tax relief for qualifying 
shared by husband and wife if they both elected 
Before 1 August 1988 each person (if not 
married, but living together) could get relief on a loan of up to 
£30 000 for mortgage interest, but later loan relief was limited by 
reference to a £30 000 loan per main residence. Here the achievement 
of equity was attempted as unmarried couples previously enjoyed an 
advantage as a result of the system of loan relief per person. 
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Business expansion scheme relief was also available to both 
individuals, up to an annual limit, but only against the husband's or 
the wife's own income. Breadwinner wives were able to get the married 
couple's allowance - it could be transferred to her from her husband 
and she could even be able to transfer her husband's personal 
allowance to herself (Seymour 1990:92). The claim for transferability 
of the married couple's allowance had to be submitted before the start 
of the relevant tax year (Budget 1992. 1992:44). 
Seymour (1990:93) also discussed ways of shifting taxable income into 
the most appropriate year when getting married and warned a married 
couple to think carefully before opening a bank account and making 
other business-related choices, as a joint account had different tax 
implications and the couple might wish the lower-income spouse to earn 
the investment income. 
It was now possible for the wife to get tax relief in providing for 
her pension, whereas in the past the couple saved no tax by providing 
for pensions if the wife's income was reduced by allowances. From 
1990/91 the wife's personal allowance could be set off against her 
investment income, leaving her earned income to be reduced by pension 
contributions (Seymour 1990:95). 
The disadvantage, as pointed out by Seymour (1990:92), was that 
spouses were no longer able to set off losses against each other's 
income buf she suggested that if "relief for the loss is likely to be 
protracted it is worth considering whether to bring the spouse in as a 
business partner". 
Dilnot, Johnson and Stark (1990:31) noted in research carried out by 
them in 1990 that "the main group to lose will be single-earner 
couples where the wife is working" (although the husband's allowance 
could be transferred) and the "main gainers will be two-earner couples 
who paid any higher rate under the old system, including those who 
used to elect to be taxed separately ... ". 
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The latest changes included simplified tax for the 
which was basically an administrative simplification, 
assessment system (White 1993:65-71). 
self-employed, 
and the self-
Until 1992 there were only two rates in the United Kingdom, namely 25 
per cent for income up to £20 700 and 40 per cent for income in excess 
of this amount. Another tax rate of 20 per cent, which applied to the 
first £2 000 of taxable income, was introduced in the 1992 budget. 
Taxpayers were also entitled to a personal allowance exempting £3 005 
from taxation and the husband received the married couple's allowance 
of £1 720. This allowance was also available to single parents and 
newly-bereaved widows/widowers. Personal and age allowances were to 
be increased in line with inflation in the 1992 budget, except for the 
married couple's allowance for those aged under sixty-five which 
remained at its 1991 levels (Ernst & Young 1991:476-7). The lower 
rate band of 20 per cent was extended by £500 in the Finance Act 1993 
to cover taxable income of up to £2 500 and up to £3 000 for 1994/1995 
(Muray & Moncrieff 1993:42). 
White (1991:166-175) predicted changes in the taxation legislation in 
the United Kingdom in future, noting that self-assessment would be the 
way in which taxes would be assessed in future. There would also be a 
more pronounced line between acceptable versus non-acceptable 
avoidance. Another influence in the United Kingdom in future would be 
the advent of the European common market and White noted that the 
harmonisation of the European Economic Community would affect United 
Kingdom tax legislation in future (White 1991:175). 
In order to prevent income-splitting, or to attempt to prevent it, 
under the new system of separate taxation of married couples 
introduced in 1990, the Chancellor proposed in his Budget to make 
changes to the income tax rules for gifts between husband and wife and 
for some other settlements (Independent taxation 1989:559). These 
changes followed the personal tax reforms in the previous year's 
budget, and the rules for settlements operated in a way that was 
consistent with the Government's objectives for independent taxation 
of husband and wife. 
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The changes will ensure that when independent taxation begins in 
April 1990 income from simple outright gifts of assets between 
husband and wife and certain pensions allocated between them will 
be taxed as the income of the recipient, and not as the income of 
the person making the gift or allocation. 
There will also be a change in the income tax treatment of some 
trusts where the person who made the trust, or the husband or 
wife of that person, is able to benefit from the trust income or 
capital. Beneficiaries of the trusts affected will not be able 
to claim payment of the basic rate tax suffered by the trustees. 
This will stop trusts being used to obtain the tax advantages 
which are no longer available through covenants. The change will 
take effect immediately for trusts made on or after today. Some 
existing trusts will be affected when independent taxation 
begins. 
(Independent taxation 1989:559) 
It was clear that a continuous process of reform was taking place in 
the United Kingdom in an attempt to provide equality for both sexes 
and for one-breadwinner families and for equity in the tax treatment 
of individuals, although there were still groups of taxpayers wh~ 
considered that their tax treatment was not equitable when compared 
with others. 
Separate taxation of husband and wife was introduced in the United 
Kingdom in 1990. This was also the goal for South Africa. South 
African legislators should also note the provisions made for single 
breadwinners or one-breadwinner families. The fact that certain 
allowances were transferable between the spouses and that allowance 
was made for children, could be considered for application in the 
South African context too. 
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3.3.2 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
3.3.2.1 History 
The federal income tax system began in 1913 with the ratification of 
the 16th amendment to the United States Constitution (Cook 1981:7). 
This Act levied taxes on income according to legal title as determined 
by state property laws. Subsequent legislative changes led to the 
current system in which couples could choose to be taxed as a couple 
or individually. 
The period 1913-1947 
The first income tax law enacted in 1913 required married individuals 
to file separate returns if each had income. Although most of the 
states of the "union" derived their property law from English common 
law, a few states adopted their laws from Spain. The "so-called 
'community property law' recognized an equal claim of the spouses to 
income attributable directly or indirectly to the efforts of either 
partner after marriage" (Cook 1981:7). 
This meant that married couples who lived in community property states 
could split their income and each paid tax on half of the joint 
income, whereas spouses in other states had to pay tax on their own 
actual incomes. Before World War II, the wife normally stayed at home 
and the husband was the only earner in the family. This meant that 
residents in community property states had a considerable advantage 
over residents in other states as the same progressive rates were 
applied. (Cook 1981:8) 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the community property laws of 
Washington, Arizona, Louisiana and Texas for federal income tax 
purposes in court cases in 1930 (United States Joint Committee on 
Taxation 1980:19-21). 
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As the tax rates increased during the Second World War, the income tax 
benefits for the community property states also increased and other 
states started adopting community property laws. This resulted in the 
Revenue Act of 1948 which enacted the "community property" principle 
for federal income tax purposes in all states of the United States. 
This meant that couples who filed jointly were actually taxed as two 
single persons who each earned one-half of the couple's total income 
(United States Joint Committee 1980:22). 
Income splitting brought order into this chaotic situation almost 
immediately by making property arrangements between husbands and 
wives irrelevant from the standpoint of income tax 
administration. The 1948 legislation re-established tax 
equality among residents of all states in that, for federal tax 
purposes, it permitted total family income to be treated 
independently of state property laws. From then on, virtually 
all married couples in the United States aggregated and split 
their incomes, although they were entitled under the law to be 
taxed separately. 
(Cook 1981:8,9) 
The period 1951-1969 
As the 1948 Act basically created two rates of income taxation, (one 
for married couples filing jointly, and one for all other individual 
taxpayers) the. single taxpayer was discriminated against. This 
resulted in a third set of tax rates being enacted in 1951 for "heads 
of households" who were single taxpayers with certain dependants 
(United States Joint Committee 1980:23). These rates were more 
advantageous than the rates applied to single persons. 
The Revenue Act of 1964 brought about a general reduction of income 
tax rates, divided the brackets so that t~ere were more brackets, and 
carried graduated rates downward (which "extended the benefits of 
income splitting to low-income joint filers" (Cook 1981:10)). 
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Changes were also made to the deductions allowed from income, namely a 
standard deduction of $300 plus $100 for spouses and each dependent 
or, alternatively, the old 10 per cent of gross income deduction. 
Both deductions were limited to a maximum of $1 000. This meant that 
two single people could claim a total of $600 whereas they would only 
get a deduction of $400 if they were married (Cook 1981:10). This was 
a change in favour of single filers. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 had, as its main purpose, the "closing of 
loopholes to privileged classes" (Cook 1981:10). This change also 
provided lower tax for single filers who had been lobbying for lower 
taxes as they had been paying more tax than married couples at the 
same income levels since 1948. 
In 1969, Congress concluded that, while some difference between 
the rate of tax paid by single persons and married couples filing 
jointly was appropriate to reflect the additional living expenses 
of married taxpayers, the then current differential of as much as 
42 percent could not be justified on that basis. 
(United States Joint Committee 1980:23) 
The 1969 Act mandated into law the principle that, for any given 
amount of taxable income, the single return tax burden could not be in 
excess of 1,2 times the tax due on a joint return (Cook 1981:14). The 
Joint Committee refined the amendment by noting that "the new rate 
schedule was designed to impose on middle-income single persons tax 
liabilities no more than 20 per cent above those for married couples" 
(United States Joint Committee 1980:23). The law, however, was 
applicable to all single taxpayers and, whichever way it was defined, 
this was the creation of marriage tax for double earners and 
immediately perceived to be so by the general American public. From 
that day forth the fight was on to abolish the negative effects of 
joint taxation and, from 1972 to 1976, Congress and various Committees 
were kept busy debating the issue (Cook 1981:16-18). 
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The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 increased the standard deduction to 
16 per cent of income. It also enacted different minimum and maximum 
standard deductions for single and joint returns, namely $1 600 for 
single returns and $2 300 for joint returns. In the Tax Reduction and 
Simplification Act of 1977, the standard deduction was replaced with a 
flat amount called the "zero bracket amountn or "ZEBRA". This amount 
was set at $2 200 for single persons and heads of household and at 
$3 200 for married couples who filed jointly. This was an attempt to 
alleviate the marriage penalty. (Cook 1981:18) 
In a historical survey of the progressivity of the United States 
income tax, Roberts and Samson (1989:12) noted that 
[i]n part, this current low ratio is due to a relatively high 
initial rate (15 per cent) coupled with a quickly achieved, 
relatively low top tax rate (28 per cent) ... The historical 
variation in progressivity variables reflects a trial and error 
approach to refining tax equity. The income tax does represent a 
tax base that is flexible to the needs of government and 
society's concept of fairness. Thus, given the fluctuations in 
rates, brackets, and levels of exempt income, it seems safe to 
conclude that the changes will continue in the future in the 
continuing search for the elusive goal of the perfect tax system. 
In April 1980 a report was published by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation (United States Congress Joint Committee on taxation 1980) and 
there have been some subsequent changes to the income tax act. 
3.3.2.2 Current practice 
The applicable [United States] rate depends upon whether an 
individual is married or not and, if married, whether the 
individual files a joint return with his or her spouse. Certain 
individuals also qualify to file as a "head of household." 
(Ernst & Young 1991:487-488} 
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Although there were only three rates for the United States (namely 15 
per cent, 28 per cent and 31 per cent) an additional rate band was 
introduced in 1993. The rates applied at different income bands for 
the four different categories of taxpayer. Before 1993, these 
categories were as follows: 
A married couple who filed a joint return (the bands were 
$0-$34 000, $34 000-$82 000 and above $82 000) 
A married couple who filed separate returns (the bands were 
$0-$17 000, $17 000-$41 075 and above $41 075) 
A single individual (the bands were $0-$20 350, $20 350 -
$49 300 and above $49 300) 
A head of a household (the bands were $0-$27 300, 
$27 300-$70 450 and above $70 450) 
(Ernst & Young 1991:488) 
The bands for a married couple who filed separate returns were almost 
exactly half that of the married couple who filed a joint return and 
the single individual and heads of household were inbetween. The head 
of a household had the most advantageous rates for a single 
individual. To qualify for head of household status the taxpayer 
could not be married or could not be a surviving spouse and the 
taxpayer had to maintain as his home either a household as principal 
place of abode of dependents or either or both of his parents 
(Brazelton 1992:80). 
The ranges of taxable income were annually indexed for inflation. 
Some states and cities also levied tax in addition to the federal 
taxes. This could range from nil per cent to 12 per cent for the 
states, and up to 3,5 per cent for the cities and municipalities. 
(Ernst & Young 1991:488) 
There was also an "alternative minimum tax" (AMT) to "prevent 
individuals with substantial economic income from using preferential 
98 
tax deductions, exclusions and credits to reduce substantially or 
eliminate their tax liability" (Ernst & Young 1991:488). The higher 
of the AMT or the normal tax was payable. 
Where the married couple was taxed jointly one of the spouses could be 
held liable for the tax deficiencies of the other spouse, unless he or 
she could show that, on signing the return, he or she did not know and 
had no reason to know that there was an understatement and that the 
taxpayer could show that it was inequitable to hold her or him liable 
for the deficiency (Knight, Knight & Lee 1994:19-29). This meant that 
where spouses had elected to be taxed jointly and had signed the tax 
return they were both responsible for it and for the taxes and 
omissions of each other. 
Alimony was deductible by the person who paid it, while the person who 
received it was taxed thereon (Ernst & Young 1991:488). A taxpayer 
could claim the greater of itemized deductions or a standard deduction 
which, during 1991, was as follows: 
$5 700 for a married individual who filed a joint return 
$5 000 for a head of a household 
$3 400 for a single taxpayer 
$2 850 for a married individual who filed a separate return 
(once again, this was half the deduction of the 
married-filing-joint-return rate) 
(Ernst & Young 1991:489) 
Itemized deductions included medical expenses up to a certain maximum, 
certain interest expenses, charitable contributions made to qualified 
charities, income and property taxes, unreimbursed employee business 
expenses and certain other job-related expenses (Ernst & Young 
1991:489}. A personal exemption was also deductible by an individual 
who was not a dependant of another taxpayer. In 1991 this personal 
exemption was equal to an amount of $2 150. An additional personal 
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exemption was also deductible for a spouse when a joint return was 
filed, and additional personal exemptions could be claimed for each 
qualified dependant. These exemptions were phased out as the adjusted 
gross income of the taxpayer increased. (Ernst & Young 1991:491) 
Goldfield (1986:44), in reviewing the tax consequences of marriage, 
noted that "marriage fundamentally alters the income tax circumstances 
of the spouses", and he commented upon the importance of prenuptial 
agreements as "where the property goes" was crucial to be able to 
separate the property in the case of a divorce. 
He listed the advantages of joint returns and noted that the married 
couple who filed jointly could claim a bigger dependency exemption and 
that the limitations on deductions would be computed on an aggregate 
basis. Couples with one working spouse could provide retirement funds 
for the other spouse, whereas a disadvantage arose where the 
deductions decreased, for example the dependent child deduction and 
medical deductions, with the increase of the taxpayer's adjusted gross 
income. (Goldfield 1986:45-47) 
Employees were allowed to start up a "Flexible Spending Account" {FSA) 
for dependants (physically or mentally deficient children or a 
disabled spouse or parent) and children under the age of 13. These 
FSAs were tax deductible {Baxendale, Coppage & Attaway 1993:278-282). 
This allowed taxpayers to deduct provisions for dependants from tax 
instead of the usual low child rebates provided for in South Africa. 
In South Africa there were also no provisions for dependants other 
than children and supporting a disabled spouse or parent was at the 
taxpayer's own expense, without help from the Government. 
Smith, Ray and Farlow {1990:108-111) also discussed ways of using 
income shifting between family members to maximise family wealth. 
This did not only involve income splitting between spouses, which was 
a legal option, but also the shifting of assets or income in such a 
way that taxable income accrued to a family member in a lower tax 
bracket from a family member in a higher tax bracket. They did warn, 
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however, that these transfers could be subject to income, gift and 
generation-skipping transfer taxes. 
Gittelman (1989:394-396) and McCaffrey (1984:40-46) both discussed tax 
planning for divorce in the United States of America and pointed to 
the tax-saving possibilities. Alimony was deductible by the spouse who 
paid it and included in the income of the spouse who received it, but 
child support did not qualify as alimony, and no gain or loss was 
recognized on a transfer of property from an individual to a spouse or 
former spouse if the transfer was 11 incident" to the divorce, that is, 
if it occurred within one year of the divorce (Gittelman 
1989:394-396). Mintz (1993:4-9) warned, however, that transfers on 
behalf of a spouse, even during a divorce, could be liable for tax. 
Norton (1991:63,64) noted that "Washington aims to collect a bigger 
share of the income you earn in 1991" mostly by phasing out up to 
three per cent of the itemized deduction if the adjusted gross income 
of the taxpayer was more than $100 000 and personal exemptions were 
also reduced by three per cent for incomes of more than $150 000, 
leaving the maximum marginal rate for a family of four with an income 
between $150 000 and $275 000 at 34,1 per cent. 
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 increased income tax rates for 
individuals and did so retroactively: a new thirty-six per cent rate 
applied to taxable income over $140 000 for joint filers and surviving 
spouses, $127 500 for heads of household, $115 000 for single 
taxpayers and $70 000 for married taxpayers who filed separately 
(Griffin & Gonzalez 1993:96). This did not impact on the horizontal 
equity and it made no difference whether the married couple was taxed 
jointly or separately. 
The legislation of the United States of America made provision for a 
choice of tax unit for married couples, something that has not been 
recommended in South Africa. There were also various allowances and 
deductions that provided for the spouse and other dependants which 
could be a viable option for South Africa. There appeared to be 
greater horizontal equity in the United States of America as single 
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breadwinners were provided for by way of the "head-of-household" 
schedules and specific provision was made for most dependents, not 
only children. The married woman could, furthermore, choose to be 
taxed separately. South Africa could apply many of these tax 
principles to its benefit. 
3.3.3 GERMANY 
Germany has been levying taxes since the beginning of the previous 
century, but since then many changes have been made to the way in 
which individuals were taxed. 
3.3.3.1 History 
In 1820 Prussia enacted a law that imposed income tax per household. 
Every house owner, male or female, with their dependents had to pay an 
amount depending on their income. Persons without a home/household, 
paid half the tax due on their income. With the passage of time, 
certain family members were excluded from the tax unit and in the 1891 
income tax act of Prussia only the married couple remained as the tax 
unit of the household. All family members with own incomes were not 
considered to be part of the household. In 1906 the income tax act 
still only referred to the married couple as the tax unit and the 
income of a married woman was included in the income of her husband. 
This remained so until after the First World War. (Cronje 1985:86,87) 
Although the Income Tax Act of 1920 provided that the incomes of 
husband and wife were to be added together for tax purposes, it taxed 
separately income of the wife earned from a career carried on 
independently from her husband. From 1925 this also applied to the 
income from the wife's own business. In 1934, however, all income of 
a married woman was included in the family income for tax purposes in 
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an attempt to discourage women from working and to alleviate the high 
rate of unemployment in the country. (Cronje 1985:87) 
The act was changed with the advent of the Second World War as women 
were needed in the workforce. The wife's income from a career 
separate from her husband, was taxed separately, but not the income 
from her own business. This was to encourage women to work in the 
weapons factories. In 1951, couples were jointly taxed once more, and 
in 1953, the government decided against the splitting of a married 
couple's income but in 1957 it was provided that married men and women 
would be separately taxed. This was changed in 1958 by paragraph 32a 
of the Income Tax Act which provided that where married couples were 
taxed together their incomes were added together and divided by two. 
Married couples could choose to be taxed separately but it was to 
their advantage to use the system of splitting their incomes due to 
the sharply progressive rates in use. (Cronje 1985:90) In 1971 a 
taxation review committee reviewed the system and the Income Tax Act 
was amended in 1974. No real changes were made to the system of 
separate taxation. (Cronje 1985:94) 
3.3.3.2 Current practice 
A married couple in Germany could choose to add their incomes together 
and to use the tax tables for married persons, which basically meant 
that the tax was calculated on half of the income and then multiplied 
by two. It was only married couples, widows and widowers and people 
divorced under certain circumstances during the year of assessment who 
were allowed to use these married tables. (Cronje 1985:95) 
The effective tax rate for a married couple on a joint income of 
DM120 000 (24 per cent in 1991) was the same rate applicable to an 
income of DM60 000 for a single taxpayer in Germany. The maximum 
marginal rate in 1991 was 53 per cent for single taxpayers {at an 
I 
income of DM200 000) and 47 per cent for married taxpayers taxed 
together (for an income of DM200 000) {Ernst & Young 1991:159). 
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All tax-allowable deductions and expenses were granted "per taxpayer" 
so that the married couple normally received double the deductions of 
a single taxpayer even if they were taxed together (Ernst & Young 
1991:158-161). There were, however, some instances where the married 
couple was taxed as one taxpayer and where the single individual 
received the same tax advantages as the married couple. These 
instances were as follows: 
-A percentage of the income fro~ pension funds, annuities and 
unemployment funds was exempt from tax up to a certain 
maximum. This maximum was the same for the married couple and 
for the single taxpayer. The exemption applied only to 
employees. 
-Employees were entitled to a standard deduction which remained 
the same for a married couple taxed together. 
-Only one deduction, up to a certain maximum, was allowed per 
married couple or single taxpayer for consulting a tax 
expert. 
-Income from annuities was exempt up to a certain maximum. 
(Cronje 1985:102-103) 
The restrictions on the deduction of the standard deduction were 
lifted and a married couple could each claim the deduction of DM108 
per annum, thus a deduction of DM216 per couple. Employees could also 
receive a standard deduction up to OM3 510 (unmarried individual) or 
DM7 020 (married couple) for certain insurance payments (Ernst & Young 
1991:160). 
An income tax surcharge of 7,5 per cent was introduced by a draft bill 
and would apply from 1 July 1991 to 30 June 1992. This was to finance 
increased public expenditure (it was called a "solidarity" charge - to 
provide for the increased liability involved in uniting the two 
Germanys). It applied to withholding taxes on wages and income tax 
prepayments. (Ernst & Young Tax News International 1991:6 and Endres 
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1991:32.) Although the surcharge did not affect the joint/separate 
taxation issue, it did amplify whatever advantages and disadvantages 
there might have been, as the 7,5 per cent was charged on the tax 
already calculated. A similar charge was enacted in South Africa to 
pay for the 1994 election but this was more gender specific and 
favoured married women (see Chapter 6). 
The maximum tax deduction for residential property erected or acquired 
after 31 December 1990, was increased from DM15 000 to DM16 500 for 
the owner-occupier. The children's building illowance (a tax 
reduction in the first eight years after acquisition of a home based 
on the number of children) was also increased from DM750 to DM1 000 
per child (Endres 1991:32). 
The income tax system in Germany allowed couples the choice to either 
be taxed separately or as a married couple but without the penalties, 
that is increased marginal rates, imposed on joint taxation in certain 
other tax systems. This thus automatically provides for 
one-breadwinner families. 
3.3.4 FRANCE 
In France an income-splitting system was also in operation. Not only 
were the incomes of the husband and wife added together, but also the 
income of the entire household, and the taxes are then calculated, 
based on a coefficient system. 
3.3.4.1 History 
Louis XIV levied a tax of 10 per cent on all income in 1710. In the 
nineteenth century, during the revolution of 1848, an income tax act 
based on the British one was enacted and from 1871 to 1909 a great 
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number of changes were made to French income tax legislation (Cronje 
1985:111). 
During 1917, a consolidated income tax act was introduced whereby the 
income of the entire family was added together and taxed in the hands 
of the head of the household. In 1934 a surtax was added to the 
taxation of the unmarried taxpayer and in 1946 a family coefficient 
system was introduced which taxed married and unmarried persons 
according to the coefficient applicable to them. A value was 
allocated to each member of the family and the total income was 
divided by the number of the coefficient. The tax was calculated for 
a portion and the total tax was this portion times the number of the 
coefficient. This was based on the assumption that each additional 
member of the family increased the financial burden on that family and 
decreased the living standard of the family. (Cronje 1985:112) 
In January 1949 a proportional tax was introduced with a proportional 
surtax, but the income tax act in operation since 1960 replaced the 
proportional tax and surtax with progressive rates of income tax 
(Cronje 1985:113). 
3.3.4.2 Current practice 
A married couple had to file a joint return and report dependent 
children's income, if any. The family coefficient rules were still 
used to 
... combine the progressive tax rate with the taxpaying capacity 
of the household. Under the family coefficient system, the 
income brackets to which the tax rates are applied are determined 
by dividing taxable income by the number of allowances available 
to an individual. The final tax liability is then calculated by 
multiplying the tax computed for one allowance by the number of 
allowances claimed. 
(Ernst & Young 1991:142) 
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The allowances were as follows: 
Single individual 1 
Married couple with 
no children 2 
one child 2,5 
two children 3. 
There were, however, limits to the tax saving as the tax saving for a 
married couple was not allowed to exceed FF12 180 for each additional 
half allowance claimed (Ernst & Young 1991:142). 
Cronje (1985:117-119) listed a number of provisions that treated the 
spouses as separate individuals; provisions that gave spouses twice 
the advantage of unmarried taxpayers; provisions that gave spouses a 
bigger advantage than unmarried taxpayers and provisions that treated 
the married couple and the unmarried taxpayer in the same way. All 
were to the advantage of the spouses and were tax incentives that 
encouraged marriage in France. 
There were, however, only three instances identified by Cronje in 
1985, where the tax legislation was to the detriment of marriage and 
this included a tax credit given to taxpayers with a coefficient of 1, 
that is unmarried or divorced persons and widows and widowers without 
dependants, a credit not available to married couples. A taxpayer with 
a coefficient of 1,5 was also entitled to a tax credit, but a lower 
one than the taxpayer with a coefficient of 1, and an unmarried person 
with a taxable income lower than a certain amount could claim a 
deduction for each child younger than three years (Cronje 
1985:119-120). 
France considered the family and not the individual or married couple 
as the tax unit and solved the problem of higher marginal rates by 
using low rates and multiplying the taxation payable by the number of 
members in that family. In France the economic unit was considered to 
be the tax unit and as such no, or very few, horizontal equity 
problems in this respect occurred. In South Africa, however, this 
system would impact even further on the privacy and independence of 
107 
the married woman and would not be acceptable. It should be noted, 
however, that provision was made in France for single breadwinners and 
one-breadwinner families. 
3.3.5 CANADA 
In Canada the individual was the tax unit, but this drew a lot of 
criticism, mostly from single individuals as they felt that married 
couples enjoyed an advantage from the system, as the husband could 
receive additional allowances for a non-working or dependent wife. 
3.3.5.1 History 
During 1867, the parliament of Canada obtained the right to levy 
taxes. Income tax was, however, only levied for the first time in 
1917. Until 1941, all the provinces and the Central Government had 
the right to levy taxes. From 1948 a number of income tax acts were 
promulgated and amended and finally replaced in 1971 by a new income 
tax act. (Cronje 1985:125) 
From 1962 until presentation of their report in 1967, the Carter 
Commission considered the tax system and especially the unit of tax 
for individuals. They recommended that the family should be the unit 
of taxation but that either of the spouses must be able to choose to 
hand in a separate assessment and be separately taxed. (Cronje 
1985:126-131) 
There was a lot of criticism and the Government released a White Paper 
comprising suggestions for changing the tax system. They felt that 
the suggestion that the family must be the tax unit was tantamount to 
a tax on marriage (Cronje 1985:133). According to the changes brought 
about in 1971, the individual was the tax unit in Canada, but if one 
spouse had no or very little income, then the other spouse could 
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consider her or him as a dependant. The earner was then the only 
taxpayer. The personal income tax system in Canada has been indexed 
for inflation since 1974. (Cronje 1985:134) 
3.3.5.2 Current practice 
An individual living in Canada was taxed on his or her income (Ernst & 
Young 1991:63). Personal tax credits included a basic personal credit 
($1 068 for 1991) and credits for dependants, age, disability and 
educational and tuition fees (Ernst & Young 1991:67). Cronje 
(1985:135-139) listed the provisions that took into account the fact 
that the taxpayer was married and these ranged from an additional 
deduction for a dependent spouse, to a number of deductions and 
allowances that could be transferred from the one spouse, who could 
not use the entire benefit, to the other spouse. Both husband and 
wife could deduct a certain amount saved for a house from tax, whereas 
the single taxpayer received the deduction once only. 
A deduction allowed to the working married woman only, was the 
deduction of the expenses for having her children taken care of while 
she was working. This deduction was limited per child and per the 
number of children. It was, however, allowed to the husband if his 
wife was incapable of looking after the children if she was physically 
or mentally incapacitated, or in hospital, an institution or jail. 
(Cronje 1985:139) A taxpayer could claim a deduction from income for 
dependent children - the age limits were more or less the same as 
those used in South Africa until 1995 (Cronje 1985:141). Since 1980 a 
taxpayer was also allowed to deduct income paid to a spouse as 
remuneration (Cronje 1985:142). The changes to the South African 
Income Tax Act (section 7(2)) over the last few years have echoed this 
change. 
Separate taxation was the rule in Canada, but with allowances made 
for the married couple and especially the married working woman, the 
problems encountered with one-breadwinner families were reduced and 
the working married woman was also treated fairly by the tax system. 
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3.3.6 AUSTRALIA 
3.3.6.1 History 
The different states in Australia formed a Commonwealth in 1901. The 
Commonwealth first levied taxes on income received in 1915. The 
individual has always been the tax unit, but it was only in 1941 that 
a uniform tax was levied in all the states. From 1942 to 1950 
personal deductions were not allowed and during 1959 a tax committee 
was appointed to investigate certain aspects of the tax system. It 
made suggestions regarding tax deductions for age and this was 
accepted in 1964-65. {Cronje 1985:148-149) 
In 1972 a committee was appointed to investigate the entire Australian 
tax system and it tabled its final report in 1975. The system of 
separate taxation was widely criticised and the committee felt that 
individuals should have the choice to be taxed as a married couple or 
separately, but these recommendations were not accepted by the 
government and the individual remained the tax unit in Australia. 
(Cronje 1985:158) 
3.3.6.2 Current practice 
Although spouses were taxed separately at the same rates as single 
taxpayers, there was an exception regarding the dependent spouse who 
had a separate net income of less than A$282. The taxpaying spouse 
could claim a tax rebate up to A$1 296. {Ernst & Young 1991:11) This 
was the only concession for a married couple and alleviated, to a 
certain extent, the unjust treatment of one-breadwinner families. 
The tax rates for individuals were decreased in 1993 for taxable 
incomes up to A$50 000 and are to be decreased still further until 
1996 (Country survey 1993:39). The dependent spouse rebate was 
granted for couples with or without children (A$1 412 in 1993) and was 
dependent on separate net income. This rebate was phased out from 
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A$75 000 for families with dependent children and from A$50 000 for 
families without dependent children (Dependent spouse rebate 
1991:558). As from 29 September 1994 this rebate has been abolished 
and replaced by a "Home Child Care .. allowance (Richards 1993:56). 
This allowance was paid fortnightly in cash directly to the spouse at 
home caring for the children. The allowance was approximately A$150 
per annum more than the current maximum dependent spouse rebate 
(Legislation 1994:25). This meant that, although the breadwinner 
received no tax relief for the dependent ~~ouse, cash benefits were 
regularly received as compensation for the dependent spouse not 
working but raising children. This might well be an option in a 
country such as South Africa where poverty leads to problems and child 
care could be neglected. 
Payments made by an employer on behalf of a parent for work-based 
child care would also be tax deductible within certain limits (Work 
based child care 1992:20 and FBT child care exemption 1992:[304]). 
3.3.7 CERTAIN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES 
3.3.7.1 The Scandinavian countries 
Denmark 
Since 1970 the married woman was considered to form a separate tax 
unit in respect of her income from an independent business, personal 
wages, salaries, pension and similar income. Since 1982 income from 
capital was also taxed in the hands of the person who earned it but at 
a rate applied as if the income from investments was added to the 
income of the spouse earning the most from labour. (Cronje 1985:25) 
This meant that there was no need for income splitting. 
In 1991 income tax was levied at a flat rate of approximately 50 per 
cent on taxable income, which included a flat rate local tax ranging 
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between 22 per cent and 31 per cent, depending on the municipality of 
residence. An additional tax was levied at a flat rate of 12 per cent 
on personal income in excess of DKK227 200. If the sum of personal 
income and positive net capital income exceeded DKK155 100 {DKK310 200 
for a married couple), an additonal tax was levied at a flat rate of 6 
per cent on the excess. 
There were two personal deductions, namely a statutory deduction of 
3 per cent of personal income, with a maximum of DKK3 700, and a 
standard personal deduction with a tax value of approximately 
DKK13 500. The municipality of residence levied approximately half of 
the 50 per cent tax levied on the taxpayer. {Ernst & Young 
1991:104,105) 
Major tax reforms have been enacted since 1991 but did not impact on 
horizontal equity. There were no provision for one-breadwinner 
families in Denmark and this is similar to the new local trend. 
Finland 
Married couples were taxed on their joint income until 1975, then an 
income-splitting system was applied and finally, since 1976, spouses 
paid tax separately on all earned income but income from capital was 
still taxed jointly (Cronje 1985:24). Individuals were now taxed on 
their own investment income. Interest income on bank deposits and 
bonds were subject to a 10 per cent withholding tax, whereas dividends 
paid to residents were subject to normal income tax {Ernst & Young 
1991:135). 
Income tax was payable to the national government, the municipality 
and to the church {if the taxpayer was a member). Income included 
personal income as well as capital gains. There were only six tax 
brackets, from 7 per cent to 39 per cent, and municipal taxes varied 
between 14 per cent and 18 per cent of taxable net income. (Ernst & 
Young 1991:132) 
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Deductions and allowances, including payments to labour unions, 
medical expenses, pension funds and even travel expenses between home 
and work in certain instances, were deductible. The interest paid on 
loans to acquire a family home were deductible within certain maximum 
and minimum limits. In a family, a maximum deduction for interest was 
FIM24 000, but for a subsequent family house the tax limitation on 
annual deductible interest was FIM12 000, if only one spouse was 
entitled to the deduction, and FIM9 000 if both the spouses were 
entitled to the deduction. (Ernst & Young 1991:133) 
There was also an allowance for persons buying their first apartment 
or house but they had to own at least 50 per cent of a dwelling before 
they could deduct the allowance. An additional deduction was granted 
to taxpayers with one child and the deduction doubled if they had two 
or more children. (Ernst & Young 1991:134) There was also an 
allowable deduction from dividends, interest and rental income limited 
to a maximum deduction of FIM20 000. A deduction of FIM13 200 was 
granted for a child between the ages of three and seven, provided the 
child was supported by the taxpayer. This was the only personal 
deduction allowable for purposes of the national taxation on income. 
All the other deductions were for purposes of the local taxation on 
income and were mainly for children and to protect lower income groups 
from paying too much tax. (Ernst & Young 1991:132-134) 
Married couples in Finland were therefore taxed completely separately 
and no unfair advantages were given to either the unmarried or the 
married taxpaying individual, although one-breadwinner couples may 
have been treated less than fair. 
Norway 
During 1959, it became possible for the spouse with the lowest income 
to choose to be taxed as a single person, but the income from capital 
was still taxed jointly (Cronjd 1985:24). 
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In 1991 there were income-tax rates for single individuals, and 
married couples were assessed jointly on income from work, capital and 
business. A common tax was levied on taxable income for national 
income tax purposes at a rate of 5,5 per cent reduced by NOK20 700 for 
unmarried individuals and NOK41 400 for married couples (Ernst & Young 
1991:343) so that there was no discrimination whether the couple was 
assessed jointly or as single individuals. 
If the gross income was more than NOK207 000 (single individuals) or 
NOK249 000 (for married couples), excluding interest and dividend 
income, an additional "top" tax of 9,5 per cent was payable. Although 
the limit for the married couple was not double that of the single 
individual, it was still more than the single amount. An advantage 
for the single breadwinner couple was that they were allowed NOK42 000 
more income before the additional tax was levied. There was also a 
municipal income tax at a rate of 21 per cent on net income, excluding 
dividends, after deduction of a standard amount of NOK20 700 for 
unmarried individuals and NOK41 400 for married couples. {Ernst & 
Young 1991:343) 
Payments made for pension plans, alimony and interest on debts were 
allowed as deductions under certain circumstances. The personal 
allowances comprised a standard minimum allowance of 15 per cent of 
gross remuneration, with a maximum of NOK10 000 and a minimum of 
NOK3 200 (Ernst & Young 1991:343). 
The tax system in Norway provided both separate taxation {with its 
advantages for the working married woman) and tax acknowledgement of 
the one-breadwinner family. This resulted in more horizontal equity 
than in South Africa. 
Sweden 
The system of joint taxation in Sweden was replaced by compulsory 
separate taxation in 1970 and in 1976 income from business and farming 
was also taxed separately (Cronje 1985:25). Income was taxed at 
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local and national level and the tax rates depended on the area as 
well as the income earned. Dividend income, net interest income and 
income from rental activities were taxed as income from capital at a 
flat rate of 30 per cent, if not earned in connection with the 
operation of a business (in which case it was taxed at the rates 
applicable to the business). (Ernst & Young 1991:439-441) 
Deductions were allowed for interest expense, expenses for travel 
between home and work, payments for personal pension insurance, a 
general deduction and alimony (Ernst & Young 1991:440). No specific 
provisions were made for one-breadwinner families. 
3.3.7.2 The Netherlands 
From 1973, after 40 years of change in the income tax acts of the 
Netherlands, a married woman was herself taxable on her earned income. 
The tax rates were changed to a sliding scale and the same tariff 
applied to every taxpayer for every portion of his or her income. 
Deductions from income were allowed: the one for a married man was 
considerably higher than the one for a married woman and only the 
husband could claim a deduction for children. A single individual 
was allowed a deduction between that of the married man and married 
woman. Since 1984, unmarried persons living together were taxed in 
the same way as a married couple and since 1985 the unused portion of 
allowances was transferable between couples. (Cronje 1985:19) 
Personal deductions comprised a single-person supplement (of a certain 
age and with a limit on the taxable income), sole-earner supplement, 
single-parent supplement and an additional single-parent allowance 
(Ernst & Young 1991:313). 
Separate taxation for married couples was in operation in the 
Netherlands but with the advantage of the sole-earner supplement and 
various other deductions available to soften the blow on 
one-breadwinner families. 
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3.3.7.3 Greece 
Although spouses could be taxed separately in Greece, prov1s1on was 
made for one-breadwinner couples in the form of an increased personal 
allowance (Ernst & Youn~ 1991:170}. 
In Greece, social insurance contributions, medical expenses,. alimony 
paid, life insurance premiums, donations to the State and certain 
other organisations, and certain household and personal expenses such 
as for clothes, furniture, rental of residence were all deductible. 
(Ernst & Young 1991:170} 
There were also a number of personal allowances, namely for single 
taxpayers, for a married taxpayer if only one spouse had taxable 
income, for every child up to the fifth child and even for subsequent 
children and fifty per cent of employment income up to a maximum 
amount (Ernst & Young 1991:170}. 
Withholding taxes applied to dividends, but interest income was 
grouped with a taxpayer's other income and taxed at the regular rates 
except for interest on bank deposits which was taxed at 10 per cent 
(Ernst & Young 1991:171}. There was provision made for working, 
married women and for the one-breadwinner family. 
3.3.7.4 Ireland 
In the Republic of Ireland the individual was the tax unit, but a 
married couple could choose to be jointly taxed and the tax was then 
calculated on half the total income and multiplied by two. It was 
advantageous to choose to be jointly taxed if each member of the 
couple did not earn more or less the same income. (Cronje 1985:26} 
The Irish Government reviewed its four-year programme in 1991 and 
positioned tax reform within certain parameters, which included 
curtailment of a range of exemptions, allowances and concessionary tax 
rates on a phased basis and widening of the standard band of tax and 
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increasing the basic personal allowances in the "course of the next 
two budgets" (Irish taxation developments 1991:32). 
All income from employment and non-cash benefits which were normally 
taxed at the cost incurred by an employer, were taxed, although 
certain benefits, for example a company car and housing loans were 
valued according to specific provisions. There were two sets of 
rates: one for single or widowed individuals (where the income bands 
applicable to the rates were exactly half the rates applicable to 
married couples), and the rates for a married couple jointly assessed. 
(Ernst & Young 1991:216-217) 
Investment income was taxed and dividend tax depended on the amount of 
tax already paid by the Irish company, which was credited to the 
benefit of the individual. Certain Irish dividends were exempt and 
interest on most bank and building society deposits had a withholding 
tax of 30 per cent. (Ernst & Young 1991:219) 
There was little scope for claiming expenses against taxable income, 
but there were a number of allowances where the 'married couple 
jointly assessed' normally had an allowance that was double that of a 
single person. There were also allowances for widowed persons. These 
were the same as the married allowance in the year of bereavement and , 
slightly more than the allowance for a single person in subsequent 
years. There were no allowances for children, but 80 per cent of 
mortgage interest could be claimed, up to a certain maximum (the 
married couple maximum was double that for a single person). 
Allowances for medical insurance, pension contributions, life 
insurance and business expansion schemes or research were also made 
from income (Ernst & Young 1991:218). Although the Irish taxation 
legislation provided for the working married woman, no real provision 
was made for one-breadwinner families or taxpayers with other 
dependants and, as such, this system would not enhance horizontal 
equity in South Africa. 
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3.4 DEVELOPMENTS IN CERTAIN EASTERN COUNTRIES 
Although this study did not concern itself with horizontal equity in 
eastern countries, it was interesting to note the tax treatment of 
individuals in certain of those countries. 
In Asia the treatment differs depending on the country. For 
individuals living in Brunei there was no ta~. Although the 
legislation provided for the imposition of individual tax it was not 
introduced and only companies were taxed. In the Phillipines 
exemptions were given to improve equity and these were determined on 
the basis of status and number of dependants. Thailand had personal 
deductions for the taxpayer, the spouse and children and there was 
separate tax for the wife's income earned from employment. Indonesia 
had additional allowances for a married taxpayer, and an allowance 
equal to the one for an individual for the wife working independently 
from her husband and family and for each dependant. (Rolt 1986:1-122) 
In the former USSR a certain percentage was allowed as a deduction 
from taxable income if the taxpayer supported more than a specified 
number of dependants (Ernst & Young 1991:504). In Poland each member 
of the married couple was taxed on half of their joint income and 
there was no relief relating to a dependant spouse or children 
(Chrusciak 1992:24). 
Even former Eastern Block countries provided some measure of relief 
for both married women and one-breadwinner families. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the history of income taxation of individuals in the 
more prominent Western Countries was reviewed from the first income 
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taxation systems introduced in the eighteenth century to the current 
systems. 
While there were three basic systems, there were many variations 
depending on the country under review. Variations such as complete and 
compulsory separate taxation, often with transferable allowances 
between spouses (for example, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Greece); allowance for 
the married couple to choose whether to be taxed as a couple or 
separately (the United States of America, Norway and the Republic of 
Ireland); adding the married couple's incomes together and taxing 
each on half of the income, in other words splitting the total income 
for income tax purposes (for example Western Germany and France). In 
France a family was taxed together on the coefficient system. 
Individual investment incomes were sometimes considered to be the 
income of the highest earning spouse. 
Most of the countries reviewed followed the trend of taxing married 
couples as separate individuals, while previously the couple was taxed 
as a unit, or they had the choice to be taxed separately or jointly. 
Almost everywhere there was some kind of provision for single 
breadwinners ranging from transferable allowances (United Kingdom) to 
additional personal exemptions and even separate rate schedules 
(United States of America). 
Often these allowances or rebates were phased out as the income 
increased. This was not horizontally equitable as, where both spouses 
worked and earned income, they both received certain tax exemptions 
that were only allowed once to the one-breadwinner taxpayer. 
What was clear from this chapter, however, was that the tax systems of 
most countries attempted to provide a solution to the one-breadwinner 
dilemma and compensation, in one way or another, for child care 
(either for the working married woman or a cash benefit to the wife 
caring for her children at home). These solutions will form the basis 
for certain of the recommendations in Chapter 7. 
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4.8 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1990 YEAR OF 
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4.12 CONCLUSION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter the history of the taxation of individuals 
in certain western countries was reviewed. The specific provisions 
relating to the current taxation of married couples and individuals 
in certain western countries were considered. This provided a 
broad overview of the taxation of individuals in a historical and 
international context and of the ways in which tax legislators in 
these countries attempted to address the problem of horizontal 
equity in relation to individual taxpayers. 
The purpose of this chapter is to put the taxation of individuals 
in South Africa into perspective. The history of income 
from its introduction in 1916 and the changes in 
legislation, as it affected the individual, are given. 
taxation legislation on individuals from the 1985 to the 
taxation 
taxation 
As the 
1994/1995 
years of assessment are discussed and evaluated in Chapter 6, only 
amendments relevant to this study are discussed in this chapter. 
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Although changes in taxation legislation have occurred since its 
inception, it was only during the last twenty to twenty-five years 
that far-reaching changes were made to the way in which the married 
couple was taxed. Changes such as the married woman's earnings 
allowance and, earlier, the rating formula, was applied to the 
married couple's earnings. The tax unit (being either a single 
individual or a married couple) was changed completely over the 
years with the gradual phasing-in of the "married woman" as another 
tax unit. The "married person" and the "married woman" were taxed 
separately and not as part of the married couple, except under 
certain circumstances. The 1995 amendments did away with any 
discrimination and only one tax unit and one set of rates would 
apply from the 1996 year of assessment (South Africa 1995). 
4.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE PRIOR TO 1984 
4.2.1 FIRST TAX LAWS AND CHANGES 
The first form of taxation in South Africa was m1n1ng tax under Act 
6 of 1910. Income tax for individuals was introduced for the first 
time in 1916 {Act 35 of 1916) when income tax was levied on annual 
incomes of more than £300. The £20 deduction for children {section 
3{d)) and a £25 deduction as "life or accident or sickness 
insurance premium on his own or his wife's life" {section 3(a)) was 
the only indication that the taxpayer was considered to be a 
married male and that the wife was taxed together with her husband. 
No other discriminatory statements referring to the wife or women 
were included in the Act. There were also no differential or 
marginal rates or any additional charges made which referred to a 
spouse. 
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In 1916, women, especially married women, did not really form part 
of the work force. They were perceived as housewives and mothers 
who did not work outside of the home. 
In 1917 for the first time it was specifically stated that the wife 
was taxed together with her husband. Act 41 of 1917 deemed a 
wife's income to be her husband's until the death or insolvency of 
her husband. 
The income of a woman married with or without community of 
property and not separated from her husband under a 
judicial order or written agreement shall, for the purposes 
of this Act, be deemed to be income accrued to her husband 
and shall be included by him in returns of income required 
to be rendered by him under this Act. 
Provided that in the event of the death or insolvency of 
the husband during any year in respect of which such income 
is chargeable, the income of the wife for the period 
elapsing between the date of such death or insolvency and 
the last day of the year of assessment shall be taxable as 
the separate income of such wife. 
(South Africa 1917:Section 66) 
In 1925 this was further refined by the insertion of section 66(3) 
which allowed a husband to recoup tax paid on behalf of his wife. 
Any tax due and payable by any person married without 
community of property and not separated from his wife under 
a judicial order or written agreement may be recovered from 
the assets of his wife in so far as the tax is payable in 
respect of income of his wife deemed to be his under the 
provision of sub-section (2} of section nine of this act. 
(South Africa 1925:Section 66(3}} 
This Act (South Africa 1925) also made provision for separate 
taxation in the form of separate returns: Section 9(2) deemed {as 
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did Act 41 of 1917) the income to be the husband's and section 39 
provided that if " ... either husband or wife make written 
application therefor to the Commissioner or the Commissioner 
considers it desirable, returns of income may be required to be 
rendered by any such husband or wife separately" (South Africa 
1925:Section 9(2)). Section 46(6) stated that separate returns 
would be separately assessed, however, "the total tax payable in 
respect of the separate assessments shall not be less than the 
total amount which would have been payable by the husband alone if 
the incomes of both husband and wife had been assessed as income of 
the husband alone" (South Africa 1925}. The returns had to be 
assessed at the same time and with reference to each other. 
Act 31 of 1941 repealed all previous Acts but retained the same 
provisions regarding married women and the taxation of married 
couples (South Africa 1941}. 
4.2.2 THE STEYN COMMITTEE AND THE DIEDERICHS COMMISSION 
The Steyn Committee (South Africa 1951) was appointed in 1949 to 
investigate the Income Tax Act of the Union of South Africa and 
submitted its first report in 1951. In Part IV of Chapter 3 they 
discussed the taxation of the income of married women. They noted 
that only one of all the repres~ntations received had considered 
the tax burden of married persons to be heavier than the burden of 
unmarried persons and had requested separate taxation for married 
couples. The Committee did not want to concede that the system 
that was in force and applied since taxation was first imposed, was 
unfair and they were not in favour of a change. (South Africa 
1951:par.60) 
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They considered that the advantages given to married taxpayers 
according to the system in operation at the time, in the form of 
higher basic deductions and a lower scale of taxation, did much to 
neutralize the disadvantages of adding together the incomes of the 
husband and wife (South Africa 1951:par.61). They also mentioned 
the neconomic unit" as justification for the tax unit. 
The joint income of husband and wife comprises the means 
available for the economic unit of which the· family is 
composed and we consider it fair and reasonable that 
taxation should be based on the joint income. The system 
is above all simple and can be more easily administered 
than a system of separate returns and assessments, 
especially in respect of the fitting relief for minor 
children from the marriage. (Translated) 
(South Africa 1951:par.61) 
The Committee also referred to the dangers of income splitting and 
the fact that it was not possible to divide income under a system 
of joint taxation. 
Reporting on the findings of the Steyn Committee, the Diederichs 
Commission agreed with the Steyn Committee regarding the taxation 
of the income of married women (South Africa 1976:13). 
4.2.3 CHANGES FROM 1950 TO 1965 
No significant changes occurred in the taxation of married couples 
and the tax schedules remained unchanged from 1941 to 1959. In 
1960 the block rate system was introduced but the tax effect on the 
married couple, compared with individuals, remained basically the 
same. (Van der Spuy 1988:4) 
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The introduction of the concept of gross income made it necessary 
to define "marriage" and "married person". The Commissioner had to 
decide whether or not a couple would be considered to be "married11 
and divorced people were only considered to be "married" if the 
divorce occurred before March 1962 {South Africa 1962:Section 1(a) 
and 1{b)(i)(aa)). 
Section 68 stipulated the following as regards the income of 
married women: 
Provided that if either the husband or the wife makes 
written application therefor to the Commissioner or the 
Commissioner considers it desirable, returns of income may 
be required to be rendered by any such husband or wife 
separately. 
(South Africa 1962:Section 68) 
A concession was made which stated that a married woman whose 
taxable income did not exceed R600 would not be taxed - her income 
was exempted from tax. An unmarried person was only allowed the 
exemption up to a maximum of RSOO (South Africa 1962:section 
10{4)(a)). 
In 1964 separate rates were promulgated for married persons and 
unmarried persons (South Africa 1964:section 1). 
4.2.4 1965: THE RATING AMOUNT 
In 1965 the first major change in the way in which the taxation of 
married couples was calculated was promulgated. The married 
couple's income was taxed as prescribed in section 5 as if the 
smaller of the incomes was a lump sum. The tax payable was then 
calculated according to the following rating formula: 
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Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
that a portion ... of the taxable income of any taxpayer in 
respect of any period of assessment commencing on or after 
the first day of March, 1965, is attributable to the 
inclusion in the taxpayer's income of the income of his 
wife and each spouse's portion of such taxable income, 
is not less than one hundred rand, the normal tax 
chargeable in respect of such taxable income shall •.. be 
an amount which bears to such taxable income the same ratio 
as the amount of normal tax which, applying the relevant 
rate, would be chargeable in respect of a taxable income 
equal to the rating amount ... bears to such rating amount: 
Provided that in no case shall the amount of normal tax 
chargeable be less than the amount of normal tax which 
would be chargeable at the relevant rate •.. in respect of 
the first rand of taxable income, and nothing in this 
section contained shall be construed as relieving any 
person from liability for taxation under this Act upon any 
portion of his taxable income •.. 
(South Africa 1965:section 5(3)(a)) 
The rating amount was calculated according to section 5(4) and was 
deemed to be the aggregate of 
(a) [t]he greater of the sums remaining after deducting from 
the husband's and wife's portions •.. of the taxable income 
of the taxpayer for the period of assessment the 
respective amounts (if any} allowed to be deducted in terms 
of sub-section (7} [which referred to lump sums from 
annuities, pension or provident funds, sugar cane or 
plantation farming], or if such sums are equal in value, 
either such sum; and 
(b) an amount equal to one-half of the lesser of the sums 
referred to in paragraph {a), or if such sums are equal in 
value, one-half of either such sum; and .•• 
(c) an amount equal to twice the amount (if any) by which the 
taxable income of the taxpayer exceeds eight thousand rand: 
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Provided that where the said aggregate exceeds the taxable 
income of the taxpayer the rating amount shall be deemed to~ be 
an amount equal to such taxable income. 
(South Africa 1965:Section 5(4))~ 
This had the effect of taxing a married couple at a lower rate 
applicable to the calculated rating income on their aggregate 
incomes, provided that the "rating income" was less than the total 
income. This would only be the case up to a certain income and 
would depend on the two separate incomes of husband and wife. 
The above can be illustrated as follows in a simplified case where 
both husband and wife earned only a salary: 
SALARY CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4 CASE 5 
R R R R R 
Husband 6 000 8 000 4 000 6 000 5 000 
Wife 5 000 8 000 6 000 2 000 3 000 
Taxable income 11 000 16 000 10 000 8 000 8 000 
The rating amount was calculated as follows: The aggregate of 
(a) The greater of 
the sums re-
maining 6 000 
(b) an amount equal 
to half of the 
lesser of 
the sums ... (1/2 of 
R5 000) 
=R2 500 
(c) an amount = 
twice the amount 
whereby taxable 
8 000 6 000 6 000 5 000 
(1/2 of (1/2 of (1/2 of (1/2 of 
RS 000) R4 000) R2 000) R3 000) 
=R4 000 =R2 000 =Rl 000 =Rl 500 
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income exceeded R8 000 
(Rll 000 (R16 000 (RIO 000 (R8 000 (R8 000 
- 8 000 -8 000 -8 000 -8 000 -8 000 
3 000 8 000 2 000 nil nil 
twice the above: R6 000 RIG 000 R4 000 
The rating amount was Rl4 500 R28 000 R12 000 R7 000 R6 500 
It was clear from the above calculations that the rating amount 
would only have been advantageous when the total taxable income. of 
the couple was less than a certain amount and the actual rate used 
depended largely on the way in which the couple's incomes differed 
in relation to each other to make up the whole. 
In 1966 this section was amended to specify how the amount should 
be calculated if the spouses were married in community of property 
(South Africa 1966:section 5(a)(iii) and section 7). 
In 1967 the "one-half" in section 5(4)(b) was changed to 2/Sths 
which afforded a certain amount of relief for the taxpayer (South 
Africa 1967:section 5(4)(b)). 
In 1968 the provision was amended to read as follows: "[If] the 
taxable income of the taxpayer for the period of assessment 
exceeded R3 000, an amount equal to 2/5ths of the sums referred to 
in paragraph (a); and 
(c): an amount equal to the amount [previously twice the amount] 
(if any) by which the taxable income of the taxpayer exceeds eight 
thousand rand" (South Africa 1968:section 5(4)(b) and (c)). This 
provided relief for the higher income groups as the 'increase' of 
the amount to be added to the rating amount was now only two-fifths 
of the amount by which the person's taxable income exceeded R8 000, 
(if the lower of the two incomes exceeded R3 000) whereas 
previously it was twice the amount. 
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The 1967 and 1968 changes in legislation impacted as follows on the 
I 
1965 taxable incomes given above which meant a rating amount of: 
SALARY 
Husband 
Wife 
Taxable income 
1967: 
(a) the greater of 
CASE 1 
R 
6 000 
5 000 
11 000 
the sums 6 000 
(b) 2/5ths of the 
lesser amount 2 000 
(c) 2(taxable 
income -
R8 000) 
Rating amount of 14 000 
1968 
(a) same as above 6 000 
(b) same as above 2 000 
(c) taxable income 
- R8 000 3 000 
Rating amount of 11 000 
CASE 2 
R 
8 000 
8 000 
16 000 
8 000 
3 200 
16 000 
27 200 
8 000 
3 200 
8 000 
19 200 
CASE 3 
R 
4 000 
6 000 
10 000 
6 000 
1 600 
4 000 
11 600 
6 000 
1 600 
CASE 4 
R 
6 000 
2 000 
8 000 
6 000 
800 
ni 1 
6 800 
6 000 
800 
nil 
6 800 
CASE 5 
R 
5 000 
3 000 
8 000 
5 000 
1 200 
nil 
6 200 
5 000 
1 200 
nil 
6 200 
' 
It was thus clear that even with the 1968 changes, cases 1 and 2 
did not benefit from the rating amount. Even if the wife earned 
more and the husband less, this would not really have impacted 
because the "(c) taxable income minus R8 000" would have increased 
the rating amount. 
In case (3) the rating amount was only advantageous from 1968 but 
for a total taxable income of R8 000 it was clearly a help from the 
start. From calculations done on a total taxable income of R9 000 
it would only have been advantageous from 1967. 
I30 
Changes over time improved the married couple's lot as the 
following comparison shows: 
Summar~ CASE I CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4 CASE 5 
R R R R R 
Total taxable 
income II 000 I6 000 IO 000 8 000 8 000 
Rating amount for 
I965 I4 500 28 000 I2 000 7 000 6 500 
I967 I4 000 27 200 II 600 6 800 6 200 
I968 II 000 I9 200 9 600 6 800 6 200 
The rating amount did not give the same advantages as separate 
taxation but with the lower tax rates applicable to married couples 
it would have provided considerable tax relief to them. 
4.2.5 THE FRANSZEN COMMISSION REPORT 
In Chapter II of its First Report, the Franszen Commission (South 
Africa I969) paid special attention to the question of taxation of 
married couples where both earned income. They recommended the 
retention of the system of joint taxation but with the reservation 
that the first R500 of a married woman's earned income be exempted 
from tax (South Africa I969:paragraph I30). This may well have 
been a significant allowance considering the salaries earned at the 
time. 
Act No. 89 of I969 curtailed the use of the rating amount for the 
calculation of taxation of married couples. 
There shall, in the determination of the taxable income of 
any taxpayer in whose income there is under the 
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provisions of section 7(2) included any earnings of his 
wife, be allowed as a deduction from his income so much, of 
the total amount of such earnings (whether consisting' of 
the earnings of one wife or of more than one wife) as does 
not in the year of assessment exceed an amount of five 
hundred rand, less one rand for every ten rand by which the 
combined amount of the taxpayer for such year of assessment 
exceeds eight thousand rand: Provided that where :the 
period of assessment is less than a full year the amount 
which shall be deducted under this subsection shall be 
limited to an amount which bears to five hundred rand ; the 
same ratio as the period assessed bears to one year, less 
one rand for every ten rand by which the combined amount of 
the taxpayer for such period exceeds an amount which bears 
to eight thousand rand the same ratio as the period 
assessed bears to one year. 
(South Africa 1969:section 20A) 
The Act further explained what was meant by the "combined amount of 
a taxpayer" and excluded the following income of the wife from· the 
meaning of "earnings": 
(i) income derived from the letting of any property or the use 
of or the grant of permission to use any patent, design, 
trade mark or copyright or other property •.. contemplated 
in the definition of 'trade' in section 1; 
( i i) income derived from an.:,· trade carried on by her in 
partnership or association with her husband or which is in 
any way connected with any trade carried on by her husband; 
(iii)any amount received by or accrued to such woman from her 
husband or any partnership of which •.. her husband was at 
the time of such receipt or accrual a member of any private 
company of which her husband was at such time a director or 
any private company of which she or her husband was at: such 
time the sole or main shareholder or one of the principal 
shareholders. 
(South Africa 1969:section 20A) 
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These would eventually become the provisions of the much discussed 
and disputed section 7(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1962 - a section 
aimed at the prevention of tax avoidance and specifically at ~the 
prevention of the splitting of the income between husband and wife. 
In 1974 the limit was increased from R500 to R600 per annum (South 
Africa 1974:section 20A) and in 1975 to R750 per annum (South 
Africa 1975: section 20A). In 1977 the concept of earnings was 
redefined to include 
... income derived from use of or grant of permission to 
use any patent, design, trade mark or copyright or other 
property of a similar nature contemplated in the definition 
of 'trade' in section 1 unless such income was derive~ by 
such woman in the course of any business, employment 
calling or occupation carried on by her [own underlining]. 
(South Africa 1977:section 20A{iA)) 
In 1979, Act 104 increased the limit to R900 and in 1980 it was 
further increased to Rl 200 {South Africa 1980:section 20A). Two 
further increases occurred before 1984, namely in 1981 and 1982 to 
R1 400 and R1 600 respectively {South Africa 1981 & 1982:section 
20A). 
The earnings allowance was constantly adjusted, presumably to keep 
up with inflation, but the complaints about the system of joint 
taxation did not cease. 
4.3 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1985 YEAR OF 
ASSESSMENT 
In 1984 the status quo changed very little from 1983: the tax 
tables, wife's earnings allowance and rebates remained the same. 
That is, earnings of up to R7 000 were taxed at 10 per cent rising 
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to a maximum of Rl2 220 plus 50 per cent of the amount in excess of 
R40 000 for married couples. The unmarried taxpayer paid a 
surcharge of 20 per cent on tax of taxable incomes up to R28:ooo 
and 50 per cent of taxable income exceeding R28 000. The allowance 
in respect of the married woman's earnings amounted to Rl 600. : 
Finance Week (Cover story 1984:631), in discussing the last budget 
presented by Minister Horwood, concentrated on the "mighty burden" 
being borne by personal taxpayers. According to the article, the 
Minister estimated that individual tax payments would yield R7~3bn 
in 1984/1985, well over double the level of 1981/1982. 
It was also noted that individuals were funding a higher proportion 
of "an increasing quantum of government expenditure" (Cover Story 
1984:632). In 1978/1979 total revenue was RIO billion of which 
individual taxpayers contributed only 23 per cent. For 1984-5 the 
comparative figures were R21,3 billion and 34 per cent. In 1978-9 
combined individual and general sales tax payments - the latter 
being met mostly by individuals - were 31 per cent. The 19?4-5 
figure was 56 per cent. "The man in the street, who was funding a 
third of government expenditure five years ago, is now contributing 
well over half" (Cover Story 1984:631). 
The 1984/1985 budget actually took an additional R2,7 billion from 
individuals as the yield from individual taxpayers rose by 
Rl,5 billion; general sales tax at 7 per cent for the full year 
raised another R1,16 billion (Cover story 1984:632). 
The Financial Mail concurred, although headed the article 
"Horwood's Budget - Sweet and sensible swansong" (1984:36), 
noting " ... that individuals have been carrying a steadily riising 
proportion of the tax burden". They pointed out that revenue from 
non-mining companies had remained fairly static at about 20 
1 
per 
i 
cent. 
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4.4 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1986 YEAR OF 
ASSESSMENT: 
The 1985-86 Budget, being Finance Minister Barend du Plessis' first 
budget, raised the surcharge on tax from 5 per cent to 7 per cent. 
The problem of bracket creep and the influence it had on the 
·individual's contribution to the State coffers was again addressed. 
Consider recent trends in [South Africa's] tax burden. As 
recently as 1979, the corporate share of income tax was 
about 63%, ie R3 283m compared to all income tax of 
RS 227m. According to estimates for the 1984-5 Budget, 
corporations would be paying only 38% of all income tax, 
or R4 503m out of a total of R11 768m. Clearly the process 
of inflation has, by catapulting an ever increasing n~mber 
of taxpayers into higher brackets, severely increased the 
burden on individuals. 
(Southey 1985:453-454) 
Southey (1985:453) also referred to the United States where, under 
the Reagan Administration, the current trend was to reverse the tax 
burden from individuals to corporations: "Corporate tax share of US 
Federal revenue dropped from 19,5% in 1969 to 6,2% in 1983, but is 
expected to rise to around 8,5% in 1984 11 • This represented a much 
lower percentage of tax paid by corporations in the United States 
out of total tax collected than even the one noted by Southey 
(1985:453) for 1984/1985 for South Africa. Various factors may have 
been responsible for this; one being that the proportio~ of 
earnings by corporations in the United States may have been 
markedly less than the proportion of earnings by individuals. This, 
however, did not fall within the scope of this research. 
Although South Africans widely perceive themselves to be 
overtaxed, this may stem from the fact that taxation ~as a 
percentage of GOP rose from 19,4% in 1975 to 24,4% in 1985. 
But international tax ratio comparisons show SA in a not 
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unfavourable light. Central government tax revenue as a 
percentage of GOP in 1983 was 22,3%, as against 27,2% in 
the US, 37,7% in the UK, 43,1% in France and 50,4% in 
Sweden. The SA ratio is lower than the world average, but 
on a par with other non-oil producing developing countries. 
(Greenblo 1987:231) 
Another problem, according to Southey (1985:453), was the number of 
tax brackets. He compared the number of tax brackets in South 
Africa, the United States and Great Britain and noted that 
[I]n the US the present schedule consists of 14 income 
brackets for joint returns, with tax rates ranging from 11% 
to 50%; in the UK there are only six tax brackets, with a 
30% rate applying in the £nil to £14 600 bracket rising to 
60% above £36 000. In SA there are no fewer than 22 tax 
brackets, with a top marginal rate of 50%. 
As regards the 1985 tax legislation amendments as they affected 
individuals, the maximum marginal rate for married taxpayers was 
raised from R40 000 to R60 000 and for unmarried taxpayers from 
R28 000 to R42 000. Finance Week (Cover Story 1985:573) noted that 
"only those in the plus-R80 000 bracket will be hit with marginally 
higher taxes although this will ... increase as the fringe benefits 
phase-in runs its course". 
According to Finance Week (Cover Story 1985:580), liability for the 
surcharge started at an income of R8 920 for single people and 
R11 925 for married people with two children. In the 60-65 age 
group, single people started paying tax at R9 670 and married 
people with no children, at R11 425. 
The 1985 tax legislation amendments were important as they 
introduced separate rates for unmarried taxpayers. There were. thus 
two sets of rates, one for the married couple and one for the 
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unmarried taxpayer. No longer were the married tax rates increased 
by a certain percentage for the unmarried person's taxes. 
4.5 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1987 YEAR OF 
ASSESSMENT 
The 1986 budget reduced income tax rates, allowed married working 
women a higher portion of their earnings tax-free and, allowed 
investors, more tax-free interest and dividends. With the tax 
"cuts", it was expected that individuals would pay less in the 
1986-87 fiscal year but pointed out that "revenue estimates ~how 
that the personal tax haul will increase by 32% to R11,8 billion in 
1986-87. And the [general sales tax] haul is estimated to inctease 
14% to R9,5 billion." (The Budget 1986:36) This meant that 
personal taxpayers would pay R4 billion more than in 1985-86, 
"purely because of inflation" {The Budget 1986:36). The tax cuts 
were "largely illusory" and "new provisional tax rules harm 
taxpayers to the extent that they must pay three, instead of two 
prov-isional payments this cannot be underestimated because 
salaried taxpauers with investment income greater than R1 000 · are 
automatically classified as provisional taxpayers" (The Budget 
1986:36). 
The inflation rate of 20 per cent was also mentioned and it was 
noted that "if this could be forgotten, then the Budget granted 
significant relief to personal taxpayers" (The Budget 1986:36). 
The tax rates were lowered by replacing the 7 per cent surcharge 
with a 5 per cent discount on tax payable after deduction of 
rebates. This had the effect of lowering the top marginal rate -
which (at R60 000 for married and R42 000 for unmarried taxpayers) 
fell from 53,5 per cent to 47,5 per cent. The 5 per cent discount 
applied to all salaried taxpayers except married women and PAVE 
deductions were adjusted to provide for this (The Budget 1986:36). 
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Married women would be taxed according to a new set of PAVE tables 
to be published. Relief to the burden of joint taxation was' the 
new tax-free status of 20 per cent of the wife's income - with a 
minimum deduction of R1 800 (The Budget 1986:36). 
The concession for working wives was considered to be 
... the most imaginative step ... To exempt from tax R1 800 
or 20% of a wife's net earnings (whichever is the greater) 
- with effect already for the 1986 tax year - is a major 
advance, as the revenue loss of R116m for 1986-1987 shows. 
It is particularly valuable at upper-income levels, and 
could do much to attract skilled women back into the labour 
market. 
(Preece 1986:611) 
The "20% rule" as originally referred to in the United States of 
America (refer Chapter 3) was applied to South African tax 
legislation before 1986 but in another guise - when the same tax 
' 
rates were applied to the married couple and the unmarried 
individual, the 20 per cent was a surcharge to the unmarried 
person's taxes. Now 20 per cent of the wife's earnings would be 
tax exempt. In the United States of America they considered ; the 
living costs to be 20 per cent more for two people living together 
than for one person and therefore unmarried tax rates should be 20 
per cent higher. This 20 per cent reduction did, of course, not 
have the same effect as the previous surcharge, as it clearly 
depended on how much the wife earned. 
The married woman's earnings allowance allowed a wife to deduct, 20 
per cent of her earnings or Rl 800 whichever was the greater, but 
was limited to her taxable income so that if she earned RIO 000, 20 
per cent (or R2 000) had tax-free status; but if she earned only 
' R3 000 (of which 20 per cent is R600) R1 800 had tax-free status 
and if she earned R1 000 only the R1 000 was tax free (South Africa 
1986 and Cover story 1986:618). 
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The fringe benefits taxation, introduced the previous year, added 
' to the individual's tax burden but resulted in a more equitable 
dispensation as the person who was paid in cash and the one : who 
enjoyed the use of a motor vehicle were both taxed on the fruit of 
their labours. 
This lead to a horizontally more equitable dispensation and 
although "Mr Citizen" was better off in 1984, all citizens were 
better off or on a "more equitable basis" as the horizontal 
inequity concerning fringe benefits was removed. 
This was the first year that a proportion of the married woman's 
' 
taxable income was exempt from tax and not just a discrete amount. 
This did in some way make up for the high marginal rates at which 
her income was taxed. 
4.6 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1988 YEAR OF 
ASSESSMENT: 
On three occasions during 1987, taxation and tax related matters 
occupied the minds and media of South Africa. Firstly, the 
so-called mini-budget was presented in March; secondly, andther 
budget was presented in June and, thirdly, the Margo Report r and 
Government White Paper were published in August. 
The only changes made were to personal tax: the maximum marginal 
tax rate reduced from 47,5 per cent to 45 per cent, (South Africa 
1987:section 1) and interest earnings exemptions increased from 
RSOO to R1 000 (South Africa 1987:section 9). These changes were 
already made public in March 1987 but were only promulgated in 1June 
1987. 
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4.7 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1989 YEAR OF 
ASSESSMENT 
The period after publication of the Margo Report and Government 
White Paper saw drastic changes to the South African income tax 
legislation as it pertained to individuals. These changes will be 
discussed in the order that they occurred annually. A comparison 
of the legislation for the different years for purposes! of 
horizontal equity, will be made in Chapter 6. 
The Minister of Finance made many references to the Margo Report in 
his 1988 Budget Speech delivered on 16 March 1988, in general 
noting the timing of the implementation of some of the reforms.: 
Some of the proposals are being implemented already via 
today's Budget, while others will first be implemented. in 
the 1989/90 year. Many of the proposals are far-reaching 
in their nature and cannot be applied without further ado 
but must first be thoroughly aired with the private sector. 
Further consultations will be held immediately with 
representatives of the ·private sector, and it is hoped that 
the remaining proposals accepted by Government, will. be 
implemented in the 1989/90 financial year. 
(South African Institue of Taxation 1988:5) 
The Minister of Finance noted that although the Government could 
not accept all the recommendations, and in some cases could accept 
them only after "certain amendments, the broad guidelines and 
' 
principles proposed by the Commission are fully endorsedn (South 
African Institue of Taxation 1988:5). 
He went on to say that 
[T]he Commission's recommendation for the separate taxation 
of spouses cannot be accepted. The splitting of ma~ried 
couples for tax purposes is a very costly process; and 
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simply cannot be afforded unless the Government can find an 
acceptable alternative source of revenue - something that 
' is not possible at present. 
(South African Institue of Taxation 1988:5) 
He noted, however, that a partial separate taxation of spouses 
would be introduced, allied to the final deduction system (PAVE) by 
the introduction of a "system of standard income tax on employees 
(SITE) and other amendments to the Income Tax Act" (1988:6). So 
1988, despite protestations to the contrary, saw the beginning of 
a gradual move towards a type of "separate taxationw. 
The Financial Mail pointed out that, although tax reductions of 
' R1,3 billion were made, virtually all for individuals, individuals 
still contributed far more than the corporate sector and noted.that 
increases of R944 million were to be raised from individuals while 
only R209 million was to be raised from the corporate sector :(The 
Budget 1988:41). 
The main changes as far as individuals were concerned were the 
introduction of SITE (standard income tax on employees), changes in 
rates and rebates, a clamp-down on deductible medical expenses and 
introduction of the joint assessment allowance. 
A new table of rates was applicable in terms of which the lowest 
band of income (unmarried RIO 000, married R12 000) would be taxed 
at a rate of 14 per cent (1988: 15 per cent) and the maximum rate 
of 45 per cent (1988: 45 per cent) applied to taxable incom~ in 
excess of R54 000 (1988: R42 000) in the case of unmarried persons 
and R80 000 (1988: R60 000) in the case of married persons (South 
Africa 1988:Section 1). 
The primary rebate for married taxpayers was increased to Rl 100 
from R920 and to R750 from R650 for other taxpayers (South Africa 
1988:Section 4). The definition of a married person was also 
changed to include 
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I [A]ny person who ... [is] entitled to any rebate in respect 
of a child under section 6(3)(a) or any person who is in 
I 
respect of such period entitled to any rebate under section 
6{3)(a) in respect of a child who is proved to . the 
satisfaction of the Commissioner to have been maintained by 
him during such period wholly or mainly from his own 
resources derived otherwise than by way of alimony' or 
maintenance received. from the other parent of such child, 
and who is not a child in respect of whose maintenance · his 
taxable income has been reduced in terms of section 21. 
(South Africa 1988:Section 2) 
This meant that any parent supporting a child could claim the thild 
rebate and then be taxed as married at the rates for married 
taxpayers. An unmarried parent supporting a child could then elaim 
to be taxed as married. A married woman was specifically precluded 
from claiming this rebate (Section 6). I 
Other concessions were also made to married women, but, as pointed 
out by Finance Week 9 [t]rue, the concessions for married working 
women are substantial but they won't come properly into effect 
until next year9 (Cover story 1988:2). ·The reason for this was 
that SITE was only determined at the end of the year of assessment 
although PAVE was still deducted monthly. 
This was not separate taxation as envisaged in petitions to the 
Margo Commission as the wife's earnings above R20 000, or~ in 
conjunction with her husband or from investments or a business, 
were still added to the husband's taxable income. The married 
woman was also not allowed the same deductions as unmarried 
individuals or her husband. 
Where she [the married woman] pays PAVE in addition to 
SITE, her entire remuneration will be taxed in • her 
husband's hands. [SITE is still payable on the !first 
R20 000 and this will then be deducted from total tax 
' payable by the husband]. Where a married woman's i:ncome 
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exceeds R20 000, it will - subject to the existing 22,5% 
concession - be added to her husband's income and taxed at 
joint marginal rates. The overall burden will be 
I 
considerably higher than had she fallen under SITE. If a 
married woman earning less than R20 000 a year also earns, 
say, interest, it will be taxed at her husband's marginal 
rate. In this case, of course, shortfalls become payable -
but there is some phasing-in relief. An additibnal 
deduction (over and above the wife's normal 22,5% of 
income) will be allowed on the formula: 20% of comb:ined 
income less 35% of wife's income, subject to a maximum of 
R5 000. 
(The Budget 1988:41) 
The married woman's earnings allowance, however, was extended to 
include a deduction of 22,5 per cent and an additional allowance, 
known as a joint assessment allowance, was introduced which 
provided relief in respect of the wife's earnings, but subject to 
certain limitations. 
Section 20A of the Act granted a deduction to a taxpayer in whose 
income there had been included certain earnings of his wife. 
"Earnings" were defined as income derived from trade, and the 
deduction could accordingly not be granted in respect of a pension 
received by a married woman. This definition was amended so ·that 
the deduction applied also to an annuity derived by a married woman 
from a pension fund or retirement annuity fund. 
A further deduction could be claimed under section 20A - 'this 
would be equal to the "applicable percentage" of the wife's 
"taxable earnings" (subject to a maximum of R4 650), reduced by 20 
per cent of so much of such taxable earnings as exceeded R16 000. 
This allowance was called the joint assessment allowance. 
Taxable earnings means a married woman's earnings as 
already defined for the purposes of the section, less the 
deductions allowable in respect of her pension fund, and 
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retirement annuity fund contributions and educational 
donations, and the deduction of R2 250 or 22,5% of i her 
earnings already allowable to her husband. 
(South Africa, Explanatory 
Memorandum 19~8:7) 
I 
Standard income tax on employees (SITE} was recommended by the 
Margo Commission and the recommendation was accepted by the 
government. This was introduced in the first Budget after 1 the 
~eport was presented. 
Note that a Rl2 000 category taxpayer who pays PAVE as well 
as SITE will have to render an income tax return. 1SITE 
will, of course, be allowed as a credit. If a married 
woman earning 1 ess than R20 000 a year a 1 so earns, 1 say, 
interest, it will be taxed at her husband's marginal rate. 
(South Africa, Explanatory , 
Memorandum 1988) 
Net remuneration, as defined for SITE, excluded remuneration 
derived by a married woman from employment which was in any way 
connected with her husband's trade or from a private company of 
which her husband was a director or principal shareholder. In 
other .words, net remuneration excluded any income which fell under 
the provisions of section 7(2) as well as the remuneration derived 
by a married woman if her husband's total gross income, other than 
the remuneration in question, did not exceed R7 500. This meant 
that the married woman was "allowed" to "deduct" her own 
contributions to pension fund and retirement annuity fund but .only 
to the extent that she had net remuneration. 
SITE had to be determined by an employer at the end of the 
employee's "tax period". This was normally the end of the yeat of 
assessment, or if the employee left the employment before that 
date, on the date on which he or she left (as defined in paragraph 
118(1)): 
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any unbroken period during the year of assessment during 
which the employee was employed by one employer. 
The tax period for a woman changing her marital status 
during the year is as follows: 
- when she marries, a tax period is deemed to have 
ended on the day preceding her marriage; 
- when she ceases to be married, a tax period is 
deemed to have ended on the date on which she ceased 
to be married. 
(South Africa paragraph 118, Fourth 
Schedule) 
In the case of a married woman employee, an employer could not take 
any retirement annuity fund contributions into account unless the 
employer had received an authorising directive from the Receiver of 
Revenue (Explanatory memorandum 1988:5). Total allowable deductions 
for contributions to pension and retirement annuity funds provided 
that the total deductions which then applied to a husband and wife 
remained unchanged (The Budget 1988:41). 
Section 7(2) stipulated that net remuneration earned by a married 
woman was not included in her husband's income if all her 
remuneration was subject only to SITE, in other words, no portion 
thereof was payable at an annualized rate of more than R20 000 per 
annum (Explanatory memorandum, 1988:4,5). 
Section 14 of Act 90 of 1988 provided that It ••• where the married 
woman is a taxpayer solely by reason of the provisions of paragraph 
(b) of the proviso to section 7(2), any such expenditure paid by 
such married woman shall be deemed for the purposes of this section 
to have been paid by her husband ... 
Although the wife was now separately taxed on income from 
employment, a married woman who earned less than a specified amount 
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(R20 000 in terms of the budget speech) would not qualify for a 
child rebate or rebates for persons over 60. To prevent hardship 
at the cut-off point of the system a special reducing rebate would 
apply. (South African Institue of Ta~ation 1988:7) 
Where a married woman's remuneration was subject only to SITE that 
remuneration was not deemed to be the income of her husband and was 
not added to his income and she did not render a return and the 
amount of tax withheld by her employer constituted her full tax 
liability. Any other income received by her (e.g. travel 
allowances, interest, dividends) was deemed to be her husband's 
and was added to his income (Ernst & Whinnev Tax News, 1988:1). 
Provided that-
(a) where any husband is at any time married to two or more 
wives ... the provisions to this subsection shall apply 
only to income .•. of the wife of his longest subsisting 
marriage. 
(b) the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to 
net remuneration (as defined in paragraph 118 of the Fourth 
Schedule) received by or accrued to such married woman~ if 
the employees' tax required to be deducted or withheld from 
all such net remuneration received by or accrued to her 
during the year of assessment consisted solely of amount of 
standard income tax on employees determinable under the 
said paragraph. 
(South Africa 1988:Section 5) 
The Financial Mail compared the taxes payable by a one-breadwinner 
family (for an income of R12 000 for a married man under 60 years 
old) in 1988 and 1989 - the reduction in taxation payable was R225 
increasing to a reduction of tax payable of R1 065 for an annual 
taxable income of R80 000 upwards, irrespective whether the 
taxpayer had none, or up to three, children (The Budget 1988:41). 
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The situation, however, was more complex for the two-breadwinner 
family as shown by the Financial Mail (The Budget 1988:42). Here 
the difference in taxes payable between the two years (1988 and 
1989) could lie between R328 and R3 755, depending on the wife's 
and the husband's income. The table only provided for an income 
of R20 000, R40 000, R60 000 and R80 000 for the husband while the 
wife's salary for each of the above brackets was calculated at 
RIO 000, R20 000 or R30 000. The tax saving was the greatest in 
each salary block for a salary of R20 000 for the wife, probably 
because SITE only was payable on that income. 
This was not the separate taxation as envisaged in petitions to the 
Margo Commission, as earnings above R20 000, in conjunction with 
husband or from investments or a business, were still added to the 
husband's income. The married woman was also not allowed the same 
deductions as unmarried individuals or her husband. 
4.8 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1990 YEAR OF 
ASSESSMENT 
The Financial Mail (The Budget 1989:30) acclaimed two major 
breakthroughs, namely the concessions to married women (through the 
extension of the SITE system) and the planned abolition of 
prescribed asset requirements for financial institutions. 
The Financial Mail pointed out that the changes in SITE did not 
mean total separate taxation but that 
[i]n fact all that is happening is that the R20 000 ceiling 
for applying SITE to a .married woman's income has been 
abolished. In future, SITE is the only tax that all married 
working women will pay .... But for a married couple, final 
tax payable will still have to be calculated. Figures 
released with the Budget by Inland Revenue show 
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across-the-board reductions for a married couple on the new 
SITE basis, assuming no increase in salaries. Given the 
likely rate of salary increase, the average married couple 
could still end up paying more tax this year, as is 
implicit in the revenue forecasts. 
(The Budget 1989:30,31) 
The Financial Mail, in a table titled "The SITE story" compared the 
final taxes payable by a two-breadwinner family in 1989 and in 
1990. In the 1990 year of assessment more salary brackets were 
introduced for the wife, up to earnings of R70 000, and the savings 
in tax were between R216. and R3 417, depending on the salaries of 
the husband and wife. The biggest saving was for a salary of 
R80 000 for the husband and a salary of RSO 000 for the wife (The 
SITE story 1989:31). 
The inflation influence was also addressed by the Financial Mail: 
Given the likely rate of salary increase, the average 
married couple could still end up paying more tax this 
year, as is implicit in the revenue forecasts. Moreover, 
it appears that up to R20 000, a married woman will pay a 
flat 25% Site rate. Above that, it appears that normal PAVE 
tables apply .... In particular, it should be noted that Du 
Plessis said that the changes will have no impact this 
financial year, but will involve an estimated loss of R139m 
in 1990-91 by when fiscal drag will wipe them out anyway, 
unless it is combated considerably more vigorously than it 
has been this year; 
(The Budget 1989:31) 
Some relief was introduced for married couples by what the 
Financial Mail called an "easier marriage penalty" by extending 
SITE to include all working wives and not only on net remuneration 
up to R20 000. There were still, however, "no significant proposals 
to counter fiscal drag," but the primary rebate was increased to 
R1 250 (from R1 100) for married taxpayers and to R850 (R750) for 
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other taxpayers. The additional rebate for the over-65s rose to 
R1 450 (R500) (The SITE story 1989:29). 
The definition of married person in the Income Tax Act was changed 
to encompass only male persons, and a widowed husband or wife: 
Section 1 was amended by the substitution for paragraph (a} of 
the definition of "married person" with the following paragraph: 
(a} any male person [(other than a married woman}] who 
during any portion of the period in respect of which any 
assessment is made, was married and not living apart from 
his spouse in circumstances which [in the opinion of the 
Commissioner] indicate that the separation is likely to be 
permanent , or any person who during any portion of such 
period was a widower or widow, ... [own underlining]. 
The definition of married woman was adjusted 
(b) by the insertion after the definition of "married 
person" of the following definition: 
'married woman' does not include a married woman who is 
living apart from her husband in circumstances which 
indicate that the separation is likely to be permanent nor, 
where any husband is at any time married to two or more 
wives, any wife other than the wife of his longest 
subsisting marriage [own underlining]. 
The rebate for a married woman was incorporated into section 6 as 
follows: 
(1} There shall be deducted from the normal tax payable by 
any person other than a company [or a married woman who is 
liable for the payment of such tax solely by reason of the 
provisions of paragraph (b) of the proviso to section 7(2}] 
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... and as far as the rebates are concerned (c) an amount 
of Rl 075 if such person is a married woman. 
(South Africa, Section 6) 
Section 18 of the principal act was also amended by the 
substitution of the second proviso to subsection (1) by the 
following proviso: 
Provided further that where [any] the taxpayer is a married 
woman [is a taxpayer solely by reason of the provisions of 
paragraph (b) of the proviso to section 7(2) [which means 
that her husband earns less than RIO 000], any such 
expenditure paid by such married woman shall be deemed for 
the purposes of this section to have been paid by her 
husband [own underlining]. 
(South Africa Section 18) 
Finance Week said that "married women will love Barend" noting that 
the budget "brings tax relief in particular to working couples who 
at present are taxed at high marginal tax rates". The earnings of 
a working woman would be assessed separately from the income of her 
husband and would be taxed on a sliding scale, which started at 25 
per cent for remuneration of R20 000, rising to about 33 per cent 
for a remuneration of R70 000 a year (Cover story 1989:5). 
The example was given of a couple, where the man earned R40 000 and 
his wife earned R30 000. According to the calculation, the new 
system meant a saving of Rl 586 in final tax payable. In the case 
where a man earned R60 000 and a woman earned R40 000, the saving, 
according to them, was R2 732 while, at the upper end of the scale, 
a husband and wife who respectively earned R80 000 and R70 000, 
would have a final tax bill amounting to R47 735 or R2 837 less 
than previously (Cover story 1989:5). 
The announcement, which represents a further step by 
government for separate taxation, came as a pleasant 
surprise. Few had expected it to move so quickly, though 
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it was a recommendation of the Margo commission that the 
individual supplants the couple as the unit of tax. It 
noted that in particular PAVE deductions couldn't be 
calculated correctly while the incomes of spouses had to be 
aggregated. 
(Preece 1989:5,6) 
In the case of a natural person other than a married woman, 
the following amounts, where applicable, shall, subject to 
the provisions of subsection (4) be allowed by way of 
secondary rebates, namely-
(cc) anv child or stepchild of the taxpaver who has become 
liable for the payment of normal tax in respect of any year 
of assessment solely by reason of the provisions of section 
5(1A) shall be deemed for the purposes of this paragraph 
not to have become liable for the payment of normal tax in 
respect of such year;" [own underlining] 
(South Africa 1962:Section 6) 
In 1989 the legislated amendments to the income tax act brought 
"separate taxation" closer for married couples but still with 
limitations on the deductions which a married woman could claim, 
compared with the deductions and rebates available to other 
taxpayers. 
4.9 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1991 YEAR OF 
ASSESSMENT 
In the same way that 1989's taxation amendments brought separate 
taxation for married couples another step closer, the 1990 Budget 
was praised for all the improvements it attempted. 
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More incentives to personal saving, liberation of 
married women, counters to fiscal drag, and a heavy 
emphasis on eliminating "backlogs" in social spending 
for a stagnant economy forced to export capital it's an 
impressive list of measures ... " 
(The Budget 1990:26) 
It was pointed out that as far as personal tax changes were 
concerned, the main beneficiaries were the lower-income and 
middle-income groups. The upper-income groups gained least, and 
were hardest hit by the increased tax on fringe benefits. They, 
however, benefited most from the exemption of dividend income from 
tax, " ... and the R408m gain from this is 20 times the cost of the 
perks tax extension. Moreover, the concept of equity also suggests 
that employment benefit packages worth a certain amount should bear 
the same tax, irrespective of how they're arranged". It was also 
noted that the beneficiaries of interest income concessions and the 
greater separation of women's tax were less easy to establish, but 
the higher-income groups would probably fare the best. {The Budget 
1990:30,31) 
All trade income of a married woman, including a reasonable 
salary from her husband's business, will be taxed 
separately. Investment income remains taxable in the 
husband's hands. In addition, [there are] gradual moves to 
equalise taxes of married and single women. Revenue 
loss:R206m. 
(The Budget 1990:28) 
As regards the taxation of married women, the Financial Mail cilled 
it the "liberation of married women" (The Budget 1990:26) when Act 
no 101 of 1990, Income Tax Act 1990, amended section 7(2) of the 
principal Act as follows: 
Any income [other than net remuneration as defined in 
paragraph liB of the Fourth Schedule] received by or 
accrued to a married woman married with or without 
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community of property shall be deemed for the purposes of 
this Act to be income accrued to her husband if -
(a) such income was derived by her otherwise than from any 
trade; or 
(b) income was received [by] or accrued to her -
(i) from any trade carried on by her in 
partnership or association with her husband or 
which is in any way connected with any trade 
carried on by her husband; or 
(ii) from her husband or any partnership of which 
her husband was at the time of such receipt or 
accrual a member or any private company of which 
her husband was at such time the sole or main 
shareholder or one of the principal shareholders, 
and such income represents the whole or any portion of the 
total income so received by or accrued to her which exceeds 
the amount of income to which she would reasonably be 
entitled having regard to the nature of the relevant trade, 
the extent of her participation therein, the services 
rendered by her or any relevant factor, or 
(c) such married woman's husband has not during the year of 
assessment derived gross income (including amounts which 
would have constituted gross income but for the fact that 
they were derived from a source outside the Republic) 
exceeding the amount of RIO 000. 
(South Africa 1962:Section 7) 
This had a major impact on the way a married woman was taxed as 
previously she had not even been allowed the married woman's 
earnings allowance of section 20A on income earned in conjunction 
with her husband, that is where she was in partnership with him, 
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working for a partnership of which her husband was a partner, or 
for a company of which he was (broadly speaking) a main or 
controlling shareholder or director. The only limitations 
remaining were if the wife earned an unreasonable amount as a 
salary in the above circumstances, if she earned investment income 
(this was still taxed in the husband's hands to prevent income 
splitting), or if her husband did not have gross income of more 
than RIO 000. In the latter case it was to the couple's advantage 
if they were taxed together. 
It was noted that relief to a wife who worked for her husband 
presumably also meant that the working wife's earnings allowance 
would disappear, as would another minor anomaly concerning the 
taxation of a travel allowance (The Budget 1990:31). Section 20A 
of Act 58 of 1962 was repealed by section 19 of Act no 101 of 1990. 
Thus ended one inequity that provided a tax advantage to a section 
of individuals and which prejudiced horizontal equity to other 
taxpayers {one-breadwinner couples) in an attempt to provide it to 
some. 
The other amendments were all more or less of an administrative 
nature to provide for the separate taxation of married women 
regarding assessed losses brought forward from 1989, the married 
women's earnings allowance, separate assessments for married women, 
an own R30 000 exemption in terms of section IO(l)(x) for lump sums 
received under certain circumstances, and provision for separate 
rate schedules for the married woman. 
Section 20 was amended as follows regarding assessed losses: 
(iii) where in the case of any married man the balance of 
assessed loss available to be carried forward from the year 
of assessment ended on 28 February 1990 was in whole or in 
part attributable to the inclusion in his income in that 
year or any previous year of income derived by his wife 
from any trade carried on by her, and 
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(a) his wife has continued to carry on the said trade 
during the year of assessment ending on 28 February 
1991; and 
(b) the income derived by her from the carrying on of 
the said trade is in consequence of the amendment to 
section 7(2) effected by section 4 of the Income Tax 
Act, 1990, no longer includable in his income, 
such balance of assessed loss shall, to the extent that it 
is attributable to the inclusion in his income of the said 
income derived by his wife not be set off against income 
derived by him during the year of assessment ending on 28 
February 1991, but shall for the purposes of determining 
the taxable income derived by his wife during such 
last-mentioned year be deemed to be a balance of assessed 
loss incurred by her in such first-mentioned year; 
Section 20A was repealed and the married women's earnings allowance 
was no longer available. 
Section 77(8) provided that "[w]here any female taxpayer is during 
any portion of the year of assessment a married woman and during 
the remaining portion of such year not a married woman, separate 
assessments shall be made upon her in respect of each such period". 
Provided that, notwithstanding the provisions of section 
370, any lump sum benefit which was received by or accrued 
to a married woman and which was taken into account for the 
purposes of this definition in the determination of her 
husband's taxable income, shall for the purposes of this 
definition in relation to any lump sum subsequently 
received by or accrued to either spouse be deemed to be a 
lump sum which was received by or accrued to the husband. 
(South Africa 1962:par I of 2nd 
schedule) 
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A wife's investment income was still taxed in her husband's hands, 
but the only such income remaining was interest. It was expected 
that tax on that too would disappear when interest became subject 
to a final withholding tax at source, as announced by Minister Ou 
Plessis. This withholding tax on interest, however, was not 
introduced. 
4.10 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1992 YEAR OF 
ASSESSMENT 
In response to the needs of the country, the 1991 Budget attempted 
to close the gap between the taxpayers and those who needed help. 
Financial Mail noted that if the previous year's Budget was 11 Barend 
du Plessis' best to date, 11 1991's "effort [was] as unequivocally 
his most ingenious" {The Budget 1991:23). They calculated the 
concessions in personal tax to amount to a loss in revenue of about 
R1 billion which reduced the original printed estimate of 
R28,8 billion to R27,8 billion, still about R2,94 billion higher 
than it would have been without fiscal drag, at an inflation rate 
of 13 per cent (The Budget 1991:24). 
In a table entitled "Fiscal drag ~ill hurt" (1991:5), Finance Week 
listed the reduction in taxes for a married taxpayer with two 
children whose wife received no taxable income in the 1991 tax 
year. The tax reductions were from R40 less tax for an income of 
Rl4 000 gradually moving upwards to a reduction of Rl 400 for an 
income of R150 000. 
Finance Week then contended that the reduction in real terms was 
not worth mentioning as 
... by not having adjusted marginal tax rates, the process 
of fiscal drag means that a greater proportion of 
inflation-adjusted salary increases will be swallowed in 
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higher tax brackets. On the other hand, the tax concessions 
to individuals are a mere R701m, against R4m-plus last 
year; and even after them, the tax burden on individuals 
will (on the estimates) rise by 27% - way ahead of the 
inflation rate, let alone last year's single-digit 
increase. Even fiscal drag will be more serious than 
for some years. 
(Fiscal drag will hurt 1991:5) 
Husbands could make a donation to their wives free of donations tax 
and so split their income. It was believed it would be difficult 
to close this loophole because a husband could make a donation to a 
spouse for a number of reasons other than putting income in the 
hands of the spouse. Estate planning was cited as one example 
(Fiscal drag will hurt 1991:5). (This loophole, however, was 
closed later by the introduction of preventative legislation in 
section 7{2).) 
An important change was made to section 7(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
It previously read as follows: 
Any income received by or accrued to a married woman 
married with or without community of property shall be 
deemed for the purposes of this Act to be income accrued to 
her husband if-
(a) such income was derived by her otherwise than from any 
trade ... 
When amended it read as follows: 
Any income received by or accrued to any person married 
with or without community of property (hereinafter referred 
to as the recipient) shall be deemed for the purposes of 
this Act to be income accrued to such person's spouse 
(hereinafter referred to as the donor) if-
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(a) Such income was derived by the recipient in 
consequence of a donation, settlement or other 
disposition made by the donor on or after 20 March 
1991 or of a transaction, operation or scheme entered 
into or carried out by the donor on or after that 
date, and the sole or main purpose of such donation, 
settlement or other disposition or of such 
transaction, operation or scheme was the reduction, 
postponement or avoidance of the donor's liability for 
any tax, levy or duty which, but for such donation, 
settlement, other disposition, transaction, operation 
or scheme, would have become payable by the donor 
under this Act or any other Act administered by the 
Commissioner; ... 
These changes to section 7(2) were made to prevent income splitting 
between spouses by way of donating income-earning assets. According 
to Walpole, however, this section would not necessarily •affect the 
standard type of family trust used to split rentals to any greater 
extent than would (section] 103• (1992:11). It must be noted that 
the new section 7(2) only attacked arrangements made for transfer 
on or after 20 March 1991 so that an income-splitting scheme 
established before then •will still operate as intended• (Walpole 
1992:9). Walpole was also of the opinion that if the donor could 
show that the donation was made to benefit the estate of the donor 
and he could show that the 
(S]tructure and administration of the deceased estate were 
of prime importance, and that, perhaps as a result of his 
personal circumstances, the scheme adopted was used so as 
to provide an annual inflow of receipts and accruals for 
his spouse and children in the event of his death or in 
order to protect an asset from the predations of his 
creditors ••• [he] might well be able to satisfy a court 
that his purpose was not solely or mainly the avoidance or 
reduction of an impost administered by the Commissioner. 
(Walpole 1992:10) 
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Walpole also suggested the use of a trust as a vessel to split 
income between family members so that lower taxes could be paid by 
the person donating the assets to the trust (1991:98-100). This 
would, however, not be possible with the new changes to section 
7(2) of the Act, but for the 1991 year of assessment when the act 
taxed the income of a married woman nfrom traden as her own income 
and not that of her spouse (section 7(2) of the Act), it might well 
have been possible to provide her with ntrade8 income from a trust 
and so avoid excessive taxation. If, however, the transfer was to 
avoid tax (subsequent to 20 March 1991) then the Commissioner could 
attack it in terms of the new section 7(2) of the Act. 
A provision such as the one in section 7(2) of the Act would be 
needed if separate taxation was to be the norm. 
4.11 TAXATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENTS FOR THE 1993 TO 1995 YEARS OF 
ASSESSMENT 
As far as individuals were concerned, very little changed with 
these budgets. The annual decrease of top marginal rates, which 
had been reduced by 1 per cent for three years since 1990 (when it 
was 45 per cent) did not occur, and the maximum rate for married 
women was increased to 40 per cent. from 38 per cent. This was nin 
line with the intention government stated three years ago to tax 
married women at the same rate as single peoplea. (The Budget 
1992:33) 
The income bands which determined tax rates were reduced and 
broadened. The effect of this, according to the Financial Mail, 
was nto create tax benefits among lower-income earners because they 
remain in the lower rungs for longer. Conversely, higher-income 
earners reach the top notch soonern (The Budget 1992:31). The 
effect of the change in income bands was illustrated by the 
Minister in his speech by means of the following example: 
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A married person with two children and a taxable income of 
R35 000 whose income rises by 10 per cent will find that 
the average tax rate under the old scales would have risen 
from 15,1 percent to 16,7 per cent, whereas under the new 
scale it drops to 14,9 percent, with a reduction in tax of 
R655 in the 1993 tax year. 
(The Budget 1992:46) 
The effect was not so favourable for all the income bands and other 
types of individual taxpayer (Refer to Chapter 6 for an 
illustration of this). The Minister also illustrated the effect of 
the tax rate increase and the change in the income bands on married 
women and noted that all married women with an income of less than 
R80 500 nwill benefit from these changes" (The Budget 1992:46). He 
pointed out that 
a married woman with a taxable income of R30 000 per annum 
whose income rises by 10 per cent and whose average tax 
rate under the old scales would have risen from 21,g to 23 
per cent, will find that her average tax rate actually 
falls to 21,3 per cent. She will pay R570 less than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
(The Budget 1992:46) 
Another change to section 7(2) of the Act made in 1992 - a press 
release dated 5 February gave advance notice of this to enable 
spouses married in community of property to adjust their 
provisional tax, as the change was to be retroactive. 
The section to be inserted after subsection (2) and numbered (2A) 
was intended to arrange the tax affairs of people married in 
community of property. 
(2a) In the case of spouses who are married in community of 
property -
(a)which has been derived from the carrying on of any trade 
shall, if such trade is carried on by only one of the 
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spouses, be deemed to have accrued to that spouse, or, if 
such trade is carried on jointly by both spouses, be 
deemed, ... to have accrued to both spouses in the 
proportions determined by them in terms of the agreement 
that governs their joint trade; and 
(b)any rental of fixed property and any income derived 
otherwise than from the carrying on of any trade shall be 
deemed to have accrued in equal shares to both spouses ... 
(The Budget 1992:21-22) 
The amendments to section 7 of the Act were deemed to have come 
into operation as from the commencement of years of assessment 
ended or ending on or after 28 February 1991 if such income was 
derived from a trade or, if such income did not derive from a 
trade, from the commencement of years of assessment ended or ending 
on or after 29 February 1992 (The Budget 1992:22). This followed 
the evolution that had taken place in section 7(2) since 1989 when 
a married woman's income subject to SITE was excluded from her 
husband's income. In the 1990/91 year of assessment her trading 
income was also excluded and her income other than from trade was 
taxable in her hands from the 1991/2 year of assessment (The 
Budget 1992:26). 
Subsection (2C) also deemed that any benefit paid or payable to a 
spouse as 9 a member or past member of a pension fund, provident 
fund, benefit fund or retirement annuity fund shall be deemed to be 
income derived by such spouse from a trade carried on;n as well as 
any annuity amount paid or payable to a spouse. 
This section thus seemed to provide an advantage to spouses married 
in community of property, if one or both of them earned investment 
income. This income was then to be split equally between them. 
This was an advantage not available to other married couples. 
According to The Taxpayer, there was 9 no intention to create 
preferential treatment for spouses married in community of property 
as against spouses who are not so married. The treatment is in 
consequence of the legal proprietary relationship created by a 
161 
community estate, and if spouses who are not married in community 
wish to change their proprietary status the court may do so on a 
motivated application by them" (The Budget 1992:24). 
Very little change in respect of individual taxation was made to 
the income tax legislation since the 1993 year of assessment. 
Rates and rebates remained the same and the taxpayer's status also 
remained the same. This was probably because of the radical 
political changes anticipated and the old government preferred to 
wait for the new government to make changes in line with their 
policies. 
In 1994 a Transition levy of 5 per cent (3,33 per cent in 1994 and 
1,67 per cent in 1995) {South Africa 1994) of gross income over 
R50 000 was introduced for all taxpayers with the exception of 
married women where the levy only came into effect from a gross 
income of R175 000. The 1995 amendments presented to Parliament in 
March were drastic and proposed to change the rate schedules to one 
schedule for all taxpayers eliminating differences in rates between 
married person, unmarried person and married woman. 
4.12 CONClUSION 
This chapter reviewed the legislative changes to the taxation of 
individuals in South Africa since the inception of taxation 
legislation in 1910. The changes made to the legislation to 
accommodate both economic needs and social realities were noted. 
The taxation of individuals, with the married couple as the 
original tax unit, gradually made provision for relief for the 
married woman's earnings by way of married woman's earnings 
allowances and joint assessment allowances and evolved to the 
legislation which regarded the married woman as a separate tax 
unit, taxed on her own scales, except where this could lead to tax 
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avoidance. These changes lead to more horizontal equity for the 
working married woman and the one-breadwinner family. The 1995 
taxation amendments {one set of rates for all taxapayers) would 
negatively influence the horizontal equity for one-breadwinne~ 
families. The effect of these amendments and the recommendations 
of the Katz Commission are discussed in Chapter 6. 
The next chapter will discuss all aspects of the report of the 
Margo Commission in respect of the taxation of inrlividuals, from 
the representations made to the Commission, and listing the main 
problems with the system of joint taxation of spouses, to the 
recommendations made by the Commission. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE MARGO COMMISSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
5.2 REPRESENTATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE MARGO COMMISSION 
5.2.1 FAIRNESS OF THE SYSTEM 
5.2.2 BIAS TOWARDS MARRIAGE 
5.2.3 EFFECT ON THE STATUS OF MARRIED WOMEN 
5.2.4 DISINCENTIVE FOR MARRIED WOMEN TO WORK 
5.2.5 PROBLEMS WITH THE PAY-AS-YOU-EARN (PAVE) SYSTEM 
5.3 PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED CHANGES LAID BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION 
5.3.1 SEPARATE TAXATION 
5.3.1.1 Income splitting 
5.3.1.2 Discrimination against the single taxpayer and one-
breadwinner couples 
5.3.1.3 Administrative problems 
5.3.1.4 Loss of revenue 
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5.3.2 CHOICE BETWEEN JOINT/SINGLE STATUS 
5.3.2.1 Against the spirit of the law 
5.3.2.2 Other taxpayers 
5.3.2.3 Administrative problems 
5.3.2.4 Loss of revenue 
5.3.3 MARRIED WOMAN'S EARNINGS ALLOWANCE INCREASED 
5.3.3.1 Against the spirit of the law 
5.3.3.2 loss of revenue 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MARGO COMMISSION 
5.4.1 GENERAL PROPOSALS 
5.4.2 PROPOSAL REGARDING TAXATION OF MARRIED COUPLES 
5.5 RESPONSE BY PARLIAMENT TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS MADE BY THE MARGO COMMISSION 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been clear for a considerable time that the South 
African tax system required a major review and to this end the 
Government appointed the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax 
Structure of the Republic of South Africa (here referred to as 
the Margo Commission). The Margo Commission mainly 
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concerned itself with the legislation in force in 1984/5 and 
prior to that. As the report was only published in 1987, 
however, there had been some tax changes in the intervening 
years and in 1988 the legislation started to react to the 
recommendations made in the report. 
The previous chapter considered the taxation of individuals' 
income since 1910 and discussed the legislation amendments up 
to 1994. This chapter will mainly note the work of the Margo 
Commission; the petitions made to the Commission as regards 
the taxation of individuals; possible solutions to the 
problems inherent in any other option chosen and the final 
report of the Commission together with the Government's 
comments as incorporated in the White Paper. 
It was the first time that a recommendation of separate 
taxation was made. From 1988 legislation was changed to 
accommodate the recommendations in respect of married women. 
It was for this reason that the work and report of the Margo 
Commission was considered. 
5.2. REPRESENTATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE MARGO COMMISSION 
Many letters were sent and personal representations made to 
the Margo Commission during the time that the Commission 
considered the system of income taxation in South Africa. The 
criticism against and problems with the system of taxation of 
married women and married couples at the time are discussed 
below and classified according to the main problems listed by 
the contributors. 
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5.2.1 FAIRNESS OF THE SYSTEM 
One point touched on by most of the petitioners and 
contributors to the Margo Commission* was the unfairness of 
the system of joint taxation for married couples. Many 
petitioners felt that the system whereby a wife's income was 
added to that of her husband and then taxed at the higher 
marginal tax rate was unfair, when compared with the take-home 
salaries of two individuals who earned the same as the married 
couple but who were not married. 
Her [the wife's] income is taxed at the husband's 
marginal rate of tax, the effect being that her entire 
work effort is only marginally rewarded .... Inequity 
arises from the fact that a married woman with the same 
income as an unmarried woman is rewarded after tax at a 
lower level. 
(Jacobson 1985:2) 
... causes gross inequality of take-home salary. 
(Montachio 1984:1) 
These viewpoints considered the inequity from the wife's point 
of view, but it was also felt to be unfair to the husband. 
Van Zyl (1985:2) stated that "it is extremely unfair that one 
spouse's taxation is increased by the other spouse's income 
without him being able to claim a contribution from the other 
spouse" (own translation). 
In a report to the Minister of Finance by the Department of 
Inland Revenue in 1976, (the Browne Commission) the tax 
*The literature used in these sections was obtained from the library of 
the Standing Committee of Inquiry into the Tax System in South Africa, where 
all the correspondence and documents of the Margo Commission are kept. 
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unit in use since 1914, that is the married couple, was 
justified as follows: 
It is based on the principle of ability to pay with 
consideration of the means of the unit earning the 
income and disposing of it. The normal situation of a 
household is that the joint earnings of a husband and 
wife are applied to the advantage of the joint 
household ... and the only inequity in the ability to 
pay may possibly be in the additional expenses that the 
wife contracts to earn the additional income. It 
cannot be gainsaid that there are savings when two 
people live together and consequently there is no 
unfairness, especially in the middle to higher income 
groups, if the taxation paid by a married couple is 
more than the total of the taxes payable by two 
unmarried persons who each earn an income equal to half 
the joint income of the married couple. {own 
translation). 
{South Africa 1976:6) 
The National Council of Women of South Africa felt, however, 
that "the ability to pay is obviously an important canon of 
taxation. However, it is not necessarily the household's 
ability to pay that should be considered but the 
individual's." {Jacobson 1985:4) 
Joint taxation was, however, considered to be fair when 
compared with one breadwinner doing extra work to earn the 
"additional income" which another husband's wife would earn, 
as this breadwinner was also taxed at marginal rates on this 
additional income. 
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[T]here will be justified discontent on the side of the 
one-breadwinner family, especially when the increased 
income results from the additional exertion and 
initiative of the only breadwinner, if it was expected 
of him to pay more tax than the two-breadwinner family 
with equal income (own translation). 
(South Africa 1976:22) 
Although the Department of Inland Revenue considered the 
married woman's earnings allowance to be justified, they did 
admit to having received representation for a similar 
allowance for other income sources, for example for people who 
received investment income and for pensioners who received a 
pension but who also worked after retirement for an additional 
salary. They also noted that the 11 ••• concept of the married 
woman's allowance is in direct conflict with the healthy and 
longstanding principle of our taxation legislation ... that 
expenses of a private nature are not an allowable deduction 
..... (own translation) (South Africa 1976:7). 
Sinclair (1984:12) pointed out that 
[A] difference between one and two breadwinner families 
already exists, for the married woman's allowance does 
not operate unless the wife works, so that two couples 
with the same income may pay different amounts of tax 
according to whether the wife works or does not earn at 
all. 
Joint taxation was also seen as unfair when compared with the 
taxation of other couples and groups of taxpayers. As 
Sinclair (1984:11) noted: 
Persons who live together outside of marriage do not 
have their incomes aggregated. Widows and widowers 
who live together without marrying are married persons 
within the Act but do not have their incomes 
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aggregated. In many of these situations there may be 
only one provider who pays tax on his whole income and 
who supports the other person sharing the residential 
unit. Why should the fact of marriage introduce the 
rigid concept that regardless of the ratios in which 
income is earned for the support of that married 
couple, the overall tax payable must be the same? 
The National Council of Women also stated that "[t]hP current 
anomaly resulting from the definition of 'married person' in 
the Act, of a person paying a different quantum of taxes 
depending on whether their spouse divorced them or died (ie 
widow/widower v divorcee) should be abolished" (Jacobson 
1985:4). 
Another inequity was introduced by sections 7(2) and 20{A) of 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 which prevented a wife, who 
worked for or was in partnership with her husband or worked 
for a private company in which he had a specific interest, 
from benefiting from the deduction allowed from her earnings 
as a married woman. A bona fide partnership or 
employer/employee relationship was thus penalised by higher 
taxes simply because the participants happened to be married 
to each other. 
Once the taxes were paid, the inequities continued because, if 
tax was overpaid and monies had to be refunded by Inland 
Revenue, these refunds were always made to the taxpayer, that 
is the husband, irrespective of whether he or his wife had 
originally paid too much tax. The wife was also not entitled 
to her own loan levy when it was repaid. Furthermore, the 
onus was on the husband to pay the additional taxes due when 
employees' tax (pay-as-you-earn) failed to recover the full 
amount during the year, even though the shortage might be in 
his wife's taxes paid. 
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The income groups that were viewed as being discriminated 
against were the middle and high income groups and it was 
pointed out that a different dispensation which "will 
prejudice low earners is manifestly unacceptable" (Sinclair 
1984:5). 
Clearly, this was a complex situation with many inequities. 
/ 
We are not here dealing with a case of direct 
discrimination but one where an indirect adverse effect 
is created by the use of a system which in practice 
differentiates in its treatment of women and men when 
taken as a couple for tax purposes .... The tax system 
is the result not of intention to discriminate against 
women but of historical fact. 
(Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 1985:265) 
5.2.2 BIAS TOWARDS MARRIAGE 
More tax is paid as a result of aggregation of incomes 
than would be paid by husband and working wife taxed as 
two single individuals. This applies above a joint 
taxable income of roughly R12 000 per annum - a figure 
unchanged since 1981. Below this income it is 
beneficial to be jointly taxed. The higher tax bill is 
seen as unfair or a tax on marriage, and with fiscal 
drag it has come to affect a relatively large number of 
taxpayers. 
( Jowe 11 1985: 1) 
The concept "tax on marriage" had become firmly rooted by 1984 
and many of the petitioners quoted this. Income tax was 
indeed the only tax legislation that treated the taxpayer 
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according to his or her marital status. General sales tax, 
value-added tax, company tax, customs and excise duties, 
etcetera all concentrated on the amounts to be collected and 
did not ask whether or not the purchaser, shareholder or 
importer was married (Van der Spuy (on behalf of the Southern 
African Women's Foundation} 1985:1,10}. 
Sinclair (1984:8} noted that "a tax penalty is visited upon 
certain persons simply by the fact of their marriage". She 
also referred to the tax benefits for persons in the lower 
income groups as a result of their marriage: "a tax bonus is 
granted to them simply because they are married". 
She further noted that the "marriage penalty" and the 
"marriage bonus" may vary according to the amount of the 
aggregated income of the spouses and the ratios in which it 
was earned. This was anomalous in that the income tax system 
in force at the time encouraged some persons to marry while it 
discouraged others from marrying or remaining married. "My 
view is that, ideally, the tax laws should neither encourage 
nor discourage marriage. It should not for example, penalize 
those who do not choose heterosexual wedlock blessed by civil 
or religious authority." (Sinclair 1984:8 & 9} 
The "tax on marriage" was also seen as playing a part in the 
"dismantling of the healthy marriage and family framework" 
(own translation)(Womenpower 1985:5}. This sentiment was also 
referred to by the National Council of Women of South Africa 
in their first document submitted to the Commission: 
The unfortunate tendency for young couples who would 
wish to marry, to cohabit in order to avoid Joint 
Taxation; and, equally disturbing, the increasing 
number of happily married couples who divorce in order 
to avoid Joint Taxation, and continue to live together. 
(Schreiner 1985:1) 
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"It is indeed unfortunate that one of the fiscal polici~s 
should appear to negate the Government's belief in and support 
for the institution of marriage" (Van Zyl 1985:3). 
Sinclair (1984:10) pointed out that it was difficult to attain 
marriage neutrality when the notion existed that all married 
couples with the same total income should be taxed equally, as 
they share essential facilities. "The conflict between these 
goals is exacerbated by the fact that our society is no longer 
based on the breadwinner-homemaker marriage pattern of the 
past." 
Vet it is quite possible to devise a system of 
separate taxation that solves some problems yet 
increases the "marriage tax". Conversely joint 
taxation could continue in such a way that the marriage 
tax is removed but all or some of the other problems 
remain. 
(Jewell 1985:2) 
It was clear that taxation neutrality towards marriage had 
many facets. Sinclair (1984:8) noted that the historical 
concept thereof should have been ignored and that 
[m]arriage neutrality is what we should be striving for 
in these times, when divergent lifestyles are emerging 
and the dominant pattern of generations past, when men 
and women had no free choice to live together without 
formalizing their relationship by marriage, is becoming 
merely one option among several. 
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5.2.3 EFFECT ON THE STATUS OF MARRIED WOMEN 
"Another important argument related to the inequity of taxing 
husbands and wives jointly is that women do not enjoy equal 
status with men as taxpayers" (Sinclair 1984:7}. 
The status of married women, and women in general, was 
discussed extensively from several viewpoints and reference 
was made to the specific non-status in tax law, the new 
Matrimonial Property Act, the Population Development Programme 
and the labour laws. Sinclair (1984:7) conceded that there 
was merit in the arguments 
... at least to the extent that the unfortunate 
terminology and structure within the relevant sections 
of our income tax act d~ leave one with the impression 
that women are so-called "non-persons". Section 7(2) 
is an example of unfortunate drafting that emphasises 
the lack of identity of the female, married earner. 
Her income is regarded merely as income that accrued to 
her husband. 
Sinclair's point was reiterated in various ways by the other 
petitioners to the Margo Commission and was considered by some 
(especially the feminists) to refer to one of the most hurtful 
aspects of the joint taxation system. 
The National Council of Women of South Africa (Document no 1 
1985:1} listed as one of the inequities of the system: "The 
right of every working person to consider remuneration for 
his/her labours as his/her personal income, which may not be 
dealt with by the State simply as an addendum to the income of 
another, in this case the spouse". 
Meyer (1985:2) stated that 
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the Income Tax Act deems the income of married women 
and minor children to belong to the husband. This is 
as fictitious and insulting a concept as it would be to 
deem the effort put into a job by a woman to be her 
husband's. The effort is her own, and the salary must 
be her own to utilize as she sees fit. 
The Women's Legal Status Committee (1985:1) referred to the 
change ~n the status of women in South African society, 
especially during the last decade, as follows: 
This is reflected in the large number of women who are 
in paid employment outside the home, either because of 
the necessity for both marriage partners to earn income 
or because they are single parents or because of the 
change in emphasis in women fulfilling their full 
occupational potential. 
Van Zyl (1985:1) noted the lack of privacy that a spouse 
enjoyed regarding her financial affairs, which also had a 
detrimental effect on her status. 
Jacobson (1985:2) referred to the resolution of the United 
Nations Commission on the Status of Women, as amended and 
adopted at the thirty-second session of the Economic and 
Social Council in July 1961, as follows: 
Considering that if the system of joint taxation of the 
earned income of husband and wife is practised, care 
should be taken to ensure that married persons do not 
pay tax at a higher rate than single persons. 
Affirming the basic principles that the remuneration of 
the work of women should be no less than that of men 
and that the tax legislation should not interfere with 
the right to marry and found a family. 
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The United Nations Commission also noted the need for tax 
legislation to provide for equal treatment of men and women in 
respect of taxation of earned income {Jacobson 1985:2). 
The change in the taxation of black married couples was also 
seen as a slight to the married working woman: "We are not 
happy with the new idea that women are to be treated like 
children under the new tax system imposed on blacks. We are 
not so many wives [sic], we want to be individuals." (Ngwenya 
1985:1) 
A second argument considering-the status of the married woman 
concerned the changes in Matrimonial Property Law and Labour 
Law as regards females: 
Tax law is now behind other legislation such as the 
Matrimonial Properties Act which treats marriage as . a 
partnership and revised labour statutes such as the 
Labour Relations Act which now accord women equal 
rights and equal treatment in the work place. 
(Jowell 1985:6) 
The extensive amendments to the Matrimonial Property Act of 
1984 which termed husband and wife to be equal partners in the 
marriage, were also listed as being incompatible with an 
Income Tax Act which considered the wife to be merely an 
adjunct to her husband. The considerable change in a married 
woman's status brought about by the Matrimonial Property Act 
and the requirements of the Labour Relations Act, which called 
for equal treatment of male and female in the workplace, were 
not compatible with the income tax legislation. 
Van der Spuy (1985:1) pointed out the efforts made by the 
Population Development Programme to limit the number of 
children to two per mother during her lifetime. She noted 
that the Government had adopted a new educational policy aimed 
at increasing woman's awareness of the dangers of 
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overpopulation, but, according to her, this would not be 
successful unless the woman's status was raised in all 
spheres: 
... a high birthrate goes hand in hand with the low 
status of women .... those countries which have decreased 
their birthrate have done so in conjunction with 
improving the status of their women. I refer 
specifically to the granting, and protection of women'~ 
legal and financial majority status by the legislature 
of each concerned country. 
It was made clear that joint taxation infringed upon the 
woman's status as an independent individual by considering her 
to be a non-person. The South African tax law lagged behind 
other South African legislation in that it did not recognize a 
woman as a separate economic entity. 
5.2.4 DISINCENTIVE FOR MARRIED WOMEN TO WORK 
The higher tax rates applicable to a married woman's earnings 
as a result of joint taxation was considered to be a 
disincentive for married women to work or return to work. 
"Aggregation is alleged to be a disincentive for women to 
continue working after marriage or to return to work after an 
absence, particularly well educated women who are usually 
married to men in higher income brackets." (Jowell 1985:3 & 4) 
This, noted Jowell {1985:3 & 4), was the same argument as that 
advanced by individuals who complained against the effect of 
progressive income tax and high marginal rates on their 
additional efforts. She noted, however, that the difference 
for the married woman was that her entire income {less the 
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allowance} was treated as incremental and taxed at her 
husband's marginal rate or higher. 
The disincentive effect of joint taxation resulted in a "loss 
to the economy of the services of skilled and/or educated 
women who, upon marriage, no longer work because the 
effort [is] not worth while" and the "loss to the economy of 
large sums of money spent on the training of persons who, for 
the reasons stated above, withdraw from the labour market upon 
marriage" (Schreiner 1985:1). 
It was also pointed out that wives who earned high salaries, 
the ones hurt by joint taxation, were most likely in 
managerial or highly skilled posts. There was a shortage of 
such workers in our country and having women in such posts 
could help create more jobs for the homeless (Jacobson 1985:2; 
Van den Berg 1985:2}. 
Sinclair (1984:4), however, doubted the validity of these 
arguments, and maintained that women would work when they 
needed the money: 
Many married women are entering the labour market 
because their husbands are not in a position alone to 
provide the financial resources the couple needs to 
maintain the standard of living chosen. These women 
work out of necessity. As long as their contribution 
results in any enrichment, that is any increase in the 
amount of money available to pay for the necessities of 
life, they will be compelled by their circumstances to 
continue to work. 
Her assessment of the disincentive issue was that poorer 
women, who are not highly skilled or professionally trained, 
work out of economic necessity, and would continue to do so. 
Women work, however, also when they need the stimulation or 
when they derive job satisfaction from their work: 
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Joint taxation of husband and wife would not cause 
professional women to sacrifice the intellectual 
stimulation and achievement they need. If these women 
relinquish their careers there will be other factors at 
play to influence their decisions. One of these 
factors may be the lack of adequate childcare 
facilities. Another may, however, be that their 
financially successful husbands prefer them to stay 
home and mind the children ... 
(Sinclair 1984:6,7) 
Sinclair (1984:7) conceded, however, that "there may thus be a 
margin of middle to upper-income groups within which the tax 
structure acts as a strong disincentive to potentially 
productive women". 
In the report on the investigation into the taxation of the 
income of married women, carried out by the Department of 
Inland Revenue in collaboration with the Standing Commission 
of Investigation regarding the Taxation Policy of the Republic 
{South Africa 1976), the Department of Inland Revenue was not 
convinced that the aggregation of incomes was really a 
disincentive for married women to do paid work • 
... with consideration of factors like sociological 
circumstances, availability of work (especially in the 
rural districts), age, training or retraining problems 
etc. the percentage of married women who are 
economically active is considered to be rather high in 
the Commission's opinion and the Commission doubts 
whether additional incentive by way of tax incentives 
would have any effect worth mentioning on the 
situation .... It is further clear that financial 
reasons would play a bigger role in the lower and 
middle income groups than in the higher groups and in 
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the former group taxation is not such a heavy load that 
it can be an inhibiting factor (own translation). 
(South Africa 1976:24) 
Research done by Wessels of the Human Sciences Research 
Council on The taxation of the income of married women 
concluded that 47 per cent of graduate married women did not 
work. She deduced that between 14,7 and 21,6 per cent of 
these persons could be activated for productive work if the 
joint income tax system was abolished. 
It would moreover appear from the comments that the 
system is a contributory factor in labour turnover 
among high level female workers, sometimes causes job 
dissatisfaction and frustration at work and in the 
home; and that in some cases it gives rise to 
matrimonial problems. 
(Wessels 1977:14) 
5.2.5 PROBLEMS WITH THE PAY-AS-YOU-EARN (PAVE) SYSTEM 
The pay-as-you-earn (PAVE) system, which collected tax on a 
regular basis from salaried taxpayers, was listed as another 
problem as the deductions for married women were higher than 
those for any other class of taxpayer earning the same salary. 
"To a large degree the dissatisfaction of married women had 
its origin in the tax deductions made according to the 
pay-as-you-earn system from their earnings" (South Africa 
1976:26}. The Browne Commission (South Africa 1976:26) also 
noted that PAVE was not a tax . per se but only a "measure for 
the collection of tax in expectation of the taxpayer's final 
liability for taxation ... ". Despite this, married women 
considered it a tax on their incomes and they compared their 
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deductions with the deductions of taxpayers in other 
categories. 
The Browne Commission gave as the reason for the higher 
deductions, the fact that the PAVE for a married woman was 
calculated on the assumption that every married woman had "a 
husband earning income and that her income is part of the 
income of the joint household carrying tax in total at a 
higher rate". They did, however, concede that the total PAVE 
deductions of husband and wife did not normally cover the full 
amount of the taxation payable and the husband had to pay in 
the shortfall (South Africa 1976:26). 
Jowell (1985:2,5) commented that 
[t]hese [PAVE deductions] do not ensure the correct 
deduction of tax from both partners' earnings during 
the year, which leads either to a refund or, more 
problematically, a need for additional tax to be paid 
on assessment. The deductions are also different for 
man and wife, which is seen as unfair •... I believe 
that working couples give most weight to the larger 
amount of tax paid because of marriage and to the 
inadequacies of the PAVE deductions which make this 
painfully obvious at year end. 
The main comments on and problems with the system of joint 
taxation were referred to, namely the fact that it was unfair 
to tax people with the same incomes at different rates; it 
presented a bias towards or against marriage; it affected the 
status of women; it acted as a disincentive for married women 
to work; and the PAVE system deducted more tax from the 
married woman's earnings during the year than from the 
earnings of the other categories of taxpayer. 
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5.3 PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED CHANGES LAID BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
Besides listing the inequities and wrongs of the current 
system of joint taxation, the representations made to the 
Margo Commission also contained suggestions for improvement. 
These included separate taxation of husband and wife; the 
choice by the married couple to be taxed together or 
separately; 
allowance. 
problems. 
and increasing the married women's earnings 
All three of these suggestions had inherent 
5.3.1 SEPARATE TAXATION 
The separate taxation of spouses involved a system whereby 
each one was taxed on his/her own income at individual rates. 
The problems connected with this included income splitting, 
discrimination against the single taxpayer and one-breadwinner 
couple, an additional administrative burden for the Department 
of Inland Revenue and a loss of revenue for the government. 
The separate taxation of spouses could take different forms: 
separate returns and separate assessments; separate returns 
and joint assessments; joint returns and joint assessments. It 
could also apply to all income or only to earned income (Tax 
Research, Inland Revenue 1984:4). The rates suggested 
differed from married rates for both spouses on their incomes 
to one rate for unmarried persons and individual married 
partners (Women's Legal Status Committee 1985:2), or a married 
rate for the husband and a single rate for the wife. It was 
also suggested that the rates be revised because 
... if no revision took place, persons now benefitting 
from joint taxation would be prejudiced. Such a 
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development is clearly unacceptable. New tax scales to 
take into account the implications of all the changes 
that will be finally recommended by the Commission may 
well have to be devised at a later stage. 
(Sinclair 1984:17) 
5.3.1.1 Income splitting 
In a system of separate taxation there was an inherent danger 
that the married couple would divide taxable income between 
them in such a way that the minimum of income tax was payable. 
This was referred to as income splitting and involved the 
transfer of income-earning assets to the spouse earning the 
lesser amount of income so that taxation was calculated at 
lower rates. This was difficult to do when only the 'earned 
income' (or salary) was taxed separately and all investment 
income was taxed in the hands of one spouse. 
Joint taxation eliminates the possibility of avoidance 
of tax by way of income-splitting. Were we to adopt a 
system of separate taxation that permitted even income 
not "earned" to be taxed separately in the hands of 
married persons, it seems clear that spouses would 
manipulate the ownership of income-producing assets to 
derive a tax advantage. Transfers by husbands to wives 
would certainly occur. The result would be that 
couples with large "unearned" incomes would be in a 
more favourable position than those who relied solely 
on "earned" income. 
(Sinclair 1984:14) 
Sinclair (1984:16) suggested that this problem might not prove 
to be so serious in practice as it was made out to be because 
the donor of large income-producing assets may fear losing 
both the asset, and the income it generated, if the 
relationship failed. 
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I doubt that a substantial amount of revenue will be 
lost by such transfers ... also because policing of 
sham transfers is not new to the administrative 
authorities. These transactions already take place, I 
imagine, between other family members. Ultimately, I 
consider that the increased policing burden on the 
authorities will have to be accepted, for it does not 
justify the retention of joint taxation. Nor, I think, 
but only tentatively, would it warrant distinguishing 
between 'earned income' and income derived from 
investment. 
(Sinclair 1984:16) 
5.3.1.2 Discrimination against the single taxoayer and one-
breadwinner couple 
The system of separate taxation would be unfair to those 
people who "benefit" from joint taxation, namely the single 
taxpayer who had his or her own domestic costs and the married 
couple with only one breadwinner who would then be taxed at a 
higher rate, or lose the benefit of the lower, joint rate. 
Another manifestation of the unfairness of the 
individual tax unit is that a single breadwinner family 
will pay more tax, and consequently will be worse off 
than a two-breadwinner family with a much larger total 
income (own translation}. 
(South Africa 1976:10) 
The biggest problem is the system's inability to 
contrive equal tax treatment for equal incomes of 
one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner families. 
Splitting of income between marriage partners provides 
space for avoidance practices which affects horizontal 
equity. 
(Married Persons 3, 1984:24) 
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5.3.1.3 Administrative problems 
Many of the representations that were made indicated that the 
authors felt that separate taxation would involve a 
considerable additional administrative burden for the 
Department of Inland Revenue. 
The complete separation of married couples' income and 
the issuing of separate assessments to each, also 
brings considerable additional administrative work as 
attempts at income splitting and tax avoidance will 
also increase (own translation). 
(South Africa 1976:17) 
The Browne Commission (South Africa 1976) noted that 
requirements in respect of personnel, stationery, printing of 
additional forms, cost of machinery and accommodation for 
personnel and records would increase administrative costs 
considerably while the revenue would decrease. 
The Commission felt that the physical range of work in 
connection with tax assessments and collections would increase 
in a direct relation to the number of economically active 
married women which would lead to an increase in the unit cost 
of tax collecting. They considered the most important 
aspects, however, to be the lack of personnel and 
accommodation. 
It could alone well be the last drop that will cause 
the bucket to overflow for an already overburdened tax 
collecting organisation. 
Apart from the physical range of the work concerned, 
the control measures that will have to be established 
to thwart tax avoidance, will increase the pressures 
even more (own translation). 
(South Africa 1976:25) 
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The separate taxation system was still considered by some to 
be separate only as regards returns but that these returns 
would still have to be jointly assessed. 
[This would be] costly and time-consuming for the 
Receiver as both files would have to be attended to at 
same time (and) until both returns are received neither 
spouse can be assessed - In 1983 there were only 764 
couples or 0,14% of cases where both spouses had an 
income. 
5.3.1.4 loss of revenue 
(Tax Research, Inland Revenue 
Department 1984:25) 
In the final analysis it has to be accepted that a 
considerable loss in revenue would have to be sustained 
by the fiscus in order to eliminate marriage as a 
factor affecting the individuals' tax burden. 
(Sinclair 1984:20) 
This fact was also mentioned by the Department of Inland 
Revenue which calculated an approximate loss of R567 million 
for the 1985/1986 tax year if the husband was to be taxed at 
married rates and the wife at single rates (Married Persons 3, 
1984:5,6). 
Womenpower (1985:6), Pretoria quoted officials as saying that 
R120 million would be lost annually if separate taxation was 
applied, but it was not clear how this was calculated. 
Womenpower noted, however, that if the tax burden was lifted 
for the married couple, more tax would be collected because 
more wives would enter the labour market. This sentiment was 
echoed by the National Council of Women of South Africa 
(Jacobson 1985:2). They quoted the saving on the wife's 
earnings allowance as approximately R434 million. 
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5.3.2 CHOICE BETWEEN JOINT/SINGLE TAX UNITS 
Another group of petitioners felt that, in order to avoid the 
disadvantages of either separate taxation or joint taxation, 
couples should be able to choose between joint or separate tax 
the most beneficial to them. In this way there would be no 
discrimination between one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner 
couples. This was considerec to be against the letter of the 
law and unfair towards other taxpayers. It would also involve 
administrative difficulties and result in a loss of revenue. 
5.3.2.1 Against the spirit of the law 
The Browne Commission felt it to be "extremely dangerous" to 
give an "unlimited right to married couples to move in and out 
of family unit tax as soon as it saves them money ... " 
(translated) (South Africa 1976:12). 
An optional system does not make sense and uncovers a 
weakness in the tax system. If a general rule dictates 
the tax scale but as an alternative grants the right to 
a taxpayer to choose a lower tariff, not based on 
ability to pay, but on social grounds, then the time 
has come to investigate the reliability of such a 
system, as the uncertainty re what is a reasonable and 
fair tax on a given amount of income, is an 
acknowledgement that the basic tax structure is at 
fault (own translation). 
(South Africa 1976:25) 
5.3.2.2 Other taxpayers 
It was felt that the system would be unfair towards other 
taxpayers who did not have the option to choose a more 
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favourable rate/method of tax. It was mentioned though, that 
the "rates of choice" would be adjusted. 
It is inherent in the fairness arguments in favour of a 
separate family unit system from choice that there is a 
separate family tariff somewhere between the extremes 
of "pure averaging" and "pure merging". The first is 
undoubtedly too favourable for couples who make the 
choice and too unfavo~rable for singles and couples who 
choose individual treatment. The choice of a family 
tariff in relationship to the tariff for individuals 
therefore requires fine judgement {own translation.} 
{South Africa 1976:12} 
5.3.2.3 Administrative problems 
An annual election by married couples to be taxed jointly or 
separately would disrupt the Department of Inland Revenue's 
records, procedures and administration, and would lead to 
fluctuations in the number of taxpayers and taxes paid {Tax 
Research Inland Revenue Department 1984). 
Sinclair {1984:18} pointed out that although it appeared as if 
separate assessments for every individual taxpayer would 
increase costs and the volume of administration, the increase 
appeared to be less than what it would be in the case of an 
election system. This might be a superficial economy as other 
complications could arise out of the election system, namely 
... that some married taxpayers will be on one system 
and other on another; Will the choice be permanent? 
Can an election be made for each tax year? Can the 
choice for a particular year, once made, be altered? 
These questions are problematical and would not arise 
if separate taxation were made mandatory. 
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5.3.2.4 Loss of revenue 
It was calculated that the decrease'in revenue would amount to 
something like R800 million for the 1985-1986 year of 
assessment, based on the following: that only persons who 
would benefit from separate taxation would be treated as 
single persons; that rebates would be divided equally between 
spouses; that for those who were taxed separately the married 
woman's allowance of R1 600 would fall away (Sinclair 
1984:19). In its document tabled before the Commission The 
National Council of Women of South Africa asserted that the 
loss occasioned by separate taxation would be partially 
recouped (R434 million) by the abolition of the married 
woman's allowance (Jacobson 1985:6). It must be noted, 
however, that certain couples would still have made use of the 
R1 600 deduction and, if they could elect which taxation would 
be applied to them, this saving would not be so high. 
It could also be advantageous from a cost point of view as it 
was noted that, if the election basis used in the United 
States was implemented here, then the State would benefit to 
the extent of R1 000 million. (Married Persons 2, 1984:8) 
The Irish Taxation Committee (1982) (Married Persons 3, 1984) 
noted that a joint assessment was generally beneficial and 
where spouses elected for single assessment, each spouse was 
taxed as a single person without the right to transfer all of 
the reliefs between them. Jointly assessed they may elect for 
separate assessments where joint tax is allocated between 
spouses. 
The advantages of the choice between joint and separate 
taxation were noted as follows: 
If separate taxation, instead of being introduced 
compulsorily, across the board, were to be introduced 
on an election basis, it seems clear that only persons 
189 
who would benefit from being separately taxed (on 
present scales) would make the election. Others would 
retain their status under the present dispensation. 
While at the same time, all complaints arising out of 
the present compulsory joint taxation could be 
neutralised. Another advantage may be that the 
proliferation of assessments that would necessarily 
accompany compulsory separate taxation would be 
curtailed. If, as referred to in para 6 above, Dr De 
Loor's statement that 83% of taxpayers benefit from 
joint taxation is still true in 1985, no more than 17% 
of taxpayers would opt for separate taxation. 
(Sinclair 1984:17,18) 
Sinclair (1984:18) also noted that the election system had 
proven feasible in both the United Kingdom and the United 
States, as there were rules which regulated the exercise by 
the taxpayer of his or her choice. 
5.3.3 MARRIED WOMAN'S EARNINGS ALLOWANCE INCREASED 
A third suggestion was that the married woman's earnings 
allowance be increased considerably in order to compensate for 
progressive rates. This was felt to be against the spirit of 
the law and would also involve loss of revenue. 
5.3.3.1 Against the spirit of the law 
Although the deduction allowed from the earnings of 
married women was justified on the grounds of ability 
to pay, it is in direct conflict with the healthy and 
longstanding principle of our tax legislation namely 
that in the calculation of taxable income, expenses of 
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a private nature are not an allowable deduction and, as 
a result of this deviation, many representations are 
received for a similar relief in respect of other 
income sources (own translation). 
(South Africa 1976:7) 
The Browne Commission also noted that a continuing increase in 
the deduction would result in unfair tax treatment of one-
breadwinner families, especially where the breadwinner 
increased his or her earnings by means of overtime work. 
5.3.3.2 Loss of revenue 
The loss in revenue to the State as a result of the deduction, 
based on the latest available statistics regarding the 
frequency of economically active married women, was calculated 
at R6 million for every additional RIOO deduction allowed for 
a married woman. The Browne Commission mentioned that the R750 
deduction cost the state R45 million in tax relief to those 
tax units with two working spouses. It was therefore 
necessary to ensure that joint income was not split in such a 
way that the husband also obtained a benefit from the R750 by 
sharing his profits with his wife or paying her a salary. 
(South Africa 1976:7,8) 
It was clear that, although the tax system that operated at 
the time of the Margo Commission's investigation was not the 
ideal system, all the alternative systems proposed to the 
Commission implied major problems and involved substantial 
costs. 
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5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MARGO COMMISSION 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure 
of South Africa (Margo Report) was published in August 1987 
and it made many far-reaching recommendations in the form of a 
complete and harmonised package. An alternative package was 
also suggested should the first one not be acceptable (South 
Africa 1987). 
5.4.1 GENERAL PROPOSALS 
The main package hinged on the introduction of a Comprehensive 
Business Tax as a means of financing the gradual lowering of 
Income Tax, reform of General Sales Tax and a change from 
joint taxation to separate taxation of husband and wife (South 
Africa, 1987:90-154). 
Further changes suggested were the following: 
-Abolition of tax expenditures and concessions 
-Neutrality between company tax rates and individual 
maximum marginal rates 
-No taxation on dividends 
-Capital transfer tax at a flat rate instead of estate 
duty 
-Abolition of several other minor taxes. 
The further changes suggested were not of great concern here 
except insofar as they affected the taxation of the married 
couple. They were mentioned merely to show that separate 
taxation was dependent on the other components of the taxation 
package and on the entire package being acceptable to the 
Government. 
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An alternative package was suggested should a comprehensive 
business tax not be acceptable, but then the options for 
reform were felt to be more limited as regards the taxation 
unit (South Africa, 1987:347). 
5.4.2 PROPOSAL REGARDING TAXATION 0~ MARRIED COUPLES 
The Commission recommended that the individual and not the 
married couple be considered to be the tax unit on a 
compulsory basis and for all kinds of income. 
The reasons they gave for this recommendation were as follows: 
-The increasing trend to tax the individual in other 
Western countries 
-The need for marriage neutrality and equal treatment 
of men and women 
-Administrative considerations 
The Commission's recommendations, as regards the married 
couple and the taxation thereof, are given in full here as 
summarised in the White Paper on the Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South 
Africa (South Africa 1988:45-46). (The paragraph references 
are to the paragraphs in the Margo Report itself.) 
a) Despite the considerations that support taxing the 
couple as a unit, the Commission recommends that the 
individual replace the couple as the unit. Its 
decision was reached after a thorough evaluation of 
previous South African investigations into the subject, 
of trends in other Western jurisdictions, and of local 
and international criticisms of joint taxation (para 
7.128). 
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(b) The Commission believes that the need for marriage 
neutrality and the equal treatment of men and women 
justifies a change in the tax unit. It is no longer 
true that women necessarily depend upon their husbands. 
Fiscal policy should be seen to discourage neither 
marriage nor employment. Individual effort should be 
recognized (paras 7.131-7.134). 
(c) Administrative considerations have played a 
compelling role in the Commission's recommendation that 
the individual supplant the couple as the unit of 
taxation. In particular, PAVE deductions cannot be 
calculated correctly while the incomes of spouses must 
be aggregated. Harmonization that is, the 
application of the Income Tax Act to Blacks - is a 
further reason for changing the unit, because Black 
spouses frequently live and work in different places 
(paras 7.135 -7.137). 
(d) The Commission recommends that separate taxation 
of spouses be made compulsory. To deal with two 
different tax units, according to the election of the 
taxpayer, is not administratively feasible, nor is it 
necessarily more equitable. Nevertheless - and despite 
separate assessment - for administrative reasons 
husbands and wives should submit joint returns unless 
they request separate returns (paras 7.138,7.142). 
(e) The Commission recommends separate taxation in 
respect of all income, and not merely earned income. 
Income splitting, if it occasions an unacceptable loss 
of revenue, should be controlled by measures similar to 
those applying in other jurisdictions, such as 
Australia (paras 7.139 - 7.141). 
(f) The Commission recommends that the matrimonial 
property system of community of property be overridden 
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by statute for the purposes of income tax. That is 
necessary to ensure that spouses who choose this system 
are precluded from relying upon their joint ownership 
to average their incomes. As between the spouses 
themselves, however, the matrimonial property system 
would operate normally. The Commission would have 
recommended that the attribution of unearned income, in 
these marriages, should depend upon the criterion of 
control, were 
difficulties. 
it net for possible 
Appropriate criteria 
administrative 
should be 
investigated by the committee on tax reform which 
should continue the work of the Commission (para 
7.142). 
The Commission further recommended a compromise in favour of 
the married couple to ensure neutrality between 
one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner families. 
(g) The substitution of the individual for the couple 
will yield marriage neutrality, but it will entail a 
loss of neutrality between one-breadwinner and 
two-breadwinner families. The Commission believes that 
the individual is the correct tax unit, but that, as 
long as the one-breadwinner family remains an important 
family structure, a compromise in favour of the married 
couple should be made. This compromise takes the form 
of a recommendation th~t the primary and child rebates 
be made fully transferable between spouses (para 
7.143). 
(h) A low-income rebate of R600 for every taxpayer 
should be introduced. This rebate will diminish by Rl 
for every RIO by which taxable income exceeds R6 000. 
It will therefore disappear at Rl2 000 - the new FDS 
threshold recommended in para 8.47. The purpose of 
this rebate is to prevent thresholds from falling too 
low, and to alleviate the hardship to taxpayers within 
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the FDS [Final Deduction System] of being unable to 
transfer primary and child rebates (paras 7.146-7.149). 
i) In the Commission's view, and to keep the 
recommended system of the individual as the unit as 
pure as possible, transferability should be confined to 
the primary and child rebates. The Commission 
therefore recommends the following (paras 7.148-7.149): 
(i) Trading losses of one spouse should be 
confined to that spouse and not be allowed to 
be set off against the income of the other 
spouse. 
(ii) Medical expenditure, including 
contributions to recognized medical benefit 
funds, should be deductible from the husband's 
income (he normally makes the contribution as 
the member) unless the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue is satisfied that the expenditure was 
borne by the wife. 
(iii) Deductions not fully utilized by one 
spouse (for example, pension and retirement 
annuity fund contributions exceeding the 
allowable deduction) should not be 
transferable between spouses. 
(iv) The fixed amounts of deductions, 
including the deductions provided for in the 
Second Schedule, and exemptions mentioned in 
the Income Tax Act, should not be adjusted 
solely because of the proposed change in the 
tax unit but should be available in their 
present form to each spouse in his or her 
capacity as a taxpayer. 
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(j) The reduced primary rebate, in respect of widows, 
widowers, divorcees, separated persons and unwed 
parents, should apply only to those taxpayers who 
divorce, separate or become unwed parents after the 
date on which the new tax unit comes into operation 
(paras 7.150-7.151). 
The Commission recognised that it might be necessary to phase 
in the changes and spread the cost over two years. 
(k) For the purpose of estimating the loss of revenue 
that would be occasioned by adopting the individual as 
the unit of taxation, statistical models 
certain principles - have been developed. 
assuming 
While the 
Commission recommends the implementation of the new tax 
unit in a single year, it recognized that it may be 
necessary to phase in the change. For this purpose a 
statistical exercise has been done to show how the 
total cost can be spread over two tax years, which need 
not be consecutive (paras 7.152-7.157). 
Two minority views of the Commission that was noted 
recommended the introduction of a primary and child rebate 
that could be transferable between married persons "in order 
to retain some neutrality between one-breadwinner and 
two-breadwinner families" (South Africa 1988:47). Another 
minority view called for separate taxation, but as a long term 
objective, with the couple having the right to elect whether 
or not to be taxed together. This would depend on whether or 
not they were disadvantaged by the system then in use. "This 
method will allow maximum use to be made of existing rules and 
has the advantage that no married couples will be 
disadvantaged in nominal terms" (South Africa 1988:49). 
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5.5 RESPONSE BY PARLIAMENT TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS MADE BY THE MARGO COMMISSION 
By far the most important recommendation by the 
Commission regarding personal income tax is that the 
unit for taxation purposes should be the individual . 
... The Government has seriously weighed this proposal 
and has taken a great number of relevant f~ctors into 
consideration. 
(South Africa 1988:7) 
In the White Paper on the Report of the Commision of Inquiry 
into the Tax Structure of South Africa, the government 
rejected the Comprehensive Business Tax recommended in the 
main package of the Commission's Report and, in so doing, 
decreased the options for reform. This also included reform 
as regards the taxation of the individual versus the married 
couple. 
The Government's decision in favour of the Commission's 
proposal for the introduction of a value added tax 
("invoice VAT") rather than a comprehensive business 
tax also has implications for the proposed separate 
taxation of married couples. The Commission itself 
points out that this alternative package 'limits the 
options for reform.' The Commission therefore proposes 
that if CBT is not acceptable: 'The move from joint to 
separate taxation of husband and wife will have to be 
postponed, recourse being had to interim measures to 
alleviate the marriage penalty.' 
(South Africa 1988:8) 
The Government felt that, "although the matter is one of great 
interest to married women, it does not enjoy a high priority 
in the business sector ... ", it was more important to reduce 
personal income tax and the number of tax brackets, or to 
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adjust the tax brackets upwards to compensate for bracket 
creep (South Africa 1988:7). 
Furthermore, if the system recommended by the Margo Commission 
was implemented, there would be a greater tax burden on the 
one-breadwinner family and "[t]he ability-to-pay principle 
would thus in the case of the family be negated by the 
imposition of individual income tax" (South Africa 1988:8). 
Another factor that weighed heavily against a system of 
separate taxation, was the State's loss of revenue as a result 
of such reform. According to the Margo Commission, 
implementation of such reform would result in a loss of 
revenue of 2,2 billion in the 1987-1988 year of assessment. 
The White Paper listed calculations by Inland Revenue of 
R3 billion or 25 per cent of the total revenue derived from 
individuals. Reference was also made to income splitting and 
the redistribution of income between husband and wife 
following the introduction of a system of separate taxation 
and it was noted that "[t]he outcome of this factor could mean 
a further substantial loss of revenue" (South Africa 1988:8). 
Lastly, it was mentioned that not all married couples with two 
breadwinners would benefit from the proposed system as 
calculations based on certain assumptions regarding the 
relative composition of the couple's total income indicated 
that "[i]n the case of a married couple where the husband 
accounts for 80 per cent of the income and the wife for 20 per 
cent, the total tax burden would increase marginally as a 
result of separate taxation where the joint income lay between 
R12 000 and R22 000" (South Africa 1988:8). 
The Government did, however, agree with the Commission that 
treating the individual as the unit for income tax purposes 
would involve substantial administrative benefits. They also 
concurred that the individual is often accepted as the unit 
for tax 
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[F]or a large proportion of the population even if 
married, the correct information for joint taxation is 
simply not always available. The Government is also 
informed that in the case of separate taxation of 
married couples Inland Revenue foresees many problems 
with the application of the Commission's proposals for 
the treatment of primary and child rebates. 
(South Africa 1988:8) 
Thus, the proposals of the Margo Commission in favour of 
separate taxation for married couples were not accepted in the 
White Paper (South Africa 1988:8), but the Department of 
Finance was requested to pay "special attention to other 
recommendations of the Commission that may possibly bring 
relief from the so-called 'marriage penalty'". The standard 
income tax on employees was noted as one of the proposals for 
alleviating the penalty mentioned. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
In 1984, the Margo Commission was appointed to consider the 
tax situation in South Africa. The various aspects and 
drawbacks of taxing the married couple jointly as represented 
in submissions to the Margo Commission by persons and 
organisations in favour of or against the system were 
considered, and possible alternatives and their implications, 
to the present system. 
Furthermore, the Margo Commission proposed to the Government 
that the individual, and not the married couple, be considered 
the tax unit. 
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Lastly, Government's response to and rejection of the 
proposals of the Margo Commission regarding the. separate 
taxation of husband and wife, were covered. 
From the information given in this chapter it can be deduced 
that there was a growing awareness of the tax plight of the 
married couple with a working wife and that something had to 
be done to alleviate this. The next chapter will show the 
effect of post-Margo legislation on horizontal equity between 
individuals. 
The most important fact recognised in this chapter, besides 
listing the problems with the various solutions, was the Margo 
Commission's recommendation of separate taxation but with 
transferable allowances. This system was introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 1990 and would seem to provide horizontal 
equity or more horizontal equity for individuals as it 
provides relief for one-breadwinner couples as well. 
This chapter assisted in giving background to the problems 
with the system of taxation of individuals, especially with 
regard to married taxpayers. 
The next chapter will compare the post-Margo legislation with 
the 1984 or pre-Margo legislation regarding individuals in an 
attempt to calculate the level of horizontal inequity in 
force, the changes to that level over the past five years, and 
the status quo as in 1994. 
CHAPTER 6 
HORIZONTAL EQUITY AND THE TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
6.2 BACKGROUND, ASSUMPTIONS AND BASES FOR CALCULATIONS 
6.2.1 INCOME AND TAXABLE INCOME 
6.2.2 DEDUCTIONS AND REBATES 
6.2.3 CHILDREN 
6.2.4 MARRIED WOMAN'S EARNINGS ALLOWANCE 
6.2.5 INCOME COMBINATIONS 
6.2.6 MEASURING HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
6.3 RESULTS AND COMPARISONS ON AN ANNUAL BASIS: 1985 TO 1995 
6.3.1 THE 1985 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
6.3.2 THE 1986 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
6.3.3 THE 1987 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
6.3.4 THE 1988 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
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6.3.5 THE 1989 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
6.3.6 THE 1990 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
6.3.7 THE 1991 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
6.3.8 THE 1992 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
6.3.9 THE 1993/94/95 YEARS OF ASSESSMENT 
6.4 CHANGES IN HORIZONTAl EQUITY FROM 1985 TO 1995 
6.4.1 CHANGES DURING THIS PERIOD 
6.4.2 DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABlE BY THE UNMARRIED PERSON 
AND THE MARRIED COUPlE 
6.4.3 CHANGES FROM 1985 TO 1994 TAKING INFlATION INTO ACCOUNT 
6.5 EXTREME CASES 
6.6 HORIZONTAl EQUITY AND THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TAX STRUCTURE OF SOUTH 
AFRICA {KATZ COMMISSION) 
6.7 CONClUSIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters the taxation of individuals in South Africa was 
discussed, noting the major changes in the taxation system over time 
in response to historical and social changes. A major change in the 
system came about during the last ten years mainly in response to 
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recommendations made by the Margo Commission in 1987. The petitions, 
correspondence and representations to the Commission were discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5. The taxation of the married couple as a unit, 
that. is, the taxation of the married woman at the highest marginal 
rates payable by her husband, the fact that she was ignored as a 
taxpaying individual and other problems, were addressed by the 
Commission. It suggested various recommendations to remedy these 
problems. 
This resulted in annual taxation legislation changes in the taxation 
of individuals through a reduction of tax-rate tables, increases in 
the married woman's earnings allowance, creation of a joint assessment 
allowance and, eventually, the separate taxation of married women. 
From the 1996 year of assessment only one set of rates would be 
applicable to all taxpayers. 
This chapter quantifies the changes that have taken place from 1985 to 
1995 and compares the married couple's tax burden with that of an 
unmarried individual earning the same income as that earned by the 
couple jointly. The taxation payable for the two groups (the 
unmarried person and the married couple) is calculated for a range 
of taxable incomes from R1 000 to R200 000 with discrete intervals, 
taking into account primary rebates and factors such as the married 
woman's earnings allowance and the joint assessment allowance. 
In Chapter 2 it was shown that to measure horizontal equity, the 
taxation payable by separate economic units must be compared. In this 
instance the units would be the married couple, as one economic unit, 
and the unmarried person. 
The differences in the taxation payable were calculated and it was 
shown that, as the married person's rates were lower than those of the 
unmarried individual, 
throughout the changes. 
the married couple's tax was normally lower 
This was due to the fact that the taxable 
income of the married person could be reduced by the married woman's 
earnings allowance, joint assessment allowance and, later, the fact 
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that the married woman was taxed separately and the joint income was 
then effectively taxed at lower maximum marginal rates. There were 
only a few instances where the married couple paid more tax on a 
certain income than the unmarried person. This was usually where the 
married woman earned the bulk of the couple's income as her tax 
threshold was the lowest of the three taxpayer groups. 
The comparisons over the period reviewed then indicated whether the 
new system was horizontally more equitable than the old system of 
taxing the married woman's income together with her husband's income. 
The influence that the suggestions made in the interim report of the 
Commission of inquiry into certain aspects of the tax structure of 
South Africa (Katz Commission) will have on the horizontal equity of 
individuals is discu.ssed together with certain specific problem areas 
with horizontal equity in the current taxation system. 
Note that, as in previous chapters, where reference is made to the Act 
or to sections of the Act, this refers to the Income Tax Act, 58 of 
1962. 
6.2 BACKGROUND, ASSUMPTIONS AND BASES FOR CALCULATIONS 
The different types of natural taxpayer as defined in the Income Tax 
Act, 58 of 1962 were used as basis for the calculations. In 1984, 
when the Margo Commission held its hearings and collected its 
information, the units of tax were the unmarried taxpayer and the 
married person. Although legislation changed and the married woman 
became a separate taxpaying entity defined in the Income Tax Act, for 
reasons of comparability the married couple is seen as a unit and 
their total taxes payable compared with taxes payable by an unmarried 
person. The married couple remained an economic unit raising their 
children in one household where they (the husband and wife) shared the 
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costs of living, compared with an unmarried individual who paid these 
costs on his or her own. The unmarried individual caring for children 
and entitled to a child rebate will be discussed in paragraph 6.2.3. 
The taxable incomes used for the calculations, as well as the 
deductions, rebates and other factors influencing the final taxes 
payable are discussed here. Also, any assumptions that had to be made 
to ensure a reasonable end-product. 
6.2.1 INCOME AND TAXABLE INCOME 
Calculations were based on taxable income assuming all incomes were 
earned from employment with no other tax-exempt incomes being earned 
or tax-deductible expenses being incurred. No fringe benefits as 
such or investment incomes or any other income which had allowable 
deductions or other tax implications, were considered. These incomes 
were treated in the same way for the different tax groups in most 
instances and would therefore not have impacted on the comparability 
or the horizontal equity considered. 
It must be mentioned that, with the gradual separation of the married 
woman's taxable income from that of her husband, her earnings from 
employment were the first to be separately taxed while income from 
investments was the last. This could have had an impact on the equity 
as compared with the taxation of an unmarried taxpayer, but, as this 
situation existed for only a few years, it was not considered to be 
important enough to quantify separately. 
Investment income was, therefore, excluded. But, as the wife's 
investment income became taxable in her hands, if the husband and wife 
both had investment income they both qualified for the exemption in 
terms of section lO(l)(i){xv} of the Act of R2 000 annually on 
interest. This was advantageous and, on a person-to-person basis, was 
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horizontally more equitable. Should only one spouse, however, have 
investment income, and donate a portion of the investment to the other 
spouse, the income from the donated investment would still be taxed in 
the hands of the donor spouse. The income was deemed to accrue to the 
donor spouse in terms of section 7(2) of the Act. This section 
specifically prevented income splitting between spouses which would 
negatively have affected horizontal equity as the unmarried,person did 
not have the option of dividing his investment income to apply lower 
tax rates. 
According to the "Statistics of taxpayers 11 (I985:8I) the largest 
number of taxpayers, namely 788 8IO out of the 2 I58 609 taxpayers, 
were in the R2 000 to R8 000 income categories. The R20 OOI to 
R22 000 income category provided the highest tax assessed as a 
percentage of total tax assessed, namely 7,09 per cent from the 69 380 
taxpayers. There were only I I8I taxpayers in the over RI50 000 income 
category and they provided 3,4 per cent of all taxes paid. 
Taxable incomes ranging from RI 000 to R200 000 were therefore used in 
the calculations done on a spreadsheet program generated by computer 
and using the following intervals: 
- Rl 000 increasing by RI 000 up to R20 000, thereafter increasing by 
R2 000 to R40 000 and thereafter in increments of RIO 000 to R200 000. 
In I985, and for a few years thereafter, the tax tables were very 
detailed, using increments of RI 000, (later R2 000) and every RI 000 
had a different rate. Although this has now changed to considerably 
fewer rate bands and, with inflation, the earnings have increased, the 
calculations were based on the taxable income intervals as set for 
I985. These detailed tax calculations are included as Appendix A. 
In the summaries of taxes payable and the comparison of differences 
between taxes payable by the married couple and the unmarried 
individuals, increments of RS 000 were used from RS 000 up to a 
taxable income of R20 000 and thereafter increments of RIO 000 to 
R200 000. 
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6.2.2 DEDUCTIONS AND REBATES 
All deductible expenses and allowances were ignored except for the 
standard deduction allowed in lieu of medical expenses for certain 
years .. Apart from that medical expenses were not considered and as 
this deduction was closely linked to taxable income and limited to an 
excess of 5% thereof, the taxpayer became mainly responsible for his 
or her own medical expenses. As all taxpayer categories have the same 
limits for their age, this deduction did not have a material impact on 
horizontal equity. A further assumption made in the study, namely that 
all taxpayers are childless, meant that the effect of medical expenses 
incurred for children was not considered. 
Pension fund contributions allowed up to certain limits per person 
were not considered, as the allowance did not change over the period 
and it did not impact on horizontal equity because the husband and 
wife were, and still are, each allowed the same deduction in this 
respect as the unmarried individual {Section ll{k} of the Act). 
Retirement annuity fund contributions were always limited per taxpayer 
which meant that the married couple together had the same allowances 
as the unmarried individual and this was considered to be unfair. 
With the separation of the tax of the husband and wife, the married 
person {husband} was allowed the same deduction as the unmarried 
person (Section ll(n)(aa) of the Act}, but the married woman (wife} 
was only allowed half that amount unless she could claim 15 per cent 
of her non-retirement funding employment income (Section ll{n} proviso 
(vii} of the Act). 
This was still considered to be unfair, but, as the taxable incomes 
used were from earnings this could be considered retirement funding 
income. A separate calculation was done later (paragraph 6.5) to show 
the impact of this, together with the concept of "breadwinner" and 
other worst-case scenarios. 
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Insurance and other deductions which fell away over time were ignored, 
although where a minimum rebate for insurance was allowed this was 
deducted with the primary rebate (Section 6(3)(b) of the Act). 
In all other cases only the primary rebates were deducted from tax 
payable as these differed for married and unmarried persons and, 
later, for married women. 
No age rebates, that is, rebates for taxpayers between sixty and 
sixty-five years of age and over sixty-five years of age, were 
deducted. It was assumed that all taxpayers were under sixty as the 
age rebates were the same irrespective of whether the taxpayer was a 
married or an unmarried person. The married woman, however, was not 
entitled to the over-sixty rebate and, until 1992, was not entitled to 
the over sixty-five rebate. This affected horizontal equity, but, as 
the over-sixty rebate was only R120 per annum and was being phased 
out, this was not seen as a serious problem. It must be noted, 
however, that for the past four years a married woman older than sixty 
years of age in 1991 has been paying R120 more tax than her unmarried 
or married person counterparts. 
As the over sixty-five rebate has been available to all taxpayer 
categories since 1992, this had no effect on horizontal equity for the 
years of assessment ending on or after 28 February 1992. For the two 
years before 1992, when the married woman was taxed as a separate 
individual, however, the rebate of R1 330 for persons over sixty-five 
years of age on the last day of the year of assessment would have had 
a negative impact on the horizontal equity where the married woman was 
over sixty-five years of age. As the inequity only continued for a 
limited period, the negative impact on horizontal equity was not 
calculated but is merely mentioned here. 
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6.2.3 CHILDREN 
It was assumed that both married couples and unmarried individuals 
were childless. If an unmarried person supported a child and this 
person claimed a child rebate, then he or she would have been entitled 
to be taxed as a married person with a higher primary rebate and lower 
tax rates. This meant that the taxes payable by an unmarried person 
and a married couple would, except for the married woman's earnings 
allowance, be identical and no meaningful comparison would therefore 
be possible. The child rebate could have affected horizont~l equity 
in respect of the married woman as she was not entitled to a child 
rebate even though she might have been the sole or co-provider for all 
the needs of the child or children. As the rebate was only RlOO per 
child (RISO for the sixth child and more (Section 5(3) of the Act)) 
this would, in most instances, not have been a material amount or have 
impacted to a great extent on taxes payable by the married woman. 
6.2.4 MARRIED WOMAN'S EARNINGS ALLOWANCE AND JOINT ASSESSMENT 
ALLOWANCE 
In the calculations, where the legislation for that particular year 
permitted it, the wife's earnings allowance was calculated and 
deducted from the taxable income. It was assumed that all the income 
of the married woman consisted of "earnings" as defined in section 20A 
of the Act and therefore subject to her earnings allowance. 
In 1989 and 1990, the joint assessment allowance was calculated and 
deducted to arrive at the couple's taxable income (Section 20A(l)(b) 
of the Act). As the income earned by the married woman was considered 
to be net remuneration, and this has been taxed in her own hands since 
years of assessment ending 1991 - "Any amount other than net 
remuneration as defined in paragraph liB of the Fourth Schedule .•. 
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shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be income accrued to 
her husband" (Section 4, Act 101, 1990) - the joint assessment 
allowance was not calculated for the taxes payable since 1991. 
The joint assessment allowance and the married woman's earnings 
allowance were both instruments used, together with the differential 
tax rates, to attempt to reduce the horizontal inequities involved in 
the progressive rates and higher marginal taxes paid as a result of 
adding the wife's earnings to those of her husband. 
Other assumptions and relevant deductions will be discussed in 
paragraph 6.3. 
6.2.5 INCOME COMBINATIONS 
The husband and wife could earn their combined income in many 
different proportions, from a one-breadwinner family where the husband 
was the breadwinner to a fifty-fifty or equal contribution combination 
(where both husband and wife contributed the same earnings) to a 
situation where the wife earned all the income. All these different 
combinations could lead to substantially different taxes being payable 
by the married couple on the same combined income. 
To accommodate this, the calculations were done using nine 
combinations ranging from a 100:0 income for the husband (the 
one-breadwinner family with the husband earning all the income), 
through 80:20 (eighty percent of the combined income being earned by 
the husband and twenty per cent being earned by the wife) 70:30; 
60:40; 50:50 (each spouse contributing half of the combined income), 
to an ever-increasing portion being earned by the wife from 40:60; 
30:70; 20:80 to 0:100, where the wife was the sole breadwinner. 
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The legislation was changed to accommodate the last-mentioned 
combination so that if the wife was the sole breadwinner or the 
husband had not earned more than RIO 000 gross income from all sources 
(that is, even his non-taxable income from outside the Republic), 
their joint income was taxed as that of a married person. The 
breadwinner wife and her husband's income were taxed jointly at 
married person's rates. This could bring considerable tax relief to 
married couples under such circumstances. It must be noted that the 
taxes payable would then be exactly the same as in the case where the 
husband was the sole breadwinner, that is the IOO:O combination. 
In the calculations and summaries, however, 
woman's rates were retained for comparability, 
situation might not have existed. That is, 
the O:IOO at married 
even though legally the 
if the wife earned a 
hundred per cent of the joint income, it would be taxed at married 
persons' rates. But what if the husband's income was obtained from a 
non-Republic source or was not taxable, the wife would then pay the 
taxes as calculated for the O:IOO combination. It was assumed that in 
the O:IOO combination the husband had an income from a non-Republic 
source that exceeded RIO 000 so that he was not taxable in the 
Republic, but neither did the couple qualify for aggregation in terms 
of section 7(2) of the Act. 
All amounts were calculated ignoring cents. 
6.2.6 MEASURING HORIZONTAl EQUITY 
As shown in Chapter 2, horizontal equity or inequity was not easily 
measurable. It was generally accepted that a single person expended 
less for direct living costs than a person with dependants. The 
concept of married person tax rates being lower than those of the 
unmarried person underlined this. This was especially clear before 
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the married woman entered the employment market in large numbers and 
when she was still dependent upon her husband for financial security. 
The household functioned as the economic unit and therefore the 
taxation of all persons contributing to that household's income had to 
be compared to the tax burden of other households. As the main 
contributors to a household of a married couple were normally the 
husband and the wife, their total tax payable had to be considered the 
household's tax burden. 
The question remained, however, how much more did it cost the 
two-person household in direct cost of living, than the one-person 
household? The Tax Reform Act of 1969 in the United States of 
America mandated into law the principle that, for any given amount of 
taxable income, the single return tax burden could not be in excess of 
1,2 times the tax due on a joint return (Chapter 3, paragraph 
3.3.2.1). 
The statistical survey of household expenditure (South Africa, 1990) 
showed that the average annual expenditure per one-person household 
was R19 340 and for the two-person household R52 988. If the 
expenditure on luxury items such as recreation, restaurants and 
holidays was ignored and only food, housing, fuel and medical expenses 
were compared the one-person household spent R7 324 compared with 
R19 223 for the two-person household and R19 295 and R22 351 for the 
three-person and four-person households respectively. (This subject 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.) 
6.3 RESULTS AND COMPARISONS ON AN ANNUAL BASIS: 1985 TO 1995 
The taxes payable and the differences between the taxes payable by the 
married couple and the unmarried person were calculated from the 1985 
to the 1993 years of assessment. This would have included the 1994 
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year of assessment as there were no changes in the 1993 legislation 
affecting the taxation of individuals that impacted on the 
calculations of taxation in Appendix A. The rates and rebates 
applicable to the 1993 year of assessment remained the same for the 
1994 year of assessment. 
The taxation legislation for individuals for the 1995 year of 
assessment was different from the 1994 year of assessment only insofar 
as it imposed a transition levy and therefore no separate ~alculations 
were done for that year. The transition levy imposed on taxpayers 
for the 1995 and 1996 years of assessment was ignored as it was 
considered to be an isolated occurrence. It must be noted however, 
that on a person to person basis, the married woman only paid the levy 
on taxable incomes exceeding R175 000 for 1995 (3,33 per cent of 
taxable income) whereas the unmarried person and the married person 
paid this levy on taxable incomes exceeding R50 000. Clearly, the 
household was considered to be the taxpaying entity in this respect 
(until the 1995 amendments) and as such the high threshold for married 
women could be considered to be fair. For the 1996 year of assessment, 
however, all taxpayers paid the levy on taxable incomes in excess of 
R50 000. 
The married couple's tax in total was compared with the tax payable by 
the unmarried person, instead of comparing the wife's tax on income 
and the husband's tax on income separately with each other and with 
the unmarried person's tax on income. This was done because the tax 
system as it was in 1985 was compared with later systems and in 1985 
there was no separate taxation. The family's tax on income, therefore, 
was compared with the tax of the unmarried individual's for purposes 
of horizontal equity. These calculations and results were summarised 
annually and the comparisons discussed here. 
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6.3.1 THE 1985 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
There were small changes in the legislation from the previous year 
(mainly the tax rates) which were more or less negated by the increase 
in the rebates. The standard deduction in lieu of medical expenses 
for the unmarried individual was R200 and for the married couple it 
was R300 and was deducted to arrive at taxable income. The wife's 
earnings allowance was a maximum of R1 600. 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN 1985 
(Refer Appendix A-1) 
TAXES PAYABLE - 1985 
Taxable Married Couple Unmarried 
Income 100:0 80:20 50:50 20:80 0:100 Person 
R R R R R R R 
10 000 722 484 484 484 484 988 
20 000 3 294 2 782 2 7B2 2 782 2 7B2 4 093 
30 000 7 064 6 392 6 392 6 392 6 392 8 622 
40 000 11 723 10 939 10 939 10 939 10 939 13 622 
50 000 16 720 15 920 15 920 15 920 15 920 18 622 
100 000 41 720 40 920 40 920 40 920 40 920 43 622 
150 000 66 720 65 920 65 920 65 920 65 920 68 622 
200 000 91 720 90 920 90 920 90 920 90 920 93 622 
The table above as well as the tables that follow for the fo 11 owing 
years, were all summarised from the tables in Appendix A. 
The unmarried taxpayer started paying tax (with the surcharge that was 
applicable in 1985) at a taxable income of R4 000 whereas the married 
couple only started paying tax for a 100:0 split at R5 000 and 
thereafter at a taxable income of R6 000 for a 80:20 combination -
only R50 tax payable. For the other combinations the married couple 
also started paying tax at a taxable income of R7 000, the tax 
payable being R2 (Appendix A-1). 
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From a taxable income of RS 000 and higher, the taxes payable by the 
couple remained the same irrespective of the split used from 80:20 
onwards. The tax payable by the married couple was always more for the 
100:0 combination, where the husband was the only breadwinner, as the 
married woman's earnings allowance was not then deductible (because 
the wife had no earnings from which to deduct it). This allowance was 
deductible in all the other categories. From a taxable income of 
RSO 000 upwards, earned by the married couple, the difference in taxes 
payable between the 100:0 and the other combinations amounted to R800. 
Unmarried person and different income ratios for married couple 
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The difference between the taxes payable by the married couple and by 
the individual was, with certain exceptions, the same irrespective of 
the split. That is, the individual consistently paid a greater amount 
of tax than the married couple. For taxable incomes of RSO 000 and 
more it amounted to R2 702 more tax for all. combinations of income 
except for the 100:0 combination where only Rl 902 more tax was paid 
by the unmarried person than by the married couple. For a taxable 
income of R4 000 the difference was only R61. Although it would 
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indicate horizontal equity that the unmarried person should pay more 
tax than the married couple, the question arose whether supporting a 
wife on a taxable income of R4 000 cost only R61 per annum, especially 
if she was also earning a part of that income. For 1985 the biggest 
horizontal inequity was in the higher taxes paid by a single 
breadwinner married person compared with other married persons. 
The 1985 year of assessment was used as the basis for further 
comparisons and was one of the years in which the taxes payable were 
the highest. For the period under review, only in 1986 were higher 
taxes payable than in 1985. According to the Income Tax Reporter 
(Marginal and average rates 1985:217} the average tax rates for the 
married person ranged from 2 per cent at a taxable income of RS 000 to 
29 per cent at R38 000, whereas the unmarried person paid tax at an 
average rate of 2 per cent at a taxable income of R4 000 to 33 per 
cent at R38 000. 
It must be noted that another inequity which existed was the taxation 
of black taxpayers in terms of the Taxation of Blacks Act 92 of 1969. 
It was inequitable to tax certain persons according to one schedule of 
rates and others earning the same income, at another set of rates 
merely because they had a different skin colour. This Act ceased to be 
effective on 29 February 1984. Black taxpayers were then also taxed in 
terms of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (Taxation notes 1984:239}. 
6.3.2 THE 1986 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
In the 1986 year of assessment the primary rebate for the unmarried 
person increased to R620 and for the married person to R880, with the 
standard deduction in lieu of medical expenses of R200 and R300 
respectively still applying. A surcharge on the tax payable (after 
deducting rebates} in excess of R750, at seven per cent, ensured a 
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considerable increase in taxes payable for most taxpayers. The married 
woman's earnings allowance remained at Rl 600. 
For the married couple, the following table shows the same pattern as 
for the 1985 year of assessment, that is the same taxes irrespective 
of the split of income for the married couple, except for the 100:0 
split where the tax was once again higher than for the other income 
combinations, as the wife's earnings allowance was not deductible when 
only the husband earned taxable income. 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN 1986 
(Refer Appendix A-2) 
TAXES PAYABLE - 1986 
Taxable Married Couple Unmarried 
Income 100:0 80:20 50:50 20:80 0:100 Person 
R R R- R R R R 
10 000 634 361 361 361 361 935 
20 000 2 993 2 513 2 513 2 513 2 513 3 704 
30 000 6 599 5 948 5 948 5 948 5 948 7 748 
40 000 11 155 10 385 10 385 10 385 10 385 12 658 
50 000 16 074 15 287 15 287 15 287 15 287 17 982 
100 000 42 597 41 741 41 741 41 741 41 741 44 732 
150 000 69 347 68 491 68 491 68 491 68 491 71 482 
200 000 96 097 95 241 95 241 95 241 95 241 98 232 
-The unmarried individual started paying tax on a taxable income 
' 
RS 000 but the marri~d couple only paid from a combined income 
R7 000 for the 100:0 split and from RS 000 (a tax of R18) for 
80:20 and other combinations (Appendix A-2). 
of 
of 
the 
The highest taxes payable on a taxable income of R200 000 were R98 232 
at an average rate of 49 per cent for the individual, R96 097 (48%) 
for the married couple for the 100:0 combination and R95 241 (47,6%) 
for the 80:20 and other combinations. 
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For an income combination of 100:0, the difference between taxes 
payable by the married couple and unmarried taxpayers was R2 075, from 
a taxable income of R60 000 upwards. Fo~ income combinations of 80:20 
and others it was R2 931 from R70 000 taxable income µpwards, that 
was, more or less three per cent of tax payable. This is illustrated 
in the graph below. 
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It was accepted that from- a certain taxable income (normally the 
highest category, 'that is where the maximum marginal rate applied to 
the taxpayer) the difference between the taxes payable by the married 
couple and those 
remain the same 
(Appendix B-2). 
used first for 
could cost only 
payable by an unmarried person would level out or 
as was the case, from a taxable income of R70 000 
This made economic sense as the monies received were 
necessities such as food, clothes and housing which 
so much for the spouse. 
Note that, although the 1986 taxes were retrospecti~ely reduced in 
1987, this was not shown in the above calculations, as the effect of 
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the surcharge was quite substantial and could indicate the extent of 
the subsidy for the married woman's earnings, if it were indeed 
intended as such. 
There was no real change in the horizontal equity or inequity as 
compared with the previous year. The higher rebates ensured lower 
taxes than in 1985 for most of the income groups except for persons 
earning R100 000 or more. Here all income groups, and not just the 
married couple or the individual, paid more tax. This increase was 
ascribed to the effect of the surcharge. 
6.3.3 THE 1987 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
The primary rebates were increased from those in 1986 to R880 for a 
married person and R620 for an unmarried person. The R30/R25 minimum 
insurance rebate still applied for the 1987 year of assessment. 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN 1987 
(Refer Appendix A-3) 
TAXES PAYABLE - 1987 
Taxable Married Couple Unmarried 
Income 100:0 80:20 50:50 20:80 0:100 Person 
---------------------------------------------------------------·--
R R R R R R R 
10 000 609 336 336 336 306 876 
20 000 2 703 2 226 2 177 1 881 1 689 3 335 
30 000 5 905 5 257 4 846 4 252 3 870 6 926 
40 000 9 951 9 182. 8 265 7 292 6 659 11 285 
50 000 14 318 13 444 12 133 10 822 9 951 16 012 
100 000 37 867 35 967 33 117 30 267 28 367 39 762 
150 000 61 617 58 767 54 492 50 217 47 367 63 512 
200 000 85 367 81 567 75 867 70 167 66 367 87 262 
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The married woman's earnings allowance was substantially increased 
from Rl 600 to Rl 800 or 20 per cent of taxable income. The 20 per 
cent exemption meant that the taxable portion of the wife's earnings 
was lowered considerably and, according to the Income Tax Reporter 
(The principal budget fragment 1986:100), this concession was 
sponsored by the other tax groups, namely bachelors, spinsters, widows 
and widowers and even the marginal earnings of the married man. 
The marginal rate on the wife's earnings of Rl2 000, if her husband 
earned Rl5 000, was 21,6 per cent whereas the rate for the husband, if 
he earned the additional Rl2 000, was 28,2 per cent and for the 
unmarried taxpayer in the same circumstances, 32 per cent. This 
marginal rate increased to 47,5 per cent for both the married man and 
the unmarried person for an income of R60 000 on an additional income 
of Rl8 000, whereas the marginal rate, if the married woman earned the 
additional income, was a mere 38 per cent (The principal budget 
fragment 1986:100). The wife's earnings, however, were still taxed in 
her husband's hands and therefore at his highest marginal rates. 
The individual started paying tax at a taxable income of R5 000 
whereas the married couple paid only from R6 000 (100:0 ratio), and 
from R8 000 for the 80:20 and other combinations (Appendix A-3). This 
was due to the increase in the married woman's earnings allowance. 
The taxes payable decreased as the split increased in the wife's 
favour and as the taxable income increased. 
This was unlike previous years, where taxes were the same in most 
instances, irrespective of the income combination, from 80:20. Here, 
from RIO 000 taxable income the 0:100 combination paid less tax than 
the other combinations so that with a taxable income of R200 000 the 
married couple paid tax of between R85 367 (100:0 ratio) and R66 367 
(0:100 ratio), thus a maximum possible difference of Rl9 000 in taxes 
payable. The wife did not pay this tax if she was the only breadwinner 
or if her husband earned RIO 000 or less. She then paid the R85 538 
referred to for the (100:0) split as she was then a married person and 
forfeited the section 20A allowance. 
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The 20 per cent tax exemption for married women was an attempt to 
neutralize the fact that her income was taxed at the husband's 
marginal tax rates. The question here was, was it fair, or 
horizontally equitable that in two households where both the husband 
and the wife worked and earned the same total taxable income, there 
could be differences as big as Rll 400 in the taxes payable by them? 
This applied for a combined taxable income of R200 000 earned in the 
ratio 80:20 (husband earning the bigger proportion), with total taxes 
of R81 567 payable and in the ratio 20:80 (the wife earning the bigger 
proportion) with total taxes of R70 167 payable. 
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(Extracted from Appendix B-3) 
What appeared to be even more unfair was the fact that where the 
household had only one breadwinner (either the 100:0 ratio or the 
0:100 ratio) there was more than R15 000 additional tax where the 
breadwinner also had to support the other spouse. 
Thus, although the percentage married woman's earnings allowance did 
contribute to greater horizontal equity in certain instances, it 
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created inequities in other instances. If the 20 per cent allowance 
was ignored, the effect of the other tax legislation amendments could 
be better judged. 
If the married woman's earnings allowance remained the same as it was 
in 1986, but the rest of the 1986 tax amendments (for the 1987 year of 
assessment) were applied to the calculation of the taxation, the 
following table would reflect the taxes payable. The table makes it 
clear just how big a difference the 20 per cent married woman's 
earnings allowance made for the double-breadwinner married couple, 
especially in the higher income groups. 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN 1987 IF MARRIED 
WOMAN'S EARNINGS ALLOWANCE WAS TAKEN AT 1986 RATES. THAT IS AT A FLAT 
RATE OF Rl600 
Taxable Married Couple 
Income 100:0 80:20 50:50 
R R R R 
10 000 609 366 366 
20 000 2 703 2 278 2 278 
30 000 5 905 5 327 5 327 
40 000 9 951 9 267 9 267 
50 000 14 318 13 619 13 619 
100 000 37 867 37 107 37 107 
150 000 61 617 60 857 60 857 
200 000 85 367 84 607 84 607 
20:80 0:100 
R R 
366 366 
2 278 2 278 
5 327 5 327 
9 267 9 267 
13 619 13 619 
37 107 37 107 
60 857 60 857 
84 607 84 607 
Unmarried 
Person 
R 
876 
3 335 
6 926 
11 285 
16 012 
39 762 
63 512 
87 262 
Comparing the two tables for the 1987 year of assessment indicated 
that, for the 0:100 combination, even for a joint income of RIO 000 
there was a difference of R60, simply as a result of the effect of the 
increased married woman's earnings allowance. For the same 
combination and for the R20 000 joint income it was almost R600 less 
tax payable as a result of the allowance, R2 608 on R40 000 joint 
income and so on until the difference of Rl8 240 on a taxable joint 
income of R200 000 (that is, more than 9 per cent). For the 80:20 
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combination and a joint income of R200 000, the difference in the tax 
payable was only R3 040 (almost 1,5 per cent), for the 50:50 
combination and a joint income of R200 000, it was R8 740 less tax 
(almost 4,5 per cent on R200 000) and for the 20:80 combination, it 
was almost 7 per cent less tax. The .increased allowance certainly 
made a difference to the taxes payable by the married woman, but her 
income was still taxed in her husband's hands. This could be seen as 
another attempt at making the taxation of individuals horizontally 
more equitable and it decreased the heavy load carried by joint 
breadwinners by effectively lowering the maximum rate at which the 
wife's earnings were taxed. Note that for a taxable income of R9 000 
the taxes payable were identical for the married couple, irrespective 
of the income combination {Appendix A-3). This was because the 20 per 
cent married woman's earnings allowance equalled the minimum allowance 
of R1 800 at that level. 
If the 20 per cent allowance was ignored there were no great 
differences in the taxes payable between the different income 
combinations and there was only R760 (for a taxable income of 
R200 000) more tax payable by the one-breadwinner spouse in the 100:0 
category compared with the 0:100 category. It was not fair that the 
100:0 category married couple paid more than other married couples, 
but this disparity increased substantially as a result of the effect 
of the 20 per cent allowance. The inequity between the 
husband-breadwinner couple and other couples increased as a result of 
the introduction of the 20 per cent allowance. 
The effective tax rates for the unmarried individual were at a maximum 
(for a taxable income of R200 000) of 43,63 per cent and for the 
married couple with an income combination of 100:0, 42,68 per cent, 
for 80:20, 40,78 per cent, for 50:50 only 37,93 per cent and for 0:100 
a mere 33,18 per cent. 
The highest effective rate overall applied to the unmarried 
individual, although that for the married couple, with the husband as 
breadwinner, was close to it. The lowest effective rate (for the 
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R200 000 taxable income group) was only 33,2 per cent for the 0:100 
combination compared with the almost 10 per cent more for the 100:0 
combination. The married woman thus·effectively paid 10,4 per cent 
less tax on R200 000 than the unmarried person and 9,5 per cent less 
than the married person. This also indicated horizontal inequity, as 
both married women and married men in the 0:100 and 100:0 combinations 
respectively supported the other spouse. 
If the 20 per cent married woman's earnings allowance was ignored the 
equity between the married couple and the unmarried person could also 
be noted. With reference to the above table it appeared that there 
was a measure of horizontal equity. The unmarried person paid 2,7 per 
cent more tax than the single breadwinner (100:0 combination) and 5,7 
per cent more where the wife earned all the income for a taxable 
income of RIO 000. The difference was the largest between the 
breadwinner wife and the unmarried person for incomes up to R50 000. 
The unmarried person and husband-as-breadwinner paid almost the same 
taxes and the marginal rates there were within 4 per cent of each 
other. This was unfair towards the 100:0 combination as it implied 
that supporting a wife with no income, cost very little. 
To summarize, 1987 saw one of the most drastic changes to the taxation 
of individuals as it affected the horizontal equity between them. 
Where, previously, the married couple could only benefit to a maximum 
of Rl 600 if the wife earned an income, now 20 per cent of her income 
was tax-free. Although this seemed fair as she was taxed at her 
husband's top marginal rates, no such relief existed for the 
one-breadwinner couple with exactly the same basic needs. Although 
the unmarried person paid more tax than the married person, the 
differences in tax payable depended on the combination in which the 
married couple earned their taxable income. The differences had a 
range of almost R20 000 and it was not fair to tax one individual 
earning the same taxable income as another economic unit at such a 
high rate. The effect of the 20 per cent woman's earnings allowance 
created horizontal inequities between the married couples, depending 
on their income combinations and between the married couple and the 
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unmarried person. The highest effective tax rate was 43,6 per cent for 
the unmarried person who earned a taxable income of R200 000. 
6.3.4 THE 1988 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
The rebates increased during the year of assessment to a primary 
rebate of R920 plus an insurance rebate of R30 for the married couple 
and a primary rebate of R650 plus an insurance rebate of R25 for the 
unmarried taxpayer. The married woman's earnings allowance also 
increased to R2 250 or 22,5 per cent of her earnings, whichever was 
the greater. The unmarried person started paying tax at an income of 
R5 000 whereas the married couple started paying tax at R7 000 for an 
income combination of 100:0 and only at R9 000 for an 80:20 
combination. These tax thresholds were all higher than in previous 
years. The married woman's earnings allowance made the tax thresholds 
higher for those income combinations where she contributed to the 
joint income. 
Up to an income of R11 000, the taxes were the same irrespective of 
the combination in which the married couple earned their income, for a 
70:30 to a 0:100 combination. From R11 000 onwards the 0:100 
combination paid less tax than the other combinations (Appendix A-4). 
For the same taxable income (for example R30 000), the married couple 
paid tax varying between R5 702 (100:0 combination) and R3 866 (80:20 
combination), which amounted to tax calculated at a rate of 6 per cent 
lower on that taxable income, or only 68 per cent of the tax payable 
for the 100:0 combination. The 0:100 combination paid R2 247 less tax, 
which amounted to tax calculated at a rate of 7,5 per cent lower on 
that taxable income and only 60 per cent of tax paid for the 100:0 
combination. The unmarried taxpayer paid R1 063 more tax than the 
married couple with the 100:0 combination and almost double the amount 
the married couple would have paid with the 0:100 combination. For a 
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taxable income of R200 000 the difference in tax paid between the 
100:0 combination and the 0:100 combination was R20 250 or 25 per cent 
less, whereas the unmarried person paid R83 015 tax, which was only 
Rl 790 more than the married couple for the 100:0 combination. 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN 1988 
{Refer Appendix A-4) 
TAXES PAYABLE - 1988 
Taxable Married Couple Unmarried 
Income 100:0 80:20 50:50 20:80 0:100 Person 
R R R 
10 000 505 205 
20 000 2 532 1 958 
30 000 5 702 4 903 
40 000 9 590 8 690 
50 000 13 831 12 863 
100 000 36 225 34 200 
150 000 58 725 55 687 
200 000 81 225 77 175 
R 
168 
1 958 
4 520 
7 790 
11 421 
31 163 
51 131 
71 100 
R 
168 
1 634 
3 866 
6 760 
10 004 
28 125 
46 575 
65 025 
R 
168 
1 434 
3 455 
6 076 
9 090 
26 100 
43 538 
60 975 
R 
795 
3 185 
6 765 
11 037 
15 515 
38 015 
60 515 
83 015 
Differences for the 100:0 combination varied from R45 more tax paid by 
the unmarried taxpayer at R5 000, where the husband breadwinner did 
not pay any tax, to Rl 790 more from R70 000 taxable income right 
through to R200 000. For the 0:100 split it varied from R45 upward to 
R22 040 more. This meant that a married couple who earned R200 000 
could, depending upon the split of their income, pay up to Rl6 000 
less tax than another couple and up to R22 040 less tax than an 
unmarried taxpayer. This was directly as a result of the increased 
wife's earnings allowance which meant that a married woman could earn 
up to 22,5 per cent of her income tax free. {Appendix B-4) 
Although less tax was paid by a double income couple, the couple where 
the husband was the sole breadwinner was the worst off and this 
remained a problem. The discrepancy that was first noted in 1987, 
with the introduction of the 20 per cent married woman's earnings 
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allowance, was increased further in 1988 with the increase of the 
percentage to 22,5 per cent. 
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It was also horizontally inequitable that an unmarried person paid, 
from a taxable income of R30 000 and upwards, more than 11 per cent 
more tax than the breadwinner wife (0:100 combination) and almost 
9 per cent (R200 000 taxable income) more tax than the husband as 
breadwinner with the other married-couple income combinations in 
between. The horizontal inequities had been transferred from the 
double-earner couple to the husband as breadwinner and in 1988 these 
inequities increased. 
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6.3.5 THE 1989 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
In 1989 the married couple enjoyed an additional relief from tax with 
the introduction of the joint assessment allowance which, in addition 
to the married woman's earnings allowance, was a deduction from 
taxable income of a percentage of the married woman's earnings based 
on a complicated formula, which diminished if the wife's earnings were 
more than R16 000. This allowance gave relief only to married couples 
earning more than a joint taxable income of R30 000 and only if the 
wife also had earnings. 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN 1989 
(Refer Appendix A-5) 
TAXES PAYABLE - 1989 
Taxable Married Couple Unmarried 
Income 100:0 80:20 50:50 20:80 0:100 Person 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
R R R R R R R 
10 000 300 20 NIL NIL NIL 650 
20 000 2 260 1 702 1 702 1 392 1 195 2 970 
30 000 5 360 4 379 4 008 3 541 3 162 6 470 
40 000 9 160 7 609 6 063 5 715 5 508 10 610 
50 000 13 260 11 384 9 324 8 906 8 633 14 910 
100 000 35 160 31 042 30 052 '1.7 060 25 060 37 370 
150 000 57 660 53 182 50 066 45 510 42 472 59 870 
200 000 80 160 75 367 70 035 63 960 59 910 82 370 
The joint assessment allowance had the following impact: 
- For the 100:0 combination, no wife's earnings allowance or joint 
assessment allowance was calculated and the one-breadwinner family 
paid more tax than any of the other income combinations, as was the 
case in all the other years. 
229 
For the 80:20 combination, the joint assessment allowance operated 
from a joint income of R30 000 to a joint income of RllO 000 from 
where it was reduced (wife's earnings of more than Rl6 000) and at a 
joint income of R200 000 it was a mere Rl 650. 
For the 70:30 combination, the joint assessment allowance was 
reduced from a joint incom~ of R70 000 up to Rl70 000 where it 
amounted to nil. 
- The 60:40 combination only benefited from a joint income of 
R30 000 to R50 000 from where the joint assessment allowance reduced 
to a nil allowance at a joint income of Rl30 000. 
- The benefit was watered down the higher the wife's contribution to 
the joint income rose, so that with a 50:50 contribution the advantage 
reduced from a joint income of R50 000 and amounted to nil at a joint 
income of Rl10 000. 
This was a very complicated calculation to provide at best R4 650 
relief from tax for the married couple and mostly assisting those 
earning more than R30 000 jointly. Together with the married woman's 
earnings allowance which exempted up to 22,5 per cent of her income 
from tax, this added up to significant tax relief for the married 
couple. 
The unmarried taxpayer started paying tax at a taxable income of 
R6 000, whereas the married couple only paid tax at R8 000 for an 
income combination of 100:0 and then only R20 tax. From the 70:30 
combination the married couple only paid Rl25 tax at a taxable income 
of R11 000 and this decreased to R93 for the 0:100 combination. 
(Apoendix A-5) The married woman's earnings allowance and the joint 
assessment allowance raised the tax thresholds from the previous year 
from the 70:30 to the 0:100 combination. 
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DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE vs INCOME FOR 1989 
Unmarried person and different income ratios for married couple 
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At the maximum end of the scale, that is at a taxable income of 
R200 000, the unmarried person paid R82 370 (an average rate of 41 per 
cent) and the married couple paid from R80 160 (40%) with the husband 
as sole breadwinner, to R68 010 (34%) for the 60:40 combination, 
R65 985 (33%) for the 30:70 combination, R63 960 {32%) for the 20:80 
combination and only R59 910 (30%) where the wife was the breadwinner. 
This meant a difference of R22 460 between the unmarried taxpayer and 
the breadwinner wife - 11 per cent more tax payable by the unmarried 
taxpayer than by the married couple. This was a significant 
difference and 11 per cent could be considered a material difference 
even though the unmarried taxpayer only had himself or herself to 
support. The 1 per cent average tax difference between the 
husband-as-breadwinner and the unmarried taxpayer could, on the other 
hand, be seen as too small a difference to make up for the support of 
at least a spouse. 
The introduction of further relief to the married couple in 1989 
caused even further discrepancies in horizontal equity. A married 
couple who earned a taxable income of R200 000 in a 20:80 combination 
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paid more than R16 000 less tax than where only one of them was a 
breadwinner. The unmarried individual and the one-breadwinner couple 
paid almost the same tax on the income of R200 000, whereas the single 
breadwinner also supported a spouse. As in the previous two years, 
1989 tax legislation increased differences in equity between married 
couples with two breadwinners and those with only one. The 
differences between the tax payable by the unmarried taxpayer and the 
different income combinations of the married couple had the same 
inequities as in the previous two years, but these increased in 1989 
as a result of the joint assessment allowance. 
6.3.6 THE 1990 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
The married woman's earnings allowance and the joint assessment 
allowance was still in force for the 1990 year of assessment but, as 
the wife paid Standard Income Tax on Employees (SITE) on all her 
earnings which constituted remuneration as defined in paragraph 118 of 
the Fourth Schedule of the Act, and the allowances were only 
applicable to income which was included in her husband's taxable 
income (which did not include any income subject to SITE), the 
allowances were no longer used in the calculations. 
All of the wife's earnings that were from net remuneration were taxed 
separately from her husband for the first time and, in terms of 
section 7(2) of the Act, only income earned by the wife "other than 
net remuneration as defined in paragraph 118 of the Fourth · Schedule" 
were added to the husband's income and were subject to the allowances 
in section 20A. 
SITE was a final tax deducted by the employer and paid over to the 
Receiver without the need for the taxpayer to submit a tax return. It 
was payable on net remuneration ("any amount of income which is paid 
or is payable to any person by way of any salary, leave pay, 
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allowance, wage, overtime pay, bonus, gratuity, commission, fee, 
emolument, pension, superannuation allowance" [and so forth] (par 1, 
Fourth Schedule of the Act) including annuities and taxable benefits 
and excluding amounts not derived from standard employment or 
annuities from pension or retirement annuity funds, amounts which, if 
the taxpayer had incurred expenditure in earning that amount that 
exceeded 1 per cent of such amount, amounts subject to the rating 
formula, and the income of the married woman where her husband earned 
R7 500 or less during a year of assessment (Par 118, Fourth Schedule 
of the Act)). 
This was also the first time that the married woman had her own tax 
tables providing for a rate of tax of 25 per cent on taxable income up 
to R20 000 and thereafter according to the tables on taxable income up 
to R40 000, after which the rate became 38 per cent. The married 
woman's maximum marginal rate was therefore 38 per cent, which was 
7 per cent lower than the maximum marginal rate for the other two 
taxpayer categories who, at taxable incomes of R80 000 and R54 000 
respectively, paid 45 per cent. The rebates were R1 250 for a married 
person, R850 for an unmarried person and R1 075 for a married woman. 
An unmarried individual started paying tax at a taxable income of 
R7 000 whereas the married woman started at a joint taxable income of 
R11 000 (60:40 combination) and at R9 000 (50:50 combination). The 
married man started paying tax at a taxable income of R9 000 for the 
sole breadwinner group and only at R12 000 (total combined income) for 
the 80:20 combination with the wife paying only from a total taxable 
income of R22 000 for that combination. At the 50:50 income 
combination, the married woman paid tax sooner than her husband who 
only started at double the taxable income at which she started paying 
tax, namely at a joint taxable income of R18 000, whereas she would 
pay from R4 500 (50 per cent of R9 000 joint taxable income and that 
tax amounted to 25 per cent of R4 500 = R1 075). At a combined taxable 
income of R190 000, the married man paid R32 760 and the married woman 
R30 085, that is R2 675 less tax than her husband. (Appendix A-6) 
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From 1990 it was possible for the first time to compare the taxes 
payable by the individual members of the married couple and to compare 
these taxes with the taxes payable by an unmarried person. 
The married woman paid more tax than her husband up, to a combined 
taxable income of R140 000 {husband R21 610 tax, wife R21 725 tax) and 
from there the maximum marginal rates applied so that at a combined 
taxable income of R160 000, the husband paid R26 010 tax on his 
R50 000 taxable income and the wife paid R25 525 tax (See the 
following table). 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN 1990 
{Refer Aggendix A-6) 
TAXES PAYABLE - 1220 
Taxable Unmarried Married man Married woman 
income person 100:0 0:100 
R R R R 
5 000 Nil Nil 175 
7 000 130 Nil 675 
8 000 270 Nil 925 
9 000 410 10 1 175 
10 000 550 150 1 425 
15 000 1 500 940 2 675 
20 000 2 870 2 110 3 925 
30 000 6 370 5 210 6 885 
40 000 10 510 9 010 10 325 
50 000 14 810 13 110 14 125 
60 000 19 270 17 310 17 925 
70 000 23 770 21 610 21 725 
80 000 28 270 26 010 25 525 
90 000 32 770 30 510 29 325 
100 000 37 270 35 010 33 125 
Thus, although the married woman started paying tax sooner than the 
other taxpayer-categories, from approximately R40 000 (her maximum 
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marginal tax rate applied from here), she paid less tax (at an 
effective rate of 33 per cent) than the unmarried person (37%} and the 
married person (35%) at a taxable income of RlOO 000. This could be 
considered to be unfair as the married woman's husband helped to 
contribute towards her living expenses and she was dealt with most 
favourably at the higher incomes. 
DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE vs INCOME FOR 1990 
Unmarried person and different income ratios for married couple 
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There was a steady increase in differences between the taxes paid by 
married and unmarried taxpayers. The difference remained constant at 
R2 260 between the tax paid by the unmarried taxpayer and the tax paid 
by the married couple, from taxable incomes ranging between R80 000 
and R200 000 for the 100:0 combination of income for the married 
couple. This was expected as the tax rates and rebates remained 
constant from where the maximum marginal rate was applied (R80 000 for 
the married person). 
The taxation for all the other income combinations of the married 
couple were considerably lower than the taxation for the 100:0 
235 
combination. The greater the proportion of the wife's earnings 
became, the greater the difference in tax paid by the married couple 
and the unmarried person. For a joint taxable income of R200 000 the 
married couple paid R71 195 tax for an 80:20 income combination and 
R71 125 for a 0:100 combination, but only R64 935 tax for an income 
combination of 20:80. 
The two one-breadwinner combinations were worse off in terms of 
taxation payable than all the married-couple combinations, paying 
almost as much tax as the unmarried taxpayer. This was unfair as, of 
all the combinations of income of the married couple, the single 
breadwinners supported a spouse on hi~ or her income, or was an 
unmarried parent with children who qualified for the child rebate. 
The other income combinations all had two breadwinners supporting the 
household. The married woman as single breadwinner paid almost as much 
tax as the 80:20 combination and she had to support a husband. 
Clearly, (see the above graph) the income combinations for married 
couples with two breadwinners presented differences from the tax paid 
by the unmarried person that were all close together and the only 
graph lines far from the others were the 100:0 and 0:100 combinations. 
One-breadwinner couples were not treated equitably. 
As far as wives who earned salaried income were concerned, they were 
treated more equitably in 1990, with the introduction of SITE,· than 
previously. The married woman was now separately taxed. But there was 
no equity for married women who earned up to almost R20 000 annually, 
as they paid more tax than even the unmarried taxpayer. 
The unmarried person was treated inequitably only when his or her 
taxation was compared with the taxation of the double-breadwinner 
couples and the taxation of the married woman as breadwinner for 
taxable i.ncomes above R80 000. With separate taxation of husband and 
wife, the inequities shifted towards the single breadwinners as the 
group treated most unfairly. As long as differences in tax paid 
ranged as widely as those shown in the graph above, there was no 
horizontal equity. While certain differences were expected these 
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should present a graph of lines close to each other and not ranging 
from R2 260 to Rl7 335 for a married couple where the breadwinner had 
at least two persons to support. 
6.3.7 THE 1991 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
With the passing of the 1990 Income Tax Act, we are but one step 
away from the complete taxation of married women separately from 
their husbands. Section 7(2), which in its original form deemed 
all the income of a married woman to be her husband's, has been 
gradually whittled down. 
(The taxation of married women 1990:102) 
The wife was taxed separately except for 
- income derived by her otherwise than from any trade (which 
by definition included salaried income); or 
- from trade income earned from her husband that was 
excessive or unreasonable; or 
- (at ber option} if her husband earned gross income 
amounting to RIO 000 or less, from all sources. 
(Section 7(2) of the Act). 
From the 1991 year of assessment a drastic reduction in tax rates 
began. The unmarried person started paying tax on an income of R11 000 
only, that tax being Rl50, whereas the married couple paid from a 
taxable income of R13 000 only (R200 tax at a 100:0 combination) and 
for other income combinations only from R16 000. 
Previously, the second proviso to section 18 of the Act allowed the 
husband to deduct medical expenses incurred by his wife. From the 
1991 year of assessment the married woman was allowed to deduct all 
the medical expenses incurred and paid by her, subject to the 
limitations imposed in section 18. These limitations applied to both 
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the unmarried and the married person. The husband still deducted the 
expenses incurred by himself even if the expense was in respect of his 
wife, provided he paid for it. 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN I99I 
(Refer Appendix A-7) 
TAXES PAYABLE - I99I 
Taxable Unmarried Married man Married woman 
income person IOO:O 0: IOO 
R R R R 
5 000 Nil Ni 1 80 
7 000 Nil Nil 440 
8 000 Ni 1 Nil 620 
9 000 Nil Nil 830 
IO 000 Nil Nil I 040 
IS 000 I 080 600 2 I80 
20 000 2 400 I 700 3 500 
30 000 5 640 4 250 6 660 
40 000 9 520 7 400 IO 260 
50 000 I3 700 II ISO I4 060 
60 000 I8 040 IS 200 I7 860 
70 000 22 440 I9 400 2I 660 
80 000 26 840 23 700 25 460 
90 000 3I 240 28 IOO 29 260 
IOO 000 35 640 32 500 33 060 
It is clear from the above table that taxes had decreased in general 
from the previous year, but for the married woman taxes increased 
substantially and she started paying tax sooner than any of the other 
taxpayers - the unmarried taxpayer paid tax from a taxable income of 
RII 000 only, whereas the married person paid from Rl3 000 only. She 
did, however, do better in the higher income groups where, from 
R60 000 upwards, she paid less tax than the unmarried person as she 
had a lower maximum marginal tax rate than the other categories. (That 
is, the effective tax rate for an unmarried person at a taxable income 
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of R60 000 was 30 per cent, a married person 25,3 per cent and a 
married woman 29,7 per cent, whereas at a taxable income of RSO 000 
they paid 27 per cent, 22 per cent and 28 per cent tax respectively.) 
DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE vs INCOME FOR 1991 
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As far as the combined tax of the married couple was concerned, they 
still paid less tax in general, but how much less depended on the 
combination of their income. Up to the 60:40 income combination it 
was advantageous, but then decreased drastically with the higher taxes 
levied on wives. A major reason for this was the fact that the rebate 
for a married woman was drastically reduced from R1 075 to a mere 
R700, whereas the primary rebate for an unmarried person was 
increased from R850 to R1 000 and for the married man from R1 250 to 
R2 100. There was a big change in tax paid from the 100:0 to 80:20 
combinations and from the 20:80 to 0:100 combinations. Married 
couples with only one working spouse, paid the most tax and the 0:100 
combination paid even more tax than the unmarried person and, up to a 
taxable income of almost R110 000, this combination also paid more tax 
than the 100:0 combiriation. 
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Although this study did not consider the effect of the child rebates, 
the following thresholds clearly show the difference that the child 
rebates could have had on the final tax paid. A married person with 
no children paid tax on earnings from R12 001 while his counterpart 
with six children only paid tax on earnings from R15 227. 
The tax thresholds, as set out in the Income Tax Reporter (New 
legislation 1990:228), for 1990 and 1991 were as follows: 
1991 1990 
Unmarried taxpayer RIO 286 R6 071 
Married woman R4 556 R4 300 
Married person R12 001 R8 928 
Married - one child Rl2 500 R9 642 
- six children R15 227 R13 411 
In the 1991 year of assessment the married woman was taxed in her own 
right for the first time and this showed clearly that separate 
taxation would not be the tax heaven that the double-earner married 
couples thought it would be. The tax thresholds .were higher than 
those in the previous year, but the married woman was still 
approximately R6 000 worse off than the unmarried person and 
approximately R7 500 worse off than her spouse. 
Compared with the unmarried person, the married couple paid more tax 
in the lower income groups (from the 50:50 combination to the 0:100 
combination). This meant that the household's tax for the married 
couple for the different combinations and up to the following joint 
incomes was more than the unmarried person's tax: 
Combination Joint Income 
50:50 R11 000 
40:60 R12 000 
30:70 Rl5 000 
20:80 R20 000 
0:100 R50 000 
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This did not represent horizontal equity. A one-person household (as 
the unmarried person is assumed to have had for the purposes of this 
study) paid less tax than the two-person household where the wife 
earned the bulk of the income or where husband and wife contributed 
equally to the joint income. The income combinations from 80:20 to 
60:40 paid less tax than the unmarried person and an increasing amount 
less, the higher the taxable income. With the married person as 
single breadwinner (the 100:0 combination), the difference in tax paid 
between him and the unmarried person remained a constant R3 140 from a 
joint income of R80 000 and upwards (the maximum marginal rate of the 
married person was applicable from here). 
The above graph clearly showed that the differences in tax paid 
between the married couple and the unmarried person for a taxable 
income of R200 000 ranged from as much as R16 380 (20:80) to only 
R3 140 (for 100:0) and R8 580 (for 0:100). Although the 0:100 
combination approached the same level as the other graphs for double 
income combinations for the married couple, it was only for very high 
combined incomes close to R200 000. The inequity suffered by the 
unmarried person resulted from the fact that the married couple could 
pay so many different levels of tax depending on the combination of 
their income. The clear inequity would be towards the single 
breadwinners compared with the double-income married couples. 
6.3.8 THE 1992 YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
There was a drastic reduction in taxation paid for the 1992 year of 
assessment. The unmarried individual started paying tax at a taxable 
income of R11 000 and the married couple with the husband as 
breadwinner only at R13 000 (R170 tax), and for the 80:20 combination 
only at R16 000 (R132 tax). The married woman's rebate increased by 
R100. The tax payable by married persons decreased from the previous 
year by R100 (on a taxable income of R20 000) to R900 (on a taxable 
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income of R100 000). The unmarried person paid R175 less tax on 
R20 000 taxable income, R575 less tax on R50 000 and R1 075 less tax 
on R100 000. (Appendix A-8). 
TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN 1992 
(Refer Appendix A-8) 
TAXES fAYABLE - 1992 
Taxable Unmarried Married man Married woman 
income person 100:0 0:100 
R R R R 
5 000 Nil Nil Nil 
7 000 Nil Nil 340 
8 000 Nil Nil 520 
9 000 Nil Nil 730 
10 000 Nil Nil 940 
15 000 975 550 2 080 
20 000 2 225 1 600 3 400 
30 000 5 325 4 050 6 560 
40 000 9 075 7 100 10 160 
50 000 13 125 10 750 13 960 
60 000 17 365 14 700 17 760 
70 000 21 665 18 800 21 560 
80 000 25 965 23 000 25 360 
90 000 30 265 27 300 29 160 
100 000 34 565 31 600 32 960 
The married couple did not always pay less tax than the unmarried 
individual. It depended on the taxable income combination. At lower 
taxable incomes and where the wife's earnings made the bigger 
contribution (from 40:60 onwards), the couple paid more tax than the 
unmarried individual. 
The difference between the taxes payable by an unmarried taxpayer and 
by a married couple was at its highest where the couple's taxable 
income was earned in the 20:80 combination at a taxable income of 
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R200 000, namely Rl4 705 less tax for the couple than for the 
unmarried person. In the 100:0 combination R2 965 less tax and in the 
0:100 combination, R6 605 less tax. 
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For the 40:60 combination, the couple paid more tax than the unmarried 
person up to a taxable income of Rl3 000; for the 30:70 combination up 
to a taxable income of RlS 000; for the 20:80 combination up to a 
taxable income of R20 000 and for the 0:100 combination more tax was 
paid by the couple up to a taxable income of R60 000. The·reason for 
this was that the wife, although she paid tax sooner than the other 
categories, had a maximum marginal rate of only 38 per cent, whereas 
the unmarried person's marginal rate of 43 per cent was reached at a 
taxable income of R56 000. Married couples who earned between RS 000 
and RSO 000 were then at a disadvantage, depending on the combination 
of their incomes. 
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In 1992 the total taxes paid were marginally less than the previous 
year but comparisons for purposes of horizontal equity still showed 
inequities. With the lower taxable incomes, the married woman was 
clearly worse off than any of the other categories, but in the higher 
income groups the unmarried person paid more tax. Was it equitable 
that the married woman who earned a high taxable income, and who had a 
husband to help support her, should be sursidised by the unmarried 
person who provided for his or her livelihood alone? 
6.3.9 THE 1993/1994/1995 YEARS OF ASSESSMENT 
As there were no significant changes to the taxation of individuals 
and the calculation of taxes payable remained the same for the 1993 
and 1994 years of assessment, both years of assessment are discussed 
here. The legislation for the taxation of individuals for the 1995 
year of assessment was not amended and individuals were taxed on the 
same principles as in the 1993 and 1994 years of assessment. The only 
change in the 1995 year of assessment was the introduction of the 
transition levy of 5 per cent on the taxable income above RSO 000 for 
married persons and unmarried persons, and above Rl75 000 for married 
women. This concession to married women made it clear that the 
legislation {until the 1995 amending act) considered the levy to be 
paid by the married person on behalf of the household and the married 
woman was only liable for this levy when she herself earned a very 
high income. As this levy applied only to the 1995 and 1996 years of 
assessment, and as it could distort the conclusions drawn on the trend 
in the taxation legislation, the impact of the levy was not quantified 
and the 1993 calculations were considered to be applicable to the 1995 
year of assessment as well. 
Although the maximum marginal rate remained at 43 per cent for married 
and unmarried persons, the bands in the tax rate tables were adjusted 
and the number of bands reduced for the 1993 year of assessment. 
There were then only ten bands for the married person; nine for 
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unmarried persons and eight for married women. The tax thresholds 
increased as follows, according to the Coopers Theron Ou Toit Tax 
News:: 
199IL2 1992L3 
R R 
For the married person (under 63) 12 106 12 501 
For the unmarried person 10 358 10 715 
For the married woman 5 112 5 264 
(10 April 1992:7) 
From the bove is was clear that the married woman paid tax sooner than 
any of the other categories, although her maximum marginal rate was 
3 per cent lower than that of the other categories. 
The maximum marginal rate for the married woman increased from 38 per 
cent to 40 per cent and the level of taxable income to which this 
applied increased from R40 000 to R50 000. All the primary rebates 
were increased (by R225 for a married person to R2 225, by R325 for an 
unmarried person to Rl 950 and by RIOO for a married woman to R900). 
From the table below, when compared with the table in paragraph 6.3.8 
(from Appendix A-8) a general, albeit very small, decrease in tax 
payable from the previous year was seen: for the married man R500 less 
tax on a taxable income of R90 000 but only R75 less on a taxable 
income of Rl5 000; on a taxable income of R30 000 a decrease of R425 
and on RSO 000 a decrease of R525 - the highest decrease just before 
the maximum marginal rate was reached. 
The taxes payable by the different categories were as follows: 
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TABLE SUMMARISING TAXES PAYABLE BY INDIVIDUALS IN I993 
(Refer Appendix A-9) 
TAXES PAYABLE - I993L94 
Taxable Unmarried Married man Married woman 
income person IOO:O 0: IOO 
R R R R 
5 000 Nil Nil Nil 
7 000 Nil Nil 330 
8 000 Nil Ni 1 520 
9 000 Nil Ni 1 710 
IO 000 Nil Nil 900 
I5 000 900 475 I 950 
20 000 2 IOO I 475 3 I50 
30 000 4 900 3 575 5 950 
40 000 8 500 6 375 9 550 
50 000 I2 600 9 975 13 350 
60 000 I6 840 I4 075 17 350 
70 000 2I I40 I8 275 2I 350 
80 000 25 440 22 475 25 350 
90 000 29 740 26 775 29 350 
IOO 000 34 040 3I 075 33 350 
The table above indicated that, although the married woman paid tax on 
lower incomes than any of the other categories, her tax payable 
approached the same levels as the tax payable by the unmarried person. 
Above a taxable income of R70 000, where the unmarried person paid 
R21 240 and the married woman paid R2I 350, she paid even less tax 
than the unmarried person. The tax rates for the married person 
remained the lowest throughout and, on a taxable income of RIOO 000, 
he paid three per cent less tax than the unmarried person and two per 
cent less tax than the married woman. These differences are 
illustrated in the following graph: 
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The differences in taxes payable between the married couple and the 
unmarried person who earned the same taxable income, were the highest 
where the wife earned the greater part of the combined income (but not 
all of it): up to Rl3 615 less tax for the married couple than for 
the unmarried person for a taxable income of R200 000 and an income 
combination of 30:70; for an 80:20 combination it was RlO 615 less and 
for the 100:0 combination only R2 965 less. The reason for this was 
that the total income was taxed in the htisband's hands and mostly at 
the maximum marginal rate - the difference was due only to the fact 
that the married person's maximum marginal rate applied at a higher 
taxable income and he was entitled to a higher rebate. 
Where the married. woman earned "a 11" the income (the 0: 100 · 
combination), the "couple" paid more tax than the unmarried person up 
to a taxable income of almost R80 000 {the tables were drawn up using 
discrete intervals). 
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The graph above, indicated the differences between the taxes payable 
by the married couple and the unmarried person, and showed that for 
two-breadwinner married couples the differences were close together. 
This minimized the horizontal inequities. For single-earner married 
couples, however, the horizontal inequity had increased since the 
previous year, as the 100:0 and 0:100 income combinations were then 
even closer together and closer to the tax paid by the unmarried 
person. This did not represent horizontal equity as households with at 
least two occupants but only one breadwinner paid almost as much tax 
as those with only one occupant and more tax than two-breadwinner 
couples. 
6.4 CHANGES IN HORIZONTAL EQUITY FROM 1985 TO 1995 
6.4.1 CHANGES DURING THIS PERIOD 
A drastic change that occurred was the gradual separation of the 
taxation of husband and wife so that, except for the instances 
referred to in section 7(2) of the Act, the wife became a taxpayer in 
her own right and was taxed separately. The main advantage was. ~that 
certain of the problems mentioned in petitions to the Margo CommiSsion 
(see Chapter 5) were then addressed. The married woman was now 
independently taxed and could maintain the privacy of her financial 
affairs. For two-breadwinner couples this meant that their total 
income was split between two people and therefore taxed at lower 
rates, and therefore they paid less tax in total. 
The married woman, however, paid higher tax and her tax threshold was 
lower than that of the other two taxpaying categories - the unmarried 
person and the married person. She was also prevented from claiming 
the child rebate, and she only qualified for half the deduction for 
retirement annuity contributions if she did not have non-retirement 
funding employment income (in which case she could claim 15 per cent 
248 
thereof, as could the other taxpayers. Taxes payable by individuals 
changed over the decade as follows: 
TAXES PAYABLE 
Taxable Unmarried Married Couple 
Income/ Person 100:0 50:50 0:100 
Year R R R R 
R200 000 
1985 93 622 91 720 90 920 90 920 
1993 77 040 74 075 64 425 73 350 
RIOO 000 
1985 43 622 41 720 40 920 40 920 
1993 34 040 31 075 23 325 33 350 
R 50 000 
1985 18 626 16 720 15 920 15 920 
1993 12 600 9 975 7 075 13 350 
R 20 000 
1985 4 093 3 294 2 782 2 782 
1993 2 100 1 475 900 3 ISO 
(Extracted from Appendices A-l.A-9) 
Note that for the 50:50 and 0:100 combinations for 1985 the same taxes 
were payable by the married couple. The reason for this wa~ :that· the. 
only thing that influenced total taxes payable by the married. _couple 
was the married woman's earnings allowance and the same maximum 
allowance applied for both combinations. 
As far as the 0:100 combination was concerned, contrary to the general 
tendency, the taxes payable for the 1993 year of assessment were 
higher than for the 1985 year of assessment for a taxable income of 
R20 000. The reason for this was that in 1985 the married person paid 
tax and the wife's earnings allowance was applicable, but in 1993 the 
married woman paid tax (that is, if her husband had other non-taxable 
income) and she paid tax sooner and also had a lower rebate than the 
other categories. From taxable incomes of RSO 000 and upwards the 
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maximum marginal rate of the married woman was applicable and this was 
lower than the married person's maximum marginal rate in 1985. 
For the married couple with the husband as only breadwinner, the joint 
tax was reduced from R91 720 in 1985 to R74 075 in 1993/1994 on a 
taxable income of R200 000. This was a parallel reduction, if compared 
with the reduction in the unmarried taxpayer's taxes during the 
period. In spite of the higher rates for the married woman and her 
low tax threshold and lower rebates, the changes were to the couple's 
advantage as the wife's income was no longer taxed at the husband's 
maximum marginal rates. The biggest decreases were for the 50:50 
split, namely a decrease of almost 29 per cent for R200 000 joint 
income, nearly 18 per cent for R100 000 and for R50 000 and 9 per cent 
for R20 000. Even for the 100:0 split it was advantageous, except for 
the R20 000 income level. 
Although the main concern here was horizontal equity and not lower 
taxes, the above table also served to illustrate that, in the areas 
where horizontal equity was previously the biggest problem in 1985 and 
earlier, namely the two-breadwinner couples and especially the 50:50 
income combination and combinations close thereto. Here the taxes 
decreased for the married couple (for incomes below R100 000 and for 
the 50:50 combination the taxes were almost halved) and the horizontal 
inequities were less. While a certain reduction of ·taxes was 
expected, simply as a result of the continuing inflation, the 
comparative table showed that the decreases also reduced the 
inequities for two-breadwinner couples. 
6.4.2 DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY THE UNMARRIED PERSON AND THE 
MARRIED COUPLE 
Differences between the taxes payable by the married couple and the 
unmarried person indicated horizontal equity or inequity and such 
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differences were calculated for the 1985 to 1993 years of assessment. 
The differences between taxes payable by the unmarried person and the 
married couple on the same taxable income from 1985 to 1993 are set 
out in Appendix B. The same combinations of income for the married 
couple were used as for the taxes calculated in Appendix A. Here, 
however, comparisons were only made between the following 
combinations: the 100:0, that is the h~sband/married person as 
breadwinner; the 50:50 where the husband and wife each contributed the 
same income to the joint taxable income; and the 0:100 combination 
where the entire taxable income was earned by the wife and, since 
1990/1991 was taxed in her hands at the married woman's rates. These 
combinations showed the general trend over the period and were 
identified as the main problem areas with regard to horizontal equity. 
The 0:100 combination (Appendix 8-10} 
The smallest differences arose for the 0:100 combination, that is the 
taxes payable by the married couple when all the income was earned by 
the wife and, recently, taxed in her hands. The tax payable by the 
married woman was almost the same as the taxes payable by the 
unmarried person on that income. For the lower 1ncome groups the 
married couple sometimes paid more tax than the unmarried person. The 
reason for this was that the married woman's tax threshold and primary 
rebate was lower than that of the unmarried person's. 
The largest differences between taxes payable by the unmarried person 
and the married couple for the 0:100 combination, arose between 1988 
and 1990 for_ the higher income groups (up to R22 460 less tax payable 
by the married couple on a taxable income of R200 000 in 1989}. 
This was as a direct result of the high rate of the married woman's 
earnings allowance and the joint assessment allowance then applied. 
The joint assessment allowance, however, was reduced to nil at a joint 
income of R200 000 for the 0:100 combination - it did not even apply 
to incomes higher than R60 000 for this combination. 
In 1985 the largest difference between the taxes payable by the 
married couple and the unmarried person was R2 702 on taxable incomes 
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between RSO 000 and R200 000 and this was a constant difference. In 
1986 and 1987 it was also a constant difference of R2 990 {1986) and 
R2 655 {1987) for taxable incomes of R70 000 or more. There was a 
giant leap in 1988 from the difference between taxes payable by the 
married couple and the unmarried person on a taxable income of 
R200 000 of R2 655 (1987) to R22 040, to R22 460 (1989) and to R21 135 
(1990). This, however, reduced to R8 580 (1991), R6 605 (1992) and a 
maximum difference of only R3 690 for 1993 and 1994. 
The differences during 1993 and 1994 indicated that the married woman 
{as a result of a lower maximum marginal tax rate than the unmarried 
person) paid only R3 690 less tax than the unmarried person on a 
taxable income of R200 000. This difference decreased to R90 for a 
taxable income of R80 000 and from there downwards the wife was at a 
disadvantage and RI 050 more tax was payable by the married 
couple/woman for a taxable income between Rl5 000 and R40 000 and R900 
more tax payable on a taxable income of RIO 000. 
It was thus not advantageous for the married couple to be married, 
where there was a female-breadwinner earning less than R70 000, as she 
(they) would pay less tax if they were unmarried. It might be 
possible for the .couple to choose .. aggregation and to be taxed as a 
married person. The tax paid by the married woman as breadwinner (when 
the couple's incomes were not aggregated) compared with the· tax 
payable by the unmarried person was higher for the lower income groups 
up to R70 000. The taxation was more horizontally equitable than from 
1988 to 1990, but not as equitable horizontally when compared with 
other income combinations. 
The 50:50 combination (Appendix B-10) 
Where both spouses contributed equally to the taxable income, the 
taxes payable by the married couple were then always lower than that 
paid by the unmarried person. The reason for this was that they were 
taxed separately and the maximum marginal rate then applied on a lower 
proportion of earnings. The differences between the taxes payable by 
the married couple and the unmarried person increased for the higher 
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income groups in later years directly as a result of separate 
taxation. 
The taxes payable in 1993 by a married couple on a joint income of 
R200 000 amounted to R12 615 less than the tax payable by the 
unmarried person. The reason for this was that the husband and wife 
each paid tax on R100 000, whereas the unmarried person paid tax on 
R200 000. The differences were the lowest for 1985, 1986 and 1987, at 
R2 702, R2 990 and R2 655 respectively, all the differences being 
constant from a taxable income of R70 000. 
The horizontal inequities for the double-earner married couple 
decreased considerably from 1985 and these couples were then treated 
more equitably, even too well when compared with single breadwinners. 
All double-earner couples paid less tax than single breadwinners and 
unmarried taxpayers. 
The 100:0 combination (Appendix B-10) 
For the 100:0 combination {where the married person, the husband, was 
the only taxpayer) there were no drastic increases and decreases in 
the differences between taxes paid by the unmarried person and the 
married couple. The largest difference was in 1991 at R3 140 for a 
taxable income from R70 000 (Appendix B-7). The differences were all 
discrete and remained the same from at least a taxable income of 
R80 000, and in some years, an even lower taxable income {1985 from a 
taxable income of RSO 000, a difference of R1 902, 1986 from a taxable 
income of R70 000, of R2 134). No advantages were derived from the 
married woman's earnings allowance as the husband earned all the 
income and no allowance could be claimed. 
In this combination the taxes payable by a married person (with the 
husband as sole breadwinner) and those payable by an unmarried person 
were compared and it was clear that there was not much difference 
between them, especially in the higher income groups. The married 
person consistently paid less tax than the unmarried person, but _this 
was a one-breadwinner house and the husband would have to support a 
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wife (and family?) on the income, whereas the unmarried person 
supported only himself or herself. The inequity lay in the fact that 
other married couples, where both spouses earned income, paid 
considerably less tax. 
Although the small differences indicated horizontal equity, it could 
not be said to be fair towards one-breadwinner families. What had 
improved though, was the tax treatment of two-breadwinner families, as 
the wife was taxed separately. The new system definitely operated to 
the advantage of the two-breadwinner family as the differences in tax 
payable between the married couple and the unmarried person were 
larger. For example, for the 50:50 taxable income combination for the 
couple, the difference was greater from 1988 onwards than it had been 
1985 to 1987. 
During the last ten years the horizontal inequities in the taxation of 
individuals shifted from the taxes payable by the double-earner 
married couple to the single-breadwinner married couple. The graphs 
in paragraph 6.3 clearly indicated that the 100:0 and 0:100 
combinations of income for the married couple produced the biggest 
problems in horizontal equity as these couples paid more tax than the 
other income combinations while the breadwinner in the 100:0 and 0:100 
combinations also had to support a dependant. 
6.4.3 CHANGES FROM 1985 TO 1994 TAKING INFLATION INTO ACCOUNT 
As earnings have increased continuously since 1985, as a result of 
inflation, a comparison needed to be made of the taxes payable for the 
inflation-adjusted incomes to determine whether the same . conclusions 
of horizontal equity could be made as in preceding paragraphs. 
The taxable incomes of 1994 were adjusted for the purposes of this 
paragraph in accordance with the inflation rates for the period 
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1985-1994. The annual inflation rates used were obtained from the 
Department of Statistics and are listed in Appendix C. Although the 
inflation rate was calculated taking into account changes in the 
consumer price index and not only on changes in salaries/wages over 
the period, it provided at least an indication of how prices moved 
and, as a result, of how salaries/wages had to increase to enable 
people to keep up with the change. 
The following table shows the effective tax rates in 1985 on taxable 
incomes from R5 000 to RlOO 000 and in 1994 on the corresponding 
inflation adjusted taxable incomes of Rl7 050 to R341 000. 
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 1985-1994 WITH INFLATION-ADJUSTED INCOMES 
Taxable Incomes Unmarried 
Person 
Married couple 
1985 1994 1985 1994 1985 1994 1985 1994 1985 1994 
R R % % % % % % % % 
5 000 17 050 4,1 8,1 1,5 5,1 nil 3,6 nil 14,3 
10 000 34 100 9,8 18,6 7,22 13,8 4,8 9,7 4,8 21,7 
15 000 51 150 15,2 25,5 11,9 20,4 9,2 14,3 9,2 26,9 
20 000 68 200 20,4 29,8 16,4 25,6 13,9 17,8 13,9 30,2 
30 000 102 300 28,7 34,2 24,5 31,3 21,3 23,7 21,3 33,4 
40 000 136 400 34,0 36,4 29,3 34,2 27,3 27,9 27,3 35,1 
50 000 170 500 37,2 37,7 33,4 36,0 31,8 30,6 31,8 36,0 
60 000 204 600 39,3 38,6 36,2 37,1 34,9 32,4 -34,8 36~7 
70 000 238 700 40,8 39,2 38,1 38,0 37,0 33,7 37,0 37,2 
80 000 272 800 42,0 39,7 39,6 38,6 38,6 34,6 38,6 37,5 
90 000 306 900 42,9 40,0 40,8 39,1 39,9 35,4 39,9 37,8 
100 000 341 000 43,6 40,3 41,7 39,5 40,9 36,0 40,9 38,0 
The changes in the consumer price index indicated that a person's 
income had to increase 3,41 times during the period under review to 
keep up with inflation. The taxes payable in 1994 on these inflated 
salaries were calculated (using 1994 legislation), as well as the 
effective or average rate of tax thereon. What was clear from the 
table was that, even if the incomes had increased approximately 
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three-fold (which did not necessarily happen), the taxpayers in the 
higher income groups were not much worse off. The effective rates 
were lower in 1994 for all 1985 taxable incomes over R80 000. This was 
directly as a result of the lower maximum marginal tax rates. 
The table above indicated that tax thresholds were lower in 1994 and 
people started paying tax sooner (if one took the inflation adjusted 
incomes and compared them with the 1985 incomes), but in the higher 
income groups the effective rate definitely decreased. 
The unmarried person paid tax at an effective rate of 4,1 per cent on 
a taxable income of R5 000 in 1985, compared with the 1994 rate of 8 
per cent (for the inflation adjusted income of R17 050). The married 
couple paid as follows: 
100:0 combination - 5% in 1994/95 (1,5% in 1985) 
50:50 combination - 3,6% in 1994/95 (0% in 1985) 
0:100 combination - 14,3% in 1994/95 (0% in 1985) 
The unmarried person was dealt with most favourably in 1994 compared 
with 1985 (in comparison with the other groups) at a taxable income of 
R50 000 (at 1994 inflated rates this was R170 500), as the effective 
rate remained the same (37 per cent in 1994 and in 1985). For.taxable 
-incomes in excess of this amount there was a lower effective rate. The 
unmarried person still paid tax at the highest effective rates for all 
taxable incomes above R30 000. For the married couple with the 100:0 
combination, the effective rate was less in 1994 than in 1985 from a 
taxable income of R70 000 (1985 level - inflated joint taxable income 
of R238 700 in 1994). For the 50:50 combination it was more 
advantageous than previously from R40 000 taxable income (inflated 
income of R136 400 for 1994) and for the 0:100 combination it was only 
more advantageous from R70 000 (although the married woman paid 0,2 
per cent more on the 1994 inflated income than she did in 1985). 
The married woman as breadwinner paid far more tax than the other 
taxpayers on a taxable income of R20 000, adjusted for inflation. Her 
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effective tax rate was I4,3 per cent for a taxable income of R5 000 
compared with 3,6 per cent (50:50}, 5,I per cent (IOO:O} and 8,I per 
cent (see table above) for the unmarried person, but thereafter her 
effective rates and the unmarried person's effective rates did not 
differ by more than 3,I per cent, and usually not more than 2,2 per 
cent. This meant that, even if she was taxed at higher rates in 1994, 
the lower overall rates applicable in I994 compared with 1985 {from 
I985 taxable incomes of R70 000) reduced the tax payable by the 
married woman. Compared with other married-couple income combinations 
she, however, was second worst off after the IOO:O combinations, in 
terms of tax payable. 
For the husband/breadwinner (IOO:O combination) the taxes were also 
almost 4 per cent higher at lower income levels increasing to 9 per 
cent higher at R20 000. At R70 000 (I994 inflated amount - R238 700} 
the effective tax rates were almost identical and from there the rates 
were lower in I994 on inflated incomes than on original incomes in 
I985. 
According to the table in Appendix E-I, reflecting the numbers of 
taxpayers in the various income groups, I5 per cent of working married 
women (I04 2I2 out of 677 000) earned between RIO 000 and RI5 000 in 
1993. More than 447 000 working married women (two-thirds of the 
working married women) earned between RIO 000 and R35 000, with 
effective tax rates of up to 2I,7 per cent. They paid tax in 1994 at 
effective rates of between I4,3 per cent and 21,7 per cent. These 
rates were the highest of all the taxpaying categories. 
Most of the taxpayers classified as married persons {2 027 562 out of 
2 439 276 taxpayers) earned less than R70 000, according to Appendix F 
and they then paid tax at higher effective rates in 1994 than in 1985 
and at higher rates than any other married couple combination if they 
were single breadwinners. For unmarried persons more than 500 000 out 
of the total of almost 860 000 earned up to R25 000 taxable income, 
paying tax at the highest rates of all taxpaying categories, except 
for the married woman. 
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It was doubtful, however, whether most of these incomes would have 
increased to this extent even though the rate of inflation used was 
the actual rate. 
So, in general, if taxpayers earned the same taxable income as in 
1985, they were better off in 1994 in terms of taxes payable than they 
were in 1985. They did, however, have difficulty in maintaining the 
same living standards as in 1985. Had their incomes increased with 
inflation, the lower income groups would have paid effectively more 
tax than in 1985. There were, in other words, no lower effective 
rates despite the lower maximum marginal rates, mainly due to the 
effect of bracket creep (the influence of inflation pushing earnings 
up into higher tax brackets but reducing effective buying power). 
Horizontal equity considerations were thus still the same as for the 
pre-inflation calculations, namely that the married man as single 
breadwinner and the married woman as single breadwinner were the worst 
off, but double-income couples gained in terms of comparative taxes. 
6.5 EXTREME CASES 
There were other instances where the current system discriminated 
against the married couple. For example, where they were· taxed 
separately and, because one of them earned very little, they paid more 
tax than when they were taxed together. Since 1989, section 7(2) of 
the Act provided the opportunity for the married couple to be taxed 
together, if the wife was regarded as the breadwinner of the family. 
This section applied when the husband "has not during the year of 
assessment derived gross income (including any amounts which would 
have constituted gross income but for the fact that they were derived 
from a source outside the Republic) exceeding the amount of RIO 000" 
(Section 7(2}(c}(i) of the Act}. This was intended as a "relief 
measure designed to assist couples who in consequence of the fact that 
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the husband has little or no income, find themselves liable for more 
tax in total than they would have paid had the combined taxation rule 
still applied" (Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 
I990:9). 
Since the I992 year of assessment, however, the married woman could 
decide whether or not these provisions should apply to her (Section 
7(2)(c)(i) of the Act). This meant that her income was once again 
taxed in her husband's hands and she lost her privacy and 
independence, even though the choice rested with her. The husband 
became the taxpayer while she earned the income. She was also unable 
to claim any additional expenses and lost the primary rebate of R900. 
On the other hand, (if the wife did not opt for section 7(2)(c)(i) of 
the Act) the husband could not even utilise his full rebate if he 
earned less than RIO 000, as the tax payable on RIO 000 for a married 
person was only RI 750 and the rebate was R2 225 in I993 and I994. 
The advantages of aggregation (adding the couple's incomes together 
and taxing it as if these were earned by the married person) were 
obvious. If, for example, the husband had a substantial tax loss and 
the wife earned a taxable income, this could have lead to tax savings 
for the coup 1 e-. 
De Wet (I993:50) attempted to "tabulate for comparative purpo~es the 
normal tax consequences of aggregation or non-aggregation of incomes 
in terms of the section 7(2)(c)(i) option of the Act relative to the 
respective tax brackets for married women". He listed the parameters 
within which it would have been advantageous for the married woman to 
elect to be taxed with her husband. He noted that, except where the 
wife's income exceeded RI50 000 and where the husband's taxable income 
was less than R5 000, the tax payable under non-aggregation was 
greater. If, however, the husband's taxable income fell between R7 500 
and RIO 000, and the wife's taxable income was between RO and RI5 000, 
it was more advantageous to choose non-aggregation. Should the wife, 
however, have had a taxable income of between R20 000 and R75 000, the 
taxes payable, if they were taxed separately, were consistently more 
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than when their incomes were aggregated and taxed in the husband's 
hands. From a taxable income of R75 000 onwards it was not to the 
couple's advantage to choose aggregation as the wife's maximum 
marginal rate was lower than that of the married person's. 
De Wet noted that if the husband had a taxable income of RIO 000, the 
wife should not have elected to be taxed with him; if he had a nil 
taxable income - she should have elected the option up to a taxable 
income of RI75 833; if he had a loss of RS 000, she should have 
elected the option up to a taxable income of R3I9 I66; and for a 
taxable income of R5 000 she should have elected the option up to a 
taxable income of her own not exceeding RI05 833 (I993:52}. 
De Wet's calculations ignored all deductions and he only included the 
primary rebates in his calculations. Aggregation became even more 
advantageous if other deductions were considered. To illustrate this, 
take for example a couple where the husband earned less than RIO 000 
from all sources, say R9 500 taxable in the Republic. The wife earned 
a salary of respectively RIO 000, R20 000, R40 000, R60 000 and 
R80 000. Both had retirement annuity fund contributions (RAF} of 
R2 000 and medical expenses of R5 000 and the wife contributed 6 per 
cent of her salary toa pension fund. If she was taxed as a married 
woman she paid the fo 11 owing taxes: 
Income taxes ga~able b~ a married woman if she was taxed as such 
R R R R R 
Income IO 000 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000 
Pension fund 600 I 200 2 400 3 600 4 800 
RAF I ISO 875 875 875 875 
Medical 
expenses 4 000 4 000 3 I64 2 224 I 284 
Taxable income 4 250 I3 925 33 56I 53 30I 73 04I 
Tax payable 723 2 625 8 I32 IS 570 23 466 
Less rebate 900 _.2.QQ _.2.QQ 900 900 
.1ill. I 725 7 232 I4 670 22 566 
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Her pension fund deductions were all allowable as up to 7,5 per 
cent of her salary was deductible in terms of section 11(k) of the 
Act, but the retirement annuity fund deduction was limited to 
R1 750 less the pension fund contribution, or R875, whichever was 
the greater (section 11(n) of the Act). The medical expenses were 
limited to the expense minus the greater of R1 000 or 5 per cent of 
the taxable income (Section 18 of the Act). In the above 
circumstances the husband would be taxed as a married person and 
would pay no tax. 
If she and her husband were taxed jointly in terms of section 7(2), 
they had the following deductions and paid the following taxes: 
Income taxes payable by a married couple if their incomes were 
aggregated 
R 
Income 19 500 
Pension fund 600 
Retirement 
annuity fund 2 900 
Medical 
expenses 9 000 
Taxable income 7 000 
Tax payable 1 210 
Less rebate 2 225 
Taxes payable 
when wife was 
taxed as a 
Nil 
married woman __Nil 
Advantage in 
aggregation 
R 
29 500 
1 200 
2 300 
8 700 
17 300 
3 160 
2 225 
_ill 
R 
49 500 
2 400 
1 750 
7 732 
37 618 
7 933 
2 225 
5 708 
R 
69 500 
3 600 
1 750 
R 
89 500 
4 800 
1 750 
6 792 5 852 
57 358 77 098 
15 217 '23 481 
2 225 2 225 
12 992 21 256 
14 670 22 566 
1 678 1 310 
The advantages were not only due to the fact that the couple could 
be taxed at married person rates, but that a larger deduction could 
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be claimed in respect of retirement annuity fund contributions and 
medical expenses. The situation was even more critical if the 
husband, for example, was over 65 years of age and he was unable, 
because of his low taxable income/gross income, to utilise the 
over-sixty-five rebate. If the wife had a high taxable income and 
they aggregated their incomes in terms of section 7(2)(c) of the 
Act, then it was possible to utilize this rebate. There was also 
no limit to the tax deductible medical expenses and they could 
deduct them in full. 
The limitation of the deductibility of retirement annuity fund 
contributions for the married woman was addressed in section 11(n) 
proviso (ix) of the Act. This proviso allowed a married woman who 
became a member of a retirement annuity fund prior to 1 March 1992, 
to choose that her contributions to this fund be deemed to be her 
husband's. This meant that the husband, who was granted a greater 
deduction in terms of section 11(n)(aa)(B) and (C), deducted the 
contributions and the married couple received the advantage of a 
greater deduction. This, however, was not always to the couple's 
advantage and depended on their incomes, the amount of the 
contributions to the retirement annuity fund, their respective 
non-retirement funding employment income and their contributions to 
pension funds, as well as the husband's contribution to the 
retirement annuity fund (Mitchell 1993:55). This concession 
applied only to years of assessment ending no later than 
28 February 1997. Mitchell (1993:95) concluded in a later article 
that donation of even partial contributions was possible so that 
the wife could deduct whatever limit was allowed and the rest of 
the contribution was then deemed to be her husband's. Whether the 
legislator ag~eed with this blatant splitting of expenses was 
doubtful but, if it was allowed, it could mean a considerable tax 
saving for certain couples, but only until 1997. When their 
incomes were aggregated in terms of section 7(2), however, the 
husband claimed the deduction based on the contributions of both 
spouses. 
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Another factor which influenced the aggregation decision was the 
payment of SITE. If the wife only paid SITE and was not required to 
render a return and her husband had, for example, a tax loss, the 
wife's SITE was final unless she chose aggregation, in which 
instance the loss could be set off against her taxable income. 
The inequity from a horizontal equity viewpoint was evident where 
the husband had gross income in excess of RIO 000 (say RIO OOI). 
The situation might even have existed that he was ill and over 
65 years old. The wife actually supported him with her higher 
income, and she also paid some of his medical expenses, but she was 
not entitled to the higher deductions available to a married person 
or the more favourable rates because of the RIO 000 aggregation 
limit. If the husband in the above example was over 65 years of age 
and earned a gross income of RIO OOI, had no retirement annuity 
fund or pension fund contributions, but had the R5 000 medical 
expenses as stated above, his tax calculation was as follows: 
Income 
less medical expenses 
Taxable income 
Tax payable 
less primary rebate R2 225 
less over-65 rebate 2 500 
Tax payable 
R 
10 OOI 
5 000 
5 001 
850 
He was not able to utilize an amount of R3 874 of his rebates, 
while his wife, who had to help support him, had to pay tax (refer 
to table on previous pages), had a low primary rebate, and was not 
allowed to deduct all her medical expenses or all her contributions 
to a retirement annuity fund. 
If the wife's income was taxed in her husband's hands (as section 7 
of the Act allowed for income of the husband which was only Rl less 
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than the situation referred to above), then the taxes payable would 
have been as follows: 
Income taxes payable by a married couple if their incomes were 
aggregated - Husband had income of RIO OOI 
R 
Income 20 OOI 
Pension fund 600 
Retirement 
annuity fund 
Medical 
2 000 
expenses IO 000 
Taxable income 7 40I 
Tax payable 
Less rebates 
Taxes payable 
when wife was 
taxed as a 
I 282 
4 725 
_1ill 
married woman __Nil 
Advantage in 
aggregation 
R 
30 OOI 
I 200 
2 000 
IO 000 
I6 80I 
3 060 
4 725 
__Nil 
R 
50 OOI 
2 400 
I 750 
IO 000 
35 85I 
7 438 
4 725 
2 713 
R 
70 OOI 
3 600 
I 750 
IO 000 
54 65I 
I4 I06 
4 725 
9 38I 
I4 670 
5 289 
R 
90 OOI 
4 800 
I 750 
IO 000 
73 45I 
2I 949 
4 725 
I7 224 
22 566 
5 342 -
From the above table it was clear that for a couple wh'ere __ the 
husband earned very little and was over 65 years of age, 
aggregation had considerable benefits as the full married person 
rebates could be utilised and the medical expenses of both spouses 
were deductible in full. The limit of RIO 000 created an inequity 
as explained above, but it was accepted that there should be a 
limit. Perhaps it could be possible to have a certain income group 
(say between RIO 000 and R20 000 gross income for the husband) 
where these concessions were phased out so that the cut-off was not 
so harsh. 
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6.6 HORIZONTAL EQUITY AND THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TAX STRUCTURE OF SOUTH 
AFRICA (KATZ COMMISSION) 
The Commission of inquiry into certain aspects of the tax structure 
of South Africa (Katz Commission) submitted an interim report on 
their findings on 18 November 1994. The Commission recommended one 
set of rates for all taxpayers, having concluded that equality 
before the law included the requirement that no differentiation be 
made on the grounds of marital status, as they considered doing so 
to be unconstitutional: 
all of these provisions [for married person, 
married woman] distinguish between married men and 
women on the basis of the personal characteristics of 
the taxpayer namely sex and/or gender and consequently 
can be described as unfair discrimination not 
sustainable under the Constitution. 
(South Africa (Katz Commission} 1994:71} 
There should also be only five different tax rates and "some form 
of primary rebate . . . to alleviate the burden placed on very·. low 
incomes by the proposed 9 percent flat rate" (South Africa 
1994:96}. This rebate, however, was not spelled out and has been 
ignored in the following calculations. 
The differences in tax payable by the unmarried person and the 
married couple based on the rates and other recommendations of the 
Katz Commission have been calculated in the same way as for the 
previous paragraphs in this chapter (Appendix F). The same taxable 
incomes and married-couple income combinations have been used, but 
rebates have been excluded as these were not quantified by the 
Commission. The following graph illustrates the effect of the Katz 
Commission's recommendations on horizontal equity as defined for 
this study: 
(J) 
0.. 
:l 
0 
(.) 
"'0 
(J) 
·;:: 
,_ 
<U 
E 
>. 
.0 
265 
DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE 
TAX BASED ON KATZ PROPOSALS 
2000r-----~------------------------------~ 
-2000 
-4000 
~ -6000 
<U 
~ 
0. 
X 
<U 
-8000 
~ -10000 
100:0 
80:20 
70:30 
C) 
·~ -12000 
·----· 60:40 
......... 50:50 
<U 
(/) 
-14000 
-16000 '--------~--~---~-----_l 
-20000 20000 60000 100000 140000 180000 220000 
Total taxable income 
{Extracted from Appendix F) 
......... 40:60 
30:70 
20:80 
0:100 
From the above graph it was clear that the tax payable by all 
· two-breadwinner couples taxed in terms of the Katz Commission's 
recommendations would be close together except for, once again, 
single-breadwinner couples. They then paid exactly the same tax as 
the unmarried person on the same taxable income. (The 100:0 and 
0:100 combinations form a line on the same level on the nn 
. difference in tax paid in the graph above). They were taxed as 
individual persons without gender or ~arital status and they did 
not have the advantages of income splitting enjoyed py the other 
· combinations. 
The tax payable would be the same for each income combination for 
the married couple irrespective of the spouse who earned it. That 
is, the 30:70 and 70:30 combinations paid the same tax for each 
. taxable income and the differences in tax paid were represented on 
the same line above. The same was true for the 80:20 and 20:80 
combinations and for the 60:40 and 40:60 combinations. The biggest 
difference in tax paid between the unmarried person and the married 
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couple was for the 50:50 combination where the income was divided 
equally between the spouses and they had the maximum benefit of 
lower rates. The advantage of halving the income only applied, 
however, from a taxable income of R60 000 upwards. 
For a taxable income of less than R32 000 there was no difference 
in tax payable between the unmarried person and any of the income 
combinations, but after that the differences increased and for the 
joint taxable income of R200 000 it was as much as Rl4 100 (for the 
50:50 combination), Rl3 500 (for the 60:40 and 40:60 
combinations), Rl2 900 (for the 70:30 and 30:70 combinations), 
Rll 700 (for the 80:20 and 20:80 combinations) and nil (for the 
100:0 and 0:100 combinations). 
These recommendations, however, did not ensure horizontal equity 
and the main losers were the single-earner married couples and all 
the other taxpayers who qualified to be taxed as married persons, 
that is divorced people supporting children, widows and widowers. 
The Katz Commission proposed the provision of R0,5 billion in 
undefined aid to these people, but only for incomes up to R22 700. 
Even with the implementation of the Katz Commission's proposals 
there would still ~ot be horizontal equity as defined in Chapter 2 
of this study. The differences between one-breadwinner, families 
and other taxpayers did not provide for dependants. The more 
favourable rates of the married person made provision for the fact 
that the married person normally maintained dependants and so 
needed more money for necessities than the unmarried person or even 
a married woman with a husband who also provided for the family. 
Another problem envisaged with the implementation of the Katz 
Commission's proposals regarding the taxation of individuals was 
that, as high tax rates for married women were previously quoted as 
a disincentive for these women to work, it could be accepted that 
lower rates would encourage these women to return to work. It was 
further assumed that, as they did not work before the lower tax 
rates were introduced, they did not need to work to support their 
267 
families financially as the other spouse earned enough to support 
them. Should they also enter the labour market in an economy where 
jobs were scarcer by the day, and many school and university 
leavers were unable to find jobs, these women would further 
saturate the labour market and take jobs away from people who 
desperately needed them. A tax system, however, should not be there 
to encourage or discourage people from trying to work, and this 
matter should never be the reason for jeopardising horizontal 
equity. 
The recommendations of the Katz Commission regarding the taxation 
of individuals might have removed gender discrimination from the 
Income Tax Act, but it still did not ensure horizontal equity to 
the taxpayer groups discriminated against since introduction of 
separate taxation. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
From this chapter it was clear that horizontal equity was not 
achieved by merely changing tax rates and taxable entities. Over 
the last ten years many of the problems in connection with the 
joint taxation of married couples have been addressed ·by 
legislation and tax rates in general have come down. 
As far as the married couple is concerned, they still paid less tax 
in total up to 1995 than the unmarried person who earned the same 
income as their joint income, except where the wife earned the bulk 
of the joint income. If the individuals were considered, the 
married woman paid the most tax up to a certain limit and then, 
because she had a lower maximum marginal tax rate, the tax of the 
married person and the unmarried person exceeded hers. 
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In this chapter the taxes payable by the married couple and the 
unmarried person who earned the same taxable income as the married 
couple jointly, have been calculated and compared for the period 
from 1985 to 1994. The annual differences between these taxes and 
the total change over the period have been calculated. 
The incomes have also been adjusted for inflation over the same 
period and the results noted. For the higher-income groups the tax 
was lower in 1994 than in 1985, but for the lower-income groups the 
effective tax rates increased. 
The main problem with horizontal equity in the taxation of 
individuals in the 1985 year of assessment was the two-breadwinner 
married couple, as the wife was taxed at her husband's marginal 
rates. This problem was progressively eliminated with the 
increased married woman's earnings allowance and the joint 
assessment allowance and, from 1990, separate taxation for married 
women. Gradually the single-breadwinner couple emerged as the 
group that paid the most tax of all the married couples on a 
particular level of income. This was unfair as these taxpayers 
support a spouse and/or children on one person's income. 
In the 1994 and 1995 years of assessment the double-breadwinner 
couple paid consistently less tax than the unmarried person and 
increasingly less tax than the other married-couple income 
combinations. This also did not represent horizontal equity. The 
solution suggested by the Katz Commission only helped the single 
breadwinners who earned up to R22 700 annually, which suggested a 
certain measure of vertical equity and also horizontal equity for 
those taxpayers earning R22 700 or less, but did not provide 
horizontal equity for all taxpayers earning more than that. 
A solution must therefore be found in the next chapter that 
provides tax relief for the single breadwinner, without 
compromising the requirements of the new Constitution and the other 
requirements set in the Katz Commission's report. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This study has shown that the background, social structure and 
workpatterns of the adult members of the family unit have 
changed over the past century. These changes occurred 
gradually as a result of various factors such as increased 
financial pressures on the household. and the fact that the 
married woman began working outside the home where previously 
she concentrated on raising her children and caring for her 
family. 
The definition of the taxation unit was previously based on 
this perception of the one-breadwinner family, and it was 
structured so as to benefit this family. This was to the 
detriment of the new two-breadwinner family. As a result, the 
working married woman paid tax at her husband's marginal rates 
and he was responsible for her taxes. Thus, she was deprived 
of privacy and status regarding her financial and tax matters. 
In the last few decades tax systems all over the world have 
changed in an attempt to accommodate working married women. 
Chapter 3 discussed the taxation of individuals in· other. 
western countries and indicated the changes made· in 
legislation to accommodate working married women. In South 
Africa this subject has been widely debated, but taxation 
legislation continued to favour the one-breadwinner family 
until 1987, when the Margo Commission advised separate 
taxation. 
Chapter 4 discussed South African income tax legislation since 
its inception and indicated the changes made up to 1995. The 
chapter concentrated on the changes in the taxation of 
individuals and especially the taxation of the married couple 
versus the unmarried person. The joint taxation of husband and 
wife was not originally regarded as a problem as the wife did 
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not normally earn any income nor was she a co-breadwinner. 
Gradually, taxpayers perceived this situation to be unfair. As 
more and more married women entered the labour market, the 
unfairness of the situation was further highlighted by 
complaints from feminists and others and by investigations by 
various commissions and committees. 
The Margo Commission researched and discussed this topic at 
great length during 1984 and 1985. Chapter 5 reviewed its 
activities in this respect, listing all the problems perceived 
at the time by both the Commission and the taxpayer, noting 
possible solutions and the problems arising from such possible 
solutions. Finally, the chapter discussed the Commission's 
recommendations for separate taxation and the transferability 
of allowances between spouses, as well as government's 
response to the recommendations. 
Chapter 6 calculated the effect on the taxation of individuals 
in the period since the recommendations of the Margo 
Commission and compared the different individual taxpaying 
units. As the married couple (or the household) was still 
considered to be the economic unit for consumption purposes, 
the tax payable by this unit (considered for the purposes ··of 
this study to be a childless married couple) was compared with 
the tax payable by the unmarried individual. The pattern. of 
taxing married couples has changed radically from 1985 to 
1995. It changed from a tax system that discriminated against 
the two-income married couple to one that treated them 
preferentially at the cost of the single-breadwinner family. 
The calculations in Chapter 6 showed that the inequities that 
previously existed against the married woman were, however, 
not completely removed, as she started paying tax sooner and 
at higher rates than the other two taxpaying categories. She, 
however, had a lower maximum marginal rate than the other two 
categories, which worked in favour of married women earning 
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higher incomes. This was not fair to those in the lower 
income groups as married women earning lower incomes were 
probably working to provide necessary additional income for 
their families. 
It was also shown that the nlosersn would be the 
single-breadwinner families where the husband, or wife, earned 
the income for the family, or where the husband had a gross 
income slightly in excess of RIO 000 and the wife did not 
qualify to be taxed as a married person, that is, where her 
income was not taxed in her husband's hands. 
Chapter 7 considers the definition of the tax unit and of 
horizontal equity as applied in the South African context. 
Several recommendations are made in an attempt to solve the 
dilemma of the one-breadwinner family. The first solution 
suggested agrees with the original recommendation made by the 
Margo Commission and similar, current legislation in England, 
while other recommendations incorporate the implications of 
the new Constitution. Certain other suggestions are also made 
in an attempt to alleviate the burden on the working married 
woman and on the two-breadwinner married couple. 
7.2 HORIZONTAl EQUITY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TAX UNIT 
Mirrilees (1979:1) isolated equity and economic efficiency as 
the most important criteria to be satisfied by structuring 
principles of income tax reform of personal income tax. These 
criteria were best met by a comprehensive definition of the 
income tax base. 
The tax unit in South Africa ... is the married 
couple. This is based on the principle of ability to 
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pay, having regard to the resources of the unit which 
earns and disposes of the income. The common situation 
of a household is that the joint earnings of husband and 
wife are used for the benefit of the joint household. 
This is valid even where each spouse exercises control 
over his or her earnings, which are not necessarily 
pooled to finance household ex~enditure. Expenses borne 
by one spouse (eg rent, food, light, fuel) relieve the 
other of this burden and by the same token clothing 
bought out of earnings of, say , the wife, relieves the 
husband of that expense so that, compared with the family 
with only one breadwinner and the same income, there is 
no difference in common household expenditure, and the 
only disparity in ability to pay may lie in the 
additional expenses incurred by the wife in earning the 
additional income brought by her into the unit 
(translated). 
(South Africa 1976:para 2) 
Webb (1993:14,16) also noted that the official statistics on 
the income distribution in the United Kingdom used the 
household as·the unit of analysis. 
In many cases an individual's access to independent 
income will be a poor indicator of living standards. 
This is because as noted above, many individuals will 
share at least in part in the income of other household 
members. 
The married couple was therefore taken as an economic unit for 
the purpose of calculating tax payable in comparisons of 
horizontal equity. Calculations in Chapter 6 indicated that, 
if the tax of a married couple was added together and compared 
with the tax of an unmarried person earning the same income as 
their joint income, many factors influenced horizontal equity. 
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These factors ranged from their total joint income and 
marginal rates to the actual combination constituting their 
joint income. Where a married couple's joint income consisted 
of 50 per cent husband's income and 50 per cent wife's income, 
the couple paid less tax than where the combination was, for 
example, 80 per cent and 20 per cent. Although the tax rates 
in 1994/1995 were lower than in 1985 {refer to inflation 
adjusted rates - see Chapter 6), there was still no horizontal 
I 
equity and, although a certain amount of inequity was to be 
accepted, it was felt that those inequities were too 
extensive. 
For years of assessment commencing on or before 31 December 
1994 there was definitely no equality and also only varying 
degrees of equity in the taxation of individuals in South 
Africa, depending on the income combinations of married 
couples. Married couples were previously taxed together and 
at more favourable rates than unmarried persons. The reason 
for this was that the married couple was previously perceived 
to have only one breadwinner who supported dependants. As 
such the married couple was treated more leniently than the 
unmarried taxpayer by income tax systems all over the world. 
To treat all taxpayers in the same way, that is, equality in 
tax payable and in after-tax income, would not show 
consideration for the position of the single-breadwinner and 
this too would certainly not achieve equity. Equality would 
imply no consideration of the number of dependants of a 
taxpayer or the number of breadwinners in a household. 
Even though many families are now two-income families, the 
significance of the family as a unit cannot be ignored when 
considering horizontal equity. The family is considered to be 
the economic unit as it is the entity that provides the 
housing and shelter and food to all family members. 
noemographic variables such as family size manifest themselves 
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in the consumption patterns of various households• (Balcer & 
Sadka 1979:1). When considering the needs of the household, 
living standards, and other important financial 
considerations, authors considered the household to be the 
economic unit. (Refer Symons and Walker (1986:38-47), 
Blundell et a1 (1984:1-22), Smeeding et a1 (1993:229-256), 
Jenkins and Lambert (1993:337-355).) 
Although a person who earns a taxable income, is liable for 
income tax, such a person may have to support himself/herself 
and a spouse, children and other dependants, while another 
person, earning the same income, may only be responsible for 
himself/herself. Thus, the person with the dependants would, 
after tax, have less to spend per person than the person 
without dependants and horizontal equity would be compromised. 
Large families will typically need more resources than 
small families to reach the same standard of living 
In assessing the distribution of income, the 
progressivity and effectiveness of the tax and social 
security systems and the impact of government policies on 
the living standards of households, it is necessary to 
take a view on the nature and levels of these cost 
differences. 
(Banks & Johnson 1994:1) 
The Margo Commission also referred to the family as an unit: 
It is important to note that the economy-of-scale 
argument ... serves also to assert that the liability for 
tax of one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner families 
should be (roughly) the same. Only the additional 
expenses incurred by the second earner in generating the 
second income justifies a concession in the latter's 
favour. 
(South Africa 1987: para 7.12) 
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Taxation legislation in South Africa specifically prohibits 
the deduction of private expenses as such a "concession" would 
not be in the spirit of the law. The differentiated rates and 
the 0 Splittingn of the couple's income already provides a 
legal reduction in taxes. This 0 helpn to the second 
income-earner is further discussed in paragraph 7.5. The 
Margo Commission mentioned the economies-of-scale and that 
this would be to the advantage of the single-breadwinner, but 
only up to a certain point. Thereafter, two-breadwinner 
couples are better off than one-breadwinner couples. 
The Taxpayer also noted that the Margo Commission divided 
equity into horizontal equity and vertical equity and referred 
to families in the following context: 
The former [horizontal equity] requires that similar 
individuals be treated similarly or that persons in the 
same situation be treated equally or that individuals and 
families in similar circumstances bear the same taxes. 
Vertical equity, on the other hand, requires that ... 
(Neutrality and equity in taxation 1990:161) 
This reference to families must surely mean family members 
living under the same roof and living off the same resources 
and include a person with a dependent spouse and/or children. 
The British Green Paper of 1980 identified the discrimination 
between types of family unit, citing the difference in tax 
treatment and especially the difference granted to 
one-breadwinner families versus two-breadwinner families as 
sources of this discrimination (United Kingdom 1980:paras. 
34-8). 
Chapter 2 made extensive reference to the different 
definitions of horizontal equity and here the following 
definitions were applied to the current South African context: 
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Equal tax treatment of persons in the same economic 
circumstances. 
(Hettich 1983:417) 
... [T]axpayers in essentially equivalent circumstances 
should bear essentially equal tax burdens ... 
(Blum & Pedrick 1986:100) 
It is normally defined as a situation in which families 
with the same standard of living are treated equally in a 
system of transfers and taxes. In other words families 
with the same initial living standard experience an equal 
change as the result of redistribution. 
(Habib 1979:283) 
These researchers all considered the family or the person's 
economic circumstances (which would include his or her 
expenses for dependants) to be part and parcel of his or her 
taxable equity in comparison with other taxpayers. Lilla 
(1986:139,140) also concluded that n[f]amily, not the 
individual, is their 'unit of analysis' in thinking about 
distributive matters". 
To have horizontal equity therefore, the tax system must tax 
the family with a single-breadwinner less than the taxpayer 
without dependants or the two-breadwinner family, if all earn 
the same (joint) taxable income. 
' 7.3 IMPACT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
AFRICA ON THE TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
Chapter 3 of the interim constitution contains the Bill of 
Rights which entrenches nvarious fundamental human rights and 
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freedoms" (Basson 1994:8). Section 8 of the Bill of Rights 
contains the right to equality and especially gender equality. 
This implies that there can be no discrimination on the 
grounds of gender and this brought the Income Tax Act under 
attack as it differentiated between a married person and a 
married woman. It was expected that all clauses referring to 
a married woman would have to be removed from the Act and 
therefore also the tax rates for married women. Van Schalkwyk 
( 1994.: S4) referred to the constitution and suggested changes 
on these grounds but cautioned that this might not be 
immediately affordable. 
The interim report of the Katz Commission of Inquiry into 
certain aspects of the tax structure of South Africa concluded 
that discrimination based on marital status" •.. could be 
unconstitutional [or] •.. be inappropriate" and the Commission 
recommended that it be eliminated (1994: par 6.3.20). If this 
is done, the problem with the definition of tax units could 
arise, especially if there is more than one unit. Descriptions 
of taxpayers should then exclude any reference to male/female 
or to marital status. 
The Constitution therefore demands a drastic change to the 
legislation of income tax in South Africa, but such a change 
should still provide the equities sought and not just equality 
between individuals. 
On March 15, 1995 the Minister of Finance announced the 1995 
amendments to the Income Tax Act, no 58 of 1962. These 
amendments were not yet promulgated at the time of completion 
of this study and are therefore, only briefly referred to 
here. 
The most important amendment for the purposes of this research 
was the abolition of three different tax rate schedules and 
the removal of the biggest areas of discrimination on the 
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grounds of gender, marital status or any allowances made to 
persons who have children, entitling them to a child rebate 
from the Act. 
"[T]he Budget had achieved 'constitutionality' through the 
removal of gender discrimination" (Cohen 1995:1). The 
Minister of _Finance said that the changes to the tax rate 
structure would result in people who earned less than R30 000 
a year benefitting or "not being worse off, except for single 
earners with five or more children". He also emphasised that 
households with two earners would derive substantial benefit 
from the budget "irrespective of income or number of 
children". (Cohen 1995:2) 
As these changes are basically what was suggested by the Katz 
Commission in their interim report and the main criticism 
against the amendments (as against the Katz Commission 
recommendations) was the total apathy for the plight of 
one-breadwinner families and taxpayers with dependants, no 
further research will be done on or mention made of these 
amendments in this thesis. 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING HORIZONTAL EQUITY IN THE 
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN FUTURE 
The effect of the changes in legislation from 1985 to 1994 on 
horizontal equity in the taxation of individuals was made 
clear in Chapter 6. The changes since the Margo Commission 
have been many and varied, but, although all the Commission's 
recommendations have not been implemented, many of the 
problems of the system of taxation of married couples as it 
then existed have been solved. These included the following: 
the problem of the working wife's privacy relating to tax 
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matters, the status acquired by the working wife as a separate 
taxpayer (which meant that she had the same independence in 
her tax affairs as was enjoyed by all other taxpayers) and 
separate taxation for the married woman (although this did not 
necessarily mean less taxation). It could probably be said 
that the marriage penalty from a tax point of view was a thing 
of the past (refer to Chapter 6). Horizontal equity, however, 
sought by all individuals and not just the married woman, has 
not yet been achieved. 
Previously, the biggest problem was horizontal equity for the 
two-breadwinner family, especially where both spouses earned 
more or less the same income. 
This later changed and it is the one-breadwinner family that 
is treated inequitably by the tax system. One-breadwinner 
families are the following: 
-A working husband with a spouse and children dependent 
on him 
-A working wife with a spouse who earns very little or no 
income 
-Single parents as a result of the increase in divorce 
(this often means that the mother raises the 
children) 
-Other family connections, for example the taxpayer 
having to provide for an aged or indigent parent or 
brother or sister 
-Other connections, for example, unmarried people 
together or people in a homosexual union as 
unacknowledged by the fiscus. 
living 
yet 
Keeping in mind horizontal equity and the equality required by 
the new South African constitution, this question remains to 
be solved. 
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To solve the problem of horizontal equity completely, however, 
is impossible as inequities would always arise from any 
reform. The cost to the government of attaining equity is 
also considered to be too high. The perception of equity 
differs from person to person and everyone defines equity and 
(especially horizontal equity) differently to suit their own 
purposes. No consensus could be reaLhed therefore concerning 
equity. Just as the concept of vertical equity is difficult to 
quantify (should the rich be taxed so much that they have the 
same take-home pay as the poor or should they be encouraged by 
the tax system?) so too, the concept of horizontal equity is 
difficult to quantify. 
It cannot be expected of the government to compensate single 
breadwinners for the fact that two-breadwinner couples have 
the advantage of two sets of rates and are taxed at lower 
marginal rates on the joint income of the spouses. Provision 
of some kind of relief should be made for the single 
breadwinner, however, and the inequities could, and should, 
be lessened by providing tax relief under prescribed 
circumstances to people with dependants. 
Although the 1995 taxation amendments were not known ai the 
stage of formulating the proposed solutions to address the 
problem with horizontal equity, it appeared then that the 
recommendations of the Katz Commission of inquiry would be 
implemented, at least in respect of the one set of rates for 
all taxpayers. This fact does not affect the recommendations 
made here insofar as solutions for horizontal equity were 
sought in terms of the 1994 legislation. Other recommendations 
made involved different rates and, also, solutions are sought 
to the horizontal equity problem inherent in the 
recommendations of the Katz Commission. The recommendations 
in this study were therefore not limited to the proposals of 
the Katz Commission. General solutions to the problem of 
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horizontal equity were sought and not just to the ruling 
legislation's contribution to the problem of equity. 
It must be noted too, that this study proposes that the surest 
solution to the equity problem would be to have differentiated 
tax rates for breadwinners and non-breadwinners and, to a 
certain extent, transferable allowances between spouses. 
Although this would be the i,deal solution, it is difficult to 
say exactly to what extent the rates should be differentiated 
and what the differences should be. (There is also the 
possibility that such legislation could be construed as 
unconstitutional.) 
7.4.1 RECOMMENDATION ONE: TRANSFERABLE AllOWANCES 
The introduction of an allowance granted to a married couple 
and which could then be transferable between the spouses,when 
not utilised by the first spouse, was suggested by the Margo 
Cononission at the same time· as separate taxation for spouses 
was suggested (Paragraph 5.4.2). 
7.4.1.1 The nature of the recommendation 
Although a transferable allowance can take many forms and be 
subject to many limitations, the simplest way to introduce a 
transferable tax benefit to one-breadwinner couples would be 
to allow the primary rebate of the one spouse to be 
transferred to the other spouse, if it is not utilised in full 
by the first spouse. The rebate given to married persons 
(husband) at this stage is R2 225 and to married women (wife) 
is R900 (legislation in force from 1993 to 1995). 
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The 0:100 combination of income for married people would be 
the biggest gainer as the wife would be able to deduct the 
R2 225 allowed to her husband as a primary rebate. This would 
apply when the husband has no taxable income in the Republic 
but at least RIO 000 gross income from non-Republic sources. 
This group was most discriminated against under the 
legislation governing the 1993, 1994 and 1995 years of 
assessment. The 100:0 combination would also gain but only to 
a maximum of R900 - the primary rebate of the wife not 
utilising it. The married couple with only one breadwinner 
would, however, have the benefit of R900 plus R2 225, as for 
all other income combinations for spouses. Herein lies the 
equity. Provision of relief for the ·single breadwinner is 
necessary and the transferability of the primary rebates is a 
small but real compensation. Previously, when the wife's 
income was taxed in her husband's hands, the primary rebate 
was only available to the husband on the joint income of the 
spouses but in this way it will be available for deduction 
from the couple's tax. 
A comparison between the tax provisions for the tax years 1993 
to 1995 and Recommendation One concerning the tax thresholds 
and the taxes payable would give an indication of the impact 
of Recommendation One on the different taxes. 
With reference to the table below, all the thresholds for the 
married couple are the same except for the 20:80 and 0:100 
combinations and these thresholds are only Rl 000 below the 
others. This indicates horizontal equity, at least in the tax 
thresholds, which was not the case previously. 
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COMPARISON OF TAX THRESHOlDS 1993/94/95 AND RECOMMENDATION ONE 
Unmarried person/income 
combination married couple 1993/94/95 Recommendation one 
R R 
Unmarried person 11 000 11 000 
Married couple:IOO:O 13 000 18 000 
80:20 16 000 18 000 
70:30 18 000 18 000 
60:40 14 000 18 000 
50:50 11 000 18 000 
40:60 9 000 18 000 
30:70 8 000 18 000 
20:80 7 000 17 000 
0:100 6 000 17 000 
(Extracted from Appendix I-1) 
TAXES PAYABlE BY MARRIED COUPlE 1993-95 AND RECOMMENDATION ONE 
Taxable income 80:20 50:50 0:100 
married couple 1993-95 Rec 1 1993-95 Rec 1 1993-95 Rec 1 
R R R R R R R 
10 000 Nil Nil Nil Nil 900 Ni 1 
15 000 Nil Nil 425 Nil 1 950 Nil 
20 000 675 455 900 425 3 150 925 
30 000 2 455 2 455 2 425 2 425 5 950 3 725 
50 000 7 275 7 275 7 075 7 075 13 350 11 125 
100 000 25 625 25 625 23 325 23 325 33 350 31 125 
150 000 45 625 45 625 43 725 43 725 53 350 51 125 
200 000 66 425 66 425 64 425 64 425 73 350 71 125 
(Extracted from Appendix I-1) 
It is clear from the above table that Recommendation One only 
lowers the taxes of the lower income couples. In the case of 
higher income couples (usually where the second spouse also 
earns more than the RIO 000 gross income required for 
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aggregation), the taxes payable are identical to those for the 
1993 to 1995 years of assessment. 
7.4.1.2 Disadvantages of the recommendation 
The practical problems associated with this recommendation 
concerned limiting abuse and identifying the spouses that 
could use this benefit, without placing undue stress on the 
already strained administrative resources of Inland Revenue. 
Another negative factor might be the possible cost to the 
State if this recommendation is implemented. 
The spouses should be identified in the same way as they are 
identified in the United Kingdom. There spouses have to apply 
for the transferable allowance. The spouses would then 
already have calculated their respective taxable incomes and 
·the extent to which they would utilize their own rebates. When 
they submit their tax forms (together), they should request 
the transferability of their rebates. This will eliminate 
unnecessary handling of the returns of spouses who utilize 
their own rebates to the full. 
Robinson and Stark (1988:48), however, considered these 
allowances in the United Kingdom to be a nsubstantial tax 
expenditure which is poorly targeted•. In the United Kingdom 
transferable allowances meant that the wife and the husband 
were entitled to npersonal allowances• equal to that of a 
single taxpayer. There they can claim an additional married 
couple's allowance which could be transferred between the 
spouses - a single person would only have the one allowance -
amounting to £2 605 in 1989, whereas a one-breadwinner couple 
would have the £2 605 and the married couple's allowance of 
£1 490 while the two-breadwinner couple would be entitled to 
twice the £2 605 and the £1 490 married couple's allowance. 
They felt that two-breadwinner couples (who needed it the 
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least as both spouses are earning income) were favoured, 
whereas the tax relief should rather have targeted couples 
with children. Transferability of primary rebates in South 
Africa would not give rise to these same distortions as no 
additional married couple's allowances apply in South Africa. 
Moreover, it is the higher rebate for a married person - as a 
remnant from the days of the single breadwinner - that should 
be transferable to the wife if the husband does not utilise it 
in full, or the wife's rebate should be available to the 
husband who (as· a married person), was taxed at lower tax 
rates, to provide equity for the one-breadwinner couples. 
This allowance would only be available to people who are 
considered to be 'married' in terms of the Income Tax Act and, 
as such, is not an ideal solution as it would not provide for 
any single parents or for other single-breadwinners mentioned 
above. The reason for this is to prevent abuse and it would 
not be practically possible to apply it to people who could 
not be identified as married as there would be no proof of 
this. Married persons would be identified in the way that 
Inland Revenue has always done so. 
The single parent was taxed at the married person's rates and 
had the higher primary rebate. This concession should, 
however, be available to those parents who physically raise 
and provide for their children (refer to paragraph 7.4.2.1), 
whereas both divorced parents were taxed as married persons. 
The allowance should not be phased out with higher incomes as 
this recommendation alleviates horizontal inequity and not 
vertical inequity. Progressive rates would still provide the 
vertical equity and the amount becomes less and less material 
the higher the taxpayer's income. 
It is not entirely fair that the 'breadwinner' married woman 
would now get an additional R2 225 rebate, whereas the 
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breadwinner married man only gets the R900, as the wife's 
maximum marginal rate is lower than that of the married 
person. The marginal rates, however, should gradually be 
adjusted to provide the equity sought and to comply with the 
requirements of the constitution as already suggested by the 
Katz Commission. The tax relief is considered to be for the 
family and not only for the specific taxpayer. This would 
provide the most effective relief to lower-income taxpayers. 
Would taxpayers capitalize on this reform? It is doubtful that 
anyone would legally marry another person to obtain, at most, 
an additional R2 225 rebate. Persons in certain (high) income 
categories, however, might stop working in order for their 
spouses to receive the tax benefit. This, however, is also 
doubtful as such a person would then give up the monthly 
benefit of a large salary cheque in expectation of their 
spouse receiving a very small benefit and that only some time 
later as this advantage could only be claimed when submitting 
a tax return. 
Another problem would arise for married couples who are paying 
Standard Income Tax on Employees (SITE) as a final tax and 
therefore not submitting a tax return. This would counteract 
this advantage of SITE, but the couple could still submit tax 
returns and apply for the transferability of rebates. This 
would, however, involve additional administrative work for the 
Department of Inland Revenue. 
What would it cost Inland Revenue to implement this 
recommendation? As it was not possible to determine exactly 
how many one-breadwinner couples and single breadwinners were 
included in the statistics of married persons or how many of 
these married persons had wives earning taxable income, it was 
assumed that all the married women had husbands who earned 
enough for them to be able to utilize their own rebates. This 
would mean that there were approximately 2 107 170 married 
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persons (Refer Appendix E-2) who did not have a working spouse 
who was liable for tax. This number should be reduced by the 
number of widows and widowers who did not have any dependent 
children and then multiplied by R900, which is the only 
additional rebate available to them. This would mean a cost to 
the State of approximately Rl,9 billion. Although a 
substantial loss of revenue, it amounts to only 5 per cent of 
the total tax collections from individuals in 1994. While it 
is also improbable that all the other married persons would 
qualify, this rough estimate should cover the R2 225 available 
to the qualifying married women. It was not possible to 
determine how many married women would be able to utilize the 
R2 225, as statistics were not available of married women with 
non-taxpaying husbands who do not have gross income in excess 
of RIO 000. 
The biggest disadvantage of this recommendation, however, is 
that it does not take into account the provisions of the new 
constitution and any repercussions that may arise as a result 
of possible discriminatory references and definitions in the 
Act. 
7.4.1.3 Advantages of the recommendation 
This reform would be most effective in the lower income groups 
where it is needed most. It also raises the thresholds for the 
two categories of one-breadwinner married couples from R6 000 
to Rl7 000 in the 0:100 category and from Rl3 000 to Rl8 000 
in the 100:0 category compared with the taxes payable for the 
1993/94/95 years of assessment (Appendix I-1). This would be 
more equitable as both breadwinners would have almost the same 
tax thresholds. 
As could be expected, the income combinations of the married 
couple, where the wife earns more than the husband, would gain 
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the most from this reform because the rebate which is 
transferred to her is bigger than the R900 rebate she 
transfers to her husband. 
combination's tax threshold 
For this reason the 
would . only increase 
80:20 
by 
approximately R2 000. The tax payable in the case of the 
70:30 combination under this option would be identical to the 
normal taxes payable. (Refer Appendix A-9 and Appendix I-1). 
DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLES. 
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(Extracted from Appendix H-1) 
The graph (above) indicates the difference in tax payable by 
the unmarried person versus the married couple, if the couple 
should be able to transfer their respective rebates to the 
other spouse when not fully used. The biggest change, 
compared with the situation in the . 1993/94/95 years of 
assessment would be that the graphs for the two-breadwinner 
lines are now closer together but still some way removed from 
the taxes payable by the other double-income married couples. 
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This is therefore an improvement, or more equitable, for 
single breadwinners, but they would still pay more tax (and 
substantially more) than other married couples. 
The canons of taxation would be satisfied to a great extent. 
The legislation would be certain, or rather ascertainable, 
when the spouses calculate their joint tax or their respective 
taxes. The Inland Revenue Department may have less certainty, 
as they would only know how 'r11any rebates would be transferable 
when the spouses requested this. Collection costs would 
probably be less economical, as both returns would have to be 
assessed at the same time. Horizontal equity would improve and 
it would not be inconvenient for the taxpayer, as the married 
couple would only need to submit their returns together and 
request transferability. 
The question could be asked whether this would be a 
politically attractive reform. To politicians, it might be an 
acceptable change as they could show that they really care 
about the one-breadwinner family·. This is especially 
necessary as this problem has been with us since the 
introduction of separate taxation and the social security 
. - . . 
system in South Africa is not capable of providing for these 
people. Where both breadwinners in a household are unemployed, 
however, this reform will not provide any relief. This study 
was addressing a tax problem and not poverty relief for the 
underprivileged. 
The recommendation would, with very little change to the 1995 
legislation and with no change to its tax rates and rebates, 
provide a visible attempt by the government to alleviate the 
burden of single-breadwinners and, in time, it could be 
expanded to provide for other non-married breadwinners as 
well. 
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This reform would provide more horizontal equity than was the 
case at the time, at least to single breadwinners in the 
lower income categories, that is, relief on taxable income of 
up to R25 000 for the 80:20 combination, up to R22 000 for the 
60:40 combination, up to R30 000 for the 40:60 combination, up 
to R50 000 for the 30:70 combination and up to R60 000 for the 
20:80 combination. Relief of R2 225 and R900 in tax throughout 
would prevail in the case of the 0:100 combination and the 
100:0 combination respectively (Appendix 1-1). 
This would bring the lines of the graph closer together which 
would mean a move towards horizontal equity. This is the best 
that could be hoped for as perfect equity is known to be 
impossible. 
7.4.2 RECOMMENDATION TWO: MARRIED WOMEN TAXED AS UNMARRIED 
PERSONS 
To provide relief for single breadwinners without compromising 
the equality required by the constitution, references to 
gender should be removed from the Income Tax Act, and 
especially reference to rates and rebates for married women. 
Then the married person rates could be used, but only for 
proven breadwinners with dependants and the unmarried person 
rates could be used for all other taxpayers, without any 
compromising reference to gender. There would be rates for 
breadwinners and rates for nother taxpayersn. The current 
"married person" and •unmarried personn rebates could remain 
or be adjusted to accommodate the cost of the increase in 
rebate from R900 to either Rl 950 or R2 225 for the almost 
700 000 married women. 
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7.4.2.1 Description of nbreadwinnern 
The definition or description of nbreadwinnern should be clear 
and precise to prevent tax avoidance. It should, first and 
foremost, apply to married couples where only one spouse 
provides the income for the couple (and the family) and for 
single parents with dependent children. It should exclude 
widows and widowers except insofar as they qualify in another 
context, that is, if they have dependent children. 
'Breadwinner' should include only those single parents who 
actually provide for their children. In the United Kingdom, 
where an advanced network provides social security payments to 
lower income groups and single parents, 313 000 families 
received the 'family credit' in 1990. Of these, 40 per cent 
were single-parent families, with mainly the mother supporting 
the family (Dilnot and Duncan 1992:1). There were more than 
one million single-parent families in the United Kingdom at 
that stage and the family credit would help the mothers, as 
part-time work is usually the only answer for such parents 
still raising their own children. 
Webb (1993:33) focused his study on the independent income 
available to men and women from labour-market activity and 
from other sources. 
Considering first single women with dependent children, 
there seems every reason to suppose that this group will 
continue to grow in number in the next 10 years. What is 
less clear however is that the long-term decline in the 
rate of labour market participation among lone parents 
will also continue. 
Bingley, Symons and Walker (1994:81,82) concluded that still 
more single mothers would enter the United Kingdom labour 
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market as a result of recent changes to the United Kingdom 
Child Support Act. 
In the United States of America the number of single mothers 
as single parents increased from 11 per cent of total parents 
in 1970 to 22 per cent in 1990. Of these, 53 per cent of the 
mothers were in the labour force in 1990 compared with only 29 
per cent in 1970 (labich 1991:36). 
It is clear that an increasing number of single mothers 
overseas raise their children without any maintenance or 
support from the fathers and the . number of single-parent 
families is increasing. It is assumed that both the number of 
single parent families and the number of single mothers as 
breadwinners are increasing in South Africa as well. It would 
be unfair towards the care-giving parent, and other taxpayers, 
to allow both parents the nbreadwinnern benefit simply because 
they are able to submit birth certificates of their children. 
The mother should be required to convince the Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue that she is the only breadwinner or, 
alternatively, mothers should be assumed to be the 
breadwinner, unless the father can prove his maintenance 
support by submitting both a divorce settlement order and 
physical proof of payments made to or on behalf of the 
children. There should, however, be no discrimination. That 
is, the parent claiming the advantage should have to provide 
proof of payments on behalf of or to the children and not 
merely produce the birth certificate. 
Although each member of a divorced couple frequently provides 
for his or her children, usually the ex-husband's 
contribution is limited to a monthly maintenance amount while 
the other parent physically, and often financially, provides 
for the children. Where the mother does not work and lives on 
the maintenance received from her ex-husband, the husband is 
clearly the breadwinner. 
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The problem arises, however, when both parents work and both 
contribute to the maintenance of the children. In such a case 
the status quo could be maintained, that is, both parents 
could then be considered as breadwinners · on presentation of 
the required proof. 
It is assumed that the automatic allocation of divorced 
parents to the married person category costs the State a 
considerable amount of tax revenue each year and might not be 
properly targeted as there may be some divorced parents who do 
not support their children at all. No statistics on single 
parents were available and the most recent available 
statist.ics on divorces were those for 1992. In 1992 there were 
28 264 divorces among the White, Coloured and Asian population 
groups. Central Statistical Service did not have statistics 
on Black divorces. A total of 36 203 minor children were 
involved in the above-mentioned divorces (Central Statistical 
Service - telephonic confirmation). If it is assumed that each 
divorced couple had minor children, there could then be as 
many as 28 264 people that are taxed as married persons, while 
only one parent is providing for the children. (26 per cent 
of households in South Africa are headed by women (Fair Lady 
1995:62).) 
This figure only related to one year's divorces. The number 
of divorced parents being taxed as married persons, while not 
supporting their children, could be quite significant over 
time. Assuming that a minor child was a tax advantage in the 
sense that it entitled the parent to a child rebate and, as a 
result, to being taxed as a married person until the child was 
(say) 20 years old, and assuming that the average divorce rate 
was 28 000 per annum, then, at any given time, there could be 
as many as 560 000 divorced parents being taxed as married 
persons, while not necessarily providing for their children. 
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Therefore, only married people supporting a spouse (where the 
spouse earns less than a certain amount, for example the 
RIO 000 currently allowed) or single parents actually 
supporting their children, should be considered to be. 
breadwinners. The term breadwinner already excludes certain 
taxpayers who automatically fell into the "married person" 
category but were really unmarried persons, such as widows and 
widowers without dependants. This definition should, in time, 
be broadened to include all breadwinners, such as taxpayers 
who also support other family members. 
Having two taxpayer categories, one for breadwinners and one 
for other taxpayers, would automatically remove the problems 
of gender discrimination in terms of the constitution from the 
Act. Breadwinners are determined in a non-discriminatory 
manner and tax relief for them would remove the horizontal 
inequities presently existing against them. The disadvantage 
of this system might lie in the proof required in order to be 
classified as a breadwinner. But then, the Receiver of 
Revenue's offices did not appear to have any problems with the 
proof required to be classified as a married person and it is 
assumed that the matter could also be solved in a similar 
fashion. 
The onus is on the taxpayer to make full and accurate 
disclosure of relevant matters and failure to do so could 
involve substantial tax penalties (Sections 75, 76 and 104 of 
the Act). It would not be necessary to physically submit 
relevant receipts or proof, but taxpayers would have to retain 
these for the prescribed retention period. 
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7.4.2.2 The nature of the recommendation 
Married couples with two breadwinners (both earning gross 
income in excess of RIO 000) would fall into the category of 
Rother taxpayersn and both husband and wife would then be 
taxed at "unmarried personR rates. Sole breadwinners would 
then be taxed at RbreadwinnerR rates, the rates used for 
married persons until the I995 year of assessment. 
The option to aggregate should be retained for married couples 
where one spouse earns gross income of less than RIO 000 or 
another inflation-linked limit. Aggregation may not always be 
to the couple's advantage. The option should be available to 
both the husband and the wife, if the other spouse earns less 
than the limit and not just if the husband earns the lower 
amount, as was the case in the past. They should request 
aggregation when they submit their tax returns. Their returns 
would then have to be submitted together, as in the case of 
Recommendation One (paragraph 7.4.I.I) in order to facilitate 
administrative difficulties. The married couple's joint tax 
·would then be calculated at nbreadwinner• tax rates. 
It should be noted that taxes payable by the unmarried person 
and the married person as breadwinner (IOO:O combination) 
remain the same under Recommendation Two. The breadwinner 
does not pay less tax but equity lies in the fact that the 
comparative taxes are different for the other combinations. 
A comparison of the differences in the tax thresholds and the 
taxes payable between the legislation for the I993 to I995 
years of assessment and Recommendation Two should illustrate 
the effect of the recommendation on the taxes payable and show 
that there is more equity in the tax thresholds in terms of 
Recommendation Two than in the tax thresholds of the 
legislation for I993 to I995. 
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COMPARISON OF TAX THRESHOLDS 1993/94/95 AND RECOMMENDATION TWO 
Unmarried ~erson/income 
combination married cou~le 1993/94/95 Recommendation Two 
R R 
Unmarried person 11 000 11 000 
Married couple:100:0 13 000 13 000 
80:20 16 000 13 000 
70:30 18 000 13 000 
60:40 14 000 13 000 
50:50 11 000 13 000 
40:60 9 000 13 000 
30:70 8 000 13 000 
20:80 7 000 14 000 
0:100 6 000 13 000 
(Extracted from A~~endix I-2) 
Although the thresholds were higher where the husband earned 
most of the couple's income (R16 000 and R7 000 for the 80:20 
and 20:80 combinations respectively), under Recommendation Two 
the couple would start paying tax on R13 000 taxable joint 
income for most income combinations. The 20:80 combination 
gains the most as here the threshold is R14 000. 
A detailed comparison of the 1993-1995 taxes payable by the 
married couple and the taxes payable according to 
Recommendation Two is found in A~~endix 1-2. The table below 
merely illustrates the actual effect of Recommendation Two on 
taxes payable by the married couple. As can be seen from the 
table, Recommendation Two would result in higher taxes for the 
married couple for most incomes and most income combinations. 
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TAXES PAYABLE BY MARRIED COUPLE I993-95 AND RECOMMENDATION TWO 
Taxable income 80:20 50:50 O:IOO 
married couple I993-95 Rec 2 I993-95 Rec 2 I993-95 Rec 2 
R R R R R R R 
IO 000 
I5 000 
20 000 
30 000 
50 000 
IOO 000 
I50 000 
200 000 
Nil Nil 
Ni 1 475 
675 I 475 
2 455 3 575 
7 275 9 97!) 
Nil Nil 900 
425 475 1 950 
900 I 475 3 I50 
2 425 I 800 5 950 
7 075 7 000 I3 350 
Nil 
475 
I 475 
3 575 
9 975 
25 625 27 540 23 325 25 200 33 350 3I 075 
45 625 47 540 43 725 46 580 53 350 52 575 
66 425 68 340 64 425 68 080 73 350 74 075 
(Extracted from Appendix I-2) 
For the 80:20 combination the increase is large from 
approximately RI3 000 taxable income but on R200 000 the 
increase is only approximately one per cent. The taxes payable 
for the 50:50 combination are higher up to a taxable income of 
approximately R22 000. For the 50:50 combination on R200 000 
the increase is only two per cent. There would be a decrease 
of approximately half a per cent on R200 000 for the O:IOO 
combination. 
The tax rates could be adjusted downwards to accommodate some 
of the increases but it would require the determination of the 
number of breadwinners in order to calculate the cost to the 
State. The comparison of the taxes serves merely to indicate 
the direction of increase or decrease of the tax payable. What 
is important here is that there would be more horizontal 
equity than in I994 and I995. 
7.4.2.3 Advantages of the recommendation 
Married women and married persons with spouses who also earn 
income might feel disadvantaged as they would be taxed at the 
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higher unmarried person rates. The married woman's tax 
thresholds would, however, rise and she would have a higher 
rebate, but the higher maximum marginal rate would apply to 
the higher income. This would seem fair towards both the 
single breadwinners and the unmarried persons. The 
two-breadwinner married couple would still have the advantage 
of splitting their incomes and the wife would have the higher 
rebate of the unmarried person as well. In total the married 
couple's rebates would increase by R775 (2 x Rl 950 = R3 900, 
versus R2 225 + R900 = R3 125}. 
Assuming that all spouses who could aggregate their incomes 
would request aggregation, the differences between the taxes 
payable by the married couple, and the unmarried person would 
give rise to the following graph: 
DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLES 
Breadwinner and 'unmarried person' tax tables 
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It is clear from the graph that not all the couples would 
request aggregation as the joint tax · of certain single-
breadwinner couples is still higher (and often substantially 
100:0 
80:20 
70:30 
60:40 
50:50 
40:60 
30:70 
20:80 
0:100 
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higher) than for double-breadwinner couples, when compared 
with single taxpayers. There is, however, equity in the 
treatment of single breadwinners as Recommendation Two does 
not discriminate between the spouses who earn the income (the 
100:0 and 0:100 combination married couples pay the same tax). 
It is expected that the cost of implementing this reform would 
be minimal as a great number of married persons would now pay 
more tax to make up for what the State loses from the lower-
income married women. 
The onus would be on breadwinner taxpayers to prove that they 
are indeed breadwinners, on the same basis as in paragraph 
7.4.1. This could affect the certainty of the taxpayer (as the 
Receiver of Revenue could always query the return), but as 
long as a taxpayer fell within the parameters for breadwinners 
set by the Act, he or she would be a breadwinner. Certainty 
for the Receiver of Revenue, however, is more difficult to 
determine as there do not appear to be firm statistics on the 
number of breadwinners. The Receiver of Revenue would not be 
able to calculate a reliable cost for implementing this 
recommendation. The way to collect and submit taxes would be 
convenient as the procedures required would remain the same, 
except for submitting proof of breadwinner status. The 
Receiver of Revenue would also only have to deal with two sets 
of rates. 
The biggest advantages of the recommendation are that there 
would be no discrimination on the basis of marital status or 
gender and provision was made for two breadwinners in a 
household. 
It is difficult to see how taxpayers could capitalise on this 
reform and only the breadwinners would "gainn from it. It 
would be to a taxpayer's advantage to prove that he/she is a 
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breadwinner and the definition thereof should be clearcut and 
rigorously monitored. 
7.4.2.4 Disadvantages of the recommendation 
Recommendation Two might, however, not be politically 
acceptable because, although the plight of one-breadwinner 
families is known, these breadwinners are not as vociferous as 
some other pressure groups and lower-income members of the 
community all consider themselves subjects for aid from the 
State. Furthermore, all the nmarried personsn who would 
become non-breadwinners might feel that they have been treated 
unfairly and they could form a considerable pressure group. 
The removal of widows and widowers without dependants from the 
most advantageous tax classification could also be a sensitive 
issue and this might well prejudice politicians against this 
recommendation. Another disadvantage is that the cost to the 
Fiscus could not be calculated accurately and the uncertainty 
of this might discourage acceptance of the recommendation. 
However, the advantages, namely horizontal equity and 
non-discrimination, make this recommendation acceptable and 
outweigh the cost uncertainty. 
7.4.3 RECOMMENDATION THREE: ALL TAXPAYERS TAXED AT RATES 
SUGGESTED BY THE KATZ COMMISSION WITH A FIXED AllOWANCE 
FOR BREADWINNERS 
The interim report submitted by the Katz Commission contained 
certain proposals regarding the taxation of individuals in 
South Africa. These proposals (discussed in Chapter 6) were 
based in part on the new constitution and on problems 
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perceived in the system. Chapter 6 concluded, however, that 
these proposals too would not provide horizontal equity and 
the Katz Commission did not spell out the provisions for 
single breadwinners. It did mention that their provisions for 
single breadwinners were only to the advantage of lower income 
groups (up to R22 700), but they did not mention specific 
provisions. As the government gave serious consideration to 
recommendations of the Katz Commission and as certain of their 
proposals were incorporated in the 1995 Budget proposals, 
these could not be ignored in a study of this nature. 
The single set of rates proposed would bring equality and 
delete any gender discrimination from the Act. This would be 
a good starting point, but adjustments should be made to 
provide relief (and horizontal equity) to the single 
breadwinners. 
The next recommendation in this study is thus based on the 
single set of tax rates for all individuals proposed by the 
Katz Commission. The taxation payable by single breadwinners 
(as defined in paragraph 7.4.2.1) should, however, be adjusted 
with a further allowance for dependants. 
The adjustment to the taxation payable by single breadwinners 
could take many forms but the following three variations are 
considered to be the most suitable. As a separate set of 
rates would appear to be unconstitutional such an option was 
not considered here. Firstly, a fixed tax-deductible 
allowance could be considered (paragraph 7.4.3), or, secondly, 
an additional rebate could be given in lieu of the allowance 
(paragraph 7.4.4), or thirdly, as was the case with the 
married woman's earnings allowance, there could be a 
percentage reduction in either taxable income or tax payable 
(paragraph 7.4.5). 
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If the recommendations of the Katz Commission are implemented, 
the breadwinner will pay the same tax as all other taxpayers. 
This tax will have to be adjusted by means of an allowance. 
The questions are by how much and how? A tax deductible 
allowance is suggested based on the "cost per person" 
calculated according to the general information on household 
costs supplied by the Central Statistical Services. This 
allowance will be granted once only to persons with dependants 
and not per dependant as it is not the intention to compensate 
the taxpayer for all his or her costs but merely to provide 
the taxpayer with some relief and to place him or her onto a 
more equitable after-tax basis with taxpayers without 
dependants. 
7.4.3.1 Cost per person for necessary living expenses 
The Central Statistical Services published a survey of 
household expenditure, (South Africa 01-11-01, 1990) and the 
following table was extracted from Table 2.5 of this 
publication. 
SUMMARY OF AVEPAGE ANNUAL EXPENDfTURE FOR HOUSEHOLDS 
-------------------------------------------------------------
-·------------------NUMBER OF 
PERSONS 
TOTAL PER FOOD, HOUSING PER CLOTHES PER INCOME PER IF TWO 
EXPENDfTURE PERSON MEDICAL & FUEL PERSON PERSON PEPSON EARNERS 
TAX 
---------- ---------------------------------------------------------
---------------ONE 19340 
TWO 52988 
THREE 52158 
FOUR 57689 
FIVE 44652 
TOTAL AVEPAGE 40707 
AVEPAGEOF: 
FIRST FOUR 182175 
FIRST FIVE 226827 
THREE/FOUR 109847 
19340 7324 7324 762 762. 20327 20327 517~ 26494 19223 9611.5 1706 853 54195 27097.5 17706 17386 19295 6431.666 27097.5 1825 608.3333 52040 17348.65 . 17150 14422 22351 26023 5587.75 2219 554.75 48052 12013 17787 8930.4 18098 24026 3619.6 1787 357.4 45502 9100.4 22751 13203 15596 1582 41774 12461 20887 
18217.5 68193 6819.3 6512 651.2 174620 17462 57817 15121.8' 86291 5752.733 8299 553.2666 220122 14674.8 71020 15692.42 41646 5949.428 4044 577.7142 100096 14299.71 34937 
(Extracted from South Africa, 1990) 
This was a survey of household expenditure but, although the 
household income was given, it was not possible to determine 
which households had more than one breadwinner. 
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For quantification of the allowance only certain cost items 
were considered as necessary expenses, namely food, housing, 
medical expenses and fuel. If the cost per person (for these 
pnecessaryn expenses) is taken, it is clear that large 
discrepancies exist depending on the size of the household. 
The cost, on average, to the one-person household of the above 
'necessary expenses' was R7 324 while the cost to the 
two-person household was R9 611 per person. It is assumed 
that most two-person households also had two breadwinners as 
the income per household is more than double (R54 195 compared 
with R20 327 for the one-person household). The three-person 
household had a lower income and lower expenses and it is 
assumed that these households usually consist of one child and 
two adults, but not always two breadwinners. The three-person 
household only spent an average of R6 431 per person, and the 
four-person household an average of R5 587 per person. The 
average per person for the total pnecessaryp costs for a 
one-person to a four-person household might give a more 
reasonable cost per person. This amounts to R6 819 per person, 
whereas for the one-person to five-person household the 
average is R5 752 per person. The three-person and 
four-person households were considered to be the most 
representative as there are more of these households than any 
other household groups and the average cost per person taken 
over both three and four person households is RS 949 per 
person. It would then be reasonable to take an amount of 
R6 000 per annum to be the cost per person of pnecessaryn 
expenses. 
7.4.3.2 The nature of the recommendation 
An allowance of R6 000 is therefore suggested as a deduction 
from the taxable income of the breadwinner with dependants. 
The tax payable was calculated according to the rates 
306 
recommended by the Katz Commission, but for all breadwinners 
as defined in paragraph 7.4.2.I, an amount of R6 000 was 
deducted from taxable income before calculating the tax. 
(Refer Appendix G-3). Where the second spouse had RIO 000 or 
less gross income the incomes were aggregated and the joint 
income adjusted by the allowance of R6 000. It should be 
noted that the RIO 000 maximum could change as tax rates 
change and it is assumed that the RIO 000 limit was determined 
based on factors such as the cost per dependent spouse in 
conjunction with the differentials in the tax rates between a 
married person and a married woman. With the new tax rates 
proposed by the Katz Commission, the limit could be different 
but without access to the exact number of breadwinners and the 
other information used to calculate this limit, it was kept at 
RIO 000 for the purposes of this calculation. 
The tax thresholds would change as follows for this 
recommendation. Note that the tax thresholds are lower for all 
income tax groups. The Katz Commission did refer to a rebate 
but did not quantify it and therefore it was not taken into 
account here. 
COMPARISON OF TAX THRESHOLDS I993-95 AND RECOMMENDATION THREE 
Unmarried person/income 
combination married couple 
person II 000 
Married couple:IOO:O 
80:20 
70:30 
60:40 
50:50 
40:60 
30:70 
20:80 
O:IOO 
I993/94/95 Recommendation 3 
R R Unmarried 
I 000 
I3 000 7 000 
16 000 7 000 
18 000 7 000 
14 000 7 000 
11 000 7 000 
9 000 7 000 
8 000 7 000 
7 000 7 000 
6 000 7 000 
(Extracted from Appendix 1-3) 
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The difference in threshold between married couples and the 
unmarried taxpayer is as a direct result of the breadwinner 
allowance of R6 000. At the income where. the thresholds apply, 
that is, where the married couple could start paying tax, the 
second spouse earned less than RIO 000, the couple's incomes 
were aggregated and the R6 000 deduction was allowed. 
TAXES PAYABlE: MARRIED COUPlE I993-95 AND RECOMMENDATION THREE 
Taxable income 80:20 I 50:50 O:IOO 
married cougle I993-95 Rec 3 Ig93-95 Rec 3 I993-95 Rec 3 
R R R R R R R 
IO 000 Nil 360 Nil 360 900 360 
IS 000 Nil 8IO 425 8IO I 950 8IO 
20 000 675 I 260 900 I 260 3 ISO I 260 
30 000 2 455 2 I60 2 425 2 700 5 950 2 I60 
so 000 7 275 7 740 7 075 4 500 I3 350 7 740 
IOO 000 25 625 23 400 23 325 I9 800 33 350 27 060 
ISO 000 45 625 40 500 43 725 39 300 53 350 47 880 
200 000 66 425 61 200 64 425 58 800 73 350 68 880 
(Extracted from Aggendix 1-3) 
As the same tax rates are applicable to husband and wife, both 
the IOO:O and the O:IOO.combinations of taxable income for the 
married couple would, under this recommendation, pay the same 
taxes. The same applies to the 80:20 and 20:80 combinations 
and for all the other combinations. It is irrelevant whether 
the husband or the wife earns a certain proportion of their 
joint income as they are both taxed at the same rates. All 
married couples where the second spouse earns RIO 000 or less 
gross income, however, were jointly taxed in the above table, 
although it is possible that not all of the couples would 
choose aggregation. 
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7.4.3.3 Advantages of the recommendation 
The main advantage of this recommendation is that it provides 
both equality and no discrimination on grounds of gender or 
marital status. The RG 000 dependant allowance also attempts 
to provide horizontal equity to the group most discriminated 
against in proposals of the Katz Commission and in previous 
years, namely single breadwinners {or one-breadwinner 
families). 
DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
Tax based on Katz commission proposed rates and dependant allowance 
2000.-------------~-------------------------. 
-2000 
-4000 
-6000 
-8000 
-10000 
-12000 
-14000 
-16000 
40000 80000 120000 160000 200000 
Total taxable income 
-o--- 100:0 
····O··· 80:20 
--<>-- 70:30 
--l:.r- 60:40 
_,,._ .. 50:50 
_ .... _. 40:60 
-- 30:70 
........... 20:80 
-+- 0:100 
{Extracted from Appendix H-3) 
It should be noted from the above graph that finally both 
combinations of husband/wife {that is the 80:20 and 20:80; 
70:30 and 30:70, 60:40 and 40:60 and so forth) pay the same 
tax, irrespective of whether the husband or the wife earn any 
specific proportion of income. This is already a move towards 
greater horizontal equity as the tax of the 70:30 combination 
{for example) of one household could be compared with that of 
another household, with a 30:.70 combination. 
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As it was assumed that all couples, where the second spouse 
earns RIO 000 or less, would choose to aggregate their incomes 
and deduct the R6 000 allowance, this lead to the decrease in 
the difference for the lower income groups and the distortion 
in the graph. Couples should, of course, carefully consider 
aggregation and only choose it when it is to their benefit. 
There would, however, still appear to be too big a difference 
between the taxes payable by double-income married couples 
and by single breadwinners. This is clear from the graph, as 
the graph lines for the double-income married couple are far 
below those of single breadwinners. It does, however, 
represent an attempt to provide some relief for the 
breadwinners, although it might not provide perfect horizontal 
equity. 
This allowance should be reviewed regularly and adjusted for 
inflation and other cost of living expenses where necessary. 
This, together with the rates proposed by the Katz Commission, 
would provide a large measure of equity. 
7.4.3.3 Disadvantages of the recommendation 
According to the Katz Commission, the implementation of the 
single set of rates and the reform of the SITE system would 
cost R1,2 billion. The Commission was prepared to offer an 
additional R0,5 billion for single breadwinners. From the 
married person statistics of the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, approximately 2 million married persons qualify as 
single breadwinners but possibly as many as 500 000 divorced 
parents do not provide for their children and the widows and 
widowers who do not qualify as breadwinners have not been 
deducted. It has also been assumed that all couples who can 
request aggregation would do so. Thus, if approximately 
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1,5 million breadwinners deduct R6 000, and the average 
taxpayer earns R40 000 at a current average rate of 22,5 per 
cent (South Africa 1994:par 8.1.1), it would cost 
approximately R2 billion to implement Recommendation Three. 
The rates could, of course, be adjusted upwards to accommodate 
this allowance. 
The new rates could be considered to be so low that all 
taxpayers (even single breadwinners) would be prepared to pay 
these taxes. Taxpayers continuously make comparisons and 
complaints would certainly ensue from the rates as postulated 
by the Katz Commission, as these only provide relief for 
breadwinners earning an income of up to R22 700. 
As it would be to the benefit of taxpayers to be single or 
sole breadwinners, controls in this respect should be strict. 
Breadwinners should be carefully defined (paragraph 7.4.2.1) 
and they should prove single breadwinner status by submitting 
the relevant documents, such as marriage certificates, proof 
of spouse's income, birth certificates of children and divorce 
settlements (whichever is applicable). The allowance is, 
however, not so large that it would induce people to marry, 
have children or stop the second spouse from working. 
The husband, who was the married person of the double-income 
married couple, would be worst off in terms of tax payable, 
but the rates proposed by the Katz Commission are so low that 
most taxpayers would benefit from the new rates. A rate 
increase should, however, be considered in order to compensate 
for the R6 000 allowance. 
If the proposals of the Katz Commission are accepted by 
government it would be unpopular from the point of view of the 
sole breadwinners and could be considered as a politically 
unattractive move. The dependant/breadwinner allowance would 
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nsweeten the pilln in this respect and provide more horizontal 
equity for taxpayers. 
7.4.4 RECOMMENDATION FOUR: ALL TAXPAYERS TAXED AT RATES 
SUGGESTED BY THE KATZ COMMISSION WITH A REBATE FOR 
BREADWINNERS 
The biggest problem with granting a deductible allowance for 
breadwinners and people with dependants is that an assessed 
loss could be created with these allowances, unless 
specifically prohibited by the Act. These losses could 
represent liabilities for Inland Revenue in the sense that it 
might involve a refund of PAVE overpaid and also additional 
administrative work. 
7.4.4.1 The nature of the recommendation 
A refinement of Recommendation Three would be to provide 
breadwinners with a rebate (which the Katz Commission did not 
specify, but a standard rebate of R2 625 for all taxpayers was 
proposed in the 1995 Budget) instead of the allowance 
suggested in paragraph 7.4.3. This rebate cannot create an 
assessed loss and is deductible from tax payable and not from 
taxable income. Apart from this, the working of 
Recommendation Four would be the same as for Recommendation 
Three. 
The rebate could still be based on the household cost of 
living expenses, as in paragraph 7.4.3.1, but would only be 
available where the taxpayer is paying tax and could not 
create an assessed loss. A rebate was calculated at the 
1994/1995 maximum marginal rate of tax on the R6 000 living 
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expenses, that is 43 per cent of R6 000, namely R2 580 (but 
rounded off to R2 500). 
The cost to Inland Revenue might be more than with the 
previous recommendation, but the administrative burden would 
be more or less the same as regards the auditing of 
breadwinner's claims. Politically it should have the same 
positive effect. It should also not provide a material 
incentive to marry, divorce m· stop working. 
The rebate would have a significant influence on the taxes 
payable and especially on the tax thresholds as it would raise 
these considerably. This would promote vertical equity but 
because the thresholds would differ for the different income 
combinations this would affect horizontal equity negatively. 
COMPARISON OF TAX THRESHOLDS 1993-95 AND RECOMMENDATION FOUR 
Tax unitLincome 
combination married cou~le 1993L94L95 Recommendation 4 
R R 
Unmarried person 11 000 1 000 
Married couple:100:0 13 000 28 000 
80:20 16 000 28 000 
70:30 18 000 28 000 
60:40 14 000 26 000 
50:50 11 000 22 000 
40:60 9 000 26 000 
30:70 8 000 28 000 
20:80 7 000 28 000 
0:100 6 000 28 000 
(Extracted from A~~endix 1-4) 
The biggest difference in thresholds for married couples is 
that between the 50:50 combination and the others. It should 
be noted that the thresholds that are so high are only those 
applicable to single-breadwinners. The double-breadwinners 
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where both spouses earn more than RIO 000 gross income would 
all have a threshold of Rl 000, identical to the unmarried 
person's threshold. Although this represents a large increase 
in the thresholds, it is only applicable to a small proportion 
of taxpayers. 
The high thresholds might indicate that the rebate is too high 
and if the average tax rate on income as specified by the Katz 
Commission (refer paragraph 7.4.3.4} namely 16 per cent, is 
applied to the R6 000 living costs, a rebate of only 
approximately Rl 000 would be indicated. This would, of 
course, lower the tax thresholds correspondingly. 
TAXES PAYABlE BY MARRIED COUPlE 1993-95 AND RECOMMENDATION 
FOUR 
Taxable income 
married couple 
R 
10 000 
15 000 
20 000 
30 000 
50 000 
100 000 
150 000 
200 000 
80:20 
1993-95 Rec 4 
R R 
Nil Nil 
Nil Nil 
675 Nil 
2 455 200 
50:50 
1993-95 Rec 4 
R R 
Nil Nil 
425 Nil 
900 Nil 
2 425 2 700 
0:100 
1993-95 Rec 4 
R R 
900 Nil 
1 950 Nil 
3 150 Nil 
5 950 200 
7 275 7 400 7 075 4 500 13 350 7 400 
25 625 23 400 23 325 19 800 33 350 26 900 
45 625 40 500 43 725 39 300 53 350 47 900 
66 425 61 200 64 425 58 800 73 350 68 900 
(Extracted from Appendix 1-4} 
It should be noted from the table above that, although 
thresholds for breadwinners are higher than in Recommendation 
Three, the taxes payable on the higher incomes are almost the 
same as for the previous recommendation. The reason for this 
is because the maximum marginal rate was applied to the 
allowance (Appendices G-3 and G-4). It should also be noted 
that, with the exception of the 50:50 combination, the taxes 
payable by the other combinations (Appendix G-4) are more or 
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less the same for the same joint taxable incomes. This 
implies greater horizontal equity. 
The IOO:O and O:IOO income combinations still pay the most tax 
of all the married couple groups: R68 900 on R200 000 
compared with R6I 200 for the 80:20/20:80 combinations and 
more than RIO 000 {5 per cent of taxable income) more tax than 
that payable by the 50:50 income combination. On a taxable 
income of RIOO 000 the difference in tax payable between the 
50:50 and the IOO:O/O:IOO combinations is R7 IOO (7 per cent 
more tax payable by single breadwinners), on taxable income of 
R50 000 the difference is 5,8 per cent, but the taxes payable 
by the IOO:O/O:IOO and the 80:20/20:80 combinations are the 
same from a taxable income in excess of R50 000 (Appendices 
G-4, 1-4). 
7.4.4.2 Disadvantages of the recommendation 
There are still differences in tax payable between the various 
income combinations, as noted above. 
The other disadvantages are the same as for the previous 
recommendation, namely the fact that married couples where one 
spouse earns RIO 000 or less gross income can choose to 
aggregate their income and so cause administrative problems 
for Inland Revenue. The cost to the Fiscus of the rebate and 
loss of certainty for Inland Revenue rel~ting to budgeted 
income are further disadvantages. The cost of the rebate for 
the approximately I,5 million married persons would be 
R3,7 billion {I,5 million taxpayers at R2 500), which is a 
material amount and considerably more than for Recommendation 
Three. 
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7.4.4.3 Advantages of the recommendation 
The graph clearly shows the impact of Recommendation Four on 
the horizontal equity of the taxation of individuals. It is 
almost identical to the graph of Recommendation Three. There 
is still a considerable difference between the graph lines of 
the single-breadwinners {which do, however, coincide) and the 
double-breadwinner categories. It represents a definite 
improvement on the rates proposed by the Katz Commission 
without any provision for single-breadwinners, as their 
incomes would then have been taxed in the same way as for the 
unmarried taxpayer. The double-breadwinner graph lines 
coincide for the same combinations {80:20/20:80, 70:30/30:70, 
et cetera) which denotes an improvement in horizontal equity. 
All these graph lines are also close together. 
DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
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(Extracted from Appendix H-4) 
The zero difference for the 60:40/40:60 and 50:50 combinations 
occurs for taxable incomes on the tax thresholds and also at 
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the points where the rebate is no longer applicable, that is 
where the second spouse's earnings are more than RIO 000 and 
the couple is no longer jointly taxed. 
Inland Revenue would also have less administrative work with 
this recommendation than in the case of Recommendation Three 
as the rebates could not cause a loss that has to be carried 
forward. The system would be relatively simple and economical 
to implement and there would be certainty for both taxpayers 
and tax collectors. Taxpayers would not necessarily capitalise 
on this reform as doing so would not provide such a great 
advantage (for the same reasons as for Recommendation Three). 
Politically, it would also be attractive as politicians could 
show that they care about the breadwinners. 
7.4.5 RECOMMENDATION FIVE: ALL TAXPAYERS TAXED AT THE RATES 
SUGGESTED BY THE KATZ COMMISSION BUT WITH A 
PROPORTIONAL ALLOWANCE FOR BREADWINNERS 
7.4.5.1 Nature of the recommendation 
The previous two recommendations, although based on rates 
proposed by the Katz Commission, made provision for single 
breadwinners by either a fixed allowance or a fixed rebate. 
This was clearly visible in an almost horizontal graph line 
for the single breadwinners on the graphs. To bring the 
single-breadwinner line closer to the lines of the double 
breadwinners would be more equitable towards single 
breadwinners and would require the granting of a proportional 
allowance to them. 
An allowance to breadwinners based on a percentage of the 
breadwinner's taxable (joint) income would appear to provide 
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the most equity. The question is what percentage to use? With 
reference to Chapter 3 and the 20 per cent differential set 
there between unmarried persons and people with dependants 
(United States of America), and the 20 per cent married 
woman's earnings allowance provided in South Africa in 1987, a 
20 per cent deduction from taxable income was taken to be the 
•breadwinner's allowance• for Recommendation Five. 
A pure 20 per cent allowance would, however, discriminate 
against the lower income breadwinners and the R6 000 living 
costs, as defined in paragraph 7.4.3.1, would still be a 
minimum requirement. The allowance for Recommendation Five is 
thus: 20 per cent of the breadwinner's taxable income or 
R6 000, whichever is the greater. •Breadwinner• would still 
be defined according to the definition in paragraph 7.4.2.1. 
Breadwinners would have to submit proof of their qualification 
as such, request breadwinner status and submit the second 
spouse's income tax return together with their own. On 
assessment, the allowance would then be deducted from their 
taxable incomes. 
COMPARISON OF TAX THRESHOLDS 1993-95 AND RECOMMENDATION FIVE 
Unmarried ~ersonLincome 1993L94L95 Recommendation 5 
combination married cou~le R R 
Unmarried person 11 000 1 000 
Married couple:100:0 13 000 7 000 
80:20 16 000 7 000 
70:30 18 000 7 000 
60:40 14 000 7 000 
50:50 11 000 7 000 
40:60 9 000 7 000 
30:70 8 000 7 000 
20:80 7 000 7 000 
0:100 6 000 7 000 
(Extracted from A~~endix I-5) 
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The thresholds are the same as for the R6 000 fixed allowance 
for breadwinners in Recommendation Three. This is horizontally 
more equitable as all the thresholds are the same. 
For the lower income groups this would appear to be a more 
onerous tax than previously, but it must be remembered that 
the Katz Commission referred to a rebate designed to phase in 
taxes on taxable incomes up to R22 700. 
TAX PAYABLE BY MARRIED COUPLE 1993-95 AND RECOMMENDATION FIVE 
Taxable income 80:20 
married couple 1993-95 Rec 5 
R R R 
10 000 Nil 360 
15 000 Nil 810 
20 000 675 1 260 
30 000 
50 000 
100 000 
150 000 
200 000 
2 455 2 160 
7 275 6 300 
25 625 23 400 
45 625 40 500 
66 425 61 200 
50:50 
1993-95 Rec 5 
R R 
Nil 360 
425 810 
1 260 
2 700 
0:100 
1993-95 Rec 5 
R R 
900 
1 950 
3 150 
5 950 
900 
2 425 
7 075 4 500 13 350 
360 
810 
1 260 
2 160 
6 300 
23 325 19 800 33 350 21 600 
43 725 39 300 53 350 37 800 
64 425 58 800 73 350 54 600 
(Extracted from Appendix I-5) 
The taxes are lower than in the 1993 to 1995 years of 
assessment from taxable incomes of R19 000 (100:0 
combination), R28 000 (80:20 and 70:30), R34 000 (60:40 and 
50:50), R32 000 (40:60), R11 000 (30:70), R8 000 (20:80) and 
for the 0:100 combination the tax payable is less from the 
first rand of taxable income (refer Appendix I-5). There is 
also a definite improvement in the taxes payable by the 
married woman as breadwinner, by the married person/husband as 
breadwinner and by the other double breadwinners, as seen from 
the table summarised above. 
,, 
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7.4.5.2 Disadvantages of the recommendation 
The biggest disadvantage would be the cost to the Fiscus~ as 
this recommendation would be more expensive than the previous 
two. 
Referring to Appendix E-2, if it is assumed that for all the 
married women there is a married person paying tax (even 
though she could have a non-taxpaying husband and she did not 
elect to be taxed as a married person)~ then the percentage of 
married persons with a spouse (married woman) would be 
approximately 25 per cent. That means that approximately 75 
per cent of married persons would be able to claim the 20 per 
cent allowance. That is, approximately 2,097 million married 
persons minus approximately 500 000 divorced persons who 
should not claim a breadwinner allowance, is equal to 
1,597 million married persons (that is, 57 per cent of the 
total of all married persons) who would be entitled to the 
allowance. A 20 per cent breadwinner allowance on 57 per cent 
of the total tax collected from married persons would be 
R2,92 billion which could be granted as a breadwinner 
allowance. 
The above is a very broad estimate and it rests upon the 
assumption that all married women have spouses (married 
persons) paying tax, which might not be the case. The number 
of divorced persons not being able to claim the allowance is 
an estimate (see paragraph 7.4.2.1). The number of widows and 
widowers not able to claim the allowance has not been 
deducted, as it was not possible to estimate this number. 
Another disadvantage of this recommendation might be the 
resistance to it by other taxpayers. It is clear from the 
above tables that the breadwinners would have a considerable 
tax advantage over other taxpayers and there is the 
possibility that the low tax rates might have to be increased 
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to pay for these allowances. This might mean that this 
recommendation would not be such an attractive reform 
politically. 
This recommendation might also encourage taxpayers to 
capitalize on it as it would be increasingly attractive to be 
considered a breadwinner. Married couples with dependent 
children and with both spouses earning income, might find it 
advantageous to divorce so that the spouse earning the biggest 
income of the two could be considered the breadwinner and 
claim the allowance. The other spouse would not be affected 
as the tax rates are fixed. The 20 per cent "tax-free" income 
might also mean that a spouse, who does not earn that much, 
might stop working altogether so that the other spouse could 
be considered the breadwinner and claim the allowance. 
7.4.5.3 Advantages of the recommendation 
DIFFERENCE IN TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
Katz Commission proposed rates and 20% dependant allowance 
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This reform would come closest to providing horizontal equity 
for the married couple. It would be the ideal solution as it 
would almost amount to two different sets of rates. 
The tax payable by the breadwinner categories (100:0 and 
0:100) are now close to the tax payable by the other 
double-earner groups. From the above graph, it is clear that 
all the married couple graph lines are close together and are 
all moving in the same direction. Up to a taxable income of 
approximately Rl20 000 the single-breadwinner graph lines are 
almost midway between the other lines, but thereafter the 
single breadwinners pay the least tax of all the tax groups. 
The percentage of the allowance might even be decreased or 
phased out from here as this would bring the single 
breadwinner line closer to the lines of the other married 
couples and closer still to horizontal equity. This 
recommendation would come the closest to providing horizontal 
equity now that separate taxation has been introduced. 
Horizontal equity is almost the only advantage of 
Recommendation Five, but it represents such a great 
improvement, that it could be considered reason enough to 
implement this recommendation. 
This study therefore favours Recommendation Five as the best 
solution to the problem of horizontal equity, should the 
recommendations of the Katz Commission be implemented. The 
percentage could be changed and the other factors refined when 
the number of single breadwinners are known or can be 
calculated more accurately, as this would affect the cost to 
the State. 
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7.4.6 FINAl RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the five recommendations made above, it is clear that to 
change the legislation to accommodate certain persons or 
aspects of taxation is not an easy or simple matter. Many 
factors have to be taken into account and the fact that not 
all statistics of taxpayers and their circumstances are known 
makes it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to calculate the 
exact consequences of a recommendation. 
Should the tax rates not have been changed (that is should the 
three sets of tax rates for the married person, unmarried 
person and married woman have remained), Recommendation One 
with the transferable allowances would, as an interim measure, 
bring about more horizontal equity in the short term. The 
three sets of tax rates were, however, contrary to the 
non-discriminatory clause in the constitution and this 
recommendation would, therefore, only be acceptable in the 
short term. 
Recommendation Two would provide two sets of rates which do 
not discriminate on the basis of gender or marital status, but 
which provide breadwinners with a separate set of tax rates 
more favourable than those applicable to other taxpayers. This 
would provide more horizontal equity. If the rates applicable 
to the 1993-1995 years of assessment are used, this is the 
recommendation which would most likely be in line with the 
constitution and still provide horizontal equity for both 
one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. 
The Katz Commission proposed one set of rates for all 
taxpayers. This would comply with the requirements of the 
constitution, but would not make prov1s1on for the 
one-breadwinner family. Although the rates are mostly more 
favourable and most taxpayers would pay less tax in terms of 
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the recommendations of the Katz Commission, the fact remains 
that taxpayers compare their tax burdens, and single 
breadwinners pay more tax, in relation to their 
responsibilities towards their dependants, than other married 
taxpayers. An allowance to them should provide the horizontal 
equity that is lacking. Recommendations Three and Four both 
provide the same deduction in tax in two different 
applications and would be mor·e economical and probably easier 
to implement than Reco~endation Five. The last 
recommendation, however, would provide the most horizontal 
equity. This recommendation, or an adaptation thereof, should 
be considered. 
7.5 OTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
One of the great competitive challenges of the nineties 
will be much closer to home than most global companies 
imagine. With so many moms and th~ir spouses at the 
office, the work force of tomorrow is foremost in the 
minds of ·the work· force of today •... Women. make .up 
almost half the U.S labour pool, and losing their .talents 
to home and hearth is something companies can ill ·afford. 
(Loeb 1991:4) 
The enormous increase in working married women and in working 
married mothers over the last few decades has not only created 
problems with the taxation of these women, but other aspects 
(which could even be considered as social aspects) also have 
implications for taxation. As the number of women returning to 
work after or shortly after the birth of their children 
increased drastically, this meant that the parents had to make 
provision, in a responsible manner, for their children during 
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work hours. This was still considered to be the mother's 
responsibility. 
The increasing economic independence of women has upset 
the traditional marriage exchange in which a wife trades 
her household work for her husband's economic support •.• 
society today draws increasingly on women's paid labor 
while continuing to rely on their unpaid home work. 
(Spitze & South 1986:11} 
Work family conflicts arise because, as women enter paid 
employment, their male partners tend not to assume an 
equitable share of the :unpaid labour of housework, child 
care and home managment. 
(McKeen & Bujaki 1994:29) 
To have horizontal equity clearly does not only mean that 
working women, breadwinners or any other type of taxpayer 
should not be discriminated against, but also that other 
considerations, which are inequitable in the · workplace and 
which could affect the taxation and tax treatment of these 
taxpayers, should also be considered. It is not equitable 
merely to tax married women on a par with other taxpayers. The 
working married couple with children should be placed in a 
similar position to the working married couple without 
children. As determined in Chapter 2, the family is the unit 
for measuring horizontal equity. 
Day care is listed as a women's issue, but it is more 
properly a social issue: if today's children don't get 
emotionally supportive care when their mothers are at 
work, all society will be the ultimate loser •••. The 
root principle of income tax is that a deduction should 
be allowed to the extent that it was incurred to generate 
taxable income. Working mothers (and single fathers} can 
do their jobs only if the home fires are kept burning. 
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Recognizing these costs through tax legislation would do 
more for equality in the workplace than any heavy-handed 
resort to affirmative action. 
(Coxe 1984:218) 
Although South African tax legislation does not, in general, 
grant the deduction of private costs as suggested above, the 
provision for children is an urgent social need and is linked 
to the neccessity for equity (and equality)~ Tax concessions 
for the children of working parents should, therefore, be 
considered. 
Some may contend that provision for children is actually 
contrary to the equality provisions and therefore contrary to 
the constitution, but Kramer (1993:14) noted that in Australia 
different needs meant different treatment to obtain equality. 
Some Australian organisations have acknowledged that a 
situation of [equal employment opportunities] requires 
recognizing that different groups of employees have 
different needs in the workplace. Initiatives 
designed to accommodate workers with family 
responsibilities have been acknowledged by some employers 
as a way of improving organizational performance and 
developing commitment among employees ..•. For instance 
in the Proudfoot case in 1992, it was established that 
different services were required to give men and women 
equal access to appropriate health services. 
In most overseas countries child care enjoys certain financial 
recognition from government and in some instances the 
government provides cash assistance to compensate those 
mothers who did not return to work. In other countries 
assistance takes the form of subsidies or tax allowances for 
work-place nurseries. Help with child care has become 
increasingly important overseas and, as the number of working 
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mothers increases, this should be important in South Africa as 
well. From a social point of view, it is essential that 
children should be well cared for prior to going to school and 
in after-school' care centres. To accomplish this, money is 
needed and private enterprise should be encouraged to 
subsidise such needs. 
The provision for child care can take many forms. In 
Australia, almost 90 000 centres for community child care have 
been established. Fee relief for these centres was introduced, 
and eligibility for such fee relief was extended. Incentives 
were provided to industry to invest in child care for 
employees' children (Kramer 1993:15). 
During 1994, legislation was also introduced in Australia to 
pay a cash grant to the mother who stayed at home to raise her 
children. This provision was made via the social security 
budget. Previously, child-care costs made it possible for the 
husband to claim a dependent-spouse rebate, which was only 
available to one-earner couples (Child care costs 1994 par 
[813], [814]). 
To qualify for the Home Child Care Allowance (HCCA) a person 
had to be married or "living in a marriage-like relationship9 ; 
have a child under 16 or in secondary school; both parent and 
child should live in Australia and earn less than A$250,85 per 
month. The HCCA could be claimed at a maximum rate of A$60 per 
fortnight, that is, A$120 per month. This allowance does not 
depend on the income of the spouse of the person claiming it. 
The allowance is phased out as the income of the spouse 
receiving it increases. It is not linked to the number of 
children and it is paid into a bank, building society or other 
such account (New home child care allowance 1994:[814]). 
A similar allowance in South Africa would solve many problems 
and would ensure that certain children at least are well cared 
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for by their own mothers. Considering the rate of 
unemployment and the number of parents, however, this would be 
a very expensive exercise. Although this is a social security 
payment and not a tax matter, provision for children should 
be considered a priority. 
In the United States of America the Bush Administration 
offered $732 million in block grants to the states for child 
care and also proposed increasing the modest tax credits (the 
maximum was then $1 440) for lower-income parents making use 
of most kinds of day care. Simply increasing the personal 
exemption, or even 8 tapping into their social securityn for up 
to three years per child, was also considered (labich 
1991:37). The big companies in the United States also pledged 
millions to subsidize or to provide for day-care facilities 
for their employees' children (labich 1991:37). 
In the United States of America employers also offer 
dependent/child-care 'flexible spending accounts' which 
provide reimbursement of dependent/child-care expenses 
incurred during the coverage period. The employer witholds 
the contribution every month and the employee is not taxed on 
that portion of his or her earnings. This provision is 
available for children under thirteen years of age or for 
anyone who qualifies as a dependent on the employee's Federal 
Income Tax return (Baxendale et al 1993:278,279). Another 
allowance for Federal Income Tax, the 8 Child-care credit•, 
allows a deduction of expenses incurred for a qualifying child 
or dependent to the extent of 30 per cent of the dependant's 
care expenses incurred by taxpayers earning a certain income. 
It is phased out from $10 000 gross income and the maximum is 
$2 400 for one qualifying individual (Baxendale 1993:279). 
The United States of America has a very sophisticated tax 
system it may not be so easy to implement the allowances they 
grant for child care in South Africa. But the principles of 
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. the different concessions, namely tax-exempt income if used 
for dependants or tax credits for child care, could be 
considered here. 
In the United Kingdom, legislation was introduced in 1990 to 
abolish taxation on workplace nurseries. These creches were 
previously taxed as perks. Trade and industry is now slowly 
following by providing work-place nurseries for their 
employees' children (White 1990:9,10). 
In the UK a company which set up [a work place nursery] 
was intended to meet two aims: assisting women returners 
as part of an equal opportunities package and solving 
some recruitment problems ••• Prior to the provision of 
the nursery, the decision to opt for maternity leave did 
not always lead to a return to work. Although it was 
seen initially as an aid to recruitment, the nursery now 
meets a further need, with the majority of women opting 
for maternity leave returning to work and making use of 
the facility. 
(Daniels 1991:8) 
Strategy for the future for South Africa ranges from giving an 
out-and-out grant to non-working mothers to providing a tax-
deductible allowance in addition to the deduction that would 
be allowed by sections 11 (a), (b) of the Act as incentive to 
industry for providing workplace nurseries. 
A combination of government aid on different levels would be 
the most effective. Some aid to provide the basic needs 
should be given via a social security system to those parents 
who do not work and who have no or very low incomes. 
Employers should also be encouraged to provide day care and 
after-school care facilities for the children of their 
employees by granting a tax-deductible allowance per child for 
centres that meet certain basic health and educational 
329 
requirements. This benefit should not be taxed as a fringe 
benefit in the hands of the parents or only those parents who 
earn above a certain taxable income should be taxed on this 
benefit. Employers could also provide, as part of a salary 
package, aid towards payment of day-care costs and such aid 
should not be taxed as a fringe benefit. For parents who do 
not fall into the first category and who do not have a 
work-place care centre, a tax allowance should be considered 
to aid with the costs of child care. 
A detailed investigation of these possibilities constitutes a 
further research project. 
7.6 FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether horizontal 
equity existed in the taxation of individuals. Horizontal 
equity should take certain of the taxpayer's personal 
circumstances, for example dependants, into account and need 
not necessarily compare the tax loads of the different tax 
units, but rather the tax loads of the different households 
(one-breadwinner versus two-breadwinner households). 
The Margo Commission reviewed the tax situation of individual 
taxpayers in 1984 and 1985 (their findings were published in 
1987) and found various problems with the system of joint 
taxation of married couples. It recommended separate taxation 
of husband and wife but with allowances transferable between 
spouses. 
The years that followed the Margo Commission recommendations 
saw changes to the tax system specifically aimed at reducing 
inequities related to the taxation of married women. 
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This study evaluated these changes on a comparative basis and 
concluded that, although the married woman and two-breadwinner 
couples were not treated horizontally equitably by the tax 
system initially, the eventual separate taxation of married 
couples, and especially the latest recommendations of the Katz 
Commission and 1995 amendments to the Income Tax Act, 
definitely eliminated any inequalities towards these taxpayer 
groups and reduced any inequities. 
This study indicated that the inequities emerging are against 
the one-breadwinner couple. To attain greater horizontal 
equity, provision should be made for families and households 
with one breadwinner only. This must be accomplished by, 
strictly defining nbreadwinnern (to exclude any persons not 
responsible for dependants) and then by identifying such 
households. 
Should the tax units have remained as they were with the 
married person still having the most favourable set of rates, 
the primary allowances should be made transferable between the 
spouses where one spouse is unable to fully utilize the 
allowance, or by taxing the working married woman and her 
spouse at unmarried person rates but taxing the 
one-breadwinner family at the rates for a married person. 
The new constitution requires equality in South Africa. The 
Katz Commission recommended only one set of rates for all 
taxpayers. The amendments to the Income Tax Act proposed this 
equality in 1995. This means that an additional allowance 
will have to be made for taxpayers qualifying as breadwinners. 
This could be done by way of a fixed annual tax-deductible 
allowance, or a rebate based on cost of living expenses of the 
household, or by way of a proportional allowance. 
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This last recommendation would provide the most horizontal 
equity on all levels of income. It would, however, be the 
most expensive to the State. 
As the government is currently moving towards equality, and 
this is most vociferously defended, these suggestions would 
have to be clearly seen as providing equity to the less 
well-off or it might not be politically attractive. 
A further tax reform to provide horizontal equity to 
two-breadwinner couples and to the many single-parent 
families, would be some or other tax allowance for child care. 
This, and the topics discussed below, could form the basis of 
further research. 
Horizontal equity is a very broad concept and the present 
research only considered certain aspects of this. Mathematical 
solutions and equations for measuring horizontal equity in the 
South African context could also be developed. 
The cost of living expenses of households could be quantified 
in more detail and could be used with a study of the number of 
single parents in South Africa to develop taxation allowances 
to aid single parents. 
The possibilities of aid for child care through the tax 
system, which has been a fruitful field of study overseas, has 
not been addressed in South Africa and is worthy of 
investigation. The State should provide child care in various 
ways by granting subsidies or providing a tax deduction to 
employers who provide child care or exempt from tax, as a 
fringe benefit, the value of the child-care assistance. 
The expansion of the definition of breadwinner could also be 
studied in greater detail than for the purposes of the 
recommendations made in this study. 
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Equity is one of the most basic canons of taxation and the 
most basic constitutional requirement. Striving for horizontal 
equity is very important in tax reform and, in conjunction 
with vertical equity, should always be an aim of legislators 
as this provides fairness in taxation. 
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APPENDIX A -1 
---------
TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 1985 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
------------------------------------------------------- _..-- ----------------------- .. 
1985 INDIV FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX 
===:::::===== = = = = = == = = = = = =-= = = = = = ========:========== = = = = = = = = = = = = ================== = = = = = = 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 61.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 205.2 74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 349.2 194 50 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
7,000 493.2 314 146 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
8,000 637.2 434 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
9,000 800.4 568 . 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 
10,000 987.6 722 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
11,000 1198.8 896 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 
12,000 1434 1090 788 788 788 788 788 788 788 788 
13,000 1693.2 1304 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 
14,000 1976.4 1538 1172 1172 1172 1172 1172 1172 1172 1172 
15,000 2283.6 1792 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 
16,000 2614.8 2066 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 
17,000 2970 2360 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 
18,000 3330 2660 2180 2180 2180 2180 2180 2180 2180 2180 
19,000 3709.2 2974 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 
20,000 4093.2 3294 2782 2782 2782 2782 2426 2782 2782 2782 
22,000 4904.4 3968 3424 3424 3424 3424 3424 3424 3424 3424 
24,000 5763.6 4682 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 
26,000 6670.8 5436 4828 4828 4828 4828 4828 4828 4828 4828 
28,000 7626 6230 5590 5590 5590 5590 5590 5590 5590 5590 
30,000 8622 7064 6392 6392 6392 6392 6392 6392 6392 6392 
32,000 9622 7938 7234 7234 7234 7234 7234 7234 7234 7234 
34,000 10622 8852 8116 8116 8116 8116 8116 8116 8116 8116 
36,000 11622 9789 9037 9037 9037 9037 9037 9037 9037 9037 
38,000 12622 10746 9978 9978 9978 9978 9978 9978 9978 9978 
40,000 13622 11723 10939 10939 10939 10,939 10939 10939 10939 10939 
50,000 18622 16720 15920 15920 15920 15920 15920 15920 15920 15920 
60,000 23622 21720 20920 20920 20920 20920 20920 20920 20920 20920 
70,000 28622 26720 25920 25920 25920 25920 25920 25920 25920 25920 
80,000 33622 31720 30920 30920 30920 30920 30920 30920 30920 30920 
90,000 38622 36720 35920 35920 35920 35920 35920 35920 35920 35920 
100,000 43622 41720 40920 40920 40920 40920 40920 40920 40920 40920 
110.000 48622 46720 45920 45920 45920 45920 45920 45920 45920 45920 
120,000 53622 51720 50920 50920 50920 50920 50920 50920 50920 50920 
130,000 58622 56720 55920 55920 55920 55920 55920 55920 55920 55920 
140,000 63622 61720 60920 60920 60920 60920 60920 60920 60920 60920 
150,000 68622 66720 65920 65920 65920 65920 65920 65920 65920 65920 
160,000 73622 71720 70920 70920 70920 70920 70920 70920 70920 70920 
170,000 78622 76720 75920 75920 75920 75920 75920 75920 75920 75920 
180,000 83622 81720 80920 80920 80920 80920 80920 80920 80920 80920 
190,000 88622 86720 85920 85920 85920 85920 85920 85920 85920 85920 
200,000 93622 91720 90920 90920 90920 90920 90920 90920 90920 90920 
APPENDIX A-2 
----------
TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
-------------- ------- .. -------------------------------------------------------------
1986 INDIV. FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX 
========= = = == = = == = = = = = == = = = = = =====:=====;::==============:::;: = = = == = = = = = ========::========= 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 79.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 250.31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 421.51 120.84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8,000 592.71 292.04 18.12 18.12 18.12 18.12 18.12 18.12 18.12 18.12 
9,000 763.91 463.24 189.32 1'89.32 189.32 189.32 189.32 189.32 189.32 189.32 
10,000 935.11 634.44 360.52 360.52 360.52 360.52 360.52 360.52 360.52 360.52 
11,000 1123.43 805.64 531.72 531.72 531.72 531.72 531.72 531.72 531.72 531.72 
12,000 1333.15 976.84 702.92 702.92 702.92 702.92 702.92 702.92 702.92 702.92 
13,000 1564.27 1163.02 874.12 874.12 874.12 874.12 874.12 874.12 874.12 874.12 
14,000 1816.79 1370.6 1047.46 1047.46 1047.46 1047.46 1047.46 1047.46 1047.46 1047.46 
15,000 2090.71 1599.58 1242.2 1242.2 1242.2 1242.2 1242.2 1242.2 1242.2 1242.2 
16,000 2368.91 1849.96 1458.34 1458.34 1458.34 1458.34 1458.34 1458.34 1458.34 1458.34 
17,000 2702.75 2121.74 1695.88 1695.88 1695.88 1695.88 1695.88 1695.88 1695.88 1695.88 
18,000 3023.75 2399.94 1954.82 1954.82 1954.82 1954.82 1954.82 1954.82 1954.82 1954.82 
19,000 3361.87 2693.12 2233.02 2233.02 2233.02 2233.02 2233.02 2233.02 2233.02 2233.02 
20,000 3704.27 2992.72 2513.36 2513.36 2513.36 2513.36 2513.36 2513.36 2513.36 2513.36 
22,000 4427.59 3628.3 3114.7 3114.7 3114.7 3114.7 3114.7 3114.7 3114.7 3114.7 
24,000 5193.71 4306.68 3758.84 3758.84 3758.84 3758.84 3758.84 3758.84 3758.84 3758.84 
26,000 6002.63 5027.86 4445.78 4445.78 4445.78 4445.78 4445.78 4445.78 4445.78 4445.78 
28,000 6854.35 5791.84 5175.52 5175.52 5175.52 5175.52 5175.52 5175.52 5175.52 5175.52 
30,000 7748.87 6598.62 5948.06 5948.06 5948.06 5948.06 5948.06 5948.06 5948.06 5948.06 
32,000 8686.19 7448.2 6763.4 6763.4 6763.4 6763.4 6763.4 6763.4 6763.4 6763.4 
34,000 9647.05 8340.58 7621.54 7621.54 7621.54 7621.54 7621.54 7621.54 7621.54 7621.54 
36,000 10629.31 9257.57 8521.41 8521.41 8521.41 8521.41 8521.41 8521.41 8521.41 8521.41 
38,000 11632.97 10195.96 9442.68 9442.68 9442.68 9442.68 9442.68 9442.68 9442.68 9442.68 
40,000 12658.03 11155.75 10385.35 10385.35 10385.35 10385.35 10385.35 10385.35 10385.35 10385.35 
50,000 17982.35 16074.54 15287.02 15287.02 15287.02 15287.02 15287.02 15287.02 15287.02 15287.02 
60,000 23332.35 21204.12 20382.36 20382.36 20382.36 20382.36 20382.36 20382.36 20382.36 20382.36 
70,000 28682.35 26547.7 25691.7 25691.7 25691.7 25691.7 25691.7 25691.7 25691.7 25691.7 
80,000 34032.35 31897.7 31041.7 31041.7 31041.7 31041.7 31041.7 31041.7 31041.7 31041.7 
90,000 39382.35 37247.7 36391.7 36391.7 36391.7 36391.7 36391.7 36391.7 36391.7 36391.7 
100,000 44732.35 42597.7 41741.7 41741.7 41741.7 41741.7 41741.7 41741.7 41741.7 41741.7 
110,000 50082.35 47947.7 47091.7 47091.7 47091.7 47091.7 47091.7 47091.7 47091.7 47091.7 
120,000 55432.35 53297.7 52441.7 52441.7 52441.7 52441.7 52441.7 52441.7 52441.7 52441.7 
130,000 60782.35 58647.7 57791.7 57791.7 57791.7 57791.7 57791.7 57791.7 57791.7 57791.7 
140,000 66132.35 63997.7 63141.7 63141.7 63141.7 63141.7 63141.7 63141.7 63141.7 63141.7 
150,000 71482.35 69347.7 68491.7 68491.7 68491.7 68491.7 68491.7 68491.7 68491.7 68491.7 
160,000 76832.35 74697.7 73841.7 73841.7 73841.7 73841.7 73841.7 73841.7 73841.7 73841.7 
170,000 82182.35 80047.7 79191.7 79191.7 79191.7 79191.7 79191.7 79191.7 79191.7 79191.7 
180,000 87532.35 85397.7 84541.7 84541.7 84541.7 84541.7 84541.7 84541.7 84541.7 84541.7 
190,000 92882.35 90747.7 89891.7 89891.7 89891.7 89891.7 89891.7 89891.7 89891.7 89891.7 
200,000 98232.35 96097.7 95241.7 95241.7 95241.7 95241.7 95241.7 95241.7 95241.7 95241.7 
--- -----
TAXESPAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON ANC MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME SINGLE 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
--------------------- .. _ ""-- --------------------~-------------------------------------1987 FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX 
========== :;:: ;::; :== = == = ::::= ====:=====~================================================== 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 116.85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 268.85 1.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 420.85 153.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8,000 572.85 305.9 62.7 32.3 32.3 32.3 32.3 32.3 32.3 32.3 
9,000 724.85 457.9 184.3 184.3 . 184.3 184.3 184.3 184.3 184.3 184.3 
10,000 876.85 609.9 336.3 336.3 336.3 336.3 336.3 336.3 336.3 305.9 
11,000 1044.05 761.9 488.3 488.3 488.3 488.3 488.3 488.3 488.3 427.5 
12.000 1230.25 913.9 640.3 640.3 640.3 640.3 640.3 640.3 622.06 549.1 
13,000 1435.45 1079.2 792.3 792.3 792.3 792.3 792.3 789.26 749.74 670.7 
14,000 1659.65 1263.5 944.3 944.3 944.3 944.3 944.3 919.98 877.42 792.3 
15,000 1902.85 1466.8 1113.4 1113.4 1113.4 1113.4 1113.4 1062.1 1010.8 913.9 
16,000 2165.05 1689.1 1301.5 1301.5 1301.5 1301.5 1278.7 1217.9 1157.1 1045 
17,000 2446.25 1930.4 1508.6 1508.6 1508.6 1508.6 1458.44 1387.38 1316.7 1187.5 
18,000 2731.25 2177.4 1734.7 1734.7 1734.7 1734.7 1652.62 1570.54 1491.88 1341.4 
19,000 3031.45 2437.7 1979.8 1979.8 1979.8 1955.1 1861.24 1767.38 1679.98 1508.6 
20.000 3335.45 2703.7 2226.8 2226.8 2226.8 2177.4 2078.6 1979.8 1881 1689.1 
22,000 3977.65 3268 2756.9 2756.9 2756.9 2650.5 2533.46 2416.42 2299.38 2078.6 
24,000 4657.85 3870.3 3325 3325 3290.8 3154 3017.2 2880.4 2746.26 2490.9 
26,000 5376.05 4510.6 3931.1 3931.1 3845.98 3687.9 3529.82 3371.74 3222.4 2926 
28,000 6132.25 5188.9 4575.2 4575.2 4433.08 4252.2 4071.32 3894.62 3724.38 3383.9 
30,000 6926.45 5905.2 5257.3 5257.3 5052.1 4846.9 4641.7 4446 4252.2 3870.3 
32,000 7758.65 6659.5 6319.4 5934.08 5703.04 5472 5243.62 5024.74 4805.86 4381.4 
34,000 8611.75 7451.8 6735.5 6644.3 6385.9 6127.5 5876.32 5630.84 5385.36 4915.3 
36,000 9483.85 8265.95 7531.6 7387.96 7100.68 6813.4 6537.9 6264.3 5991.84 5472 
38,000 10374.95 9099.1 8347.65 8151.57 7841.11 7531.6 7228.36 6925.12 6629.1 6051.5 
40,000 11285.05 9951.25 9182.7 8931.9 8597.5 8265.95 7939.15 7612.35 7292.2 6659.5 
50,000 16012.25 14318.4 13444.4 13007.4 12570.4 12133.4 11696.4 11259.4 10822.4 9951.25 
60,000 20762.25 18872.7 17778.3 17231.1 16683.9 16136.7 15589.5 15042.3 14495.1 13444.4 
70,000 25512.25 23617 22287 21622 20957 20292 19627 18963.9 18325.5 17048.7 
80,000 30262.25 28367 26847 26087 25327 24567 23807 23047 22287 20767 
90,000 35012.25 33117 31407 30552 29697 28842 27987 27132 26277 24567 
100,000 39762.25 37867 35967 35017 34067 33117 32167 31217 30267 28367 
110,000 44512.25 42617 40527 39482 38437 37392 36347 35302 34257 32167 
120,000 49262.25 47367 45087 43947 42807 41667 40527 39387 38247 35967 
130,000 54012.25 52117 49647 48412 47177 45942 44707 43472 42237 39767 
140,000 58762.25 56867 54207 52877 51547 50217 48887 47557 46227 43567 
150,000 63512.25 61617 58767 57342 55917 54492 53067 51642 50217 47367 
160,000 68262.25 66367 63327 61807 60287 58767 57247 55727 54207 51167 
170,000 73012.25 71117 67887 66272 64657 63042 61427 59812 58197 54967 
180,000 77762.25 75867 72447 70737 69027 67317 65607 63897 62187 58767 
190,000 82512.25 80617 77007 75202 73397 71592 69787 67982 66177 62567 
200,000 87262.25 85367 81567 79667 77767 75867 73967 72067 70167 66367 
TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 1988 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
---------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------
INDIV RNALTX RNALTX RNALTX RNALTX RNALTX RNALTX RNALTX RNALTX RNALTX 
========= = = = = = == = = = = = == = = = = = ================== = = = = = == = = = = = ================== = = = = = = = = 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
195 
345 
495 
645 
795 
953 
1129 
1325 
1541 
1777 
2033 
2309 
2589 
2885 
3185 
3821 
4497 
5213 
5969 
6765 
7601 
8441 
9299 
10159 
11037 
15515 
20015 
24515 
29015 
33515 
38015 
42515 
47015 
51515 
56015 
60515 
65015 
69515 
74015 
78515 
83015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
55 
205 
355 
505 
655 
805 
962 
1136 
1330 
1544 
1778 
2018 
2272 
2532 
3086 
3680 
4314 
4988 
5702 
6456 
7216 
7990 
8790 
9590 
13831 
18228 
22725 
27225 
31725 
36225 
40725 
45225 
49725 
54225 
58725 
63225 
67725 
72225 
76725 
81225 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
85 
205 
325 
467.5 
617.5 
767.5 
922 
1091 
1280 
1489 
1718 
1958 
2467 
3016 
3605 
4234 
4903 
5612 
6361 
7121 
7890 
8690 
12863.5 
17040 
21307.5 
25605 
29902.5 
34200 
38497.5 
42795 
47092.5 
51390 
55687.5 
59985 
64282.5 
68580 
72877.5 
77175 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17.5 
167.5 
317.5 
467.5 
617.5 
767.5 
922 
1091 
1280 
1489 
1718 
1958 
2467 
3016 
3605 
4234 
4903 
5612 
6343.9 
7052.6 
7764 
8510 
12379.75 
16446 
20598.75 
24795 
28991.25 
33187.5 
37383.75 
41580 
45776.25 
49972.5 
54168.75 
58365 
62561.25 
66757.5 
70953.75 
75150 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17.5 
167.5 
317.5 
467.5 
617.5 
767.5 
922 
1091 
1280 
1489 
1718 
1958 
2467 
3016 
3578 
4147.6 
4750 
5385.2 
6053.2 
6744.8 
7436.4 
8150 
11896 
15852 
19890 
23985 
28080 
32175 
36270 
40365 
44460 
48555 
52650 
56745 
60840 
64935 
69030 
73125 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17.5 
167.5 
317.5 
467.5 
617.5 
767.5 
922 
1091 
1280 
1489 
1718 
1958 
2408.5 
2890 
3402.5 
3946 
4520.5 
5126 
5765 
6437 
7111.5 
7790 
11421.5 
15258 
19181.25 
23175 
27168.75 
31162.5 
35156.25 
39150 
43143.75 
47137.5 
51131.25 
55125 
59118.75 
63112.5 
67106.25 
71100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17.5 
167.5 
317.5 
467.5 
617.5 
767.5 
922 
1091 
1271 
1449.4 
1642.4 
1850 
2279.8 
2738.8 
3227 
3746 
4298 
4879.2 
5489.6 
6129.2 
6786.6 
7444 
10949 
14664 
18472.5 
22365 
26257.5 
30150 
34042.5 
37935 
41827.5 
45720 
49612.5 
53505 
57397.5 
61290 
65182.5 
69075 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17.5 
167.5 
317.5 
467.5 
617.5 
767.5 
904 
1042.4 
1194.5 
1363 
1545.65 
1742 
2151.1 
2589.2 
3059.4 
3557 
4082 
4634.4 
5214.2 
5821.4 
6461.7 
7102 
10476.5 
14070 
17777 
21555 
25346.25 
29137.5 
32928.75 
36720 
40511.25 
44302.5 
48093.75 
51885 
55676.25 
59467.5 
63258.75 
67050 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17.5 
167.5 
317.5 
467.5 
604 
727 
850 
981.2 
1118 
1282 
1451.6 
1634 
2027.6 
2448.8 
2895.6 
3368 
3866 
4390.8 
4947.2 
5529.2 
6136.8 
6760 
10004 
13487 
17084 
20745 
24435 
28125 
31815 
35505 
39195 
42885 
46575 
50265 
53955 
57645 
61335 
65025 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17.5 
167.5 
283.75 
400 
516.25 
632.5 
748.75 
866 
990 
1127 
1275 
1434 
1790 
2168 
2571 
3002 
3455 
3930 
4427 
4954 
5504 
6076 
9090 
12326 
15698 
19125 
22612.5 
26100 
29587.5 
33075 
36562.5 
40050 
43537.5 
47025 
50512.5 
54000 
57487.5 
60975 
TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 1989 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
1989 INDIV. FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TAX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TAX FINAL TX FINAL TX 
========= = = = = = == = = = = = == = = = = = == = = = = = =================== = = = = = == = = = = = ========== = = = = = = = = 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
. 9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
230 
370 
510 
650 
800 
970 
1160 
1370 
1600 
1850 
2120 
2390 
2680 
2970 
3590 
4250 
4950 
5690 
6470 
7290 
8110 
8930 
9770 
10610 
14910 
19370 
23870 
28370 
32870 
37370 
41870 
46370 
50870 
55370 
59870 
64370 
68870 
73370 
77870 
82370 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
20 
160 
300 
440 
580 
730 
900 
1090 
1300 
1530 
1760 
2010 
2260 
2800 
3380 
4000 
4660 
5360 
6100 
6840 
7600 
8380 
9160 
13260 
17460 
21760 
26160 
30660 
35160 
39660 
44160 
48660 
53160 
57660 
62160 
66660 
71160 
75660 
80160 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
20 
132 
265 
405 
545 
692.5 
857.5 
1042.5 
1247.5 
1472.5 
1702.5 
2197.5 
2732.5 
3307.5 
3922.5 
4379.5 
4852.5 
5502.45 
6198.05 
6893.65 
7609.75 
11384.25 
15154.2 
19005.85 
22939.2 
26954.25 
31042.5 
35434.5 
39871.5 
44308.5 
48745.5 
53182.5 
57619.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
125 
265 
405 
545 
692.5 
857.5 
1042.5 
1247.5 
1472.5 
1702.5 
2197.5 
2732.5 
3307.5 
3922.5 
4379.5 
4852.5 
5326.75 
5792.9 
6390.265 
7028.7 
10446.37 
14001.3 
17752.4 
21966.8 
26277 
30682.5 
35088 
39493.5 
43899 
48304.5 
52710 
57115.5 
62056.5 61496.25 
66493.5 65692.5 
70930.5 69888.75 
75367.5 74085 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
125 
265 
405 
545 
692.5 
857.5 
1042.5 
1247.5 
1472.5 
1702.5 
2197.5 
2732.5 
3281.4 
3838.8 
4231 
4633.6 
5059 
5493.2 
5944.6 
6396 
9508.5 
13457.4 
17541.7 
21721.3 
25997.2 
30367.5 
34741.5 
39115.5 
43395 
47490 
51585 
55680 
59775 
63870 
67965 
72060 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
125 
265 
405 
545 
692.5 
857.5 
1042.5 
1247.5 
1472.5 
1702.5 
2141.25 
2611 
3111.75 
3643.5 
4008.25 
4396 
4791.25 
5202.5 
5628.25 
6063 
9324 
13281 
17334 
21480.5 
25720 
30052.5 
34091.25 
38085 
42078.75 
46072.5 
50066.25 
54060 
58053.75 
62047.5 
66041.25 
70035 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
125 
265 
405 
545 
692.5 
872.8 
1033.95 
1209.7 
1400.05 
1599 
2017.5 
2465.2 
2942.1 
3448.2 
3798.5 
4158.4 
4531.3 
4970.8 
5435.48 
5922.4 
9180.5 
13108.3 
17128.2 
21239.7 
25214 
29085 
32977.5 
36870 
40762.5 
44655 
48547.5 
52440 
56332.5 
60225 
64117.5 
68010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
125 
265 
405 
545 
675.625 
811.6 
961.275 
1124.65 
1301.725 
1495.5 
1893.75 
2319.4 
2774.35 
3261.1 
3606.3 
4010.56 
4440.22 
4882.6 
5338.3 
5818.8 
9043 
12936.1 
16922.4 
20642 
24323 
28072.5 
31863.75 
35655 
39446.25 
43237.5 
47028.75 
50820 
54611.25 
58402.5 
62193.75 
65985 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
125 
265 
392.4 
507.2 
625 
750.4 
889.8 
1044.4 
1211.8 
1392 
1770 
2180 
2616.4 
3078.4 
3541.2 
3940.48 
4361.68 
4794.4 
5245.2 
5715.2 
8906.5 
12763.9 
16368' 
19868 
23432 
27060 
30750 
34440 
38130 
41820 
45510 
49200 
52890 
56580 
60270 
63960 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
93.5 
202 
310.5 
419 
527.5 
640 
759.75 
891.5 
1037.75 
1195 
1541.5 
1910 
2300.5 
2719 
3162.5 
3628 
4115.5 
4620.4 
5059 
5508 
8633.5 
11825 
15045 
18320 
21652.5 
25060 
28522.5 
32010 
35497.5 
38985 
42472.5 
45960 
49447.5 
52935 
56422.5 
59910 
----------
TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS\ 
INCOME SINGLE 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
------------------------------------------------~~----------------------~-------------~-
1990 FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL TX FINAL Tx· , FINAL TX FINAL TAX FINAL TX FINAL TX 
========================================~===;==========================================~ 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 175 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 125 425 
7,000 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 . 325 675 
8,000 270 0 0 0 0 0 125 325 525 925 
9,000 410 10 0 0 0 so- 275 500 725 1175 
10,000 550 150 0 0 0 175 425 675 925 1425 
11,000 700 290 0 0 25 300 575 850 1125 1675 
12,000 870 430 94 0 125 425 725 1025 1325 1925 
13,000 1060 580 206 24 225 550 875 1200 1525 2175 
14,000 1270 750 318 122 325 675 1025 1375 1725 2425 
15,000 1500 940 430 270 435 800 1175 1550 1925 2675 
16,000 1750 1150 550 443 619 925 1325 1725 2125 2925 
17,000 2020 1380 682 616 803 1050 1475 1900 2325 3175 
18,000 2290 1610 826 795 987 1185 1625 2075 2525 3425 
19,000 2580 1860 982 981 1171 1380 1775 2250 2725 3675 
20,000 2870 2110 1150 1175 1355 1575 1925 2425 2925 3925 
22,000 3490 2650 1543 1599 1739 1965 2225 2775 3325 4485 
24.000 4150 3230 2035 2059 2151 2355 2619 3125 3725 5045 
26.000 4850 3850 2551 2535 2591 2755 3031 3475 4149 5645 
28,000 5590 4510 3091 3035 3059 3175 3443 3825 4597 6245 
30,000 6370 5210 3655 3555 3535 3615 3855 4215 5045 6885 
32,000 7190 5950 4251 4091 4035 4075 4275 4691 5525 7525 
34,000 8010 6690 4871 4647 4543 4555 4719 5167 6005 8205 
36,000 8830 7450 5515 5227 5067 5035 5199 5667 6501 8885 
38,000 9670 8230 6183 5823 5607 5535 5691 6171 7013 9605 
40,000 10510 9010 6875 6435 6155 6035 6195 6675 7525 10325 
50,000 14810 13110 10435 9735 9135 8885 8995 9485 10475 14125 
60,000 19270 17310 14215 13255 12495 12095 12115 12695 13795 17925 
70,000 23770 21610 18055 16905 16075 15605 15595 16125 17155 21725 
80,000 28270 26010 21955 20675 19815 19335 19315 19635 20595 25525 
90,000 32770 30510 25915 24545 23675 23285 23095 23245 24095 29325 
100,000 37270 35010 29935 28495 27635 27235 26935 26935 27635 33125 
110,000 41770 39510 34095 32555 31735 31235 30855 30705 31215 36925 
120,000 46270 44010 38255 36695 35855 35235 34775 34495 34835 40725 
130,000 50770 48510 42455 40925 40015 39285 38715 38325 38495 44525 
140,000 55270 53010 46655 45195 44215 43335 42675 42195 42195 48325 
150,000 59770 57510 50895 49485 48435 47435 46635 46085 45935 52125 
160,000 64270 62010 55135 53775 52655 51535 50635 49975 49715 55925 
170,000 68770 66510 59415 58065 56875 55685 54495 53875 53495 59725 
180,000 73270 71010 63695 62355 61095 59835 58655 57795 57295 63525 
190,000 77770 75510 68015 66645 65315 63985 62695 61715 61115 67325 
200,000 82270 80010 72335 70935 69535 68135 66735 65635 64935 71125 
-- --------
TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 1991 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991 INDIV. TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX 
=========~================================================~============================= 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 260 
7,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 188 440 
8,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 188 332 620 
9,000' 0 0 0 0 0 0 152 314 476 830 
10,000 0 0 0 0 0 80 260 440 620 1040 
11,000 150 0 0 0 0 170 368 566 788 1250 
12,000 360 0 0 0 44 260 476 704 956 1460 
13,000 600 200 0 0 116 350 584 851 1124 1700 
14,000 840 400 0 0 188 440 704 998 1292 1940 
15,000 1080 600 0 0 260 530 830 1145 1460 2180 
16,000 1320 820 160 44 332 620 956 1292 1652 2420 
17,000 1590 1040 320 98 404 725 1082 1439 1844 2690 
18,000 1860 1260 480 272 476 830 1208 1604 2036 2960 
19,000 2130 1480 644 466 548 935 1334 1772 2228 3230 
20,000 2400 1700 820 660 620 1040 1460 1940 2420 3500 
22,000 3000 2180 1172 1056 1028 1250 1748 2276 2852 4100 
24,000 3600 2660 1568 1472 1436 1460 2036 2636 3284 4700 
26,000 4260 3170 2008 1888 1856 1900 2324 3014 3740 5340 
28,000 4920 3710 2464 2316 2288 2340 2636 3392 4220 5980 
30,000 5640 4250 2920 2770 2720 2780 2960 3800 4700 6660 
32,000 6360 4850 3394 3232 3176 3240 3444 4220 5212 7340 
34,000 7140 5450 3898 3694 3640 3730 3940 4640 5724 8060 
36,000 7920 6080 4402 4162 4120 4220 4460 5084 6252 8780 
38,000 8720 6740 4918 4666 4600 4710 4984 5532 6796 9520 
40,000 9520 7400 5470 5170 5080 5200 5520 5980 7340 10260 
50,000 13700 11150 8440 7930 7750 7920 8360 9020 10260 14060 
60,000 18040 15200 11830 11080 10780 10910 11440 12280 13300 17860 
70,000 22440 19400 15500 14560 14100 14170 14730 15620 16740 21660 
80,000 26840 23700 19300 18260 17710 17660 18150 19000 20200 25460 
90,000 31240 28100 23220 22120 21530 21360 21660 22440 23680 29260 
100,000 35640 32500 27200 26060 25460 25210 25260 25910 27160 33060 
110,000 40040 36900 31320 30110 29500 29110 28980 29470 30680 36860 
120,000 44440 41300 35440 34240 33560 33060 32790 33060 34200 40660 
130,000 48840 45700 39600 38430 37660 37060 36650 36710 37750 44460 
140,000 53240 50100 43760 42640 41800 41060 40540 40420 41330 48260 
150,000 57640 54500 47960 46860 45960 45110 44460 44160 44910 52060 
160,000 62040 58900 52160 51080 50120 49160 48420 47990 48550 55860 
170,000 66440 63300 56400 55300 54280 53260 52380 51830 52190 59660 
180,000 70840 67700 60640 59520 58440 57360 56360 55690 55860 63460 
190,000 75240 72100 64900 63740 62600 61460 60360 59570 59560 67260 
200,000 79640 76500 69160 67960 66760 65560 64360 63460 63260 71060 
-- -----· 
TAXES PAYABLE BY. UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 1991/1992 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
--~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNMAARIE£COMBINEDCOMBINEDCOMBINEDCOMBINEDCOMB!NEDCOMBINEDCOMB1NEOCOMB!NEDCOMBINED 
=====:::::=== ============================================================================= 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 160 
7,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 340 
8,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 232 520 
9,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 214 376 730 
10,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 160 340 520 940 
11,000 135 0 0 0 0 70 268 466 688 1150 
12,000 345 0 0 0 0 160 376 604 856 1360 
13,000 555 170 0 0 16 250 484 751 1024 1600 
14,000 765 360 0 0 88 340 604 898 1192 1840 
15,000 975 550 0 0 160 430 730 1045 1360 2080 
16,000 1225 760 132 0 232 520 856 1192 1552 2320 
17,000 1475 970 284 0 304 625 982 1339 1744 2590 
18.000 1725 1180 436 146 376 730 1108 1504 1936 2860 
19,000 1975 1390 592 333 448 835 1234 1672 2128 3130 
20,000 2225 1600 760 520 520 940 1360 1840 2320 3400 
22,000 2805 2060 1096 902 896 1150 1648 2176 2752 4000 
24,000 3385 2520 1432 1304 1292 1360 1936 2536 3184 4600 
26,000 4005 3010 1800 1706 1700 1770 2224 2914 3640 5240 
28,000 4665 3530 2240 2120 2120 2200 2536 3292 4120 5880 
30,000 5325 4050 2680 2560 2540 2630 2860 3700 4600 6560 
32,000 6045 4630 3138 3008 2984 3080 3316 4120 5112 7240 
34,000 6765 5210 3626 3456 3436 3560 3804 4540 5624 7960 
36,000 7515 5820 4114 3910 3904 4040 4316 4984 6152 8680 
38,000 8295 6460 4614 4400 4372 4520 4828 5432 6696 9420 
40,000 9075 7100 5150 4890 4840 5000 5340 5880 7240 10160 
50,000 13125 10750 8040 7580 7450 7670 8160 8870 10160 13960 
60,000 17365 14700 11350 10660 10420 10610 11200 12100 13200 17760 
70,000 21665 18800 14940 14070 13680 13820 14450 15410 16600 21560 
80,000 25965 23000 18660 17700 17230 17260 17830 18760 20040 25360 
90,000 30265 27300 22500 21490 20990 20910 21300 22170 23500 29160 
100,000 34565 31600 26400 25360 24860 24710 24860 25610 26960 32960 
110,000 38865 35900 30440 29340 28840 28560 28540 29140 30460 36760 
120,000 43165 40200 34480 33400 32840 32460 32310 32700 33960 40560 
130,000 47465 44500 38560 37520 36880 36410 36130 36320 37490 44360 
140,000 51765 48800 42640 41660 40960 40360 39980 40000 41050 48160 
150,000 56065 53100 46760 45810 45060 44360 43860 43710 44610 51960 
160.000 60365 57400 50880 49960 49160 48360 47780 47510 48230 55760 
170,000 64665 61700 55040 54110 53260 52410 51700 51320 51850 59560 
180,000 68965 66000 59200 58260 57360 56460 55640 55150 55500 63360 
190,000 73265 70300 63380 62410 61460 60510 59600 59000 59180 67160 
200,000 77565 74600 67560 66560 65560 64560 63560 62860 62860 70960 
TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 1992/1993 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
----------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------· 
1993 UNMARRIED TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX 
=========== = = = = = = =========================================================================================== 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
60 
270 
480 
690 
900 
1140 
1380 
1620 
1860 
2100 
2660 
3220 
3780 
4340 
4900 
5620 
6340 
7060 
7780 
8500 
12600 
16840 
21140 
25440 
29740 
34040 
38340 
42640 
46940 
51240 
55540 
59840 
64140 
68440 
72740 
77040 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
65 
245 
475 
675 
875 
1075 
1275 
1475 
1895 
2315 
2735 
3155 
3575 
4135 
4695 
5255 
5815 
6375 
9975 
14075 
18275 
22475 
26775 
31075 
35375 
39675 
43975 
48275 
52575 
56875 
61175 
65475 
69775 
74075 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
57 
209 
361 
515 
675 
995 
1315 
1643 
2043 
2455 
2867 
3279 
3691 
4131 
4655 
7275 
10575 
14175 
17945 
21785 
25625 
29625 
33625 
37625 
41625 
45625 
49785 
53945 
58105 
62265 
66425 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
235 
425 
809 
1203 
1597 
1991 
2395 
2803 
3215 
3635 
4055 
4475 
6925 
9765 
13045 
16705 
20445 
24225 
28245 
32305 
36395 
40525 
44675 
48825 
52995 
57205 
61415 
65625 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
64 
140 
216 
292 
368 
444 
520 
805 
1185 
1579 
1987 
2395 
2803 
3215 
3635 
4061 
4505 
6725 
9525 
12485 
15925 
19725 
23625 
27665 
31705 
35785 
39945 
44125 
48305 
52485 
56665 
60845 
65025 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
140 
235 
330 
425 
520 
615 
710 
805 
900 
1110 
1320 
1625 
2025 
2425 
2865 
3305 
3745 
4185 
4625 
7075 
9525 
12725 
15925 
19625 
23325 
27375 
31425 
35525 
39625 
43725 
47825 
51975 
56125 
60275 
64425 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
26 
140 
254 
368 
482 
596 
710 
824 
942 
1068 
1194 
1320 
1572 
1824 
2094 
2382 
2670 
3015 
3471 
3959 
4449 
4945 
7425 
10425 
13465 
16725 
20205 
23725 
27565 
31405 
35345 
39385 
43425 
47505 
51585 
55665 
59745 
63825 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
64 
197 
330 
463 
596 
729 
862 
1005 
1152 
1299 
1446 
1593 
1740 
2046 
2382 
2718 
3054 
3430 
3822 
4214 
4606 
4998 
5390 
8225 
11385 
14655 
18065 
21495 
24925 
28565 
32205 
35845 
39645 
43525 
47405 
51335 
55365 
59395 
63425 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
64 
216 
368 
520 
672 
824 
984 
1152 
1320 
1488 
1656 
1824 
1998 
2190 
2574 
2958 
3374 
3822 
4270 
4718 
5166 
5614 
6094 
6670 
9550 
12590 
16035 
19625 
23225 
26825 
30445 
34065 
37685 
41305 
44925 
48685 
52445 
56205 
59965 
63725 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
140 
330 
520 
710 
900 
1110 
1320 
1530 
1740 
1950 
2190 
2430 
2670 
2910 
3150 
3710 
4270 
4830 
5390 
5950 
6670 
7390 
8110 
8830 
9550 
13350 
17350 
21350 
25350 
29350 
33350 
37350 
41350 
45350 
49350 
53350 
57350 
61350 
65350 
69350 
73350 
APPENDIX B-1 
---------
DIFFERENC_§~ I.N_T~_XES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
1965 
--------------------·------------- ... -----------------------------------
INCOME 100:0 60:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:60 0:100 
====================================================================== 
1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4000 -61.2 -61.2 -61.2 -61.2 -61.2 -61.2 -61.2 -61:2 -61.2 
5000 -131.2 -205.2 -205.2 -205.2 -205.2 -205.2 -205.2 -205.2 -205.2 
6000 -155.2 -299.2 -347.2 -347.2 -347.2 -347.2 -347.2 -347.2 -347.2 
7000 -179.2 -347.2 -371.2 -371.2 -371.2 -371.2 -371.2 -371.2 -371.2 
6000 -203.2 -395.2 -395.2 -395.2 -395.2 -395.2 -395.2 -395.2 -395.2 
9000 -232.4 -436.4 -436.4 -436.4 -436.4 -436.4 -436.4 -436.4 -436.4 
10000 -265.6 -503.6 -503.6 -503.6 -503.6 -503.6 -503.6 -503.6 -503.6 
11000 -290.6 -500.6 -500.6 -500.6 -500.6 -500.6 -500.6 -500.6 -500.8 
12000 -344 -706 -706 -706 -706 -706 -706 -706 -706 
13000 -369.2 -723.2 -723.2 -723.2 -723.2 -723.2 -723.2 -723.2 -723.2 
14000 -436.4 -804.4 -804.4 -804.4 -604.4 -804.4 -604.4 -604.4 -804.4 
15000 -491.6 -889.6 -889.6 -889.6 -889.6 -889.6 -889.6 -889.6 -689.6 
16000 -548.8 -976.8 -978.8 -978.8 -978.6 -976.8 -978.8 -978.8 -978.8 
17000 -610 -1072 -1072 -1072 -1072 -1072 -1072 -1072 -1072 
18000 -670 -1150 -1150 -1150 -1150 -1150 -1150 -1150 -1150 
19000 -735.2 -1229.2 -1229.2 -1229.2 -1229.2 -1229.2 -1229.2 -1229.2 -1229.2 
20000 -799.2 -1667.2 -1311.2 -1311.2 -1311.2 -1311.2 -1311.2 -1311.2 -1311.2 
22000 -936.4 -1480.4 -1480.4 -1480.4 -1480.4 -1480.4 -1480.4 -1480.4 -1480.4 
24000 -1081.6 -1657.6 -1657.6 -1657.6 -1657.6 -1657.6 -1657.6 -1657.6 -1657.6 
26000 -1234.6 -1842.8 -1842.8 -1842.8 -1842.8 -1842.8 -1842.6 -1842.8 -1842.6 
26000 -1396 -2036 -2036 -2036 -2036 -2036 -2036 -2036 -2036 
30000 -1558 -2230 -2230 -2230 -2230 -2230 -2230 -2230 -2230 
32000 -1664 -2368 -2368 -2366 -2388 -2388 -2386 -2388 -2388 
34000 -1770 -2506 -2506 -2506 -2506 -2506 -2506 -2506 -2506 
36000 -1833 -2585 -2585 -2565 -2585 -2585 -2565 -2585 -2585 
36000 -1676 -2644 -2644 -2644 -2644 -2644 -2644 -2644 -2644 
40000 -1899 -2663 -2663 -2683 -2683 -2663 -2663 -2683 -2663 
50000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
60000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
70000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
60000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
90000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
100000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
110000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
120000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
130000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
140000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
150000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
160000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
170000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
160000 -1902 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 -2702 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
______ ......,. _____________ ..,.... _____ ----- .. _----- .. _----- ---------------------------------
1986 DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF 
========================= = = = = = == = = = = :::= = = = = = ================= = = = = = == = = = = = = = = 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-79.1 1 
-250.31 
-300.67 
-300.67 
-300.67 
-300.67 
-317.79 
-356.31 
-401.25 
-446.19 
-491.13 
-518.95 
-581.01 
-623.81 
-668.75 
-711.55 
-799.29 
-887.03 
-974.77 
-1062.51 
-1150.25 
-1237.99 
-1306.47 
-1371.74 
-1437.01 
-1502.28 
-1907.81 
-2128.23 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
-2134.65 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-79.11 
-250.31 
-421.51 
-574.59 
.:..574.59 
-574.59 
-591.71 
-630.23 
-690.15 
769.33 
-848.51 
910.57 
1006.87 
-1068.93 
1128.85 
-1190.91 
1312.89 
1434.87 
-1556.85 
-1678.83 
-1800.81 
-1922.79 
-2025.51 
-2107.9 
-2190.29 
-2272.68 
2695.33 
-2949.99 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-79.11 
-250.31 
-421.51 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-591.71 
-630.23 
-690.15 
-769.33 
-848.51 
-910.57 
-1006.87 
-1068.93 
-1128.85 
-1190.91 
-1312.89 
-1434.87 
-1556.85 
-1678.83 
-1800.81 
-1922.79 
-2025.51 
-2107.9 
-2190.29 
-2272.68 
-2695.33 
-2949.99 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-79.11 
-250.31 
-421.51 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-591.71 
-630.23 
-690.15 
-769.33 
-848.51 
-910.57 
-1006.87 
-1068.93 
-1128.85 
-1190.91 
-1312.89 
-1434.87 
-1556.85 
-1678.83 
-1800.81 
-1922.79 
-2025.51 
-2107.9 
-2190.29 
-2272.68 
-2695.33 
-2949.99 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
-79.11 -79.11 
-250.31 -250.31 
-421.51 -421.51 
-574.59 -574.59 
-574.59 -574.59 
-574.59 -574.59 
-591.71 -591.71 
-630.23 -630.23 
-690.15 -690.15 
-769.33 -769.33 
-848.51 -848.51 
-910.57 -910.57 
-1 006.87 -1 006.87 
-1 068.93 -1 068.93 
-1128.85 -1128.85 
1190.91 -1190.91 
-1312.89 -1312.89 
- 1434.87 - 1434.87 
-1556.85 -1556.85 
-1678.83 -1678.83 
-1800.81 -1800.81 
1922.79 -1922.79 
-2025.51 -2025.51 
-2107.9 -2107.9 
-2190.29 -2190.29 
-2272.68 -2272.68 
-2695.33 -2695.33 
-2949.99 -2949.99 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 - 2990.65 
2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
-2990.65 - 2990.65 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-79.11 
-250.31 
-421.51 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-591.71 
-630.23 
-690.15 
-769.33 
-848.51 
-910.57 
-1006.87 
-1068.93 
-1128.85 
-1190.91 
-1312.89 
-1434.87 
-1556.85 
-1678.83 
-1800.81 
-1922.79 
-2025.51 
-2107.9 
-2190.29 
-2272.68 
-2695.33 
-2949.99 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-79.11 
-250.31 
-421.51 
-574,59 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-591.71 
-630.23 
-690.15 
-769.33 
-848.51 
-910.57 
-1006.87 
-1068.93 
-1128.85 
-1190.91 
1312.89 
1434.87 
-1556.85 
-1678.83 
-1800.81 
-1922.79 
-2025.51 
-2107.9 
-2190.29 
-2272.68 
-2695.33 
-2949.99 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-79.11 
-250.31 
-421.51 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-574.59 
-591.71 
-630.23 
-690.15 
-769.33 
-848.51 
-910.57 
-1006.87 
-1068.93 
-1128.85 
-1190.91 
-1312.89 
-1434.87 
-1556.85 
-1678.83 
-1800.81 
-1922.79 
-2025.51 
-2107.9 
-2190.29 
-2272.68 
-2695.33 
-2949.99 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 
-2990.65 -2990.65 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 . 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
------------------------------------ -------------- ,_-- ----- -------- -----
1987 DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF OIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF 
=========================== === ==== == = == = === ==== = ===::::; ::== = == == = = == =':= == == = = = = 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12.000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20.000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70.000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-266.95 
-266.95 
-266.95 
-266.95 
-266.95 
-282.15 
-316.35 
-356.25 
-396.15 
-436.05 
-475.95 
-515.85 
-553.85 
-593.75 
-631.75 
709.65 
-787.55 
-865.45 
-943.35 
1021.25 
-1099.15 
-1159.95 
-1217.9 
-1275.85 
-1333.8 
-1693.85 
-1889.55 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
-1895.25 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-268.85 
-420.85 
-510.15 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-555.75 
589.95 
-643.15 
-715.35 
-789.45 
-863.55 
-937.65 
-996.55 
-1051.65 
1108.65 
-1220.75 
-1332.85 
-1444.95 
-1557.05 
-1669.15 
-1439.25 
1876.25 
-1952.25 
-2027.3 
-2102.35 
-2567.85 
-2983.95 
-3225.25 
-3415.25 
-3605.25 
-3795.25 
-3985.25 
-4175.25 
-4365.25 
-4555.25 
-4745.25 
4935.25 
-5125.25 
-5315.25 
-5505.25 
-5695.25 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-268.85 
-420.85 
-540.55 
-'-540.55 
-540.55 
-555.75 
-589.95 
-643.15 
-715.35 
-789.45 
-863.55 
-937.65 
-996.55 
-1051.65 
-1108.65 
-1220.75 
-1332.85 
-1444.95 
-1557.05 
-1669.15 
-1824.57 
-1967.45 
-2095.89 
-2223.38 
-2353.15 
-3004.85 
-3531.15 
-3890.25 
-4175.25 
-4460.25 
-4745.25 
-5030.25 
-5315.25 
-5600.25 
-5885.25 
-6170.25 
-6455.25 
-6740.25 
-7025.25 
-7310.25 
-7595.25 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-268.85 
-420.85 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-555.75 
-589.95 
-643.15 
-715.35 
-789.45 
-863.55 
-937.65 
-996.55 
-1051.65 
1108.65 
-1220.75 
-1367.05 
-1530.07 
-1699.17 
-1874.35 
-2055.61 
-2225.85 
-2383.17 
-2533.84 
-2687.55 
3441.85 
-4078.35 
-4555.25 
-4935.25 
-5315.25 
-5695.25 
-6075.25 
-6455.25 
-6835.25 
-7215.25 
-7595.25 
-7975.25 
-8355.25 
-8735.25 
-9115.25 
-9495.25 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-268.85 
-420.85 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-555.75 
-589.95 
-643.15 
-715.35 
-789.45 
-863.55 
-937.65 
-996.55 
-1076.35 
-1158.05 
-1327.15 
-1503.85 
-1688.15 
-1880.05 
-2079.55 
-2286.65 
-2484.25 
-2670.45 
-2843.35 
-3019.1 
-3878.85 
-4625.55 
-5220.25 
-5695.25 
-6170.25 
-6645.25 
-7120.25 
-7595.25 
-8070.25 
-8545.25 
-9020.25 
-9495.25 
-9970.25 
-10445.2 
-10920.2 
-11395.2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-268.85 
-420.85 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-555.75 
589.95 
-643.15 
-715.35 
-789.45 
-886.35 
-987.81 
-1078.63 
-1170.21 
-1256.85 
-1444.19 
-1640.65 
-1846.23 
-2060.93 
-2284.75 
-2515.03 
2735.43 
-2945.95 
-3146.59 
-3345.9 
-4315.85 
-5172.75 
-5885.25 
-6455.25 
-7025.25 
-7595.25 
-8165.25 
-8735.25 
-9305.25 
-9875.25 
-10445.2 
-11015.2 
-11585.2 
-12155.2 
-12725.2 
-13295.2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-268.85 
-420.85 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-555.75 
-589.95 
-646.19 
-739.67 
-840.75 
-947.15 
-1058.87 
-1160.71 
-1264.07 
-1355.65 
-1561.23 
-1777.45 
-2004.31 
-2237.63 
-2480.45 
-2733.91 
-2980.91 
-3219.55 
-3449.83 
-3672.7 
-4752.85 
-5719.95 
-6548.35 
-7215.25 
-7880.25 
-8545.25 
-9210.25 
-9875.25 
-10540.2 
-11205.2 
-11870.2 
-12535.2 
-13200.2 
-13865.2 
-14530.2 
-15195.2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-268.85 
-420.85 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-540.55 
-555.75 
-608.19 
-685.71 
-782.23 
-892.05 
-1007.95 
-1129.55 
-1239.37 
-1351.47 
-1454.45 
-1678.27 
-1911.59 
-2153.65 
-2407.87 
-2674.25 
-2952.79 
-3226.39 
-3492.01 
-3745.85 
-3992.85 
-5189.85 
-6267.15 
-7186.75 
-7975.25 
-8735.25 
-9495.25 
-10255.2 
-11015.2 
-11775.2 
-12535.2 
-13295.2 
-14055.2 
-14815.2 
-15575.2 
-16335.2 
-17095.2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-116.85 
-268.85 
-420.85 
-540.55 
. -540.55 
-570.95 
-616.55 
-681.15 
-764.75 
-867.35 
-988.95 
-1120.05 
-1258.75 
-1389.85 
-1522.85 
-1646.35 
-1899.05 
-2166.95 
-2450.05 
-2748.35 
-3056.15 
-3377.25 
-3696.45 
-4011.85 
-4323.45 
-4625.55 
-6061 
-7317.85 
-8463.55 
-9495.25 
-10445.2 
-11395.2 
-12345.2 
-13295.2 
-14245.2 
-15195.2 
-16145.2 
-17095.2 
-18045.2 
-18995.2 
-19945.2 
-20895.2 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
_____________ ...,.. ___________ - -------------- -------------------------- .. _---- -----
1988 DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF D!FF 
========================= =:::::: = = = == == === ::=== == ============ = = = == ==== = == =:::;:; === == 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
-195 
-290 
-290 
-290 
-290 
-298 
-324 
-363 
-405 
-447 
-489 
-531 
-571 
-613 
-653 
-735 
-817 
-899 
-981 
-1063 
-1145 
-1225 
-1309 
-1369 
-1447 
-1684 
-1787 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
1790 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
-1790 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-45 
-195 
-345 
-495 
-560 
-590 
-628 
-661.5 
-707.5 
-773.5 
-855 
-942 
-1029 
-1100 
-1167 
-1227 
-1354 
-1481 
-1608 
-1735 
-1862 
-1989 
-2080 
-2178 
-2269 
-2347 
-2651.5 
-2975 
-3207.5 
-3410 
-3612.5 
-3815 
-4017.5 
-4220 
-4422.5 
-4625 
-4827.5 
-5030 
-5232.5 
-5435 
-5637.5 
-5840 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-45 
-195 
-345 
-495 
-627.5 
-627.5 
-635.5 
-661.5 
-707.5 
-773.5 
-855 
-942 
-1029 
-1100 
-1167 
-1227 
-1354 
-1481 
-1608 
-1735 
-1862 
-1989 
-2097.1 
-2246.4 
-2395 
-2527 
-3135.25 
-3569 
-3916.25 
-4220 
-4523.75 
-4827.5 
-5131.25 
-5435 
-5738.75 
-6042.5 
-6346.25 
-6650 
-6953.75 
-7257.5 
-7561.25 
-7865 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-45 
-195 
-345 
-495 
-627.5. 
-627.5 
-635.5 
-661.5 
-707.5 
-773.5 
-855 
-942 
-1029 
-1100 
-1167 
-1227 
-1354 
-1481 
-1635 
-1821.4 
-2015 
-2215.8 
-2387.8 
-2554.2 
-2722.6 
-2887 
-3619 
-4163 
-4625 
-5030 
-5435 
-5840 
-6245 
-6650 
-7055 
-7460 
-7865 
-8270 
-8675 
-9080 
-9485 
-9890 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-45 
-195 
-345 
-495 
-627.5 
-627.5 
-635.5 
-661.5 
-707.5 
-773.5 
-855 
-942 
-1029 
-1100 
-1167 
-1227 
-1412.5 
-1607 
-1810.5 
-2023 
-2244.5 
-2475 
-2676 
-2862 
-3047.5 
-3247 
-4093.5 
-4757 
-5333.75 
-5840 
-6346.25 
-6852.5 
-7358.75 
-7865 
-8371.25 
-8877.5 
-9383.75 
-9890 
-10396.2 
-10902.5 
-11408.7 
-11915 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-45 
-195 
-345 
-495 
-627.5 
-627.5 
-635.5 
-661.5 
-707.5 
-773.5 
-855 
-942 
-1038 
-1139.6 
-1242.6 
-1335 
-1541.2 
-1758.2 
-1986 
-2223 
-2467 
-2721.8 
-2951.4 
-3169.8 
-3372.4 
-3593 
-4566 
-5351 
-6042.5 
-6650 
-7257.5 
-7865 
-8472.5 
-9080 
-9687.5 
-10295 
-10902.5 
-11510 
-12117.5 
-12725 
-13332.5 
-13940 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-45 
-195 
-345 
-495 
-627.5 
-627.5 
-635.5 
-661.5 
-707.5 
-773.5 
-873 
-990.6 
-1114.5 
-1226 
-1339.35 
-1443 
-1669.9 
-1907.8 
-2153.6 
-2412 
-2683 
-2966.6 
-3226.8 
-3477.6 
-3697.3 
-3935 
5038.5 
-5945 
-6738 
-7460 
-8168.75 
-8877.5 
-9586.25 
-10295 
-11003.7 
-11712.5 
-12421.2 
-13130 
-13838.7 
-14547.5 
-15256.2 
-15965 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-45 
-195 
-345 
-495 
-627.5 
-627.5 
-635.5 
-661.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-45 
-195 
-345 
-495 
-627.5 
-627.5 
-669.25 
-729 
-721 -808.75 
-814 -908.5 
-927 -1028.25 
-1051.8 -1167 
-1191 -1319 
-1307 -1462 
-1433.4 -1610 
-1551 -1751 
-1793.4 -2031 
-2048.2 -2329 
-2317.4 -2642 
-2601 -2967 
-2899 -3310 
-3210.2 -3671 
-3493.8 -4014 
-3769.8 -4345 
-4022.2 -4655 
-4277 -4961 
-5511 -6425 
-6528 -7689 
-7431 -8817 
-8270 -9890 
-9080 -10902.5 
-9890 -11915 
-10700 -12927.5 
-11510 -13940 
-12320 -14952.5 
-13130 -15965 
-13940 -16977.5 
-14750 -17990 
-15560 -19002.5 
-16370 -20015 
-17180 -21027.5 
-17990 -22040 
- --------
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
______________ ..._ __________ -----------------------------------------------------
1989 DIFF DIFF OIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF DIFF 
============::;;:============ = = = = = ::= = = = = = == = = = = = = ========== = = = ::::::: :;:= = = == = = :::= = = = = = = = = = 
1.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 -90 
-90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 
7,000 -230 -230 
-230 -230 -230 -230 -230 -230 -230 
8,000 -350 -370 -370 -370 -370 -370 -370 -370 -370 
9,000 -350 -510 -510 -510 -510 -510 -510 -510 -510 
10,000 -350 -630 -650 -650 -650 -650 -650 -650 -650 
11,000 -360 -668 -675 675 -675 -675 -675 -675 -706.5 
12.000 -390 -705 -705 -705 -705 -705 -705 -705 -768 
13,000 -430 -755 -755 -755 -755 -755 -755 -767.6 -849.5 
14,000 -470 -825 -825 
-825 -825 -825 -825 -862.8 -951 
15,000 -510 -907.5 -907.5 -907.5 -907.5 -907.5 -924.375 -975 -1072.5 
16,000 550 -992.5 -992.5 -992.5 -992.5 -977.2 -1038.4 -1099.6 -1210 
17.000 -590 -1077.5 -1077.5 -1077.5 -1077.5 -1086.05 -1158.72 -1230.2 -1360.25 
18,000 -630 -1142.5 -1142.5 -1142.5 -1142.5 -1180.3 -1265.35 -1345.6 -1498.5 
19,000 -670 -1207.5 -1207.5 -1207.5 -1207.5 -1279.95 -1378.27 -1468.2 -1642.25 
20,000 -710 -1267.5 -1267.5 -1267.5 -1267.5 -1371 -1474.5 -1578 -1775 
22,000 -790 -1392.5 -1392.5 -1392.5 -1448.75 -1572.5 -1696.25 -1820 -2048.5 
24,000 -870 -1517.5 -1517.5 -1517.5 -1639 -1784.8 -1930.6 -2070 -2340 
26,000 -950 -1642.5 -1642.5 -1668.6 -1838.25 -2007.9 -2175.65 -2333.6 -2649.5 
28,000 -.1030 -1767.5 -1767.5 -1851.2 
-2046.5 -2241.8 -2428.9 -2611.6 -2971 
30,000 111 0 -2090.5 -2090.5 -2239 
-2461.75 -2671.5 -2863.7 -2928.8 -3307.5 
32,000 -1190 -2437.5 -2437.5 -2656.4 -2894 -3131.6 -3279.44 -3349.52 -3662 
34,000 -1270 -2607.55 -2783.25 -3051 -3318.75 -3578.7 -3669.78 -3748.32 -3994.5 
36,000 -1330 -2731.95 -3137.1 -3436.8 -3727.5 -3959.2 -4047.4 -4135.6 -4309.6 
38,000 -1390 -2876.35 -3379.73 -3825.4 -4141.75 -4334.52 -4431.7 -4524.8 -4711 
40,000 -1450 -3000.25 -3581.3 -4214 -4547 -4687.6 -4791.2 -4894.8 -5102 
50,000 -1650 -3525.75 -4463.62 -5401.5 -5586 -5729.5 -5867 -6003.5 -6276.5 
60,000 . -1910 -4215.8 -5368.7 -5912.6 -6089 -6261.7 -6433.9 -6606.1 -7545 
70,000 -2110 -4864.15 -6117.6 -6328.3 -6536 -6741.8 -6947.6 -7502 -8825 
80,000 -2210 -5430.8 -6403.2 -6648.7 -6889.5 -7130.3 -7728 -8502 -10050 
90.000 -2210 -5915.75 -6593 -6872.8 7150 -7656 -8547 -9438 -11217.5 
100,000 -2210 -6327.5 -6687.5 -7002.5 -7317.5 -8285 -9297.5 -10310 -12310 
110,000 -2210 -6435.5 -6782 -7128.5 -7778.75 -8892.5 -10006.2 -11120 -13347.5 
120,000 -2210 -6498.5 -6876.5 -7254.5 -8285 -9500 -10715 -11930 -14360 
130.000 -2210 -6561.5 -6971 -7475 -8791.25 -10107.5 -11423.7 -12740 15372.5 
140,000 -2210 -6624.5 -7065.5 -7880 -9297.5 -10715 -12132.5 -13550 -16385 
150,000 -2210 -6687.5 -7160 
-8285 -9803.75 -11322.5 -12841.2 -14360 -17397.5 
160,000 -2210 -6750.5 -7254.5 -8690 -10310 -11930 -13550 -15170 -18410 
170,000 -2210 -6813.5 -7373.75 
-9095 -10816.2 -12537.5 -14258.7 -15980 -19422.5 
180,000 -2210 -6876.5 -7677.5 -9500 -11322.5 -13145 -14967.5 -16790 -20435 
190,000 -2210 -6939.5 -7981.25 -9905 -11828.7 -13752.5 -15676.2 -17600 -21447.5 
200,000 -22f0 -7002.5 8285 -10310 -12335 -14360 -16385 -18410 
-22460 
-- ------
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
---------~----------------------~---------------~--------------------------------
1990 R A A R R A A R R 
===================~==============~===============================~============== 
1.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 175 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 125 425 
7,000 -130 -130 130 -130 -130 -130 20 195 545 
8,000 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -145 55 255 655 
9,000 -400 -410 -410 -410 -360 -135 90 315 •765 
10.000 -400 -550 -550 
-550 -375 -125 125 375 875 
11,000 410 -700 -700 -675 -400 -125 150 425 975 
12,000 -440 -776 -870 -745 -445 145 155 455 1055 
13,000 -480 854 -1036 
-835 -510 -185 140 465 1115 
14,000 -520 -952 -1148 -945 -595 -245 105 455 1155 
15,000 -560 -1070 -1230 
-1065 -700 -325 50 425 1175 
16,000 -600 -1200 1307 -1131 -825 -425 -25 375 1175 
17.000 -640 -1338 
-1404 1217 -970 -545 -120 305 1155 
18,000 -680 -1464 -1495 1303 -1105 -665 -215 235 1135 
19,000 720 -1598 -1599 -1409 -1200 -805 -330 145 1095 
20,000 -760 -1720 -1695 -1515 -1295 945 -445 55 1055 
22.000 -840 -1947 -1891 -1751 -1525 -1265 -715 -165 995 
24,000 -920 -2115 -2091 -1999 -1795 -1531 -1025 -425 895 
26,000 -1000 -2299 
-2315 -2259 -2095 -1819 1375 -701 795 
28,000 -1080 -2499 
-2555 -2531 -2415 -2147 -1765 -993 655 
30,000 -1160 -2715 -2815 2835 -2755 -2515 -2155 -1325 515 
32,000 -1240 -2939 -3099 -3155 -3115 -2915 -2499 -1665 335 
34,000 -1320 -3139 -3363 -3467 -3455 ' -3291 -2843 -2005 195 
36,000 -1380 -3315 -3603 -3763 -3795 -3631 -3163 -2329 55 
38,000 -1440 -3487 -3847 -4063 -4135 -3979 -3499 -2657 -65 
40,000 -1500 -3635 -4075 -4355 -4475 -4315 -3835 -2985 -185 
50,000 -1700 -4375 5075 -5675 -5925 -5815 -5325 -4335 -685 
60,000 -1960 -5055 -6015 -6775 -7175 -7155 -6575 -5475 -1345 
70,000 -2160 -5715 -6865 7695 -8165 -8175 -7645 6615 -2045 
-8635 -7675 -2745 80,000 -2260 -6315 -7595 -8455 -8935 -8955 
-9675 -9525 -8675 -3445 90.000 -2260 -6855 -8225 -9095 -9485 
-10335 -10335 -9635 -4145 100,000 2260 -7335 -8775 -9635 -10035 10915 -11065 -10555 -4845 110,000 -2260 -7675 -9215 -10035 -10535 11495 -11775 -11435 -5545 120,000 -2260 -8015 -9575 -10415 -11035 
-12055 12445 -12275 -6245 130,000 -2260 -8315 -9845 -10755 -11485 
-12595 -13075 -13075 -6945 140,000 -2260 -8615 10075 -11055 -11935 
-13135 -13685 -13835 -7645 150,000 -2260 -8875 -10285 11335 -12335 
-13635 -14295 14555 -8345 160,000 -2260 -9135 -10495 
-11615 -12735 
-14275 -14895 -15275 -9045 170.000 -2260 -9355 -10705 -11895 -13085 
-14615 -15475 -15975 -9745 180,000 -2260 -9575 -10915 
-12175 13435 15075 -16055 -16655 -10445 190,000 -2260 -9755 - 11125 
-12455 -13785 
-15535 -16635 -17335 -11145 200,000 -2260 -9935 -11335 
-12735 -14135 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991 A A A R R R R R A 
================================================================================ 
1,000 
2,000. 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-150 
-360 
-400 
-440 
-480 
-500 
-550 
-600 
-650 
-700 
-820 
-940 
-1090 
-1210 
-1390 
-1510 
-1690 
-1840 
-1980 
-2120 
-2550 
-2840 
-3040 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
-3140 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 80 
-150 -150 
-150 20 
-360 -360 
-316 -100 
-600 -600 
-484 -250 
-840 -840 
-652 -400 
-1080 -1080 
-820 -550 
-1160 -1276 
-988 -700 
-1270 -1492 
-1186 -865 
-1380 -1588 
-1384 -1030 
-1486 -1664 
-1582 -1195 
-1580 -1740 
-1780 -1360 
-1828 -1944 
-1972 -1750 
-2032 -2128 
-2164 -2140 
-2252 -2372 
-2404 -2360 
-2456 -2604 
-2632 -2580 
-2720 -2870 
-2920 -2860 
-2966 -3128 
-3184 -3120 
-3242 -3446 
-3500 -3410 
-3518 -3758 
-3800 -3700 
-3802 -4054 
-4120 -4010 
-4050 -4350 
-4440 -4320 
-5260 -5770 
-5950 -5780 
-6210 -6960 
-7260 -7130 
-6940 -7880 
-8340 -8270 
-7540 -8580 
-9130 -9180 
-8020 -9120 
-9710 -9880 
-8440 -9580 
-10180 -10430 
-8720 -9930 
-10540 -10930 
-9000 - 1 0200 
- 1 0880 - 11 380 
-9240 - 1 041 0 
- 11180 - 11780 
- 9480 - 1 0600 
-11440 -12180 
-9680 - 1 0780 
- 11680 -12530 
-9880 - 1 0960 
- 11920 -12880 
- 1 0040 - 111 40 
-12160 -13180 
-1 0200 - 11320 
-12400 -13480 
- 1 0340 - 11 500 
- 12640 - 13780 
- 1 0480 - 11680 
- 12880 -14080 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
44 
152 
260 
218 
116 
-16 
-136 
-250 
-364 
-508 
-652 
-796 
-940 
-1252 
-1564 
-1936 
-2284 
-2680 
-2916 
-3200 
-3460 
-3736 
-4000 
-5340 
-6600 
-7710 
-8690 
-9580 
-10380 
-11060 
-11650 
-12190 
-12700 
-13180 
-13620 
-14060 
-14480 
-14880 
-15280 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
62 
188 
314 
440 
416 
344 
251 
158 
65 
-28 
-151 
-256 
-358 
-460 
-724 
-964 
-1246 
-1528 
-1840 
-2140 
-2500 
-2836 
-3188 
-3540 
-4680 
-5760 
-6820 
-7840 
-8800 
-9730 
-10570 
-11380 
-12130 
-12820 
-13480 
-14050 
-14610 
-15150 
-15670 
-16180 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
44 
188 
332 
476 
620 
638 
596 
524 
452 
380 
332 
254 
176 
98 
20 
-148 
-316 
-520 
-700 
-940 
-1148 
-1416 
-1668 
-1924 
-2180 
-3440 
-4740 
-5700 
-6640 
-7560 
-8480 
-9360 
-10240 
-11090 
-11910 
-12730 
-13490 
-14250 
-14980 
-15680 
-16380 
0 
0 
0 
0 
80 
260 
440 
620 
830 
1040 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1080 
1060 
1020 
980 
920 
860 
800 
740 
360 
-180 
-780 
-1380 
-1980 
-2580 
-3180 
-3780 
-4380 
-4980 
-5580 
-6180 
-6780 
-7380 
-7980 
-8580 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE B·. JNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 t0:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
. :992 R R R R R R R R R 
================================================================================ 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-135 
-345 
-385 
-405 
-425 
-465 
-505 
-545 
-585 
-625 
-745 
-865 
-995 
-1135 
-1275 
-1415 
-1555 
-1695 
-1835 
-1975 
-2375 
-2665 
-2865 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
-2965 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-135 
-345 
-555 
-765 
-975 
-1093 
-1191 
-1289 
-1383 
-1465 
-1709 
-1953 
-2205 
-2425 
-2645 
-2907 
-3139 
-3401 
-3681 
-3925 
-5085 
-6015 
-6725 
-7305 
-7765 
-8165 
-8425 
-8685 
-8905 
-9125 
-9305 
-9485 
-9625 
-9765 
-9885 
-10005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-135 
-345 
-555 
-765 
-975 
-1225 
-1475 
-1579 
-1642 
-1705 
-1903 
-2081 
-2299 
-2545 
-2765 
-3037 
-3309 
-3605 
-3895 
-4185 
-5545 
-6705 
-7595 
-8265 
-8775 
-9205 
-9525 
-9765 
-9945 
-10105 
-10255 
-10405 
-10555 
-10705 
-10855 
-11005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-135 
-345 
-539 
-677 
-815 
-993 
-1171 
-1349 
-1527 
-1705 
-1909 
-2093 
-2305 
-2545 
-2785 
-3061 
-3329 
-3611 
-3923 
-4235 
-5675 
-6945 
-7985 
-8735 
-9275 
-9705 
-10025 
-10325 
-10585 
-10805 
-11005 
-11205 
-11405-
-11605 
-11805 
-12005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-65 
-185 
-305 
-425 
-545 
-705 
-850 
-995 
-1140 
-1285 
-1655 
-2025 
-2235 
-2465 
-2695 
-2965 
-3205 
-3475 
-3775 
-4075 
-5455 
-6755 
-7845 
-8705 
-9355 
-9855 
-10305 
-10705 
-11055 
-11405 
-11705 
-12005 
-12255 
-12505 
-12755 
-13005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
52 
160 
133 
31 
-71 
-161 
-245 
-369 
-493 
-617 
-741 
-865 
-1157 
-1449 
-1781 
-2129 
-2465 
-2729 
-2961 
-3199 
-3467 
-3735 
-4965 
-6165 
-7215 
-8135 
-8965 
-9705 
-10325 
-10855 
-11335 
-11785 
-12205 
-12585 
-12965 
-13325 
-13665 
-14005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
88 
214 
340 
331 
259 
196 
133 
70 
-33 
-136 
-221 
-303 
-385 
-629 
-849 
-1091 
-1373 
-1625 
-1925 
-2225 
-2531 
-2863 
-3195 
-4255 
-5265 
-6255 
-7205 
-8095 
-8955 
-9725 
-10465 
-11145 
-11765 
-12355 
-12855 
-13345 
-13815 
-14265 
-14705 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
88 
232 
376 
520 
553 
511 
469 
427 
385 
327 
269 
211 
153 
95 
-53 
-201 
-365 
-545 
-725 
-933 
-1141 
-1363 
-1599 
-1835 
-2965 
-4165 
-5065 
-5925 
-6765 
-7605 
-8405 
-9205 
-9975 
-10715 
-11455 
-12135 
-12815 
-13465 
-14085 
-14705 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
160 
340 
520 
730 
940 
1015 
1015 
1045 
1075 
1105 
1095 
1115 
1135 
1155 
1175 
1195 
1215 
1235 
1215 
1235 
1195 
1195 
1165 
1125 
1085 
835 
395 
-105 
-605 
-1105 
-1605 
-2105 
-2605 
-3105 
-3605 
-4105 
-4605 
-5105 
-5605 
-6105 
-6605 
-----
-----
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
-------------------·----------·---------·---------.. ---------.. ---------·---------·---------·---------· 
1993 R R R R R R R R R 
=========~=========:=========:::===:::;==============:=:.:=====::::==:=========~=========:===================: 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 "() 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 
7,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 330 
8,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 216 520 
9,000 0 0 0 0 0 26 197 368 710 
10,000 0 0 0 0 0 140 330 520 900 
11,000 -60 -60 -60 -60 -15 194 403 612 1050 
12.000 -270 -270 -270 -270 -130 98 326 554 1050 
13.000 -415 -480 -480 -480 -245 2 249 504 1050 
14,000 -445 -690 
-690 -626 -360 -94 172 462 1050 
15,000 -425 -900 -900 -760 -475 -190 105 420 1050 
16,000 -465 -1083 -1140 -924 -620 -316 12 348 1050 
17,000 -505 -1171 -1380 -1088 -765 -438 -81 276 1050 
18,000 -545 -1259 -1575 -1252 -910 -552 -174 204 1050 
19,000 -585 -1345 -1625 -1416 -1055 -666 -267 138 1050 
20.000 -625 -1425 -1675 -1580 -1200 -780 -360 90 1050 
22.000 -765 -1665 -1851 -1855 -1550 -1088 -614 -86 1050 
24,000 -905 -1905 -2017 -2035 -1900 -1396 -838 -262 1050 
26,000 -1045 -2137 -2183 -2201 -2155 -1686 -1062 -406 1050 
28,000 -1185 -2297 -2349 -2353 -2315 -1958 -1286 -518 1050 
30,000 -1325 -2445 -2505 -2505 -2475 -2230 -1470 -630 1050 
32,000 -1485 -2753 -2817 -2817 -2755 -2605 -1798 -902 1050 
34,000 -1645 -3061 -3125 -3125 -3035 -2869 -2126 -1174 1050 
36,000 -1805 -3369 -3425 -3425 -3315 -3101 -2454 -1446 1050 
38,000 -1965 -3649 -3725 -3719 -3595 -3331 -2782 -1686 1050 
40,000 -2125 -3845 -4025 -3995 -3875 -3555 -3110 -1830 1050 
50,000 -2625 -5325 -5675 -5875 -5525 -5175 -4375 -3050 750 
60,000 -2765 -6265 -7075 -7315 -7315 -6415 -5455 -4250 510 
70,000 -2865 -6965 -8095 -8655 -8415 -7675 -6485 -5105 210 
80,000 -2965 -7495 -8735 -9515 -9515 -8715 -7375 -5815 -90 
90,000 -2965 -7955 -9295 -10015 -10115 -9535 -8245 -6515 -390 
100,000 -2965 -8415 -9815 -10415 -10715 -10315 -9115 -7215 -690 
110,000 -2965 -8715 -10095 -10675 -10965 -10775 -9775 -7895 -990 
120,000 -2965 -9015 -10335 -10935 -11215 -11235 -10435 -8575 -1290 
130,000 -2965 -9315 -10545 -11155 -11415 -11595 -11095 -9255 -1590 
140,000 -2965 -9615 -10715 -11295 -11615 -11855 -11595 -9935 -1890 
150,000 -2965 -9915 -10865 -11415 11815 -12115 -12015 -10615 -2190 
160,000 -2965 -10055 -11015 -11535 -12015 -12335 -12435 -11155 -2490 
170,000 -2965 -10195 -11145 -11655 -12165 -12555 -12805 -11695 -2790 
180,000 -2965 -10335 -11235 11775 -12315 -12775 -13075 -12235 -3090 
190,000 -2965 -10475 -11325 -11895 -12465 -12995 -13345 -12775 -3390 
200,000 -2965 -10615 -11415 -12015 -12615 -13215 -13615 -13315 -3690 
APPENDIX B-10 
-------------
DIFFERENCES IN TAX PAYABLE 
MARRIED COUPLE - INDIVIDU.ALS 
100:0 
TAXABLE INCOME 1985 1986 1967 1986 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
= = == == == = = === == = = = == == ===== == == = == == = = = ==== == ======= = == == = = = == == = = = == == = = = == = 
5000 -131 -79 -116 -45 0 0 0 0 0 
10000 -265 -300 -266 -290 -350 -400 0 0 0 
15000 -491 -491 -436 -447 -510 -560 -460 -425 -425 
20000 -799 -711 -631 -653 -710 -760 -700 -625 -625 
30000 -1558 -1150 -1021 -1063 -1110 -1160 -1390 -1275 -1325 
40000 :.._1699 -1502 -1333 -1447 -1450 -1500 -2120 -1975 -2125 
50000 -1902 -1907 -1693 -1684 -1650 -1700 -2550 -2375 -2625 
60000 -1902 -2126 -1889 -1767 -1910 -1960 -2840 -2665 -2765 
70000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2110 -2160 -3040 -2865 -2865 
80000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
90000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
100000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
110000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
120000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
130000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
140000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
150000 -1902 -2134 -1695 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
160000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
170000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
180000 -1902 -2134 -1695 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
190000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
200000 -1902 -2134 -1895 -1790 -2210 -2260 -3140 -2965 -2965 
DIFFERENCES IN TAX PAYABLE 
MARRIED COUPLE - INDIVIDU.ALS 
50:50 
TAXABLE INCOME 1985 1968 1967 1968 1969 1990 1991 1992 1993 
= = == == == = = = == == = = = == == = = === == = = ====== == == == = == == == = = = == == = = = == == = = = == == = = = == = 
5000 -205 -79 -116 -45 0 0 0 0 0 
10000 -503 -574 -540 -627 -650 -375 80 0 0 
15000 -869 -848 -789 -855 -907 -700 -550 -545 -475 
20000 -1311 -1190 -1158 -1227 -1267 -1295 -1360 -1285 -1200 
30000 -2230 -1800 -2079 -2244 -2461 -2755 -2860 -2695 -2475 
40000 -2663 -2272 -3019 -3247 -4547 -4475 -4320 -4075 -3675 
50000 -2702 -2695 -3876 -4093 -5566 -5925 -5760 -5455 -5525 
60000 -2702 -2949 -4625 -4757 -6069 -7175 -7130 -6755 -7315 
70000 -2702 -2990 -5220 -5333 -6538 -8165 -6270 -7645 -6415 
80000 -2702 -2990 -5695 -5640 -6869 -8935 -9180 -8705 -9515 
90000 -2702 -2990 -6170 -6346 -7150 -9485 -9880 -9355 -10115 
100000 -2702 -2990 -6645 -6852 -7317 -10035 -10430 -9855 -10~15 
110000 -2702 -2990 -7120 -7358 -7778 -10535 -10930 -10305 -10965 
120000 -2702 -2990 -7595 -7865 -6285 -11465 -11380 -10705 -11215 
130000 -2702 -2990 -8070 -8371 -8791 -11935 -11760 -11055 -11415 
140000 -2702 -2990 -8545 -8877 -9297 -12335 -12160 -11405 -11615 
150000 -2702 -2990 -9020 -9363 -9603 -12735 -12530 -11705 -11615 
160000 -2702 -2990 -9495 -9890 -10310 -13065 -12860 -12005 -12015 
170000 -2702 -2990 -9970 -10396 -10816 -13435 -13180 -12255 -12165 
180000 -2702 -2990 -10445 -10902 -11322 -13785 -13480 -12505 -12315 
190000 -2702 -2990 -10920 -11408 -11628 -14135 -13760 -12755 -12465 
200000 -2702 -2990 -11395 -11915 -12335 -14135 -14060 -13005 -12615 
DIFFERENCES IN TAX PAYABLE 
MARRIED COUPLE - INDIVIDU.ALS 
0:100 
TAXABLE INCOME 1985 1986 1987 1966 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
= = = === == = = === === = = == == == = ==== = == == == == = == == == ===== = = = ===== = = == == = = = ===== = = == = 
5000 -205 -79 -116 -45 0 175 80 0 0 
10000 -503 -574 -570 -627 -650 675 1040 940 900 
15000 -869 -648 -986 -1028 -1072 1175 1100 1105 1050 
20000 -1311 -1190 -1646 -1751 -1775 1055 1100 1175 1050 
30000 -2230 -1800 -3056 -3310 -3307 515 1020 1235 1050 
40000 -2683 -2272 -4625 -4961 -5102 -185 740 1065 1050 
50000 -2702 -2695 -6061 -6425 -6276 -685 360 635 750 
80000 :-2702 -2949 -7317 -7689 -7545 -1345 -160 395 510 
70000 -2702 -2990 -6463 -6817 -8625 -2045 -780 -105 210 
80000 -2702 -2990 -9495 -9890 -10050 -2745 -1360 -605 -90 
90000 -2702 -2990 -10445 -10902 -11217 -3445 -1960 -1105 -390 
100000 -2702 -2990 -11395 -11915 -12310 -4145 -2560 -1605 -690 
110000 -2702 -2990 -12345 -12927 -13347 
-4645 -3180 -2105 -990 
120000 -2702 -2990 -13295 -13940 -14360 -5545 -3780 -2605 -1290 
130000 -2702 -2990 -14245 -14952 -15372 -6245 -4380 -3105 -1590 
140000 -2702 -2990 -15195 -15965 -16385 -6945 -4980 -3605 -1690 
150000 -2702 -2990 -16145 -16977 -17397 -7645 -5560 -4105 -2190 
160000 -2702 -2990 -17095 -17990 -18410 -8345 -6180 -4605 -2490 
170000 -2702 -2990 -18045 -19002 -19422 -9045 -6780 -5105 -2790 
180000 -2702 -2990 -18995 -20015 -20435 -9745 -7360 -5605 -3090 
190000 -2702 -2990 -19945 '-21027 -21447 -10445 -7980 -6105 -3390 
200000 -2702 -2990 -20895 -22040 -22460 -11145 -8560 -6605 -3690 
APPENDIX C: 
AVERAGE ANNUAL CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND INFLATION RATE FOR THE PERIOD 
1985 TO 1994 
YEAR CONSUMER PRICE INDEX INFLATION RATE 
1985 49,1 16,4% 
1986 58,2 18,5% 
1987 67,6 16,2% 
1988 76,2 12,7% 
1989 87,4 14,7% 
1990 100,0 14,4% 
1991 115,3 15,3% 
1992 131,3 13,9% 
1993 144,1 9,7% 
*Source: South African Reserve Bank; Quarterly Bulletin; March 1994 
----------
1992/1993 100:0 MARRIED 80:20 
INFLATION 
1985 ADJUSTED----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INCOME INCOME UNMARRIE[ M .RATE% HUSBAND WIFE COMBINED M.RATE% HUSBAND TAX WIFE TAX COMBINED M.RATE% 
================================================================= = = = = = ========== = = = = = ========================= 
5000 17050 1392 8.164222 885 NIL 885 5.190615 13640 216.6 3410 -320.3 216.6 1.270381 
10000 34100 6376 18.69794 4723 NIL 4723 13.85043 27280 3003.8 6820 295.8 3299.6 9.676246 
15000 51150 13083 25.57771 10446.5 NIL 10446.5 20.42326 40920 6706.2 10230 948.3 7654.5 14.96480 
20000 68200 20366 29.86217 17519 NIL 17519 25.68768 54560 11844.6 13640 1664.4 13509 19.80791 
30000 102300 35029 34.24144 32064 NIL 32064 31.34310 81840 23266.2 20460 3278.8 26545 25.94819 
40000 136400 49692 36.43108 46727 NIL 46727 34.25733 109120 34996.6 27280 5188.4 40185 29.46114 
50000 170500 64355 37.74486 61390 NIL 61390 36.00586 136400 46727 34100 7426 54153 31.76129 
60000 204600 79018 38.62072 76053 NIL 76053 37.17155 163680 58457.4 40920 9899.6 68357 33.41006 
70000 238700 93681 39.24633 90716 NIL 90716 38.00418 190960 70187.8 47740 12491.2 82679 34.63720 
80000 272800 108344 39.71554 105379 NIL 105379 38.62866 218240 81918.2 54560 15174 97092.2 35.59098 
90000 306900 123007 40.08048 120042 NIL 120042 39.11436 245520 93648.6 61380 17902 111550.6 36.34753 
100000 341000 137670 40.37243 134705 NIL 134705 39.50293 272800 105379 68200 20630 126009 36.95278 
70:30 MARRIED 70:30 60:40 MARRIED 
1985 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INCOME HUSBAND TAX WIFE TAX COMBINED M.RATE%. HUSBAND TAX WIFE TAX COMBINED M.RATE%. 
================= = = = = = ========== = = = = = ========================== = = = = = ========== = = === ================= 
5000 11935 -107.35 5115 -28.15 NIL 0 10230 -431.3 6820 295.8 295.8 1.734897 
10000 23870 2287.7 10230 948.3 3236 9.489736 20460 1571.6 13640 1664.4 3236 9.489736 
15000 35805 5200.4 15345 2022.45 7222.85 14.12091 30690 3768.2 20460 3278.8 7047 13.n712 
20000 4n4o 9161.4 20460 3278.8 12440.2 18.24076 40920 6706.2 27280 5188.4 11894.6 17.44076 
30000 71610 18951.2 30690 6198.4 25149.6 24.58416 61380 14654.6 40920 9899.6 24554.2 24.00215 
40000 95480 29131.4 40920 9899.6 39031 28.61510 81840 23266.2 54560 15174 38440.2 28.18196 
50000 119350 39395.5 51150 13810 53205.5 31.20557 102300 32064 68200 20630 52694 30.90557 
60000 143220 49659.6 61380 17902 67561.6 33.02130 122760 40861.8 81840 26086 66947.8 32.72130 
70000 167090 59923.7 71610 21994 81917.7 34.31826 143220 49659.6 95480 31542 81201.6 34.01826 
80000 190960 70187.8 81840 26086 96273.8 35.29098 163680 58457.4 109120 36998 95455.4 34.99098 
90000 214830 80451.9 92070 30178 110629.9 36.04753 184140 67255.2 122760 42454 109709.2 35.74753 
100000 238700 90716 102300 34270 124986 36.65278 204600 76053 136400 47910 123963 36.35278 
50:50 MARRIED 40:60 MARRIED 
1985 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INCOME HUSBAND TAX WIFE TAX COMBINED M.RATE%. HUSBAND TAX WIFE TAX COMBINED M.RATE% 
================= = = == =========== = = = = = ========================== = = = = = ========== = = = = ==================·. 
5000 8525 -775.75 8525 619.75 619.75 3.634897 6820 -1065.6 10230 948.3 948.3 5.561876 
10000 17050 885 17050 2442 3327 9.756598 13640 216.6 20460 3276.8 3495.4 10.25043 
15000 25575 2645.75 25575 4711 7356.75 14.38269 20460 1571.6 30690 6198.4 n70 15.19061 
20000 34100 4723 34100 7426 12149 17.81378 27280 3003.8 40920 9899.6 12903.4 18.91994 
30000 51150 10446.5 51150 13810 24256.5 23.71114 40920 6706.2 61380 17902 24608.2 24.05493 
40000 68200 17519 68200 20630 38149 27.96847 54560 11844.6 81840 26086 37930.6 27.80835 
50000 85250 24732.5 85250 27450 52182.5 30.60557 68200 10791.65 102300 34270 45061.65 26.42912 
60000 102300 32064 102300 34270 66334 32.42130 81840 23266.2 122760 42454 65720.2 32.12130 
70000 119350 39395.5 119350 41090 80485.5 33.71826 95480 29131.4 143220 50638 79769.4 33.41826 
80000 136400 46727 136400 47910 94637 34.69098 109120 34996.6 163680 58822 93818.6 34.39098 
90000 153450 54058.5 153450 54730 108788.5 35.44753 122760 40861.8 184140 67006 107867.8 35.14753 
100000 170500 61390 170500 61550 122940 36.05278 136400 46727 204600 75190 121917 35.75278 
30:70 MARRIED .20:80 MARRIED 0:100 
1985 
-------------------------
-------------....------------------------------------ .,. _________________________ ----- ,. ________________ 
INCOME HUSBAND TAX WIFE TAX COMBINED M.RATE% HUSBAND TAX WIFE TAX COMBINED M.RATE% HUSBAND WIFE COMBINED M.RATE% 
=======:========= = = = = ========== = = = = ========================== = = = = = ========== = = = =========================== = = = = ================== 
5000 5115 -1354.3 11935 1306.35 1306.35 7.661876 3410 -1645.3 13640 1664.4 1664.4 9.761876 NIL 17050 2442 14.32258 
10000 10230 -431.3 23870 4233.6 4233.6 12.41524 6820 -1047.4 27280 5188.4 5188.4 15.21524 NIL 34100 7426 21.77712 
15000 15345 544 35805 8039.8 8583.8 16.78162 10230 -431.3 40920 9899.6 9899.6 19.35405 NIL 51150 13810 26.99902 
20000 20460 1571.6 47740 12491.2 14062.8 20.61994 13640 216.6 54560 15174 15390.6 22.56686 NIL 68200 20630 30.24926 
30000 30690 2065.296 71610 21994 24059.29 23.51837 20460 1571.6 81840 26086 27657.6 27.03577 NIL 102300 34270 33.49951 
40000 40920 6706.2 95480 31542 38248.2 28.04120 27280 3003.8 109120 36998 40001.8 29.32683 NIL 136400 47910 35.12463 
50000 51150 10446.5 119350 41090 51536.5 30.22668 34100 9605.22 136400 47910 57515.22 33.73326 NIL 170500 61550 36.09970 
60000 61380 14654.6 143220 50638 65292.6 31.91231 40920 6706.2 163680 58822 65528.2 32.02746 NIL 204600 75190 36.74975 
70000 71610 18867.3 167090 60186 79053.3 33.11826 47740 9161.4 190960 69734 78895.4 33.05211 NIL 238700 88830 37.21407 
80000 81840 23266.2 190960 69734 93000.2 34.09098 54560 11844.6 218240 80646 92490.6 33.90417 NIL 272800 102470 37.56231 
90000 92070 27665.1 214830 79282 106947.1 34.84753 61380 14654.6 245520 915~ 106212.6 34.60821 NIL 306900 116110 37.83317 
APPENDIX E-1 
ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF TAXPAYERS AND TAX ASSESSED IN INCOME GROUPS IN 1993 
------------------------------------------------------
MARRIED PERSONS UNMARRIED PERSONS MARRIED WOMEN TOTAL 
INCOME GROUP NUMBER TAX NUMBER TAX NUMBER TAX NUMBER TAX 
-------------- ....... ____ --------------------------------- ______ _,... -----------------------------------
R R R R R R 
0 5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 000 10,000 0 0 0 0 65,665 25,337,816 65,665 25,337,816. 
10,000 15,000 153,406 26,448,829 198,298 95,668,766 104,212 153,292,298 455,916 275,409,893 
15,000 20,000 496,701 359,019,449 179,785 269,595,801 95,064 224,162,902 771,550 852,778,151 
20,000 25,000 340,158 596,102,052 123,030 341,401,725 95,371 326,970,761 558,559 1,264,474,538 
25,000 30,000 224,551 625,260,208 75,079 312,060,943 83,965 422,347,511 383,595 1 ,359,668,662 
30,000 35,000 161,404 648,545,767 59,660 342,442,327 69,060 468,637,746 290,124 1,459,625,840 
35,000 40,000 121,889 663,385,278 43,586 329,550,001 47,416 415,589,506 212,891 1,408,524,785 
40,000 45,000 110,027 779,799,107 36,490 346,759,112 33,607 349,215,700 180,124 1,475,773,919 
45,000 50,000 104,162 924,970,960 29,921 345,669,829 22,782 279,250,472 156,865 1 ,549,891 ,261 
50,000 60,000 181,689 2,139,015,235 38,761 563,577,919 26,940 404,972,343 247,391 3,107,565,497 
60,000 70,000 133,575 2,117,024,935 22,914 429,590,553 11,054 209,955,029 167,544 2, 756,570,517 
70,000 80,000 88,394 1,770,399,188 12,277 283,101,199 3,871 88,923,569 104,542 2,142,423,955 
80,000 90,000 113,339 2,748,587,798 13,586 371,939,175 6,958 190,462,108 133,883 3,310,989,081 
90,000 100,000 73,585 2,1 02,934,551 8,251 261,510,113 4,214 130,425,284 86,051 2,494,869,949 
100,000 150,000 98,105 3,814,670,971 9,409 391,207,665 5,372 210,537,015 112,886 4,416,415,652 
150,000 + 38,290 3,696,256,245 3,105 343,322,222 1,554 220,059,542 42,949 4,259,638,008 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2,439,276 23,012,420,574 854,151 5,027,397,348 677,107 4, 120,139,600 3,970,534 32,159,957,522 
APPENDIX E -2 
ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF TAXPAYERS AND TAX ASSESSED IN INCOME GROUPS IN 1994 
-- --------~------------------------------------------
MARRIED PERSONS UN MARRIED PERSONS 
INCOME GROUP NUMBER TAX NUMBER TAX 
MARRIED WOMEN 
NUMBER TAX 
TOTAL 
NUMBER TAX 
-------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R R R R R R 
0 5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 000 10,000 0 0 0 0 66,730 25,749,002 66,730 25,749,002 
10,000 15,000 181,383 31,515,427 218,563 104,268,187 105,903 155,779,954 505,549 291,563,568 
15,000 20,000 543,292 399,470,808 194,864 293,207,478 96,607 227,800,659 834,763 920,478,945 
20,000 25,000 390,151 687,022,230 140,415 388,908,650 96,919 332,276,903 627,485 1,408,217,783 
25,000 30,000 269,131 752,053,223 96,875 403,602,329 85,328 429,201 ,444 451,334 1,584,856,996 
30,000 40,000 336,958 1,564,589,765 129,696 846,966,543 118,367 898,576,655 585,020 3,310,132,963 
40,000 50,000 253,009 1,995,875,811 79,036 820,749,982 57,304 638,665,037 389,349 3,455,290,830 
50,000 60,000 233,287 2, 769,208 '703 51,220 750,930,233 27,377 411,544,309 311,885 3,931,683,244 
60,000 70,000 209,749 3,336,440,225 39,017 735,419,392 11,233 213,362,218 259,998 4,285,221 ,835 
70,000 80,000 97,281 1,953,149,088 13,354 308,389,163 3,934. 90,366,637 114,569 2,351,904,887 
80,000 90,000 68,523 1 ,665,205,139 8,218 225,287,035 7,071 193,552,962 83,813 2,084,045,136 
90,000 100,000 46,289 1,324,132,965 5,063 160,534,655 4,283 132,541 ,850 55,634 1,617,209,4 70 
100,000 150,000 121,353 4,734,728,143 11,051 459,542,620 5,460 213,953,648 137,863 5,408,224,412 
150,000 44,859 4,406,121 ,588 3,161 354,125,085 1,579 223,630,708 49,599 4,983,877,381 
----
...._ _____ 
-- ____ ....._ -------------------------------------------------------------
2,795,265 25,619,513,115 990,233 5,851,931 ,350 688,095 4,187,001,987 4,473,594 35,658,446,452 
APPENDIX F 
------~ 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
TAX CALCULATION BASED ON THE KA1Z COMMISSION PROPOSALS 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
----------------· ·---------------------------
1992/1993 R R R R R R R R R 
==================:============================================================= 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0· 
8,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .o 
14,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32,000 0 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -·540 -540 0 
34,000 0 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1080 0 
36,000 0 -1620 -1620 -1620 -1620 -1620 -1620 -1620 0 
38,000 0 -2052 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2052 0 
40,000 0 -2160 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2160 0 
50,000 0 -2700 -4050 -5400 -5400 -5400 -4050 -2700 0 
60,000 0 -3540 -5160 -6780 -8400 -6780 -5160 -3540 0 
70,000 0 -4200 -6270 -8160 -8700 -8160 -6270 -4200 0 
80,000 0 -4800 -7200 -9000 -9000 -9000 -7200 -4800 0 
90,000 0 -5400 -8100 -9180 -9300 -9100 -8100 -5400 0 
100,000 0 -6000 -9000 -9300 -9600 -9300 -9000 -6000 0 
110,000 0 -6900 -9390 -9720 -9900 -9720 -9390 -6900 0 
120,000 0 -7800 -9780 -10140 -10200 -10140 -9780 -7800 0 
130,000 0 -8580 -10170 -10500 -10500 -10500 -10170 -8580 0 
140,000 0 -9240 -10560 -10800 -10800 -10800 -10560 -9240 0 
150,000 0 -9900 -10800 -11100 -11100 -11100 -10800 -9900 0 
160,000 0 -10320 -11280 -11700 -11700 -11700 -11280 -10320 0 
170,000 0 -10740 -11730 -12240 -12300 -12240 -11730 -10740 0 
180,000 0 -11160 -12120 -12660 -12900 -12660 -12120 -11160 0 
190,000 0 -11520 -12510 -13080 -13500 -13080 -12510 -11520 0 
APPENDIX G-1 
RECOMMENDATION 1: 
THE 1994 TAXATION LEGISlATION ADJUSTED FOR TRANSFERABLE ALLOWANCES 
R2 225 AND R900 TRANSFERABLE 
INCOME 1992/1993 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
1992/1993 UNMARRIEICOMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED 
=======:======~======================================================================== 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13.000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80.000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
60 
270 
480 
690 
900 
1140 
1380 
1620 
1860 
2100 
2660 
3220 
3780 
4340 
4900 
5620 
6340 
7060 
7780 
8500 
12600 
16840 
21140 
25440 
29740 
34040 
38340 
42640 
46940 
51240 
55540 
59840 
64140 
68440 
72740 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
65 
245 
475 
675 
875 
1075 
1275 
1475 
1895 
2315 
2735 
3155 
3575 
4135 
4695 
5255 
5815 
6375 
9975 
14075 
18275 
22475 
26775 
31075 
35375 
39675 
43975 
48275 
52575 
56875 
61175 
65475 
69775 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
73 
261 
455 
843 
1231 
1631 
2043 
2455 
2867 
3279 
3691 
4131 
4655 
7275 
10575 
14175 
17945 
21785 
25625 
29625 
33625 
37625 
41625 
45625 
49785 
53945 
58105 
62265 
___ ,_ _ _, ... "~-"t:lo___ ""'~- ~,._n7.:: ~~,. ... c:::.-..._ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
235 
425 
809 
1203 
1597 
1991 
2395 
2803 
3215 
3635 
4055 
4475 
6925 
9765 
13045 
16705 
20445 
24225 
28245 
32305 
36395 
40525 
44675 
48825 
52995 
57205 
61415 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
235 
425 
805 
1185 
1579 
1987 
2395 
2803 
3215 
3635 
4061 
4505 
6725 
9525 
12485 
15925 
19725 
23625 
27665 
31705 
35785 
39945 
44125 
48305 
52485 
56665 
60845 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
55 
240 
425 
825 
1225 
1625 
2025 
2425 
2865 
3305 
3745 
4185 
4625 
7075 
9525 
12725 
15925 
19625 
23325 
27375 
31425 
35525 
39625 
43725 
47825 
51975 
56125 
60275 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
89 
287 
485 
881 
1277 
1695 
2135 
2575 
3015 
3471 
3959 
4449 
4945 
7425 
10425 
13465 
16725 
20205 
23725 
27565 
31405 
35345 
39385 
43425 
47505 
51585 
55665 
59745 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
143 
344 
545 
959 
1403 
1847 
2291 
2775 
3275 
3777 
4283 
4789 
5295 
8225 
11385 
14655 
18065 
21495 
24925 
28565 
32205 
35845 
39645 
43525 
47405 
51335 
55365 
59395 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9 
211 
419 
645 
1097 
1549 
2035 
2555 
3072 
3595 
4115 
4635 
5187 
5835 
9075 
12495 
16035 
19625 
23225 
26825 
30445 
34065 
37685 
41305 
44925 
48685 
52445 
56205 
59965 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
205 
445 
685 
925 
1485 
2045 
2605 
3165 
3725 
4445 
5165 
5885 
6605 
7325 
11125 
15125 
19125 
23125 
27125 
31125 
35125 
39125 
43125 
47125 
51125 
55125 
59125 
63125 
67125 
~~ _s_.,.2 ... r 7r;;~,_"c; 
APPENDIX G- 2 
CALCULATIONS FOR RECOMMENDATION 1WO 
-------------~-~--------- -
TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 1994/1995 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ -------
94/95 UNMARRIE!TOTAL TAX TOTAL TAX TOTAL TAX TOTAL TAXTOTAL TAX TOTAL TAX TOTAL TAX TOTAL TAX TAX 
========= ====~=======================~==========================================:===== 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11,000 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12,000 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13,000 480 65 95 95 95 95 95 95 0 65 
14,000 690 245 285 285 285 285 285 285 102 245 
15.000 900 475 475 475 475 475 475 0 270 475 
16,000 1140 675 675 675 675 675 675 102 438 675 
17,000 1380 875 875 875 875 875 0 249 606 875 
18,000 1620 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075 18 396 774 1075 
19,000 1860 1275 1275 1275 1275 1275 144 543 948 1275 
20,000 2100 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475 270 690 1140 1475 
22.000 2660 1895 1895 1895 1895 120 522 996 1524 1895 
24,000 3220 2315 2315 2315 2315 540 774 1332 1908 2315 
26,000 3780 2735 2735 2735 1044 960 1044 1668 2324 2735 
28,000 4340 3155 3155 3155 1434 1380 1434 2004 2772 3155 
30,000 4900 3575 3575 3575 1890 1800 1890 2380 3220 3575 
32,000 5620 4135 4135 4135 2346 2280 2346 2772 3668 4135 
34,000 6340 4695 4695 3164 2818 2760 2818 3164 4116 4695 
36,000 7060 5255 5255 3574 3322 3240 3322 3574 4564 5255 
38,000 7780 5815 5815 4092 3832 3720 3832 4092 5044 5815 
40,000 8500 6375 6375 4610 4360 4200 4360 4610 5620 6375 
50,000 12600 9975 9975 7600 7000 7000 7000 7600 8500 9975 
60,000 16840 14075 12050 10940 10280 9800 10280 10940 12050 14075 
70,000 21140 18275 15810 14570 13660 13400 13660 14570 15810 18275 
80,000 25440 22475 19700 18340 17400 17000 17400 18340 19700 22475 
90,000 29740 26775 23620 22190 21340 21100 21340 22190 23620 26775 
100,000 34040 31075 27540 26040 25340 25200 25340 26040 27540 31075 
110,000 38340 35375 31540 30130 29560 29400 29560 30130 31540 35375 
120,000 42640 39675 35540 34220 33780 33680 33780 34220 35540 39675 
130,000 46940 43975 39540 38310 38020 37980 38020 38310 39540 43975 
140,000 51240 48275 43540 42500 42280 42280 42280 42500 43540 48275 
150.000 55540 52575 47540 46740 46580 46580 46580 46740 47540 52575 
160.000 59840 56875 51700 50980 50880 50880 50880 50980 51700 56875 
170,000 64140 61175 55860 55230 55180 55180 55180 55230 55860 61175 
180,000 68440 65475 60020 59500 59480 59480 59480 59500 60020 65475 
190.000 72740 69775 64180 63780 63780 63780 63780 63780 64180 69775 
200,000 77040 74075 68340 68080 68080 68080 68080 68080 68340 74075 
APPENDIX G-3 
RECOMMENDATION 3: 
-------- -------
TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
(DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) BASED ON THE KATZ COMMISSION PROPOSALS WITH DEPENDANT ALLOWANCE 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNMARRIE[ TAX JOINT JOINT JOINT JOINT JOINT JOINT JOINT TAX 
=~===========~===========~=========~~================================================== 
1,000 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.000 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.000 360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 630 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
8,000 720 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 160 
9,000 810 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
10,000 900 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 
11,000 990 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
12,000 1060 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
13,000 1170 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 
14.000 1260 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 
15,000 1350 810 810 810 810 810 610 810 610 810 
16.000 1440 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 
17,000 1530 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 
18,000 1620 1080 1060 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
19,000 1710 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 
20,000 1800 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
22,000 1980 1440 1440 1440 1440 1980 1440 1440 1440 1440 
24,000 2160 1620 1620 1620 1620 2160 1620 1620 1620 1620 
26,000 2340 1800 1800 1800 2340 2340 2340 1800 1600 1800 
28,000 2520 1980 1980 1980 2520 2520 2520 1980 1980 1980 
30.000 2700 2160 2160 2160 2700 2700 2700 2160 2160 2160 
32,000 3420 2340 2340 2340 2880 2880 2880 2340 2340 2340 
34,000 4140 2520 2520 3060 3060 3060 3060 3060 2520 2520 
36,000 4860 2700 2700 3240 3240 3240 3240 3240 2700 2700 
38,000 5580 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 
40,000 6300 4140 4140 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 4140 4140 
50,000 9900 7740 7740 5850 4500 4500 4500 5850 7740 7740 
60,000 13800 11460 10260 8640 7020 5400 7020 8640 10260 11460 
70,000 17700 15360 13500 11430 9540 9000 9540 11430 13500 15360 
80.000 21600 19260 16800 14400 12600 12600 12600 14400 10000 19260 
90.000 25500 23160 20100 17400 16320 16200 16320 17400 20100 23160 
100,000 29400 27060 23400 20400 20100 19800 20100 20400 23400 27060 
110,000 33600 31080 26700 24210 23880 23700 23880 24210 26700 31080 
120,000 37800 35280 30000 28020 27660 27600 27660 28020 30000 35260 
130,000 42000 39480 33420 31830 31500 31500 31500 31830 33420 39460 
140,000 46200 43680 36960 35640 35400 35400 35400 35640 36960 43660 
150.000 50400 47880 40500 39600 39300 39300 39300 39600 40500 47880 
160,000 54900 52080 44580 43620 43200 43200 43200 43620 44580 52080 
170.000 59400 56280 48660 47670 47160 47100 47160 47670 48660 56280 
180,000 63900 60480 52740 51780 51240 51000 51240 51780 52740 60480 
190,000 68400 64680 56880 55890 55320 54900 55320 55890 56880 64680 
200,000 72900 68880 61200 60000 59400 58800 59400 60000 61200 68880 
APPENDIX G- 4 
RECOMMENDATION 4: 
-------------
TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
(DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATICOMBINATIONS) BASED ON THE KATZ COMMISSION'S PROPOSED RATES AND DEPENDANT REBATE 
INCOME 1994/1995 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994/1995 UNMARRIEICOMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED 
======================~~==============:=========================~=====~================ 
1,000 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 630 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8,000 720 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9,000 810 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10,000 900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11,000 990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12,000 1080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13,000 1170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14,000 1260 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15,000 1350 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16,000 1440 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17.000 1530 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18,000 1620 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19,000 1710 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20,000 1800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22.000 1980 0 0 0 0 1980 0 0 0 0 
24,000 2160 0 0 0 0 2160 0 0 0 0 
26,000 2340 0 0 0 2340 2340 2340 0 0 0 
28,000 2520 20 20 20 2520 2520 2520 20 20 20 
30,000 2700 200 200 200 2700 2700 2700 200 200 200 
32,000 3420 920 920 920 2880 2880 2880 920 920 920 
34,000 4140 1640 1640 3060 3060 3060 3060 3060 1640 1640 
36,000 4860 2360 2360 3240 3240 3240 3240 3240 2360 2360 
38,000 5580 3080 3080 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 3080 3080 
40,000 6300 3800 3800 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3800 3800 
50,000 9900 7400 7400 5850 4500 4500 4500 5850 7400 7400 
60,000 13800 11300 10260 8640 7020 5400 7020 8640 10260 11300 
70,000 17700 15200 13500 11430 9540 9000 9540 11430 13500 15200 
80,000 21600 19100 16800 14400 12600 12600 12600 14400 16800 19100 
90,000 25500 23000 20100 17400 16320 16200 16320 17400 20100 23000 
100,000 29400 26900 23400 20400 20100 19800 20100 20400 23400 26900 
110,000 33600 31100 26700 24210 23880 23700 23880 24210 26700 31100 
120,000 37800 35300 30000 28020 27660 27600 27660 28020 30000 35300 
130,000 42000 39500 33420 31830 31500 31500 3·f500 31830 33420 39500 
140.000 46200 43700 36960 35640 35400 35400 35400 35640 36960 43700 
150.000 50400 47900 40500 39600 39300 39300 39300 39600 40500 47900 
160.000 54900 52100 44580 43620 43200 43200 43200 43620 44580 52100 
170,000 59400 56300 48660 47670 47160 47100 47160 47670 48660 56300 
180,000 63900 60500 52740 51780 51240 51000 51240 51780 52740 60500 
190.000 68400 64700 56880 55890 55320 54900 55320 55890 56880 64700 
200,000 72900 68900 61200 60000 59400 58800 59400 60000 61200 68900 
APPENDIX G-5 
RECOMMENDATION 5: 
-----------------
TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
(DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) BASED ON THE KATZ COMMISSION PROPOSALS WITH 20% DEPENDANT ALLOWANCE 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNMARRIE[ TAX JOINT /COMJOINT /COMJOINT /COMJOINT /COMJOINT /COMJOINT /COMJOINT /COM TAX 
======================================================================================= 
1,000 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 630 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
8,000 720 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
9,000 810 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
10,000 900 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 
11,000 990 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
12,000 1080 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
13,000 1170 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 
14,000 1260 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 
15,000 1350 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 
16,000 1440 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 
17,000 1530 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 
18,000 1620 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
19,000 1710 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 
20,000 1800 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
22.000 1980 1440 1440 1440 1440 1980 1440 1440 1440 1440 
24,000 2160 1620 1620 1620 1620 2160 1620 1620 1620 1620 
26,000 2340 1800 1800 1800 2340 2340 2340 1800 1800 1800 
28,000 2520 1980 1980 1980 2520 2520 2520 1980 1980 1980 
30,000 2700 2160 2160 2160 2700 2700 2700 2160 2160 2160 
32,090 3420 2304 2304 2304 2880 2880 2880 2304 2304 2304 
34,000 4140 2448 2448 3060 3060 3060 3060 3060 2448 2448 
36,000 4860 2592 2592 3240 3240 3240 3240 3240 2592 2592 
38,000 5580 2844 2844 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 2844 2844 
40,000 6300 3420 3420 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3420 3420 
50,000 9900 6300 6300 5850 4500 4500 4500 5850 6300 6300 
60,000 13800 9180 10260 8640 7020 5400 7020 8640 10260 9180 
70,000 17700 12240 13500 11430 9540 9000 9540 11430 13500 12240 
80,000 21600 15360 16800 14400 12600 12600 12600 14400 16800 15360 
90,000 25500 18480 20100 17400 16320 16200 16320 17400 20100 18480 
100,000 29400 21600 23400 20400 20100 19800 20100 20400 23400 21600 
110,000 33600 24720 26700 24210 23880 23700 23880 24210 26700 24720 
120,000 37800 27840 30000 28020 27660 27600 27660 28020 30000 27840 
130,000 42000 31080 33420 31830 31500 31500 31500 31830 33420 31080 
140,000 46200 34440 36960 35640 35400 35400 35400 35640 36960 34440 
150,000 50400 37800 40500 39600 39300 39300 39300 39600 40500 37800 
160,000 54900 41160 44580 43620 43200 43200 43200 43620 44580 41160 
170,000 59400 44520 48660 47670 47160 47100 47160 47670 48660 44520 
180,000 63900 47880 52740 51780 51240 51000 51240 51780 52740 47880 
190,000 68400 51240 56880 55890 55320 54900 55320 55890 56880 51240 
200,000 72900 54600 61200 60000 59400 58800 59400 60000 61200 54600 
APPENDIX H -1 
RECOMMENDATION 1: 
_____ ,...... _______ 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
THE 1994 TAXATION LEGISLATION ADJUSTED FOR TRANSFERABLE ALLOWANCES 
R2 225 AND R900 TRANDIFFERENCES IN TAX PAYABLE 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
------------------~-------------------------------------------------------------
R R R R R R R R R 
==~~=~========================================================================== 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 o. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11,000 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 
12,000 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 
13,000 -480 -480 -480 -480 -480 -480 -480 -480 -480 
14,000 -690 -690 -690 -690 -690 -690 -690 -690 -690 
15,000 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 
16,000 -1140 -1140 1140 -1140 1140 -1140 1140 -1140 1140 
17,000 -1380 -1380 -1380 -1380 -1380 -1380 -1380 -1371 -1175 
18,000 -1445 1547 -1575 -1575 -1565 1531 -1477 -1409 -1175 
19,000 -1485 -1599 -1625 -1625 -1620 -1573 -1516 -1441 -1175 
20,000 -1525 -1645 1675 -1675 -1675 -1615 1555 -1455 -1175 
22,000 -1665 -1817 -1851 -1855 -1835 -1779 -1701 -1563 -1175 
24,000 -1805 -1989 -2017 -2035 -1995 1943 -1817 -1671 -1175 
26,000 -1945 -2149 -2183 -2201 -2155 -2085 -1933 -1745 -1175 
28,000 -2085 -2297 -2349 -2353 -2315 -2205 -2049 -1785 -1175 
30,000 -2225 -2445 -2505 -2505 -2475 -2325 -2125 -1828 -1175 
32,000 -2385 -2753 -2817 -2817 -2755 -2605 -2345 -2025 -1175 
34,000 -2545 -3061 -3125 -3125 -3035 -2869 -2563 -2225 -1175 
36.000 -2705 -3369 -3425 -3425 -3315 -3101 -2777 -2425 -1175 
38,000 -2865 -3649 -3725 -3719 -3595 -3331 -2991 -2593 -1175 
40,000 -3025 -3845 -4025 -3995 -3875 -3555 -3205 -2665 -1175 
50,000 -3525 -5325 -5675 -5875 -5525 -5175 -4375 -3525 -1475 
60,000 -3665 -6265 -7075 -7315 -7315 -6415 -5455 -4345 1715 
70,000 -3765 -6965 -8095 -8655 -8415 -7675 -6485 -5105 -2015 
80,000 -3865 -7495 -8735 -9515 -9515 -8715 -7375 -5815 -2315 
90,000 -3865 -7955 -9295 -10015 -10115 -9535 -8245 -6515 -2615 
100,000 -3865 -8415 -9815 -10415 -10715 -10315 -9115 -7215 -2915 
110,000 -3865 -8715 -10095 -10675 -10965 -10775 -9775 -7895 . -3215 
120.000 -3865 -9015 -10335 -10935 -11215 -11235 -10435 -8575 -3515 
130,000 -3865 -9315 -10545 -11155 11415 -11595 11095 -9255 -3815 
140,000 -3865 -9615 -10715 -11295 -11615 -11855 -11595 -9935 -4115 
150,000 -3865 -9915 -10865 11415 -11815 12115 -12015 -10615 -4415 
160,000 -3865 -10055 -11015 -11535 -12015 -12335 -12435 -11155 -4715 
170.000 -3865 -10195 -11145 -11655 12165 -12555 12805 -11695 -5015 
180,000 -3865 -10335 -11235 -11775 -12315 -12775 -13075 -12235 -5315 
190.000 -3865 10475 -11325 11895 -12465 -12995 -13345 12775 -5615 
200,000 -3865 -10615 -11415 12015 -12615 -13215 -13615 -13315 -5915 
APPENDIXH-2 
CALCULATIONS FOR RECOMMENDATION 1WO 
------------- ----------
--
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
-----------~------------------------------------------------------------------~-
94/95 A R R R R R R A R 
~========~=================================~=======~==============~============= 
1.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11,000 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 
12,000 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 
13,000 -415 -385 -385 -385 -385 -385 -385 -480 -415 
14,000 -445 -405 -405 -405 -405 -405 -405 -588 -445 
15,000 -425 -425 -425 -425 -425 -425 -900 -630 -425 
16,000 -465 -465 -465 -465 -465 -465 -1038 -702 -465 
17,000 -505 -505 -505 -505 -505 -1380 -1131 -774 -505 
18.000 -545 -545 -545 -545 -545 -1602 -1224 -846 -545 
19,000 -585 -585 -585 -585 -585 -1716 -1317 -912 -585 
20,000 -625 -625 -625 -625 -625 -1830 -1410 -960 -625 
22.000 -765 -765 -765 -765 -2540 -2138 1664 1136 -765 
24.000 -905 -905 -905 -905 -2680 -2446 -1888 -1312 -905 
26.000 1045 -1045 -1045 -2736 -2820 -2736 -2112 -1456 1045 
28.000 -1185 1185 -1185 -2906 -2960 -2906 -2336 -1568 -1185 
30,000 -1325 -1325 -1325 -3010 -3100 -3010 -2520 -1680 -1325 
32.000 -1485 -1485 -1485 -3274 -3340 -3274 -2848 -1952 -1485 
34.000 -1645 -1645 -3176 -3522 -3580 -3522 -3176 -2224 -1645 
36,000 -1805 -1805 -3486 -3738 -3820 -3738 -3486 -2496 -1805 
38.000 -1965 -1965 -3688 -3948 -4060 -3948 -3688 -2736 -1965 
40,000 -2125 -2125 -3890 -4140 -4300 -4140 -3890 -2880 -2125 
50,000 -2625 -2625 -5000 -5600 -5600 -5600 -5000 -4100 -2625 
60,000 -2765 -4790 -5900 -6560 -7040 -6560 -5900 -4790 -2765 
70,000 -2865 -5330 -6570 -7480 -7740 -7480 -6570 -5330 -2865 
80,000 -2965 -5740 -7100 -8040 -8440 -8040 -7100 -5740 -2965 
90,000 -2965" -6120 -7550 -8400 -8640 -8400 -7550 -'-6120 -2965 
100,000 -2965 -6500 -8000 -8700 -8840 -8700 -8000 -6500 -2965 
110,000 -2965 -6800 -8210 -8780 -8940 -8780 -8210 -6800 -2965 
120.000 -2965 -7100 -8420 -8860 -8960 -8860 -8420 -7100 -2965 
130.000 -2965 -7400 -8630 -8920 -8960 -8920 -8630 -7400 -2965 
140,000 -2965 -noo -8740 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8740 -7700 -2965 
150,000 -2965 -8000 -8800 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8800 -8000 -2965 
160.000 -2965 -8140 -8860 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8860 -8140 -2965 
170,000 -2965 -8280 -8910 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8910 -8280 -2965 
180,000 -2965 -8420 -8940 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8940 -8420 -2965 
190,000 -2965 -8560 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8560 -2965 
200,000 -2965 -8700 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8960 -8700 -2965 
APPENDIX H-3 
RECOMMENDATION 3: 
---
-------------
DIFFERENCES IN TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
(DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) BASED ON THE KATZ COMMISSION PROPOSALS WITH DEPENDANT ALLOWANCE 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 
.. 
50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
------------------~------------------~------------------------------------------
R A R R R R R R R 
===~==~~=======================================================~===============~ 
1.000 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 
2,000 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 
3,000 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 
4,000 -360 -360 -360 -360 -360 -360. -360 -360 -360 
5.000 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 
6,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
7,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
8.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
9,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
10.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
11,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
12.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
13.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
14.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
15.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
16,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
17.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
18.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
19.000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
20,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
22,000 -540 -540 
-540 -540 0 -540 -540 -540 -540 
24,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 0 -540 -540 -540 -540 
26,000 -540 -540 -540 0 0 0 -540 -540 -540 
28.000 -540 -540 -540 0 0 0 -540 -540 -540 
30,000 -540 -540 -540 0 0 0 -540 -540 -540 
32,000 -1080 1080 -1080 -540 -540 -540 -1080 -1080 -1080 
34.000 1620 1620 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1620 -1620 
36.000 -2160 -2160 -1620 -1620 -1620 -1620 -1620 -2160 2160 
38,000 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 
40,000 -2160 -2160 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2160 -2160 
50,000 -2160 -2160 -4050 -5400 -5400 -5400 -4050 -2160 -2160 
60.000 -2340 -3540 -5160 -6780 -8400 -6780 -5160 -3540 -2340 
70.000 -2340 -4200 -6270 -8160 -8700 -8160 -6270 -4200 -2340 
80,000 -2340 -4800 -7200 -9000 -9000 -9000 -7200 -4800 -2340 
90,000 -2340 -5400 -8100 -9180 -9300 -9180 -8100 -5400 -2340 
100,000 2340 -6000 -9000 -9300 -9600 -9300 -9000 -6000 -2340 
110,000 -2520 . -6900 -9390 -9720 -9900 -9720 -9390 -6900 -2520 
120,000 -2520 -7800 -9780 -10140 -10200 -10140 -9780 -7800 -2520 
130.000 -2520 -8580 -10170 -10500 -10500 10500 -10170 -8580 -2520 
140.000 -2520 -9240 10560 -10800 -10800 -10800 -10560 -9240 -2520 
150,000 -2520 -9900 10800 -11100 -11100 -11100 -10800 -9900 -2520 
160,000 -2820 -10320 11280 -11700 -11700 -11700 -11280 -10320 -2820 
170,000 -3120 -10740 -11730 -12240 -12300 -12240 -11730 -10740 -3120 
180.000 -3420 -11160 -12120 -12660 -12900 -12660 -12120 -11160 -3420 
190.000 -3720 -11520 -12510 -13080 -13500 -13080 -12510 -11520 -3720 
200.000 -4020 -11700 -12900 -13500 -14100 -13500 12900 11700 -4020 
APrENDIX H- 4 
RECOMMENDATION 4: 
DIFFERENCES IN TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
(DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) BASED ON THE KATZ COMMISSION'S PROPOSED RATES AND DEPENDANT REBATE 
INCOME 1094/1995 100:0 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
1994{1995 UN MAAR lEI R R R A R R R A 
=~~~======= :==~==================~========================================== 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12.000 
13.000 
14,000 
15,000 
16.000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24,000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
36.000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110.000 
120.000 
130.000 
140.000 
150,000 
160,000 
170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
00 
180 
270 
360 
450 
540 
630 
720 
810 
900 
990 
1080 
1170 
1260 
1350 
1440 
1530 
1620 
1710 
1800 
1980 
2160 
2340 
2520 
2700 
3420 
4140 
4860 
5580 
6300 
9900 
13800 
17700 
21600 
25500 
29400 
33600 
37800 
42000 
46200 
50400 
54900 
59400 
63900 
68400 
-90 
-180 
-270 
-360 
-450 
-540 
-630 
-720 
-810 
-900 
-990 
-1080 
-1170 
-1260 
-1350 
-1440 
-1530 
1820 
-1710 
-1800 
-1980 
-2160 
-2340 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2500 
-2800 
-3100 
-3400 
-3700 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-540 
-1080 
-1620 
-2160 
-2700 
-4050 
-5160 
-6270 
-7200 
-8100 
-9000 
-9390 
-9780 
-10170 
-10560 
-10800 
-11280 
-11730 
-12120 
-12510 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-540 
-1080 
-1620 
-2160 
-2700 
-5400 
-6780 
-8160 
-9000 
-9180 
-9300 
-9720 
10140 
10500 
-10800 
11100 
11700 
-12240 
12660 
13080 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-540 
-1080 
-1620 
-2160 
-2700 
-5400 
-8400 
-8700 
-9000 
-9300 
-9600 
-9900 
-10200 
-10500 
-10800 
-11100 
-11700 
-12300 
-12900 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-540 
-1080 
-1620 
-2160 
-2700 
-5400 
-6780 
-8160 
-9000 
-9180 
-9300 
-9720 
-10140 
-10500 
-10800 
-11100 
-11700 
-12240 
-12660 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-540 
-1080 
-1620 
-2160 
-2700 
-4050 
-5160 
-6270 
-7200 
-8100 
-9000 
-9390 
-9780 
-10170 
-10560 
-10800 
-11280 
-11730 
-12120 
0 -90 
0 -180 
0 -270 
0 -360 
0 -450 
0 -540 
0 -630 
0 -720 
0 -810 
0 -900 
0 -990 
0 -1080 
0 -1170 
0 -1260 
0 -1350 
0 . -1440 
0 -1530 
0 -1620 
0 -1710 
0 -1800 
0 -1980 
0 -2160 
0 -2340 
0 -2500 
0 -2500 
-540 -2500 
-1080 -2500 
-1620 -2500 
-2052 -2500 
-2160 -2500 
-2700 -2500 
-3540 -2500 
-4200 -2500 
-4800 -2500 
-5400 -2500 
-6000 -2500 
-6900 -2500 
-7800 -2500 
-8580 -2500 
-9240 -2500 
-9900 -2500 
-10320 -2800 
-10740 -3100 
-11160 -3400 
APPENDIX H-5 
RECOMMENDATION 5: 
------
----------
DIFFERENCES IN TAX PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE 
(DIFFERENT INCOME COMBIN_AJ.IONS) !3ASED ON THE KATZ COMMISSION PROPOSALS WITH 20% DEPENDANT AL 
INCOME 100:0 80:20 70:30 60:40 50:50 40:60 30:70 20:80 0:100 
--------------------------------------~-----------------------------------------
R R R R A A A A A 
=======~~==================~~=======================~=========================== 
1,000 -90 -90 
-90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 
2,000 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 180 
3,000 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 -270 
4,000 -360 -360 -360 -360 -360 -360 -360 -360 -360 
5,000 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 -450 
6,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
7,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
8,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
9,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
10,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
11,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
12,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
13,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
14,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
15,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
16,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
17,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
18,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
19,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
20,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 -540 
22,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 0 -540 -540 -540 -540 
24,000 -540 -540 -540 -540 0 -540 -540 -540 -540 
26,000 -540 -540 -540 0 0 0 -540 -540 -540 
28.000 -540 -540 -540 0 0 0 -540 -540 -540 
30,000 -540 -540 -540 0 0 0 -540 -540 -540 
32,000 -1116 1116 -1116 -?40 -540 -540 -1116 -1116 -1116 
34,000 -1692 1692 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1080 -1692 1692 
36,000 -2268 -2268 -1620 1620 -1620 -1620 -1620 -2268 -2268 
38,000 -2736 -2736 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2160 -2736 -2736 
40,000 -2880 -2880 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2700 -2880 -2880 
50,000 -3600 -'3600 -4050 -5400 -5400 -5400 -4050 -3600 -3600 
60,000 -4620 -3540 -5160 -6780 -8400 -6780 -5160 -3540 -4620 
70,000 -5460 -4200 -6270 -8160 -8700 -8160 -6270 -4200 -5460 
80,000 -6240 -4800 -7200 -9000 -9000 -9000 -7200 -4800 -6240 
90,000 -7020 -5400 -8100 -9180 -9300 -9180 -8100 -5400 -7020 
100,000 -7800 -6000 -9000 -9300 -9600 -9300 -9000 -6000 -7800 
110,000 -8880 -6900 -9390 -9720 -9900 -9720 -9390 -6900 -8880 
120,000 -9960 -7800 -9780 -10140 -10200 -10140 -9780 -7800 -9960 
130,000 -10920 -8580 10170 -10500 -10500 -10500 -10170 -8580 -10920 
140,000 -11760 -9240 10560 -10800 -10800 -10800 -10560 -9240 -11760 
150,000 -12600 -9900 -10800 -11100 11100 -11100 -10800 -9900 -12600 
160,000 -13740 -10320 -11280 -11700 -11700 -11700 11280 -10320 -13740 
170,000 -14880 10740 -11730 -12240 -12300 -12240 -11730 -10740 -14880 
180,000 -16020 11160 -12120 -12660 -12900 -12660 -12120 -11160 16020 
190.000 -17160 -11520 -12510 13080 -13500 -13080 -12510 -11520 -17160 
200,000 -18300 -11700 -12900 -13500 -14100 -13500 -12900 -11700 -18300 
APPENDIX 1-1 
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAYABlE 1993/94 AND RECOMMENDATION ONE 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABlE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPlE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
1993/94 TAX LEGISLATION WITH TRANSFERABlE •ALLOWANCES• 
1993/04 1993/04 RECOMM 1993/94 RECOMM 1993/94 RECOMM! 1993/94 RECOMN' 1 993/94 RECOMM.' 1993/94 RECOMW. 1993/94 RECOMM 1993194 RECOMM 1993/94 RECOMM' 
INCOME 100:0 100:0 80:20 80:20 70:30 70:30 60:40 80:40 50:50 50:50 40:150 40:150 30:70 30:70 20:80 20:80 0:100 0:100 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.. 
UNMARRIE! TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX 
==•==== ==a. llliill :a a; • =======' =====::::;tt; ========a::::::====:.•=====•=========aaa:::=a= ::;::r•a::a=========:ra ==rm======o===aa -=•=•=== c::-=:=:=:c;aa.a••===='&:A=====:::::~:::s=•aa•c::;:a=======;::aa•ma 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 
7,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 0 330 0 
8,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 !14 0 216 0 520 0 
9,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 197 0 368 0 710 0 
10,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 330 0 520 0 900 0 
11.000 eo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 254 0 483 0 872 0 1110 0 
\2,000 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 \40 0 388 0 Sll6 0 824 0 1320 0 
13,000 480 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 235 0 482 0 729 0 954 0 1530 0 
14,000 690 245 0 0 0 0 0 84 0 330 0 598 0 882 0 1152 0 1740 0 
15,000 900 475 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 425 0 710 0 1005 0 1320 0 1950 0 
18,000 1140 675 0 57 0 0 0 216 0 520 0 624 0 1152 0 1488 0 2190 0 
17,000 1380 875 0 209 0 0 0 292 0 515 0 942 0 1299 0 1558 9 2430 205 
15,000 1620 1075 175 361 73 45 45 388 45 710 55 10158 81l 1448 143 1824 211 2870 445 
19,000 1850 1275 375 515 261 235 235 444 235 605 240 1194 287 1593 344 1996 419 2910 885 
20,000 2100 1475 575 675 455 425 425 520 425 900 425 1320 485 1740 545 2190 845 3150 925 
22,000 2550 1895 91l5 995 843 809 809 805 805 1110 825 1572 881 2048 959 2574 1097 3710 1485 
24,000 3220 2315 1415 1315 1231 1203 1203 1185 1165 1320 1225 1824 12n 2382 1403 2958 1549 4270 2045 
28.000 3780 2735 1835 1643 1831 1597 1597 1579 1579 1825 1625 2094 1895 2718 1847 3374 2035 4830 2605 
28,000 4340 3155 2255 2043 2043 1991 1991 1987 1987 2025 2025 2382 2135 3054 2291 3822 2555 5390 3185 
30,000 4900 3575 2675 2455 2455 2395 2395 2395 2395 2425 2425 2670 2575 3430 2775 4270 3075 5950 3725 
32,000 5620 4135 3235 2867 2867 2603 2603 2803 2803 2685 2685 3015 3015 3822 3275 4718 3595 8670 4445 
34,000 6340 4695 3795 3279 3279 3215 3215 3215 3215 3305 3305 3471 3471 4214 37n 51158 4115 7390 5185 
36,000 7080 5255 4355 3891 3691 3835 3835 3835 3635 3745 3745 3959 3959 4800 4283 5814 4635 8110 5885 
38,000 7780 5815 4915 4131 4131 4055 4055 4061 4081 4185 4185 4449 4449 4998 4789 6094 5187 8830 8605 
40,000 8500 8375 5475 4855 4C555 4475 4475 4505 4505 4825 4625 4945 4945 5390 5295 8670 5835 9550 7325 
50,000 12800 9975 9075 7275 7275 6925 6925 8725 8725 7075 7075 7425 7425 8225 8225 9550 9075 13350 11125 
60,000 18640 14075 13175 10575 10575 9785 9785 9525 9525 51525 9525 10425 10425 11385 11385 12590 12495 17350 15125 
70,000 21140 18275 17375 14175 14175 13045 13045 12485 12485 127'25 12725 13485 13485 14855 14855 16035 18035 21350 19125 
80,000 25440 22475 21575 17945 17945 16705 Hl705 15925 15925 15925 15925 18725 16725 16005 18005 19825 19825 25350 23125 
90,000 29740 2ens 25875 21785 21785 20445 20445 19725 1 97'25 19825 19825 20205 20205 21495 21495 23225 23225 29350 27125 
100,000 34040 31075 30175 25825 25825 24225 24225 23825 23825 23325 23325 23725 23725 24925 24925. 28825 2!1825 33350 31125 
110,000 38340 35375 34475 29825 29825 28245 28245 27865 271585 27375 27375 27585 27565 28585 28585 30445 30445 37350 35125 
120,000 42640 39675 38n5 33825 33825 32305 32305 31705 31705 31425 31425 31405 31405 32205 32205 34005 34005 41350 39125 
130,000 46940 43975 43075 37825 . 37825 36395 36395 35785 35785 35525: 35525 35345 35345 35645 35645 37885 37885 45350 43125 
140,000 51240 48275 47375 41825 41825 40525 40525 39945 39945 39825' 39825 39385 39385 39645 39645 41305 41305 49350 47125 
150,000 55540 52575 51675 45825 45825 44675 44675 44125 44125 437'25 43725 43425 43425 43525 43525 44925 44925 53350 51125 
160,000 59640 56875 55975 49785 49785 48825 48825 48305 48305 47825 47825 47505 47505 47405 47405 48865 481585 57350 55125 
170.000 64140 (11175 60275 53945 53945 52995 52995 52485 52485 51975 51975 51585 51585 51335 51335 52445 52445 61350 59125 
160,000 68440 65475 64575 58105 58105 57205 57205 58865 56865 58125 56125 55865 551585 55385 55385 5(1205 56205 65350 (13125 
190,000 72740 69n5 68875 622155 822155 61415 !11415 !10645 60645 80275 60275 59745 59745 59395 59395 59965 59965 e935o (17125 
200,000 77040 74075 73175 66425 68425 85825 65825 65025 85025 84425 84425 83825 63825 63425 63425 83725 63725 73350 71125 
APPENDIX 1-2 
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAYABLE 1993/94 AND RECOMMENDATION TWO 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
1993/94 TAX LEGISLATION MARRIED PERSON RATES ONLY FOR BREADWINNERS 
1993/94 1993/94 RECOMM 1993/94 RECOMM 1993/94 RECOMM 1993/94 RECOM~ 1993/94 RECOMM 1993/94 RECOMM' 1993/94 RECOM"' 1993/94 RECOMM. 1993/~ 
INCOME 100:0 100:0 80:20 80:20 70:30 70:30 60:40 60:40 50:50 50:50 40:60 40:60 30:70 30:70 20:80 20:80 0:10( 
-----------------------------------------------------.... ..... ----------------------------------------·-------------------------------------------------------· 
UNMARRIE[ TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX 
<':!!;~======= = = = = ===~=====~===~==================================================================:=================•===================================· 
1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 
2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 0 
8.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 0 216 0 
9,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 197 0 368 0 
10.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 330 0 520 0 
11,000 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 254 0 463 0 672 0 11 
12,000 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 368 0 596 0 824 0 1: 
13.000 480 65 65 0 95 0 95 0 95 235 95 482 95 729 95 984 0 1! 
14,000 690 245 245 0 285 0 285 64 285 330 285 596 285 862 285 1152 102 1j 
15,000 900 475 475 0 475 0 475 140 475 425 475 710 475 1005 0 1320 270 I( 
16,000 1140 675 675 57 675 0 675 216 675 520 675 824 675 1152 102 1488 438' 21 
17,000 1380 875 875 209 875 0 875 292 875 615 875 942 0 1299 249 1656 606 2• 
18,000 1620 1075 1075 361 1075 45 1075 368 1075 710 1075 1068 18 1446 396 1824 774 2( 
19,000 1860 1275 1275 515 1275 235 1275 444 1275 805 1275 1194 144 1593 543 1998 948 2~ 
20.000 2100 1475 1475 675 1475 425 1475 520 1475 900 1475 1320 270 1740 690 2190 1140 3' 
22.000 2660 1895 1895 995 1895 809 1895 805 1895 •1110 120 1572 522 2046 996 2574 1524 3j 
24,000 3220 2315 2315 1315 2315 1203 2315 1185 2315 1320 540 1824 774 2382 1332 2958 1908 4; 
26,000 3780 2735 2735 1643 2735 1597 2735 1579 1044 1625 960 2094 1044 2718 1668 3374 2324 41 
28,000 4340 3155 3155 2043 3155 1991 3155 1987 1434 2025 1380 2382 1434 3054 2004 3822 2772 5: 
30,000 4900 3575 3575 2455 3575 2395 3575 2395 1890 2425 1800 2670 1890 3430 2380 4270 3220 5! 
32,000 5620 4135 4135 2867 4135 2803 4135 2803 2346 2865 2280 3015 2346 3822 2772 4718 3668 61 
34,000 6340 4695 4695 3279 4695 3215 3164 3215 2818 3305 2760 3471 2818 4214 3164 5166 4116 7: 
36.000 7060 5255 5255 3691 5255 3635 3574 3635 3322 3745 3240 3959 3322 4606 3574 5614 4564 a· 
38,000 7780 5815 5815 4131 5815 4055 4092 4061 3832 4185 3720 4449 3832 4998 4092 6094 5044 81 
40,000 8500 6375 6375 4655 6375 4475 4610 4505 4360 4625 4200 4945 4360 5390 4610 6670 5620 9: 
50.000 12600 9975 9975 7275 9975 6925 7600 6725 7000 7075 7000 7425 7000 8225 7600 9550 8500 13: 
60,000 16840 14075 14075 10575 12050 9765 10940 9525 10280 9525 9800 10425 10280 11385 11385 12590 12050 17: 
70,000 21140 18275 18275 14175 15810 13045 14570 12485 13660 12725 13400 13465 13660 14655 14655 16035 15810 21: 
80,000 25440 22475 22475 17945 19700 16705 18340 15925 17400 15925 17000 16725 17400 18065 18065 19625 19700 25c 
90,000 29740 26775 26775 21785 23620 20445 22190 19725 21340 19625 21100 20205 21340 21495 21495 23225 23620 29: 
100,000 34040 31075 31075 25625 27540 24225 26040 23625 25340 23325 25200 23725 25340 24925 24925 26825 27540 33: 
110,000 38340 35375 35375 29625 31540 28245 30130 27665 29560 27375 29400 27565 29560 28565 28565 30445 31540 37: 
120.000 42640 39575 39675 33625 35540 32305 34220 31705 33780 31425 33680 31405 33780 32205 32205 34065 35540 41: 
130,000 46940 43975 43975 37625 39540 36395 38310 35785 38020 35525 37980 35345 38020 35845 35845 37685 39540 45: 
140.000 51240 48275 48275 41625 43540 40525 42500 39945 42280 39625 42280 39385 42280 39645 39645 41305 43540 49: 
150,000 55540 52575 52575 45625 47540 44675 46740 44125 46580 43725 46580 43425 46580 43525 43525 44925 47540 53: 
160,000 59840 56875 56875 49785 51700 48825 50980 48305 50880 47825 50880 47505 50880 47405 47405 48685 51700 57: 
170,000 64140 61175 61175 53945 55860 52995 55230 52485 55180 51975 55180 51585 55180 51335 51335 52445 55860 61: 
180.000 68440 65475 65475 58105 60020 57205 59500 56665 59480 56125 59480 55665 59480 55365 55365 56205 60020 65: 
190.000 72740 69775 69775 62265 64180 61415 63780 60845 63780 60275 63780 59745 63780 59395 59395 59965 64180 69: 
200,000 77040 74075 74075 66425 68340 65625 68080 65025 68080 64425 68080 63825 68080 63425 63425 63725 68340 73: 
APPENDIX 1-3 
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAYABLE 1993/94 AND RECOMMENDATION THREE (VERSION TWO) 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABlE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
TAX RATES PROPOSED BY KATZ COMMISSION AND DEPENDANT ALLOWANCE FOR BREADWINNERS 
1993/ll4 REC.THREE 1993/ll4 RECOMMEt 1993/ll4 RECOMMEI 1993/ll4 RECOMMEI 1993/ll4 RECOMMEI 
INCOME 100:0 100:0 80:20 60:20 70:30 70:30 60:40 60:40 
1993/ll4 RECOMMEI 1993/ll4 RECOMMEt 1993/ll4 RECOMMEt 1993/ll4 RECOMMEt 1993/94 RECOMMEND. THREE 
S0:50 50:50 40:60 40:60 30:70 30:70 20:60 20:60 0:100 0:100 
------------- ------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------____________________________________ ., ______________ .. 
UNMARRIEIUNMARRIE[ TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX 
era:; a~:: cc a 11:• • • a~* 11:::1 =a c c =r; r:= a=c===--===-========:=========a=====c::::;:=a:= ====a•c:r::=a ===:n: ;:s :== ===•:au:r:ca=::a== ===•=•=r=•=:========::==~:~~m:=~:;;;=a:=====a#== :t:==r••::r===•==••a•c.aa;a~cc:== ===cz=•• • 
1,000 
2.000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15.000 
18,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
20,000 
22,000 
24.000 
26,000 
28,000 
30,000 
32,000 
34,000 
38,000 
38,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140.000 
150,000 
160,000 
170.000 
180.000 
190,000 
200,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
80 
270 
480 
890 
900 
1140 
1360 
1620 
1860 
2100 
2660 
3220 
3760 
4340 
4900 
5620 
6340 
7060 
7160 
8500 
12600 
18840 
21140 
25440 
29740 
34040 
38340 
42840 
413940 
51240 
55540 
59840 
84140 
88440 
72740 
77040 
90 
180 
270 
380 
450 
540 
630 
720 
610 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1350 
1440 
1530 
1820 
1710 
1800 
1960 
2160 
2340 
2520 
2700 
3420 
4140 
4860 
5560 
6300 
9900 
13600 
17700 
21600 
25500 
29400 
33600 
37600 
42000 
46200 
50400 
S4900 
59400 
83900 
88400 
72900 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
65 
245 
475 
675 
675 
1075 
1275 
1475 
1895 
2315 
2735 
3155 
3575 
4135 
4895 
5255 
5815 
8375 
9975 
14075 
18275 
22475 
28775 
31075 
35375 
39875 
43975 
413275 
52575 
515875 
61175 
65475 
69775 
74075 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
160 
270 
360 
450 
540 
630 
i2o 
810 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1440 
1(120 
1800 
1960 
2160 
2340 
2520 
2700 
3420 
4140 
7140 
11460 
15360 
19260 
23160 
27060 
31060 
35280 
39460 
43680 
47680 
52060 
56280 
60460 
64680 
68680 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
57 
209 
361 
515 
675 
995 
1315 
1643 
2043 
2455 
2887 
3279 
3891 
4131 
4655 
7275 
10575 
14175 
17945 
21785 
25625 
29625 
33625 
37625 
41625 
45625 
49765 
53945 
56105 
82265 
66425 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
180 
270 
360 
450 
540 
830 
720 
810 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1440 
1620 
1800 
1980 
2160 
2340 
2520 
2700 
3420 
4140 
7740 
10260 
13500 
16600 
20100 
23400 
26700 
30000 
33420 
36960 
40500 
44560 
48680 
52740 
56680 
61200 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
235 
425 
609 
1203 
1597 
1991 
2395 
2803 
3215 
3635 
4055 
4475 
6925 
9765 
13045 
16705 
20445 
24225 
28245 
32305 
36395 
40525 
44675 
48825 
52995 
57205 
61415 
65625 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
180 
270 
360 
450 
540 
630 
720 
610 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1440 
Hl20 
1600 
1980 
2180 
2340 
3060 
3240 
3420 
3600 
5650 
8640 
11430 
14400 
17400 
20400 
24210 
28020 
31830 
35640 
39600 
43620 
471370 
51780 
55690 
80000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
·o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
64 
140 
216 
292 
368 
444 
520 
805 
1185 
1579 
1987 
2395 
2803 
3215 
3635 
4061 
4505 
!1725 
9525 
12465 
15925 
19725 
23625 
27685 
31705 
35785 
39945 
44125 
48305 
52465 
56685 
60845 
65025 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
160 
270 
3150 
450 
540 
630 
720 
610 
900 
990 
1080 
1170 
1260 
1440 
1620 
2340 
2520 
2700 
2860 
3060 
3240 
3420 
3600 
4500 
7020 
9540 
12600 
16320 
20100 
23680 
27680 
31500 
35400 
39300 
43200 
47160 
51240 
55320 
59400 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
140 
235 
330 
425 
520 
615 
710 
605 
900 
1110 
1320 
1625 
2025 
2425 
2665 
3305 
3745 
4185 
4625 
7075 
9525 
12725 
15925 
19625 
23325 
27375 
31425 
35525 
39625 
43725 
47825 
51975 
515125 
60275 
154425 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
160 
270 
3150 
450 
540 
630 
720 
610 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1960 
2160 
2340 
2520 
2700 
2680 
3060 
3240 
3420 
31500 
4500 
5400 
9000 
12600 
111200 
19800 
23700 
27600 
31500 
35400 
39300 
43200 
47100 
51000 
54900 
58600 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
26 
140 
254 
368 
482 
596 
710 
824 
942 
1068 
1194 
1320 
1572 
1824 
2094 
2382 
2670 
3015 
3471 
3959 
4449 
4945 
7425 
10425 
13465 
16725 
20205 
23725 
27565 
31405 
35345 
39365 
43425 
47505 
51565 
55665 
59745 
63825 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
180 
270 
360 
450 
540 
630 
720 
610 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1440 
1620 
2340 
2520 
2700 
2880 
3080 
3240 
3420 
3600 
4500 
7020 
9540 
12800 
16320 
20100 
23680 
27660 
31500 
35400 
39300 
43200 
47160 
51240 
55320 
59400 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
64 
197 
330 
463 
596 
729 
862 
1006 
1152 
1299 
1446 
1593 
1740 
2046 
2382 
2718 
3054 
3430 
3622 
4214 
4606 
4996 
5390 
8225 
11365 
14655 
18065 
21495 
24925 
26565 
32205 
35845 
39645 
43525 
47405 
51335 
55365 
59395 
63425 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
160 
270 
360 
450 
540 
830 
720 
810 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1440 
1620 
1800 
1980 
2160 
2340 
3060 
3240 
3420 
3600 
5650 
6640 
11430 
14400 
17400 
20400 
24210 
26020 
31830 
35840 
39600 
43620 
47870 
51780 
55690 
80000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
84 
216 
368 
520 
872 
824 
964 
1152 
1320 
1468 
1656 
1624 
1996 
2190 
2574 
2956 
3374 
3822 
4270 
4716 
5168 
5614 
6094 
6670 
9550 
12590 
16035 
19625 
23225 
26625 
30445 
34065 
37685 
41305 
44925 
46685 
52445 
56205 
59965 
63725 
_......._ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
160 
270 
360 
450 
540 
630 
720 
810 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1440 
1620 
1600 
1960 
2160 
2340 
2520 
2700 
3420 
4140 
7740 
10260 
13500 
16800 
20100 
23400 
26700 
30000 
33420 
38960 
40500 
44560 
46680 
52740 
56660 
61200 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
140 
330 
520 
710 
900 
1110 
1320 
1530 
1740 
1950 
2190 
2430 
2670 
2910 
3150 
3710 
4270 
4830 
5390 
5950 
6670 
7390 
11110 
11630 
9550 
13350 
17350 
21350 
25350 
29350 
33350 
37350 
41350 
45350 
49350 
53350 
57350 
61350 
65350 
69350 
73350 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
180 
270 
360 
450 
540 
630 
720 
810 
900 
990 
1060 
1170 
1260 
1440 
11520 
1800 
1980 
2160 
2340 
2520 
2700 
3420 
4140 
7740 
11460 
15360 
19280 
23160 
27060 
31060 
35260 
39460 
43660 
47660 
52060 
58280 
80460 
154660 
86680 
APP€NDIX 1-~ 
COMPAASON Of TAXES P"-Y-'IBLE 1993,0~ AND RECOMMENDATION FOW (VERSION TWO) 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES P"-YABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON "-ND MAAR lED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBINATIONS) 
TAX RATES PAOPOS€0 BY KATl COMMISSION "-NO DEPENDANT REMTE FOR BREADWINNERS 
1993/9'1 REC.F<Jl.R 1993/9'1 RECOMM 1993/9'1 RECOMMt 1993/9'1 RECOMM .199:1/9'1 RECOMM' 1993/9'1 RECOMM. 1993/9'1 RECOMM 199:1/9'1 RECOMM. 1993/9'1 RECOMMC' 1993/9'1 RECOt.AM: 
INCOME 100:0 100:0 60:20 60:20 70:30 70:30 60:40 60:~0 50:50 50:50 40:60 40:60 30:70 30:70 20:80 20:60 0:100 0:100 
-------- ----------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------·-------------------------------------------------------
UNMAARE[UNMARRE( TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX 
.. .,;..,,. ••• - • • • ••.,. • • • •• -••••••-••••••-••*a.••-••••.,.•-•••••••-••••• 111 •._.,. ______ .,.,.,.. • ._.,...,. ... ,. .. ., ___ ,..._.., .. _.,.,,.. •• ::.•a:••••,.•-••••••-••-••••••""'••••-•••a••••a""a••o-oaaa•*""" 
1,00) 0 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,00) 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,00) 0 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
~.oro 0 360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,00) 0 450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,00) 0 540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 
7.000 0 630 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 0 330 0 
e. oro 0 720 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 0 216 0 520 0 
9,00) 0 810 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 197 0 368 0 710 0 
10.000 0 900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 330 0 520 0 900 0 
11,000 60 990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 254 0 463 0 672 0 1110 0 
12.000 270 1080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 368 0 596 0 824 0 1320 0 
13.000 ~eo 1170 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 235 0 482 0 729 0 984 0 1530 0 
14,000 690 1260 245 0 0 0 0 0 64 0 330 0 596 0 862 0 1152 0 1740 0 
15.000 900 1350 475 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 425 0 no 0 1005 0 1320 0 1950 0 
16.000 11~0 H40 675 0 57 0 0 0 216 0 520 0 824 0 1152 0 1468 0 2190 0 
17,000 1380 1530 875 0 209 0 0 0 292 0 615 0 9~2 0 1299 0 1656 0 2430 0 
16,000 1620 1620 1075 0 361 0 ~5 0 :368 0 710 0 1068 0 1~~6 0 1624 0 2670 0 
19,000 1860 1110 1275 0 515 0 235 0 ~44 0 805 0 1194 0 1593 0 1996 0 2910 0 
20.000 2100 1800 1475 0 675 0 ~25 0 520 0 900 0 1320 0 IHO 0 2190 0 3150 0 
22.000 2660 1980 1695 0 995 0 809 0 605 0 1110 1980 1572 0 20~6 0 2574 0 :lllo 0 
2~.000 n20 2160 2315 0 1315 0 120::1 0 1165 0 1::120 2160 11!21 0 2382 0 2958 0 4270 0 
26.000 3760 2340 2735 0 16~3 0 1597 0 1579 2340 1625 2340 2094 2:HO 2718 0 3:17~ 0 4830 0 
28,000 ~310 2520 3155 20 2043 20 1991 20 1987 2520 2025 2520 2382 2520 3054 20 3822 20 5:190 20 
30,000 ~900 2700 3575 200 2455 200 23!>5 200 2395 2700 2425 2700 2670 2700 3~30 200 4270 200 5950 200 
32.000 5620 3~20 1135 920 2867 920 2603 920 2603 2860 2865 2880 3015 2860 :~en 920 ~718 920 6670 920 
34.000 63~0 ~140 4695 1610 3279 1610 3215 3060 :1215 3060 3305 3060 3471 3060 4214 3060 5166 1640 73g() 1640 
36.000 7060 4860 5255 2360 3691 2360 3635 3240 3635 ::12~0 3745 32~0 3959 3240 ~606 3210 5614 2360 8110 2360 
38,000 7780 5580 5615 30~0 4131 3080 ~055 ::1420 4061 3420 ~165 3420 4449 3120 4998 3120 6094 3060 9630 3060 
40,000 8500 6300 6375 3800 -46$5 3600 4475 3600 4505 3600 4625 3600 4945 3600 5390 3600 6610 3600 9550 3800 
50.000 12600 9900 9975 1400 7275 HOO 6925 5650 6725 ~500 7075 4500 7425 4500 8225 5650 9550 7400 I 33!1} 7400 
60,000 1664} 13800 1~075 11300 10575 10200 9765 6640 9525 7020 9525 5400 10425 7020 11:185 86~0 12500 10200 17350 11300 
70,000 2114) 17700 18275 15200 1~115 13500 13045 1143) 12485 9540 12725 9000 13465 95~0 116!'fi 114l) 16035 13500 21350 15200 
80.000 2544) 21600 22415 19100 17945 16800 167ffi 14400 15925 12600 15925 12600 16725 12600 16066 14400 19625 16600 253!1> 19100 
00.000 2974} 25500 26715 23000 217tb 20100 20145 17400 19725 16320 19625 16200 202ffi 16320 21495 17400 23225 20100 29350 23000 
100.000 3~0'1) 29~00 31015 26900 25625 23~00 24225 20~00 23625 20100 23325 19800 23125 20100 24925 20~00 26825 23400 JJ::l50 26900 
110,000 363'1) 33600 35315 31100 29625 26700 262'15 24210 2761'1; 23600 27J15 23700 275lfi 23600 285lfi 2~210 30~'15 26700 31:150 :lliOO 
120.000 ~26<0 37800 39675 35300 33625 3000) J23ffi 26020 317ffi 27600 31125 27600 31400 27680 32200 280;!) 3100;; 3000) 11350 35300 
130,000 ~6940 4200) ~3975 39500 37625 33~20 363(15 3\63) 35765 31500 35525 31500 353'15 31500 356'15 31631 37665 33420 45350 39500 
110,000 51240 ~6200 46215 43700 41625 36900 40525 35640 399'15 35~00 39625 35400 39365 35400 39645 35640 ~1300 36900 19350 ~3700 
150,000 55540 50100 52515 47900 45625 40500 ~4615 39600 Hl25 39300 43725 39300 43~25 39300 43525 39600 41925 40500 53350 47900 
160,000 59840 51900 56815 52100 497tfj H500 46825 436<l:l 48Jil5 43200 47825 ~3200 47505 4:1200 47100 436;!) 46686 44560 57350 52100 
170,000 6~140 59400 61115 56300 5:1945 48600 529S5 4761\) 524!fi 47100 51915 47100 515lfi 47100 51335 ~76JO 52445 48600 61350 56300 
180,000 68443 639(1) 65~15 60500 501(5 527'1) 57200 51700 56616 512'() 56125 5100) 55600 51240 SS:ltfi 517tll 562(1; 52740 65350 60500 
190,000 1274} 68100 69715 61700 622ffi 568!1) 61~15 55600 60845 55320 60215 549(1) 59745 55320 593(15 55600 59965 5688:) 69JSO 64700 
100.000 17040 72900 74015 66900 66~25 61200 65625 60000 65025 59400 64425 56800 63625 59400 63425 60000 63725 61200 7JJ50 66900 
APPENOlX 1-5 
COMPAAISONOFTAXES PAYABLE 1993!94ANO RECOMMENDATION FIVE 
DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAYABLE BY UNMARRIED PERSON AND MARRIED COUPLE (DIFFERENT INCOME COMBit-LA.TIONS) 
TAX RATES PR<FOSED BY KATZ COMMISSION AND 20",.{, DEPENDANT" REBATE FOR BREPDWINNERS 
1993/94 REC.FIVE 1993/94 RECOMME 1993/94 RECOMME 1993/94 RECOMME 1993/94 RECOMt.£ 1993/94 RECOMt.£ 1993/94 RECOMM 1993/94 RECOMt.£: 1993/94 RECOMME 1993194 RECOMME. 
INCOME 100:0 100:0 80:20 80:20 70:30 70:30 60:40 60:40 50:50 50:50 40:60 40:60 30:70 30:70 20:80 20:80 0:100 0:100 
------------- - ------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNMARRIEtuNMARRIE[ TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX 
========= = = = = = == = = = = = ================================================================================================================================================= 
1,000 0 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,000 0 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3,000 0 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4,000 0 360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,000 0 450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,000 0 540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 
7,000 0 630 0 90 0 90 0 90 0 90 0 90 0 90 0 90 64 90 330 90 
8,000 0 no 0 180 0 180 0 180 0 180 0 180 0 180 64 180 216 180 520 180 
9,000 0 810 0 270 0 270 0 270 0 270 0 270 26 270 197 270 368 270 710 270 
10,000 0 900 0 360 0 360 0 360 0 360 0 360 140 360 330 360 520 360 900 360 
11,000 60 990 0 450 0 450 0 450 0 450 45 450 254 450 463 450 en 450 1110 450 
12,000 270 1080 0 540 0 540 0 540 0 540 140 540 368 540 596 540 824 540 1320 540 
13,000 480 1170 65 630 0 630 0 630 0 630 235 630 482 630 ng 630 984 630 1530 630 
14,000 690 1260 245 720 0 no 0 no 64 no 330 no 596 no 862 720 1152 720 1740 720 
15,000 900 1350 475 810 0 810 0 810 140 810 425 810 710 810 1005 810 1320 810 1950 810 
16,000 1140 1440 675 900 57 900 0 900 216 900 520 900 824 900 1152 900 1488 900 2190 900 
17,000 1380 1530 875 990 209 990 0 990 292 990 615 990 942 990 1299 990 1656 990 2430 990 
18,000 1620 1620 1075 1080 361 1080 45 1080 368 1080 710 1080 1068 1080 1446 1080 1824 1080 2670 1080 
19,000 1860 1710 1275 1170 515 1170 235 1170 444 1170 805 1170 1194 1170 1593 1170 1998 1170 2910 1170 
20,000 2100 1800 1475 1260 675 1260 425 1260 520 1260 900 1260 1320 1260 1740 1260 2190 1260 3150 1260 
22,000 2660 1980 1895 1440 995 1440 809 1440 805 1440 1110 1980 15n 1440 2046 1440 2574 1440 3710 1440 
24,000 3220 2160 2315 1620 1315 1620 1203 1620 1185 1620 1320 2160 1824 1620 2382 1620 2958 1620 4270 1620 
26,000 3780 2340 2735 1800 1643 1800 1597 1800 1579 2340 1625 2340 2094 2340 2718 1800 3374 1800 4830 1800 
28,000 4340 2520 3155 1980 2043 1980 1991 1980 1987 2520 2025 2520 2382 2520 3054 1980 3822 1980 5390 1980 
30,000 4900 2700 3575 2160 2455 2160 2395 2160 2395 2700 2425 2700 2670 2700 3430 2160 4270 2160 5950 2160 
32,000 5620 3420 4135 2304 2867 2304 2803 2304 2803 2880 2865 2880 3015 2880 3822 2304 4718 2304 6670 2304 
34,000 6340 4140 4695 2448 3279 2448 3215 3060 3215 3060 3305 3060 3471 3060 4214 3060 5166 2448 7390 2448 
36,000 7060 4860 5255 2592 3691 2592 3635 3240 3635 3240 3745 3240 3959 3240 4606 3240 5614 2592 8110 2592 
38,000 n80 5580 5815 2644 4131 2644 4055 3420 4061 3420 4185 3420 4449 3420 4998 3420 6094 2644 8830 2644 
40,000 '8500 6300 6375 3420 4655 3420 4475 3600 4505 3600 4625 3600 4945 3600 5390 3600 6670 3420 9550 3420 
50,000 12600 9900 9975 6300 7275 6300 6925 5850 ens 4500 7075 4500 7425 4500 8225 5850 9550 6300 13350 6300 
60,000 16840 13800 14075 9180 10575 10260 9765 8640 9525 7020 9525 5400 10425 7020 11385 8640 12590 10260 17350 9180 
70,000 21140 1noo 18275 12240 14175 13500 13045. 11430 12485 9540 12ns 9000 13465 9540 . 14655 11430 16035 13500 21350 12240 
80,000 25440 21600 22475 15360 17945 16800 16705 14400 15925 12600 15925 12600 1sns 12600 18065 14400 19625 16800 25350 15360 
90,000 29740 25500 2sns 16480 21785 20100 20445 17400 19ns 16320 19625 16200 20205 16320 21495 17400 23225 20100 29350 16480 
100,000 34040 29400 31075 21600 25625 23400 24225 20400 23625 20100 23325 19800 23ns 20100 24925 20400 26825 23400 33350 21600 
110,000 38340 33600 35375 24no 29625 26700 28245 24210 27665 23680 27375 23700 27565 23680 28565 24210 30445 26700 37350 24no 
120,000 42640 37800 39675 27840 33625 30000 32305 28020 31705 27660 31425 27600 31405 27660 32205 28020 34065 30000 41350 27840 
130,000 46940 42000 43975 31080 37625 33420 36395 31830 35785 31500 35525 31500 35345 31500 35845 31830 37685 33420· 45350 31080 
140,000 51240 46200 48275 34440 41625 36960 40525 35640 39945 35400 39625 35400 39385 35400 39645 35640 41305 36960 49350 34440 
150,000 55540 50400 52575 37800 45625 40500 44675 39600 44125 39300 43725 39300 43425 39300 43525 39600 44925 40500 53350 37800 
160,000 59840 54900 56875 41160 49785 44580 48825 43620 48305 43200 47825 43200 47505 43200 47405 43620 48685 44580 57350 41160 
170,000 64140 59400 61175 44520 53945 48660 52995 47670 52485 47160 51975 47100 51585 47160 51335 47670 52445 48660 61350 44520 
180,000 68440 63900 65475 47880 58105 52740 sn05 51780 56665 51240 56125 51000 55665 51240 55365 51780 56205 52740 65350 47880 
190,000 n140 68400 69ns 51240 62265 56880 61415 55890 60845 55320 60275 54900 59745 55320 59395 55890 59965 56880 69350 51240 
200,000 n040 72900 74075 54600 66425 61200 65625 60000 65025 59400 64425 58800 63825 59400 63425 60000 63ns 61200 73350 54600 
